




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# LIFE OF NAPOLEON.

BY BARON JOMINI,

General-in-Chief and Aid-de-Camp to the Emperor of Russia.

“Je fus ambitieux; tout homme l'est, sans doute;  
Mais jamais roi, pontife, ou chef, ou citoyen,  
Ne conçut un projet aussi grand que le mien.”

VOLTAIRE, *Mahomet.*

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

WITH NOTES,

BY H. W. HALLECK, LL.D.,

Major-General United States Army;  
Author of “Elements of Military Art and Science;” “International Law,  
and the Laws of War,” etc., etc.

IN TWO VOLUMES — WITH AN ATLAS.

VOL. II.

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AUSTRIAN POLICY.—I had hoped that the conference of Erfurth and our success in Spain would induce Austria to give up her idea of engaging alone in a contest against France; but in this I was mistaken. The Court of Vienna pursues a tenacious policy, yielding only when necessary to gather strength to renew its old purposes. Some have absurdly attributed this perseverance to the oligarchic form of its government; in reality, nothing is less oligarchic than the Cabinet of Vienna; the prime ministers, who are changed with the external policy of the government, are very frequently plebeians by birth, or nobles from parts of the empire other than the hereditary states. Some of the emperors have left the government to be carried on by their councillors; but such was not the case with Maria Theresa, or with Joseph II. The government of Austria, instead of being an oligarchy, is a mixed monarchy; in Austria and Bohemia it is absolute, but limited in Hungary, and almost republican in the Tyrol.

The decisions of a government are, undoubtedly, very much influenced by the large landed proprietors and the principal nobility of the state; but a government which, in this nineteenth century, acts only for the interest of a few families, will soon be overthrown. In a republic of demagogues, where the rulers are changed every year, there can be no permanent state policy; but all other forms of government are susceptible of pursuing a permanent course, for there are always precedents in the diplomatic archives of the state, which serve as guides to the chief of that department, both in peace and war. There are always permanent as well as temporary views of state policy. It is always an object for a state to have more real strength than its neighbors, as this is the best means of preventing an attack. The strength of a state may be either positive or federative; it may be strong in its own positive power, or by its alliances. Where a single state becomes so great, in its own positive strength, as to endanger the safety of



others, its neighbors resort to these federative means, either for self-protection, or for aggression against the single positive power. At one time France was near overthrowing the federative power of the European sovereigns; at another, the latter triumphed over all my efforts. *My age would never understand the necessity of uniting with me to establish an equilibrium against England. The slavery of the Continent results from the want of such an equilibrium.* Political preponderance is gained either by conquest or by family alliance. The results are not absolutely the same, but the real difference is not important. From Henry IV. to Louis XV., the Bourbons, who are not an oligarchy, have pursued a permanent course of policy; the means have necessarily varied with the change of events.

The policy of Austria differs, therefore, in no way from that of other states. If the monarchy of Francis II. has been able to resist violent shocks, it is because it has a warlike people, and a good system of recruiting its forces; because its geographical position is singularly favorable for defense; and lastly, because in great danger, it is rescued from shipwreck by Russia or England.

The position of Austria towards us was a false one; this was made so, first, by the revolution, which produced the first coalition; second, by the invasion of Switzerland, which produced the second coalition; and third, by the annexations of Italy to France, which caused the third coalition.

After the second coalition, Austria was constantly in fear of our preponderance; she seized every occasion to oppose this preponderance; in 1809 she did well in seeking to profit by this opposition. There certainly was nothing of an oligarchic character in this opposition. Nor is it necessary in this place to attempt to reconcile the abstractions of writers who have exhibited talents, but very little knowledge of national affairs. We will now return to our narrative.

**CHARACTER OF THE TIMES.**—The Cabinet of Vienna thought that however successful we might be in Spain, it would require two hundred thousand men to occupy a country whose entire subjugation I had projected. The Austrian government, therefore, resolved to profit by this occasion to regain the scepter of Italy and Germany; her armaments were doubled. England had, this time, no difficulty in concocting a new coalition; the imperial cabinet even anticipated the wishes of the Court of London; and it must be confessed that war, at this crisis, seemed in accordance with the wishes and interest of the nation. The

Austrian army burned to repair the defeat of Ulm, and the people to regain their former rank among nations. Moreover, Austria received a subsidy of at least one hundred millions from the Cabinet of London.

They were not ignorant at Vienna that Prussia was exasperated; that Westphalia was complaining of grievances; that Hanover and the Hanseatic towns, deprived of their commerce, detested a Continental system which was not likely to be for their immediate benefit; that the Tyrol, displeased with the Bavarian rule, was ready to rise. They thought that the north of Germany would declare against us the moment the Austrian troops, falling in considerable numbers on Bavaria, should compel the French army to concentrate its forces. The Austrian envoy at Königsberg announced that Prussia desired war, and would very soon increase her forces to one hundred thousand men; the honor and interest of Prussia were too much involved to doubt the sincerity of her promises. Dalmatia, Italy, the Tyrol, the Valteline, Piedmont, Naples, and even Sicily, became the theater of Austrian intrigues. Never did a storm seem more threatening.

My armies at this time were scattered from Naples to Madrid, from Hamburg to the gates of Lisbon; I myself was in Spain. Under these circumstances it was probable that the Austrians would, in the beginning, be successful, and that these early victories would insure others; they might rouse Germany, tempt Russia, revive the sinking courage of the Spaniards, and restore to the English ministry a popularity lost by the defeat of Moore, thus stimulating, through British resources, the peninsula to further resistance.

**MILITARY PREPARATION OF AUSTRIA.**—Austria made every effort to raise a formidable military force. Her active army was to be increased to three hundred and fifty thousand men; one hundred and fifty battalions of militia (*landwehr*) were prepared for reinforcing it in case of need, and suitable resources were intended to keep up the regular army to its complement. They imitated our organization by dividing their forces into *corps d'armée*. Six corps of about twenty-five thousand each, besides the reserve, were assembled in Bohemia to inundate Bavaria. Fifty thousand regulars and twenty-five thousand militia, forming the eighth and ninth corps, were destined for the army of Italy, under the Archduke John. Finally, an army of forty thousand men, under the Archduke Ferdinand, was to invade the duchy of Warsaw. This division of forces has been deemed objectionable; it is said that Poland and Italy were to be conquered in Germany, for any success on these two points would be use-

less, should I become victorious on the Danube. But it can not be concealed that Austria had to apprehend an insurrection in Galicia, in case Poniatowski appeared there with forces superior to theirs; and this motive alone, without any other political considerations, might have justified a considerable secondary detachment in that direction.

#### THIS POWER INCITES INSURRECTION IN GERMANY.

—The Cabinet of Vienna, not trusting alone to this great development of its forces, thought to add the revolutionary measures which had already been so effective in Spain. Forgetting the just complaints which it had made against the system of propagandism of the French Directory, it scattered through all Germany an appeal to the people to rise against their existing governments—that is, against us; a measure useful, perhaps, for the success of the Austrian projects, but contrary to its own rules of political morality—rules on which, only a few years before, this same power had based its complaints against the French Republic. Bavaria, Saxony, Westphalia, and the Tyrol were inundated with these appeals, which were posted up in every place where the Austrian column passed. The Archduke John did the same thing in Italy, thus seeking to make the war national and universal. They sought to again incite the people to war, instead of subjecting the points of difficulty to the results of military and political combinations; they sought to transform Europe into one vast field of battle, where they could assail us on all sides, because we had, as conquerors, required temporary sacrifices in order to counteract the preponderating force of English influence. A government has a right to arm all its own citizens for national defense; but I leave it to professors of public law to decide whether such appeals can properly be made to the people of another government, and whether *insurrection* can be made the basis of a political system. It appeared simple and natural for the King of Prussia to appeal to the Prussians, and the King of Saxony to the Saxons; but, I repeat, the frontier of the state is the line of demarkation of such right. If, in 1805, I had wished to incite the Hungarians, I had only to give the word; but I have never sought to produce insurrection, not even in Poland.

SECRET SOCIETIES IN GERMANY.—Independent of these measures of Austria, a vast conspiracy was extending itself through all Germany. Secret and mystical societies, under the title of *fédérés-de-la-vertu* were first established in every part of Prussia and afterwards throughout all Germany, in order to rally all my enemies on one common center of action. Many different passions combined to increase these societies, in which



were collected, through the common sentiment of hatred to us, men of the most antagonistic principles. The equestrian nobility of Germany, deprived of their privileges; the learned metaphysicians of the university, who discoursed about the principles of liberty and equality which fill the glowing pages of Demosthenes and Cicero; the soldier, humiliated by the reverses of the national arms; the *bourgeois*, vexed by the expense of the military cantonments and the stagnation of trade and manufactures—all were impatient of our occupation. In a word, the German aristocrats, demagogues, idealogists, soldiers, patriots, all united in desiring, not the return of the old Roman Empire, but the emancipation of Germany, its absolute independence, the reëstablishment of its maritime relations. It would be unjust to attribute crime to sentiments so natural. But it may be said that these brave men understood neither my position nor my intentions; they precipitated themselves into an opposition of which they did not appreciate all the consequences. They were made the blind instruments of my fall, from which they derived no advantage whatever.

Notwithstanding their immense ramifications, these societies were a long time enveloped in the most profound mystery; a fortuitous circumstance revealed to me at the same time their existence and their danger. The two chiefs of this political association were then in Austria; one at Vienna, and the other (the Duke of Brunswick-Oels) was raising a corps in Bohemia.

STATE OF WESTPHALIA.—Westphalia was to be the focus of the explosion. Here England had preserved most of her adherents, and here my own partisans were the least numerous. Hanover suffered from the loss of her maritime communications; moreover, this country had formerly enjoyed a kind of paternal administration; her princes, devoted to the throne of opulent Albion, were relieved from the necessity of taxing their own people in order to sustain the luxury of their palaces, and to support a military force so disproportionate to the resources of the country; moreover, much English money was distributed in Hanover by way of subsidies and pensions. Under our administration, on the contrary, it was subject to the heavy imposts incident to conquest.

Hesse was still more unfortunate. Since the accession of the House of Hanover to the throne of England had placed this power in more intimate relations with the petty princes who surrounded this electorate, the Hessians had always furnished nu-



merous contingents under English pay; in the wars of Spanish succession, in that of the Seven Years, in the American Revolution, in the coalition of 1793, they were seen fighting under the banners of Great Britain. By this order of things the Prince gained guineas; the officers and soldiers, pensions; and the country, which had no foreign relations or honor at stake, thus acquired a more abundant circulation of money. This country, little given to *industrial* pursuits, was poor; its administration was neglected, but not oppressive.

Since I had transformed this country into the kingdom of Westphalia, it had contributed to the support of a numerous army, a more sumptuous court, and a more complicated administration; what was still worse, the sum of twenty millions of dotations, annually assigned to my generals, was imposed on these unfortunate provinces—a wound the more incurable, as most of this money was expended in France. It was evident that if this system continued twenty-five years, Westphalia would be taxed to the amount of five hundred millions of francs, a sum equal to the intrinsic value of the soil. On the other hand, in the same length of time, the English subsidies would amount to between fifty and sixty millions. If to this there be added the enormous expenses occasioned by the passage through the country of three large armies, it must be confessed that there were motives for the spirit of insurrection which was manifesting itself. I was not ignorant of the enormous impositions laid on Westphalia. They were made in conformity to system, but not intended to be permanent. In case these provinces were restored to England on a maritime peace, they would be exhausted and incapable of injuring me, while France would be enriched at their expense. If retained by France, it was for my interest to offer them an incorporation into my empire as a recompense for the evils they had suffered during this state of transition.

**SITUATION OF PRUSSIA.**—Prussia, from very different motives, was in much the same situation as Westphalia; she was neither my ally, nor a province of my empire, but my sworn enemy. Three years of military occupation, of extraordinary contributions and humiliations, the loss of her most wealthy provinces, were more than sufficient to exasperate her.

Kings, called by Providence to the office of governing a people, should do all in their power to promote the national glory and prosperity; their duties towards other nations are of a more limited and different character. If I was right in doing all in my power to promote the glory and prosperity of France, it was no less the duty of Frederick William to do the same in order to

restore Prussia to the ranks from which she had fallen. Unskillful panegyrists have represented me as the most *débonnaire* of princes, my projects as the most philanthropic, and all those who opposed me as blind men and as traitors. This is absurd; history should not be written thus. It is natural that a Frenchman should regret the failure of projects calculated to secure the supremacy of the French Empire; but he ought not to take it ill that the Prussian exerted all his energies for the restoration of his humiliated country; such conduct would indicate the want of impartiality, justice, and good faith. Interest and honor are the general motives which influence the conduct of men; interest and honor called to arms the Prussians, Westphalians, and the inhabitants of the Hanseatic cities.

OF THE OTHER EUROPEAN POWERS.—But with the other inhabitants of Germany and Italy under my influence the question was very different; they had not the same grievances of which to complain. If Rome, Florence, Venice, and Genoa could complain of the temporary decline of their prosperity, they had at least the expectation of a future, rich in glory and hope, which was not the case with the north of Germany.

Posterity, which will judge better than my contemporaries the importance of my contest with England, and the future results of her overwhelming maritime power, will find that I employed the only honorable means for reducing it, and that I was obliged to sacrifice some evident but partial interests to secure the accomplishment of my immense undertaking. These interests, in being armed against me, obeyed only the law of Nature. For this they can hardly be blamed. But those are most blamable for whose advantage and interest I sought a continental supremacy and the humiliation of England, and who, nevertheless, have been my calumniators. If Hannibal, ruining for half a century the prosperity of Sicily and Spain, in order more effectually to oppose Rome, had at last given the empire of the world to Carthage, would they have dared to accuse him of being a despot and a barbarian, trampling under foot the interests of the people? Had he succeeded, the Carthaginians would have paid the highest honor to his name.

It was on Prussia and Westphalia that Austria and the great German conspiracy based their hopes. The Duke of Brunswick-Oels, having been deprived of his hereditary rank and power, and being, therefore, more interested than others in the success of the project, was to give the signal by debouching from Bohemia, with a legion of Prussian deserters which he had there

organized. In Westphalia, Colonel Dornberg, of Jerome's guard, deeming himself, like Marlborough, authorized to leave the service of a master imposed by conquest and rejected by public opinion of the Westphalians, was to secure the person of this prince as a hostage, and establish a regency. Major Schill, who had distinguished himself as a partisan about Colberg, was to leave Berlin with his regiment of hussars and all insurrectionary Prussians, surprise Wittenberg and Magdeburg, then act in concert with the Duke of Brunswick in Saxony. That the Prussian army established in Silesia would follow this movement was so much the more probable, as the Prussian court of Königsberg would not have time to prevent it; it is even said that Scharnhorst, the minister of war, was privy to the plan and secretly favored it. The Court of Vienna left no means untried to obtain the formal accession of Prussia; not only were negotiations carried on by the Baron of Wessenberg at Königsberg, but General Steigentesch was sent there as a commissioner to arrange a plan of operations on the probable hypothesis of concluding an alliance.

INSURRECTIONARY STATE OF THE TYROL.—But if Austria counted much on a powerful support in the north of Germany, she had no less to hope from the insurrectionary spirit of the inhabitants of the Tyrol. New guebers, these mountaineers joined to their natural spirit of independence a decided aversion to the Bavarians, and a kind of attachment to the House of Austria, whose government, paternal toward them, had avoided interfering with their customs and immunities. Greatly resembling the smaller Swiss cantons in many respects, they were not inferior to the sons of William Tell in bravery and skill of arms; and, like them, were organized in companies of *franc-tireurs* (*carabinieri*), or in battalions of militia. The hatred of the Tyrolese toward the Bavarians extended back for ages, and resulted as much from old quarrels of the feudal *seigneurs* as from more recent local disputes or clashing commercial interests. The King did all in his power to change this state of things; but the expenses incurred by Bavaria in 1800 and 1805, and for the support of her military establishment, rendered it necessary for the ministers of Maximilian Joseph to treat the Tyrol the same as the older Bavarian provinces, and to curtail some of the immunities which had been enjoyed under the Austrian rule. Feelings were exasperated at the innovations; Austria perfectly understood the state of things here, and still retained in this country a multitude of agents who were making every preparation for a general insurrection, when the proper time should arrive. The



Marquis of Chasteler, who had commanded in that country in 1800, was at the head of the corps which bordered on the frontiers of the Tyrol, and, in concert with Councillor Hormeyer, held all the threads of the conspiracy.

Chasteler was a French subject, of Belgian origin, which circumstance irritated me against him. He, on his side, exhibited a bitter animosity against me, which caused me to make severe reprisals; if he had treated me more justly, I should have taken pride in being generous to him, for I always regarded him as a man of talent. Being chief of staff to Kray and Suwarrow in 1799, he contributed no less to the success of the Allies in Italy than he had, at Mayence, in 1795, to the success of Clairfayt against Pichegru. The proper position of a man of his stamp was not at the head of an insurrection of peasants.

The priests and *aubergistes* (inn-keepers) exercise great influence in these countries; the former address themselves to the religious feelings of the people, while the latter direct their temporal interests. A rich *aubergiste* in the Swiss cantons and in the Tyrol has numerous dependents; he influences those of his own class by the superiority of his education; he usually traffics in all the products of the country, and thus becomes the principal medium of trade; this constitutes him a man of authority. One of these tavern-keepers, named Hofer, was distinguished by his great stature, his wild and uncultivated character, and the superiority which he derived from his physical advantages and his business capacity. Stimulated by the priests and Austrian agents, and placed afterward at the head of the popular risings, Hofer became a party leader, whom some have praised to the skies, and others decried to the lowest degree; he was a man of heart, but without decision of character; he was the mere scape-goat of the ignorant flock, an instrument in the hands of men more adroit than himself. He had personal bravery, but, in such a case, this is one of the least essential of the several qualifications of a party leader. The Capuchin Haspinger also had great influence with the people.

**AUSTRIA TAKES THE INITIATIVE.**—But Austria could hope nothing from these elements of discord till she herself took the initiative. The signal, so long expected, was finally given about the first of April. Certain of being immediately sustained by Austria, the Tyrolese determined to set the example. In an instant a thousand beacon-fires, lighted on the tops of the highest mountains, gave the signal in every direction for the general rising. Each valley formed its insurgent forces into a battalion,



veteran soldiers forming its skeleton, or at least acting as its principal officers. Masses of peasants, thus armed and organized, overspread the country in every direction, surprised and massacred or took prisoners the three or four thousand Bavarians, who were posted in different parts of the country; a column of two thousand French, coming from the *dépôts*, under the orders of General Bisson, met the same fate. This insurrection gradually spread even into the Voralberg, and large parties extended themselves to the vicinity of Kempfen, threatening Würtemberg.

**HER PLAN OF OPERATIONS.**—Simultaneously with this the Archduke Charles passed the Inn, on the tenth of April, directing his march on Munich and Ratisbon, where he was to assemble an army of one hundred and eighty thousand combatants. To this tardy commencement of operations they added another fault no less grave. The imperial army, at first assembled in Bohemia toward Pilsen, had only five or six days' march to make, in order to fall on Ratisbon, or upon Wurtzburg, in the very center of my scattered corps. An order from superior authority directed this army on the Inn, to debouch by the Iser and Munich in Bavaria; this line of march was triple the length of the other. But instead of making this *détour* for the purpose of gaining the decisive point, it was intended to move directly away from it. This blunder secured the safety of my army. The fault has by some been attributed to General Grune, and by others to General Meyer, but the Archduke Charles was made to suffer by it, and in the popular estimation the responsibility was thrown on him, though in reality he disapproved the project.

**POSITION AND NUMBERS OF THE AUSTRIAN FORCES.**—Had it not been for this strange march, the army, of which the Archduke Charles was made generalissimo, might have begun operations in March. But, in consequence of these new dispositions, it could not begin till April, and even then was divided into two masses, separated from each other by the Danube. The two corps remaining in Bohemia were to debouch by the left bank on Ratisbon; the center and reserve, forming three corps, advanced by Schaerding; the left, composed of the corps of the Archduke Louis and General Hiller, marched by Munich and Landshut. In addition to this force of one hundred and seventy thousand combatants, there were the extraordinary levies, which would soon be disposable; Amende's division, which was to debouch in Saxony; Jellachich's division, flanking the left at Salzburg; General Chasteler's forces, acting in the Tyrol; the army of the Archduke John on the Tarvis; a detachment at Grachatz,

to cover Croatia against Marmont; and a large body of *landwehrs* (militia) organizing in La Carinthia, as a reinforcement.

**THE FRENCH ARMY.**—Not yet knowing what direction the enemy would give to his forces, I was not without anxiety respecting the course which he might pursue. My position was not dangerous, provided I could concentrate my forces before the Austrians should undertake operations sufficiently serious to prevent this junction. I had still at my disposal a force sufficiently respectable to cause the Cabinet of Vienna to fear they would not gain so easy a victory as they had represented to the Emperor. Their only chance was to fight us before I could collect my scattered troops. Davoust's army of occupation had just been dissolved. This marshal, after leaving good garrisons in the fortifications of the north, marched from Erfurth with about forty-five thousand men, and directed himself by Bamberg on Ratisbon. Oudinot, who commanded the reserve at Frankfort, marched toward Augsburg with his corps of grenadiers. Massena, who, at the head of thirty thousand men, was marching by Lyons toward Spain, returned in all haste from Strasbourg on Ulm. Bernadotte, whose corps had been dissolved after the flight of the troops of Romana, received orders to take command of the Saxons. A part of his forces was to guard the Hanseatic cities, while the division of Dupas reinforced Oudinot.

The reserve of cavalry, which had dispersed on numerous points, marched in different directions toward the Danube; thirty thousand Bavarians, under Marshal Lefévre, cantoned on the Iser, with their light troops on the Inn. The troops of Würtemberg assembled at Heidenheim. All the other contingents of the Confederation were organizing to reinforce the different *corps-d'armée* and to cover our communications. I had also eighteen thousand Poles, and about the same number of Saxons, Westphalians, and Dutch. But these allies had sufficient to occupy them at home, to hold Prussia in check, and guard Hanover and the north of Germany against the great naval expedition threatened by the English. To impose on the cabinets of London and Berlin, I announced the formation of an army of the north under Bernadotte, numbering eighty thousand men; whereas, I had in reality directed him to march with two Saxon divisions along the frontiers of Bohemia on the Danube, leaving all the other contingents to guard their own countries. My army in Italy, which numbered less than forty-five thousand men, under the Viceroy, I hastened to reinforce with all my disposable troops in the peninsula.

**ORGANIZATION AND RELATIVE NUMBERS OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.**—The Austrian forces numbered over three hundred thousand men, and one hundred thousand *landwehrs* (militia), and seven hundred pieces of cannon, as follows:

1st. Under the Archduke Ferdinand, in Poland. . . . .	40,000
2d. General Amende's division in Saxony. . . . .	13,000
3d and 4th. The two corps in Bohemia (50,000), and the center and left under the Archduke Charles (125,000). . . . .	175,000
5th. The Austrian divisions of the Tyrol (10,000), and Chasteler's Tyrolese (20,000). . . . .	30,000
6th. The army of Italy, under the Archduke John. . . . .	55,000
<b>Total. . . . .</b>	<b>313,000</b>
7th. Of the Landwehr or Militia, 25,000 were organized at the beginning of the campaign, but they were afterward increased to 100,000, making a grand total of over 400,000 men.	

The French and allied forces numbered only a little more than 300,000 in all, with 560 pieces of cannon, as follows:

1st. Poles (18,000), and the Russian army, which did not arrive till afterward (35,000). . . . .	53,000
2d. Saxons, under Bernadotte, Dutch, under Gratien (20,000), and the Westphallians, under Jerome (15,000). These remained in the north. . . . .	35,000
3d. Main army, 2d corps, under Lannes and Oudinot (25,000), 3d corps, under Davoust (45,000), 4th corps, under Masséna (30,000), 7th Bavarians (30,000), and 8th Württembergers (12,000), in all*. . . . .	142,000
4th. Badois, Hessians, of Nassau, troops of the Confederation, etc.	12,000
5th. Army of the Viceroy and Macdonald (45,000), division of the interior (15,000). . . . .	60,000
6th. Corps of Dalmatia, under Marmont. . . . .	15,000
<b>Total. . . . .</b>	<b>317,000</b>

\*At the beginning of this campaign, the King of Bavaria wished to place the Bavarian troops under the command of his own son, a young man of character, but entirely without military experience. Napoleon would not give his consent. "Your army," he wrote to the King, "must fight in earnest in this campaign. It concerns the conservation and extension of the aggrandizements which Bavaria has received. Your son may be able to command, when he shall have made six or seven campaigns with us. Meanwhile, let him come to my head-quarters. He will be received there with all the consideration due to him, and he will *learn our trade*." The King of Württemberg also wished to appoint a general to command the Württemberg contingent, and objected to the appointment of Vandamme. Napoleon also refused this request, and placed Vandamme in the command.

It was by this firm resistance of all outside pressure in the selection of officers for particular commands that Napoleon succeeded in almost always having the right man in the right place. No amount of political influence or personal solicitation could induce him to risk the lives of his men and the success of his campaigns by placing inferior men in command. In this case he resisted the solicitations of two crowned heads, his allies, on whose good will much depended. But he knew that much more depended upon his military success, and he was not weak enough to endanger that success



**BERTHIER IS SENT TO RALLY THE FRENCH ARMY.**—I dispatched Berthier to collect my forces in Germany, at Ratisbon, if hostilities had not commenced, and between Donawerth and Augsburg, if the Austrians had taken the initiative. He had been at his head-quarters but a few days when, thanks to the wise precaution which I had taken, to establish a telegraph in Germany, I learned at Paris, on the twelfth of April, in less than forty hours, the passage of the Inn, which had taken place on the tenth. Every thing being prepared beforehand, I instantly set out for the theater of war, and after an interview, on the fifteenth, with the King of Würtemberg at Louisbourg, and with the King of Bavaria at Dillingen, I reached my head-quarters at Donawerth, on the seventeenth. Those who love comparisons will search in vain, in ancient and modern history, for an example of celerity and admirable precision equal to that which characterized the beginning of this campaign.

**ADVANCE OF THE AUSTRIANS.**—I was much disquieted about the state in which I found affairs. Berthier had brought my army to the very brink of ruin. But, fortunatelý, the Austrians were six days in marching fifty miles, from Brannau to Landshut on the Iser. This gave us time to look about us.

On the sixteenth they attacked the bridge of Landshut, which was defended by the Bavarian division under Deroi, who fought in retreat, to save himself from being cut off by the enemy's columns that passed the Iser above and below that city. Although Wrede was at Straubing, and the Prince Royal at Munich, the Bavarians succeeded in effecting a junction at Neustadt, which would have been impossible if the enemy had pushed them closely. The Archduke could have been at Ratisbon on the fifteenth, and united all his corps at that place to successfully destroy our divided forces. It was not till the seventeenth that one half of my forces had advanced as far as the Little Laber, by the three roads which lead from Landshut to Ratisbon, Keilheim, and Neustadt. Hiller marched on Mosburg; Jellachich had entered Munich; the two corps of Bohemia had penetrated into the upper Palatinate, and were leisurely moving on Ratisbon. These last turned toward Amberg on the division of Friant of Davoust's corps, which flanked its march in coming from Thuringia. It will thus be seen that if the enemy had arrived

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in order to gratify the wishes even of kings. Had he yielded, the results of this war might have been very different. Happy the country whose ruler has the firmness to do what he believes to be right, regardless of the political and personal influences by which he may be surrounded.



there two or three days sooner, he would have rendered the concentration of my army very difficult.

**FAULTS OF BERTHIER.**—My arrival at the theater of war was exceedingly fortunate. (Berthier was committing fault after fault.) My instructions to him were precise: he was directed, as I have already said, to rally the army at Ratisbon, if hostilities were not already begun, but, if the enemy had taken the initiative, to concentrate it at Augsburg and at Donawerth. Even had I directed him to concentrate at Ratisbon, unconditionally, he ought to have seen that what had been admissible when he left Paris was no longer possible under the existing circumstances. But in his whole twenty campaigns he had not been able to learn the first idea of strategy; he not only acted contrary to my instructions, but he did what I had most to fear. Davoust, appreciating the danger of a march on Ratisbon, moved by Hemaun on Ingolstadt; this was wise; Berthier, on the contrary, directed him to return by the left bank to Ratisbon. He even ventured to order Lefévre to retake Landshut. This was exposing both to destruction, by an eccentric movement which nothing could justify. Ratisbon

**NAPOLEON ARRIVES AT INGOLSTADT.**—I arrived at Ingolstadt on the eighteenth. My first care was to send two officers to Davoust to direct him to leave Ratisbon in all haste, in order to meet us on the Abens. Savary was one of those charged with this dangerous mission, penetrating, with a hundred Bavarian horse, between the Austrians and the Danube.

**DIFFICULTY OF FORMING A JUNCTION WITH DAVOUST.**—It was indispensable to maintain our position in front of Neustadt, for if the enemy should be able to reach that point, Davoust would be inevitably cut off. I united in the position of the Abens all the forces I had at my disposal. These were the Bavarians, Würtembergers, and a division of cuirassiers, forming, in all, about a hundred and forty thousand men. The enemy was marching on the Abens with one hundred thousand: if he had pushed forward with resolution, it would have been fatal to us; we should have been driven into the Danube before the return of Davoust, and before the arrival of Oudinot and Masséna, to whom I had sent orders to join me immediately. These last two would, in that case, have considered themselves exceedingly fortunate in falling back behind the Lech, leaving Davoust to his unfortunate fate. My only hope of safety was in the dilatory movements of the Austrians, or in their misconception of my position and my projects.

THE ARCHDUKE MOVES TO THE RIGHT, TOWARD RATISBON.—The Austrian army had already, on the eighteenth, begun their movements on the Abens. The Archduke suddenly suspended this march. He had just learned that Davoust was moving again toward Ratisbon; this was an additional reason why the Austrians should have established themselves at Abensberg without delay, on his line of retreat; but Prince Charles drew a different conclusion. He left General Hiller, with two corps of about fifty thousand men, to observe us on the Abens, while he himself, with the three other corps of about sixty-five thousand combatants, established himself on Rohr with the intention of moving against Davoust the next day. Hiller's forces consisted of his own corps, which was at this time at Mainburg, the corps of the Archduke Louis, near Siegenburg, and a reserve of some seven or eight thousand men.

NEW MOVEMENTS OF DAVOUST.—At break of day, on the nineteenth, Marshal Davoust left Ratisbon for Abensberg. The great road runs along the Danube in a *coupe-gorge* formed by the woody heights between Abbach and Post-Saal. The artillery and the cuirassiers were to slip along into this mouse-trap, while the four divisions of infantry flanked this march by moving along the heights where two small roads had been discovered; the one on Peising, and the other on Saalhaupt and Tengen. The divisions of Gudin and Morand took the first of these roads to the right; Saint-Hilaire and Friant followed the one at the left. Montbrun, with the light cavalry, flanked the march, and formed the rear guard by occupying Abbach. One regiment only was left at Ratisbon to retard the march of fifty thousand Austrians coming from Bohemia by the left of the Danube. In order to second the arrival of Davoust, I directed Lefebvre to debouch from Abensberg on Arnhofen with the left of the Bavarians.

The Archduke Charles at the same time fell back from Rohr on Ratisbon. This prince acted on the supposition that Davoust had not yet left that city, but had remained there impassible. It was well to move toward Ratisbon, but this movement should have been made by Post-Saal—that is, along the only road by which Davoust could effect a junction with me. The Austrians advanced in three columns; the right, consisting of twenty-three thousand men, on Eglofsheim; the center, of about twenty-five thousand men, on Dintsling; and the left, of fifteen thousand men, on Tengen. A corps of about six thousand men, under the orders of General Thierry, was left in the direction of Abensberg to maintain the communication between General Hiller's corps and the *corps-de-bataille*.

These dispositions were evidently faulty. The Gordian knot was to be cut at Abensberg or at Post-Saal, by throwing there the corps of Hohenzollern, of Rosenberg, and of the Archduke Louis. Abensberg being the nearest to the Austrian corps at Rohr, and most distant from the head-quarters of Davoust's column, it was probable they would arrive there in time. Post-Saal, on the other hand, closed the door of the *Caudine forks*, through which the French corps would be obliged to defile. These two points might easily have been occupied by throwing on Abensberg the Archduke Louis, reinforced by the two corps of reserve, and by pushing forward the corps of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg on Post-Saal, *en potence* upon the heights of Hausen. A hundred thousand combatants massed in this way on important points would have decided the campaign and the fate of Davoust.

BATTLE OF THANN.—Notwithstanding the faults committed by our adversaries, and the precision of my maneuvers, which formed in this respect so strong a contrast with theirs, we barely escaped from our great peril. No sooner has Saint-Hilaire and Friant arrived on the heights between Saalhaupt and Tengen, to protect the march of Davoust in the bottom of the defile, than they were assailed by Hohenzollern. But as the latter was isolated, the forces at this point were equal; and while the right of the Archduke was moving in such a direction as to meet none of our forces, the French repelled the attack of his lieutenant. The combat was severe; twenty thousand of my veterans were not disposed to yield to an equal number of Austrians. The Prince of Hohenzollern was unable to maintain his position; near 6 o'clock p. m. he was driven behind Hausen, with a loss of four thousand men.

DAVOUST EFFECTS HIS JUNCTION WITH NAPOLEON.—Taking advantage of this success, the right of Davoust had tranquilly continued its march on Abensberg, where it formed a junction with the Bavarians. On reaching Arnhofen it encountered the little Austrian column of Thierry, charged with covering the interval between the Archduke Charles and his brother. For the better accomplishment of this object, it had advanced toward Arnhofen with the intention of checking the march of the Bavarians, whom Marshal Lefévre was moving from Abensberg on the road to Ratisbon, in order to connect himself with Davoust. The detachment of the enemy, attacked in front by the division of Morand, and in rear by the Bavarians,



was driven with loss on Offenstetten, fortunate in not being all taken prisoners.

NAPOLEON'S DISPOSITIONS AGAINST THE AUSTRIAN CENTER.—The events of the nineteenth had entirely changed the face of affairs. The junction of Davoust with my army not only relieved all my anxiety, but placed me in a position threatening to the enemy. By his untimely extension of his right, the Archduke had not preserved a connection sufficiently intimate with the corps which he had left on the Abens. We were established opposite the interval which separated the two parts of the Austrian army, so that we could throw ourselves, in mass, between these parts, prevent their junction, and beat them in detail. The only way for the enemy to avoid this misfortune was to execute, in all haste, a concentric retreat on Landshut. To prevent him from undertaking this movement, I resolved to take the offensive instantly, directing the attack upon the enemy's left. I directed the first blows here, because I expected that the operations against this wing would be powerfully assisted by the grenadiers of Oudinot, or the corps of Massena. The former had arrived on the nineteenth at Pfaffenhofen, and the latter was to reach there the next day. They were also to menace the left of Hiller and his line of retreat on Landshut.

AFFAIR OF ABENSBURG.—I immediately made my dispositions. Davoust was left with twenty-five thousand men near Thann and Hausen, to keep in check the enemy's right. With the remaining sixty thousand men I advanced against the Archduke Louis. As it was important for me to prevent the Archduke Charles from sustaining his brother, Lannes was to throw himself with the other two divisions of Davoust and the cuirassiers of Nansouty on Rohr, in order to get possession of the road from Keilheim to Landshut, and to intercept all communication between the two wings.

After having harangued the Bavarians and Würtembergers, I left the division of Wrede at the bridge of Siegenburg to hold in check the Archduke Louis, and to attack him afterwards when the proper moment should arrive. I threw myself on the right of the Prince with the Würtembergers and the two Bavarian divisions of Lefévre; the first by Offenstetten on Rohr, and the second by Kirchdorf. Lannes was to assist and cover this movement; on arriving at Rohr, he was to reconnoiter Adelshausen and the valley of the Laber, in order to drive back any forces which the Archduke Charles might send in this direction, and thus effectually sever the enemy's center.



Fortunately for us, the Austrian left was much scattered. Hiller, with twenty-two thousand men, was on the march from Mainburg to Pfaffenhausen; the Archduke Louis, with ten thousand, was in position at Siegenburg; the Prince of Reuss, with fifteen thousand, at Kirchdorf; and General Thierry, with five thousand, at Offenstetten. The latter, too feeble to resist the superior forces which were advancing on all sides, fell back on Rohr, and came in contact with the columns of Lannes. He was overthrown and driven back as far as Rottenburg; where he was reinforced with fourteen thousand men, whom Hiller had marched in haste from Pfaffenhausen. But these reinforcements did not arrive in time to secure the passage of the Laber; Lannes impetuously crossed the bridge, pell-mell, with the baggage and fugitives of the enemy.

In the mean time the Prince of Reuss and Bianchi, attacked in front by Lefévre and in flank by the Würtembergers, were obliged to fall back on Pfaffenhausen. The Archduke Louis, pressed in front by Wrede, and threatened to be turned on his right by the other columns, also put himself in retreat on the same point. My allies, who under the French colors had learned to rival us in vigor and courage, pursued the enemy lively as far as that place. The Austrians this day lost more than seven thousand men.

DAVOUST OBSERVES THE ARCHDUKE. — Davoust found no difficulty in executing the order which I had given him, to hold the Archduke Charles in check. This prince, who with any other adversary would have been the first general of his age, permitted himself to be overawed by the ascendancy which I had gained over him. Instead of operating against Davoust, he put himself on the defensive. For this purpose he refused his left, ordering Count Hohenzollern to recross to the right of the Gross-Laber at Neider-Leuendorf. The column of the right, on the contrary, received orders to extend itself still further from Eglofsheim on Ratisbon. The regiment of infantry which Davoust had left in this city was now invested on the right of the Danube by this column, and on the left by one of the corps from Bohemia, which had marched on Stadt-am-Hof. This regiment surrendered. For twenty-four hours it had occupied fifty thousand Austrians; it had accomplished its task. The other corps from Bohemia was engaged, we know not why, in the direction from Amberg to Ingolstadt.

This battle affords a striking example of different combinations for the employment of masses. One hundred thousand Austrians of the first, second, third, and fourth corps found

themselves occupied by twenty thousand men under Davoust; while twenty-five thousand Austrians of the fifth corps were crushed by sixty-five thousand French and their allies. Notwithstanding the derangement of his first calculations, the Archduke Charles thought he ought still to maintain himself between the Danube and the Gross-Laber, in order to give Hiller the means of rallying on his left. But how could he suspect me of being so foolish as to allow his lieutenant to tranquilly make a lateral movement which it was so easy for us to intercept?

DEFEAT OF HILLER AT LANDSHUT.—On the twenty-first, Hiller, wishing to avoid the fate of Prince Louis, fell back on Landshut. I followed him with the division of Wrede, the Württembergers, and the corps of Lannes; that of Oudinot had orders to descend on the same point after passing the Iser at Mosburg; the same operation was prescribed to the fourth corps (Masséna). I directed Lefévre to descend the Laber with the two remaining Bavarian divisions, General Demont's division, and a brigade of cuirassiers, in order to form a connection with Davoust, and to lighten his duties. The roads were obstructed with the immense baggage trains of the Austrians, which fell into our hands. Hiller attempted to defend the passage of the Iser at Landshut; but this was near costing him dearly. Warmly attacked by the division of Morand, in front of the city and in the faubourgs, he might have been cut off by the division of Claparede, which was approaching from Mosburg on the right bank of the Iser; but this general imprudently halted his troops to await the arrival of Masséna, who had remained at Mosburg in order to hasten the march of his corps. It was important for me to disable Hiller, so that he could not renew the attack while I turned my efforts against the Archduke Charles. I ordered an immediate attack; General Mouton, whose courage knew no obstacles, forced the bridge by one of the most vigorous attacks in that war. The routed enemy fled in the direction of Oeting, where he passed the Inn the next day, leaving twenty-five cannon and near ten thousand men *hors-de-combat*.

DAVOUST ATTACKS THE AUSTRIAN CENTER.—I had reinforced Davoust because I feared that the Archduke might attack him while I was occupied with Hiller. But the Archduke resolved to wait until he received some news of Hiller, and to draw in the corps of Kolowrath from the left of the Danube. Bellegarde's corps, being more distant, could not arrive in time to take part in the battle; it was, therefore, merely drawn in from Stadt-am-Hof.

Davoust correctly judged that the best means of occupying the enemy in his perplexity, and of deceiving him respecting the strength of the opposing corps, was to attack him at once. After effecting a junction at Leuernsdorf with Lefébvre, he advanced along the left bank of the Gross-Laber. Near Unter-Leuchling he encountered the center of the enemy's forces, which the Archduke had moved to that place from Duitzling. The engagement was warm, and continued from eleven o'clock in the morning till night. Count Hohenzollern, who had moved along the left bank of the Gross-Laber, passed the river at Eckmühl and reinforced the Prince of Rosenberg, who was fighting at Unter-Leuchling. The enemy maintained his position; but Davoust accomplished the object he had proposed. Profiting with address by the broken character of the ground, he extended his troops in such a way as to make them appear double their real numbers, and so well imposed on the Archduke that he gave up all idea of acting on the offensive. The loss on both sides in this contest was about three thousand men *hors-de-combat*.

**NAPOLEON ADVANCES TO THE CENTER.**—Having completed the defeat of Hiller, I sent in pursuit Marshal Bessières, with the divisions of Wrede and Molitor, of the corps of Masséna, and three regiments of cavalry. Oudinot was left in reserve at Landshut. I directed myself against the Archduke Charles with Nansouty's division of cuirassiers, the corps of Lannes, the Württembergers, and the mass of Masséna's troops. The Archduke, leaving the corps of Bellegarde at Stadt-am-Hof, on the left of the Danube, had withdrawn Kolowrath's corps, which had passed the river on the night of the twenty-first. Being thus reinforced to seventy-five thousand combatants, it was to be supposed that this prince would not suffer himself to be any longer held in check by Davoust.

**BATTLE OF ECKMÜHL.**—I left Landshut on the morning of the twenty-second, directing myself on Eckmühl. The enemy had the same day combined an offensive movement. But the manner of its execution merely favored my projects. Instead of falling on Davoust in the morning, with all his forces, he directed his principal efforts toward Abbach, where he had only some light troops, and suspended the attack until afternoon to await the corps of Kolowrath, which could not sooner reach Abbach. The corps of Rosenberg, which had fought the previous day, received direction to maintain its position in order to serve as a pivot for the contemplated movement of the Austrian army. It followed, therefore, that we were opposed only by this sin-



gle corps, which was reinforced with a reserve of eight thousand men.

Toward two o'clock in the afternoon I debouched from Eckmühl against the center of Rosenberg with the Württembergers. Lannes, who now commanded the divisions of Saint-Hilaire and Gudin, attacked and turned the enemy's left with the latter division. The right was at the same time assailed by Davoust, with the divisions of Morand and Friant, and one of Lefébyre's Bavarian divisions. For three hours the Austrians sustained this unequal contest. Rosenberg, though surrounded by our eight divisions, still hoped to be sustained, and fought with the most heroic courage. There are few instances where Austrian troops have fought so well.

The Archduke, disconcerted by this attack on his left, stopped the advance of his right, and sought only to cover his retreat. This retreat was effected about six o'clock in the afternoon, before Masséna, who formed the rear of my column, could advance far enough to take part in the fight. I threw all my cavalry in pursuit of the flying forces. The enemy's cavalry, which sought to protect the retreat on Ratisbon by defending Eglofsheim, was overthrown in the evening; our troops drove them back, fighting, as far as Koffering; it drew on the infantry in the rout. The cuirassiers of Nansouty and Saint-Sulpice charge and saber the broken battalions; all fly in disorder toward Ratisbon. The Archduke Charles rallies with the reserve of John of Lichtenstein, and succeeds in arresting the pursuit, which had been favored by a bright moonlight.

A part of my troops came from Landshut, and were greatly fatigued. I also feared the disorder of a night pursuit. If I had pursued, as the Prussians did at Waterloo, the enemy's army shut in by the Danube would have been greatly cut to pieces; but our success was already sufficiently brilliant, and I was unwilling to expose it unnecessarily. Fifteen stands of colors, a great number of prisoners, and numerous cannon remained with us as trophies of the battle of Eckmühl, in which the enemy lost at least ten thousand men.

**THE ARCHDUKE RETURNS UNTO BOHEMIA.**—The Austrian army, in the vicinity of Ratisbon, still numbered more than eighty thousand combatants, including the corps of Bellegarde. My forces were not as numerous; nevertheless, Prince Charles did not venture to risk a new battle, with the Danube in his rear; and instead of calling in the corps of Bellegarde, he determined to join it. Not daring to concentrate all his forces on the single bridge of Ratisbon, he constructed one of pontons below, and



the passage was effected on the morning of the twenty-third, under the fire of our batteries. Several charges, which were made to cut off the retreating column, were not attended with all the success desired. A rear guard had remained in Ratisbon to cover the retreat; I directed it to be attacked. A wall and ditch could not arrest the impetuosity of our troops; finding an opening, they penetrated the city with the bayonet, and captured a part of the six battalions which still remained. The enemy burnt the wooden bridges in his rear, and barricaded the great stone bridge of Ratisbon.

The Emperor of Austria, who had repaired, with his court, to Schaerding in the hope of participating in the triumph of his armies, and also to be ready for negotiations with the German princes, was informed, on the night of the twenty-third, of the defeat of his troops, and immediately departed for his capital.

REMARKS.—Never had my success been more brilliant or decisive, and never was it better deserved. The combat of Thann against the Archduke's center; the battle of Abensberg, which isolated his left; the affair of Landshut, which completed his defeat; the battle of Eckmühl, a second time against the center; and finally, the combat of Ratisbon, completing the overthrow of his army, form a series of events without a parallel in history. On the twelfth of April I was in Paris; ten days after I had gained two great battles and decided the campaign in the heart of Germany. I might have said, with still greater reason than Cæsar, *Veni, vidi, vici.*

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 NAPOLEON MARCHES TO VIENNA.—As soon as the Archduke had put the Danube between his army and mine, he fell back on Cham, where he arrived on the twenty-fifth, after having been joined by the second corps of Bohemia. I did not care to follow him on the left bank of the river. Leaving Davoust at Ratisbon with orders to observe him, and to follow me as soon as he ascertained positively that the enemy's army had departed for Bohemia, I directed the main body of my forces to Vienna by the right bank, with the resolution to crush the corps of Hiller, if he should have the temerity to dispute my entrance into the capital.

Some have blamed me for not having, on the contrary, pursued the then scattered army of the Archduke Charles. I was deterred from doing this by several reasons: first, the woody chain of the Böhmerwald mountains offered to the enemy defensive positions of great advantage; secondly, the Archduke Charles had written me a letter showing a desire on his part to treat. By pursuing Hiller, I might complete his ruin, and dic-

tate a more advantageous peace in Vienna. On the other hand, by attacking the enemy in the mountains of Bohemia, Hiller, with the Archduke John and Chasteler, coming from Italy and the Tyrol, might collect eighty thousand fresh troops on the Danube, at the instant when the Archduke Charles, reinforced by the *landwehrs* of Bohemia, would charge me in front.

But let us return to the operations of Hiller, whom we left in full retreat on the Inn. This general, seeing that he was not pursued across this river, concluded that I had turned my efforts against the principal army, and determined to effect a diversion. On the twenty-seventh of April, he repassed the Inn with the thirty-five thousand men which he had left, and attacked Wrede's division at Neumark. The Bavarian general was in some degree surprised, and found himself engaged in an unequal combat; he would have been lost had it not been for the devotion of Molitor, who disengaged him and covered his retreat on Wilsbiburg. This affair, which cost us fifteen hundred men, led to no result. In the night of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Hiller received information of our victories over the principal army, and made all haste to recross the Inn.

OPERATIONS IN ITALY.—At the moment when the Archduke Charles appeared in the plains of Ratisbon, his brother, the Archduke John, descended the mountains of Carniola on the Frioul, at the head of fifty thousand men. Eugene covered Italy with a combined army, whose force did not exceed forty-five thousand combatants. He had to assist him Generals Grenier and Macdonald. Still young and inexperienced, Eugene soon exhibited all the *aplomb* of an old warrior. Brave, calm, and capable of understanding military operations, he always knew how to profit by the counsels of able men—a talent often more successful than the inspirations of superior genius.

He, nevertheless, committed an error at the outset. He had just concentrated the mass of his forces in front of Sacila, but was still waiting for a division of infantry and the reserve of cavalry from Verona. The irruption of the enemy was sudden: the brigade of Sahuc, established as an advanced guard at Pordenona, was surprised, and the 35th regiment was in part captured. Eugene, fearing the moral effect which a retreat might produce on the vacillating spirits of the Italians, deemed it best to assume the offensive, thinking that he had to contend only with the eighth corps of the enemy. He marched on the sixteenth of April, and attacked the enemy between Sacila and Pordenona, making his effort on the right, which was not the true

strategic direction. The enemy, supported by the reserve, warmly disputed the village of Porcia. But soon the ninth Austrian corps arrives on the ground, and the Archduke John, throwing it on our left, turns that wing and forces Eugene to retreat, notwithstanding the resistance opposed by Broussier against forces double his own. The defile of the Livenza, whose waters were swollen, caused disorder in our center and right; all crowded to the passage of the Brugnera; fortunately, the enemy did not push his success, and Eugene, reinforced on the Piave, by the arrival of troops which he was expecting from Verona, succeeded in rallying his broken battalions, and brought back the army in good order to the Adige, after having thrown two brigades into Venice and Palmanova. Chasteler, who had swept the Tyrol, and was now to act in concert with the Archduke John on the Adige, went to have a triumph at Innspruck, and lost the opportunity to anticipate us at Rivoli.

The Archduke, satisfied with his present success, and obliged to detach three divisions for observing Venice, Palmanova, and the operations of Marmont in Dalmatia, occupied the well-known position of Caldiero, with the intention of waiting to hear the results of movements to be made in the south of Italy, or the success of his brother in Germany; but, in respect to this last hope, he was soon undeceived, and the news of the events of Ratisbon reached Italy very opportunely, to restore confidence to my partisans and to the camp of Eugene, at the same time that it destroyed the hopes of my enemies.

#### NAPOLEON CONTINUES HIS MARCH ON VIENNA.—

The retreat of our army in Italy, instead of checking my march, was only an additional motive for my advance on Vienna.\* On

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\*On passing the mouldering towers of the castle of Diernstein, in which Richard the Lion-hearted, of England, was so long and cruelly imprisoned, Napoleon reined in his horse, and said to Berthier and Lannes:

"Richard, also, was a warrior in Syria and Palestine. He was more fortunate than we were at St.-Jean-d'Acre. But the Lion-hearted was not more valiant than you, my brave Lannes. He beat the great Saladin. Yet hardly had he returned to Europe than he fell into the hands of persons who were certainly of very different calibre. He was sold by a duke of Austria to an emperor of Germany, who by that act only has been rescued from oblivion.

"These were barbarous times, which they have the folly to represent to us as heroic, when the father sacrificed his children, the wife her husband, the subject his sovereign, the soldier his general, and all without shame or disguise! How much are times changed now! You have seen emperors and kings in my power, as well as the capitals of their states, and I exacted from them neither ransom nor sacrifice of honor. The world has seen how I treated the Emperor of Austria, whom I might have imprisoned; and that successor of Leopold (the duke), and Henry (the emper-



the twenty-seventh I moved my headquarters to Mühldorf. Le-févre, with the Bavarians, was directed on the Tyrol, where the insurrection, more serious than we anticipated, was threatening to extend into Bavaria and cut off our communications. Masséna, Lannes, and Bessières marched on Vienna; Davoust and Vandamme followed them in echelons; Bernadotte, with his Saxons, moved on Ratisbon by turning Bohemia. Hiller had abandoned the Inn without resistance; but he resolved to defend the passage of the Traun, in the formidable position of Ebersberg. A wooden bridge, a hundred toises in length, presented an obstacle still more formidable than that of Lodi, since it terminated in a fortified town, commanded by a castle, and crowned by heights very difficult of access. To effect a passage here against thirty thousand men and eighty pieces of cannon was not very easy. Masséna was not ignorant that I expected to turn this impregnable post by Lambach; but the impetuous valor of General Cohorn drew him on to a bloody fight. Three Austrian battalions, left imprudently in advance of the bridge, were overthrown, and driven at the point of the sword to the gates, which were closed. Cohorn forced the gates, and penetrated into the great street. Masséna deemed it best to sustain him—first, by the remainder of Claparède's division, and afterward, by that of Legrand. The fight was fiercely waged from street to street and from house to house.

Claparède had just gained possession of the castle when Hiller threw on the city four new columns, which penetrated at the point of the bayonet. It was a horrible butchery: the houses, filled with the combatants and the wounded, were set on fire; the encumbered state of the streets prevented any egress; never did war present a more awful scene. At length the Austrians, wearied with the carnage, yielded Ebersberg, and our troops advanced against the heights, where a combat still more unequal was waged. The arrival of Durosnel's division of cavalry by the right bank, and the certainty that he would be turned and surrounded by Lannes, at length decided him to retire, in all haste, on Enns.

Lannes having debouched the same day from Lambach on

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or), who is already more than half in our power, will not be worse treated on this occasion than before, notwithstanding he has attacked us with so much perfidy."

When making these remarks, little did Napoleon imagine his own fate in St. Helena! If the English had good cause to complain of the captivity of King Richard in Diernstein, how much greater their own disgrace for their long and cruel confinement of Napoleon on a solitary rock in the ocean!



Steyer, all this butchery was utterly useless. I expressed to Masséna great dissatisfaction at his useless sacrifice of his men; but I afterward excused him, for I learned that Hiller's obstinate defense of his position in front of the bridge across the Danube at Mauthausen had induced Masséna to believe that the Archduke Charles, coming from Budweis, had the intention of crossing to the right bank of the Danube at that point, so as to unite with Hiller and cover Vienna. The bold and obstinate attack of Masséna rendered this movement impossible, and the success was the more honorable to our troops, as a part of them fought here for the first time. It cost Hiller six or seven thousand, and we lost four or five thousand brave men, a part of whom were destroyed in the flames.

**TARDY PROJECTS OF PRINCE CHARLES TO SAVE VIENNA.**—The Archduke Charles, reaching Horasdiowitz, the first of May, thought himself pursued by my whole army; while in reality, even Davoust, after having made a simple demonstration, fell back on Straubing so as to follow me in echelons in the valley of the Danube, and Bernadotte, who had relieved him in the direction of Ratisbon, also followed the same route. Supposing us caught in a *cul-de-sac* between Straubing and the mountains of Bohemia, the Archduke thought that Hiller would be able to defend the Inn long enough to allow him to march by Budweis. The Aulic Council flattered themselves with the same project, and directed the Archduke John not to renounce rashly the political advantages which his success promised in Italy, but, if forced to retire, to fall back on the interior of Austria. The Archduke Charles, cruelly undeceived by the news of the passage of the Inn, the capture of Lintz, and of the combat of Ebersberg, remained at Budweis from the fourth to the seventh of May. This delay will always appear an enigma in the military life of this prince, as also the still longer delay at Schaffhausen and Zurich in 1799. Nothing can justify such delays but the necessity of giving repose to the troops, and of reëstablishing order, discipline, and confidence by a slow and deliberate march. But such considerations should have been made subordinate to the necessity of covering Vienna, either by preceding me to Krems, or anticipating my arrival in the capital. From Budweis to Vienna is six days' march; and the Archduke might have arrived there on the tenth, and Hiller on the ninth. The former at last put himself in motion toward Zwetel, with the intention, undoubtedly, of reaching Krems; but, hearing that we had already passed Molck, he felt that all hopes of covering Vienna were useless, and that he must now devise means for defending that capital. Hiller

received orders to cross the Danube at Stein, destroy the bridge, and by forced marches descend the left bank of the river so as to reach Vienna and occupy the Islands. If it had been merely to rescue the troops of Hiller, nearly surrounded by Lannes and Massena, the resolution would have been a very proper one; but if, for the salvation of the Austrian monarchy, it was necessary to save the capital, it would have been preferable to direct Hiller to gain, by a forced march, the defile of Siegartskirch; to defend there for twenty-four hours the access to Vienna, then to encamp under the walls of that place, and await the Archduke, who might have reached there about the eleventh of May.

At any rate, the first care of the Archduke should have been, if he could not cover Vienna, at least to effect its rescue by débouching from that city, as I did from Dresden in 1813, and by making strong demonstrations on our communications. General Kolowrath, directed on Lintz with twenty-five thousand men, would take possession of the bridges and the city. The Archduke John, forming a junction with the corps of the Tyrol and Jellachich's division, which still remained at the sources of the Enns in the valley of Rotenmann, would then advance on Lintz at the head of fifty or sixty thousand men to join Kolowrath. They vainly flattered themselves that the presence of seventy thousand men on my direct communication, would change the face of affairs; but we shall soon see that this plan was not carried into execution.

**NAPOLEON'S SECOND ENTRY INTO VIENNA.**—The disappearance of Hiller's corps permitted us to advance with redoubled celerity, and, on the tenth of May, we reached the walls of the capital. This was just one month after the Austrians had invaded Bavaria, and twenty-seven days after the news of that invasion had reached me at Paris.

In order to secure our position, it was important for us to seize upon Vienna; but this did not seem so easy a matter as in 1805. Instead of sending out to invite us into the city, the government directed the Archduke Maximilian to prepare means for defense. This prince was to have a corps of fifteen thousand men, composed of veterans and militia; the right division of Nordman was also to reinforce him; moreover, a part of the citizens took up arms, so that, if reports be true, the prince had at his disposal at least twenty thousand men.

In order to incite the troops and citizens, they were reminded of the resistance which Vienna had opposed to the Visir Kiuperli, and of the defense of Saragossa by the Spaniards; but we were not Turks, and the good people of Vienna are not Aragonese.

The lines of defense surrounding the city were not in a condition to resist us; the Archduke Maximilian abandoned the rich faubourgs, in order to concentrate his forces in the old *enceinte*, which was regularly bastioned, but imperfectly armed. The Aulic Council had made better preparations for besieging Mayence than for defending their own capital. Nevertheless, the Archduke, with so considerable a body of men, was capable of greatly embarrassing my operations. I understood the value of time much better than my adversaries, and I was not disposed to lose a second. I tried the effect of some shells thrown into the city, and they replied by a heavy fire from the ramparts, without sparing the faubourgs. I took pity on these poor inhabitants, and renounced my plan of bombarding the city, and resorted to other and still more effectual means. I caused the communications of the Archduke with the great bridge of the Danube to be attacked on both flanks, directing Masséna toward Simering, so that he could penetrate into the island of the Prater. A similar attack was directed from Döbling, on the island of Jägerhans, further up the river. If we were now to anticipate the enemy in our arrival at the great bridge of Tabor, which they had neglected to connect with the place by fortifications, the Archduke would be made prisoner, with his fifteen thousand men. The fear of this induced the prince to evacuate the city and destroy the bridge of Tabor, leaving General O'Reilly, with six hundred men, to perform the ungrateful task of signing the capitulation, which was done the next day, the thirteenth of May. At the moment when the Archduke Maximilian was evacuating Vienna, General Hiller arrived at his destination, and united with the retreating troops near Spitz. He caused the islands to be occupied, but it was too late to save the capital: the bridge of Tabor was destroyed.\*

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\*While at Vienna, an incident occurred characteristic of Napoleon and of his manner of enforcing discipline. One of the chief surgeons of his army was quartered in the house of an aged canoness. While under the influence of wine, the surgeon wrote her an insulting letter. She appealed to General Andreossy for protection, and the general took the letter to the Emperor, who ordered the surgeon to appear on parade the next morning. Napoleon attended the parade, and, advancing in front of the ranks, called for the surgeon to step forward. Presenting the letter, he asked him if he had written it.

"Pardon, sire," said the surgeon; "I was intoxicated at the time, and did not know what I was doing."

"Miserable man," exclaimed Napoleon, "to outrage a canoness worthy of respect, and bowed down by the calamities of war! I do not admit your excuse. I degrade you from the Legion of Honor. You are unworthy to wear that venerated symbol. General Dersonne, see that this order is ex-



## DISPOSITIONS FOR THE PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE.

—I now directed all my attention to the means of passing the Danube. While separated from the enemy by so large a river, it would be difficult to understand his operations. Moreover, we had been fifteen days separated from the army of the Archduke by the mountains of Bohemia, and had lost track of it. We had every reason, however, to believe that if it had not already arrived, it would do so very soon. My army was not yet united; but we had no time to lose. Vandamme and the Würtembergers had been left at Lintz to cover the great central *débouche* of Bohemia, and to secure the bridge, with the fortifications which had been laid out for its defense. Bernadotte, coming from Passau, with the Saxons, was to relieve him. Davoust was marching from San-Polten on Vienna. I had about this city the corps of Masséna, and that of Lannes, the guard, and the cavalry of Bessières.

THE MOTIVES FOR THIS UNDERTAKING.—I was uncertain of the position and plans of the Archduke; but I deemed it best, at any rate, to go forth and meet him. Natural as was this resolution, it has nevertheless been censured by those who judge by the result, rather than by the motives which influenced my determination. They say that, master of the capital and of one-half of the Austrian monarchy, I might have waited in security the arrival of the army of Italy, without seeking to render my position more extended, more complicated, and, at the same time, more hazardous. Those who made these criticisms forgot the relative situation of the two armies after the memorable victories of Ratisbon. Counting on the ascendancy which these victories were calculated to procure me over the enemy, it was desirable to have a *débouche* beyond the Danube, in order to continue offensive operations. If I should leave the Archduke quiet possession of Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary, he might be able to concentrate his troops, and reinforce them by the whole militia which they had begun to organize; the contest

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cuted. Insult an aged woman! I respect an aged woman as if she were my mother."

Another characteristic incident is related of Napoleon while occupying the island of Lobau, after the battle of Essling. Passing a company of grenadiers, seated at their dinner, he remarked to them, "Well, my friends, I hope you find the wine good." "It will not make us drunk," replied one of their number; "there is our wine-cellar," pointing to the Danube. Napoleon was surprised at this answer, as he had ordered the distribution of a bottle of wine to each man. On investigation, it was found that forty thousand bottles, which he had sent to the army a few days before, had been purloined and sold by the commissaries. They were immediately brought to trial, and condemned to be shot.



would then have been doubtful. If I should attack him in the condition of despondency caused by the defeat of Ratisbon, I might expect to beat him, and end the war. In case I were reduced to the defensive, it would be of still greater advantage to me to possess both banks of the river, were it only to enable me to operate on the left side in case the enemy collected large forces on the right. Without this advantage, I would possess only a hazardous line of operations, extending from Straubing to a narrow gorge parallel with Bohemia, where the enemy seemed to have established the theater of his resistance. The Archduke, based on Prague, had only to effect the concentration of the Austrian forces at Linz to place me in a difficult situation. But, with a bridge across the Danube, I might accept battle on either side, being certain, in case of reverse, of finding the means of retreat to the opposite bank, for the Archduke could not operate with forces sufficient to give battle on both sides of the river.

When I determined upon the passage, the enemy had not yet shown himself in the environs of Vienna, and could not then oppose the passage. But it was possible for him in a few days to occupy and fortify such positions as would render it very difficult. I made haste to profit by an occasion which might not again occur, and, notwithstanding the reverse which followed, I in a measure succeeded, for I crossed three-quarters of the river, and gained an advantageous place of arms, which enabled me afterward to cross the remaining arm of the Danube. My resolution and the motives of it have not been appreciated by my censors, but that is not astonishing, for they attempt to measure me by themselves.

**DIFFICULTIES OF THE PASSAGE.**—Of all the operations of war, there is none more hazardous and difficult than the passage of a large river in the presence of an enemy. Every one has heard of the celebrated passage of the Rhine, at Tolhuis and at Kehl; but at Tolhuis, Louis XIV. was opposed by only seven or eight thousand Dutch, and at Kehl, Moreau encountered only a single brigade of the Circles. The two passages of the Danube which we effected at Lobau will probably remain the most celebrated in the military history of an age prolific in great events. If we take into consideration the great care and precautions that are requisite, the immense amount of materials employed in such an operation, the concurrence of circumstances necessary to secure success, and the difficulties which may be occasioned by the slightest derangement on the part of the enemy, it is really surprising that an operation of this kind ever succeeds. Nevertheless, wonderful as it may seem, the most difficult military

enterprises are commonly the most successful, from the simple fact that greater care and precautions are employed in their execution.

From Schaerding to within two leagues of Vienna, the Danube flows through a narrow gorge between the mountains of Bohemia and Bavaria, but after passing the village of Nussdorf, its waters, as if in revenge for their former constraint, spread out over a wide surface, forming a multitude of islands, that of Lobau being one of the largest. There are many points of passage in the vicinity of Vienna, but a practiced eye will perceive, by a single glance at the map, that the point higher up the stream near the village of Nussdorf is, of all others, the most advantageous for an army on the right bank, inasmuch as it here commands the left bank; the great Thalweg,\* being here only about one hundred and eighty toises in width, sweeps past a considerable island, capable of serving as a *tête-du-pont* for the first bridge, and a *point-d'appui* for the troops charged with opening or protecting the passage. An arm of about fifty toises in width, and a very gentle current, separates this island from the opposite shore; its passage would require no very extraordinary operation. The celebrated island of Lobau is situated about two leagues below Vienna; this island is about a league in length and three-quarters of a league in width; it is separated from the right bank, first, by another island of about three thousand toises in circumference, and then by the main stream, in which are five or six other small islands. This division of the waters of the Danube rendered them less deep and less rapid. The first arm, which separates Ebersdorf from the first island, is not less than two hundred and forty toises in width; the second, opposite Lobau, about one hundred and sixty; finally, a third arm separates this great island from the Marschfeld shore, and forms, as it were, a kind of ditch to the great central citadel; it is about seventy toises in width, but is divided in different places by islands. At Nussdorf, the main body of the Danube is only one hundred and eighty toises wide, and the small arm sixty; a passage at this place would, therefore, have the double advantage of being commanded by the high ground on the right bank, and requiring only one-half the number of boats; moreover, it was directly opposite the Bisemberg, a mountain of difficult access, situated in a commanding position between the roads to Moravia and Bohemia. The possession of this mountain by us before the arrival of the Archduke would have been a matter of great interest, but after

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\*The term "Thalweg" is here used for the main channel.

he had effected a junction with Hiller, the occupation of the Bisemberg not only became more difficult, but would actually facilitate the operations of the enemy against us. Under this point of view, the passage at the island of Lobau was the most advantageous; moreover, we would be able to float down to this point all the boats above Vienna, and in the small arm of the Prater. And lastly, the great extent of the island would afford shelter to the troops effecting the passage, in case the enemy appeared in superior force on the opposite side.

PREPARATIONS FOR ITS EXECUTION.—No sooner had I reached Vienna than I directed my attention to the means of crossing the Danube. Lannes, who was stationed further up the river, was directed to make preparations for throwing a bridge across at Nussdorf, and Saint-Hilaire was directed to gain possession of the great island of Schwarze-Lake. Massena, who was encamped between Simering and Ebersdorf, was, on the contrary, directed to prepare to pass to the island of Lobau. These double preparations, at points some four leagues apart, divided the attention of the enemy, and enabled us to select the least difficult point for the construction of the bridge. Saint-Hilaire sent two battalions of voltigeurs in boats to make a lodgement on the island of Schwarze-Lake; but, receiving no timely support, these detachments were surrounded by General Nordmann, and, after a brave defense, forced to surrender. The zeal and skill of our pontoniers enabled them to overcome obstacles which any other troops would have regarded as insuperable. On the nineteenth of May they succeeded in throwing a bridge of fifty-four great boats across the two arms opposite Ebersdorf, under the protection of battalions of tirailleurs, who drove the enemy's troops from Lobau. This operation was now the more difficult, as the melting of the snow in the Germanic and Tyrolese Alps had so much swollen the waters of the Danube as to render the current frightfully rapid, at the very moment that we were attempting the passage. Notwithstanding all our care, we did not find a sufficient number of anchors to moor so many boats; but the pontoniers and artillery supplied the deficiency by large boxes of balls. Not having pontons enough for the bridge, we were obliged to resort, in part, to trestles. On the night of the twentieth the bridge was thrown from Lobau to the left bank, and the corps of Massena commenced the passage. That of Lannes, which came from Vienna, was immediately to follow; but it was directed not to leave the capital till the last moment, lest the enemy should take the alarm.



The waters of the Danube were rising rapidly; every moment we were obliged to interrupt the passage of the troops, in order to adjust the bridges, which, being constructed of boats of different sizes, instead of regular pontoons, were continually thrown out of place.

KOLOWRATH'S ATTACK ON LINTZ.—While we were thus engaged on the bridge from Lobau, I learned that the Austrians had made a serious attack on the *tête-du-pont* of Lintz on the 17th of May. This attack was made by the entire corps of Kolowrath, twenty-five thousand strong. The Würtembergers were nearly forced to yield to this vast superiority of numbers, when Bernadotte arrived with the Saxons and restored the equilibrium; the enemy was forced to renounce a work so well defended. This circumstance, instead of arresting our operations at Lobau, only induced me to redouble our ardor, for the Archduke had evidently either divided his forces or had remained with the mass of his army at Lintz. Reassured by the arrival of Bernadotte, I directed Vandamme to approach as far as Mautern; Davoust, disposed in echelons between Molk and Vienna, was to assemble his forces, in all haste, under the walls of the capital.

MASSENA CROSSES TO THE LEFT BANK OF THE DANUBE.—On the morning of the twenty-first, I pressed forward the passage with ardor, and disposed the troops of Masséna in such a manner as to be prepared for any event. Opposite the island of Lobau is Marschfeld, an immense plain, cut only by the little stream which is formed near Wagram by the embanking of the Russbach; the north side of the island is formed into a strong reëntering curve by the small arm of the river, but the east side is quite straight; on the bank of this branch of the Danube are the villages of Aspern and Essling, about half a league apart; being built of stone, and composed of a single street, these villages served as a kind of natural rampart. The cemetery of Aspern formed a real redoubt; at Essling a large grain magazine played the same part; to the southeast is the town of Enzersdorf, a post also susceptible of a good defense.

Our bridges had naturally been thrown to the north opposite the reëntering point between Aspern and Essling; I placed the division of Molitor (of Masséna's corps) in the first of these villages, and Boudet's division in the second. The other two divisions as they arrived were to form the reserve; the cavalry of Bessières was placed at the center between these two bastions. The passage was interrupted almost every moment. The re-

ports of the advanced guard greatly differed; some said that only the advanced guard of the enemy was before us, while others thought his whole army was present. A large body of cavalry formed a mask which we could not penetrate. But this uncertainty did not continue long.

**THE ARCHDUKE ATTACKS THE FRENCH.**—The Archduke heard, between Horn and Meissau, of the fall of Vienna, and reached Bisemberg on the fifteenth. His army reposed there till the nineteenth. From the top of this mountain the enemy had observed all our movements, and by the nineteenth had learned the construction of the bridge of Lobau. Previous to the fourteenth the Archduke had hoped to debouch from Vienna, as I did from Dresden in 1813; but he then saw that he had only to remain in observation where he was, and embrace the first opportunity to give battle when I should attempt to cross the Danube. Perhaps his waiting was in part induced by a desire to learn the issue of Kolowrath's attempt on Lintz. But he learned on the nineteenth, not only Kolowrath's defeat, but also that the Archduke John had not operated in that direction. On the twentieth the Austrian generalissimo came, at the head of Klénau's advanced guard, to examine the state of affairs opposite the island, and gave orders to his army to be ready to march the following day.

At nine o'clock on the morning of the twenty-first, the Archduke, discovering from the top of the Bisemberg the corps of Davoust on the march by the right bank of the Danube, thought that by falling on these troops, which had already crossed the river, he would have to fight only one-half of my forces. His army began their march about noon; the three corps of Hiller, Bellegarde, and Hohenzollern were directed concentrically on Aspern, followed in reserve by the corps of grenadiers; Rosenberg's corps was to extend to the right and left of Enzersdorf, and then direct themselves on Essling. The reserve of cavalry was to march between these two principal masses. The Prince of Reuss was to remain at the Bisemberg, to cover that point and threaten Davoust in the direction of Korneuburg. Eighty thousand men, with three hundred pieces of cannon, were thus to fall upon the single corps of Masséna sustained only by the cavalry of Bessières. Nothing ever equalled the valor displayed by our troops in this critical situation. Molitor, posted alone in Aspern, receives the assault of the masses of Hiller and Bellegarde; Masséna seeks to sustain that point, and the village is alternately in the hands of the opposing forces. The cemetery forms a kind of fort where the hero of Genoa and Zurich fights

like a lion. Lannes, whose *corps-d'armée* is detained by the rupture of the bridge, takes command of Boudet's division, and defends Essling from the attacks of Rosenberg.

The enemy had crowded the greater part of his infantry around Aspern, where they had not room to move. The cavalry held the center and protected the numerous batteries arranged to fire obliquely on the villages which cost so many brave men. This artillery fire even reached to our thin reserves. I ordered Bessières to charge it; the light cavalry failed in the attempt; but our cuirassiers, led by D'Espagne, charged in turn, and forced the enemy to withdraw their pieces. At this moment the infantry of Hohenzollern, prolonged toward the center, and our intrepid squadrons, led by Bessières, D'Espagne, and Lassalle, dashed against it without the least hesitation; but all the Austrian battalions, formed by a recent order of the Archduke, in columns of attack by battalions, presented small masses which nothing could break. The cavalry of Lichtenstein went to their assistance; ours, in its turn, fell back, and, after a triple charge, yielding to superior numbers and a murderous artillery, proudly resumed its place in the line. In this unequal contest the brave D'Espagne met a glorious death.

Dispirited by the repeated assaults on Aspern, the Archduke Charles hoped to meet with less resistance at Essling, where he had gone in person. Rosenberg, after a long circuit, had finally united his two columns, and made, in vain, two attacks on Lannes and Boudet. These assaults were repeated till evening, and the village burned, but Lannes, surrounded by flames and buried in projectiles, opposed them with intrepidity. Night here suspends the ardor of the combatants, but at Aspern their fury is redoubled; the Archduke directs Hiller and Bellegarde to carry the place at all hazards. Masséna, at the head of four regiments considerably weakened by the successive losses of the combat, opposes a barrier of iron against these two *corps-d'armée* of the enemy. In the midst of a storm of projectiles which burned a part of the village, he defends every house, alley, and garden, with the most brilliant courage; the division of Molitor, having lost one-half of its number, is finally forced to give way, about nine o'clock in the evening. Masséna flies to the division of Legrand, dashes at its head into the village, and recaptures part of it; but the enemy remains master of the cemetery which has cost so much blood. Never was a day more glorious for the French troops than this; less than thirty thousand troops had bravely fought against eighty thousand under the concentric fire of an immense artillery. It was a miraculous defense.



The bridges, which had been many times carried away, and as often restored, at last were made sufficiently secure to enable the troops of Lannes and Oudinot to cross over during the night, and the guard and cuirassiers of Nansouty at the break of day.

**BATTLE OF ESSLING.**—On the morning of the twenty-second, our army being about fifty-five thousand strong, required a little more development. If Davoust had been present, I should have pivoted on the left, supporting that flank on the Danube, and making the principal attack by the right, but that operation required the presence of a third corps, and the necessary space for forming the troops and effecting a change of front without unmasking the bridges. The enemy intended to anticipate us. At two o'clock in the morning the attack was renewed on Aspern; and a little afterward it extended as far as Essling; this was directed by the Archduke in person. Lannes was forced to abandon the place, except the granary, which formed a kind of redoubt; but being soon afterward reinforced by Saint-Hilaire, who had just arrived, he, in turn, routed the enemy. In Aspern, the combat was waged with the same obstinacy and with the same results. Legrand's division, reinforced by that of Cara Saint-Cyr, at first disputed the place with the Austrians, then captured General Weber and some hundreds of prisoners, and again established themselves in the cemetery.

It was time to think of extricating ourselves from this *coupe-gorge*. Davoust informed me that his corps had begun to pass, and, in fact, the division of Demont debouched from the bridges. I then determined to act offensively. The direction of the concave line of the enemy naturally indicated the point where we must begin our attack. Davoust was to debouch by Essling; Masséna was to maintain his position in Aspern; Oudinot and Lannes, forming the center with the cavalry, were to pierce the enemy's center, and, seconded by Davoust's left, crush the Archduke's *corps-de-bataille*, and throw it back on the upper Danube. Oudinot, with his grenadiers, advances with impetuosity; Lannes has drawn up his corps in echelons; he throws forward the division of Saint-Hilaire, while the remainder of his forces sustains it and forms a second line. Our troops advance with audacity, and overthrow every thing before them; soon the first line of the enemy is penetrated. The Austrian artillery causes great ravages in the troops of Oudinot and Lannes, who are drawn up in a rather deep order of attack; I, therefore, advise Lannes to deploy his forces as he gains ground. Marbot carries this order to Saint-Hilaire, who begins its execution. Claparède forms in

this way Oudinot's corps of grenadiers, deploying his brigade, by the right, *en potence*, in order to oppose Rosenberg.

The Archduke has too practiced an eye not to perceive the importance of the movement of my center, and of the retreat of his first line; he prolongs his corps on Breitenlée, where his headquarters are, and debouches with all his reserves on the same point. Lannes and Bessières sustain Oudinot; the combat becomes fierce, both parties displaying the most admirable valor. Bessières passes through the intervals of our infantry, and, at the head of his squadrons, dashes upon those of the enemy, and then charges his infantry; the boldest penetrate even to the Austrian head-quarters at Breitenlée. The Archduke seizes the colors in his own hands, and rallies the battalions which have yielded to the audacity of our troops. The battle is becoming hand-to-hand with our soldiers, whose advance nothing can now arrest. One effort more, and victory can not escape us. . . . But this effort is now impossible; for, at this moment, the most disastrous news destroys all our hopes. The great bridge of the Danube is broken by fire-ships, rafts, and heavy floating bodies directed against it by the enemy, and brought in contact with the bridge with fatal violence by the swift current of the stream; the bridge, broken and scattered, floats far down the Danube; the *aid-de-camp* who brought me this alarming news could give no definite information respecting the present position of the wreck, and I still had some hope of reëstablishing it; but this hope was soon dissipated.

I could no longer reckon on the four divisions of Davoust, or the reserve of artillery, for offensive operations. But it was necessary to maintain our position till night, and return into our citadel of Lobau. The situation of a part of an army which first crosses a river in the face of a hostile army drawn up to receive it, is always critical; but how much more is the position of this fraction when deprived not only of all assistance from its own army, but also of all hope of retreat. In a forcible passage, whatever may the advantage of the opposing army, the troops are animated by the certainty of being constantly reinforced, and of having the chances of success turned in their favor by the new battalions which are gradually brought into action. But in the affair of the twenty-first we had not even this advantage, for the frequent rupture of the bridges, and the swelling of the Danube, whose waters overflowed the islands and avenues to the bridges, required all the heroic devotion of Masséna, Lannes, and their soldiers to maintain the advantage already gained. Notwithstanding the reinforcements received during the night,

the situation of the troops was still lamentable, when the order for retreat, and the news of the rupture of the bridges which caused this disorder, made all feel that they had now to conquer or die.

My attitude, both calm and severe at the moment when I received this news, contributed to maintain the confidence of our brave soldiers; no one knew that any thing had happened, till I had had time to ascertain whether there were any means of re-establishing the bridges. Lannes was to maintain his position till this was fully ascertained; but this hope being soon destroyed, the marshal was ordered to return to Essling, and the fatal news, flying from mouth to mouth, informed our soldiers of the threatening danger. Instantly a sad silence succeeded to the shouts which usually precede victory; but even this silence, accompanied by perfect calmness, showed that every one was determined to do his duty. At the moment when Lannes was checking his advance by my orders, the Archduke, who, better advised than the day before, had either carried the mass of his forces on the center, or had been drawn there by the maneuver with which I had threatened him, commenced a general attack with all the forces at his disposal, and under the terrible fire of his batteries. His troops, astonished to see ours halt, acquired new audacity, and believed themselves already victorious; when Lannes commended retreating, the enemy's ranks were filled with enthusiasm, and they fell with vigor upon Saint-Hilaire, who formed the first echelon. This veteran of the army of Italy, pierced with a bullet, carried to his grave the regrets and admiration of all. His troops, for a moment alarmed at his death, nevertheless, continued their movement in good order. Lannes, hearing of the death of his companion in arms, flew to the head of his command, and marched it boldly toward Essling; Oudinot followed him on the left.

The enemy, emboldened by his unusual success, at first pressed hard on Lannes' rear. Aspern and Essling again became the center of all their efforts. Surrounding these two villages with a concave line, they pour in upon the French a most murderous fire. The battle continues without further maneuvers; it is a horrible butchery, but indispensable to save the honor of the army and the lives of those who remained exposed, for, to attempt to retire, in open day, by a single bridge, in presence of an enemy double our numbers and artillery, is to expose at least one half of these troops to inevitable destruction. The scene of the night before is renewed in these two villages, which are taken and retaken five or six times by the opposing combatants.



Toward noon, the enemy attempts to turn Aspern by penetrating by a small woody island in the direction of Stadelau; he has already gained ground and is about to take the village in reverse and threaten the little bridges thrown across this branch of the stream. Molitor marches there with his division, now reduced to three thousand combatants, and gathers new laurels, which Masséna also shares. "Sometimes on foot and sometimes mounted, he is seen in the woods, on the island, in the village, sword in hand, directing the attack and defense." The intrepid Legrand, of whom I might say with even greater reason than of Gardanne, "he was a grenadier in stature as well as courage," displayed no less coolness and firmness in Aspern. In the mean time the Prince of Rosenberg also attacks Essling, and is sustained by the Archduke with a brigade of grenadiers. Five times he penetrates into the village, and five times Boudet, immovable in his redoubt, forces him to retire. Finally, at two o'clock, the Archduke, having failed in twenty assaults against the two bastions of our line, decides, though late, to make a decisive attack on the center. If this should succeed, the troops, thrown back on the little bridges which remain, cannot prevent the enemy from destroying them, and the divisions compromised in the villages will be destroyed. The corps of Hohenzollern, sustained by twelve battalions of grenadiers, advances for this purpose. Lannes opposes a vigorous resistance; Hohenzollern is overthrown, and yields the honor of the attack to the grenadiers, who, led by the Archduke in person, attack our artillery with the bayonet. The cavalry at the same time attempt to penetrate between Essling and the Danube. But these efforts are useless. The Archduke, astonished at our firmness and his own losses, renounces the attempt there, and directs his attack on Essling, which he finally carries. If he is left master of this place, nothing can prevent him from debouching on the Danube, and destroying the remnants of those brave troops who sacrifice themselves with so much devotion. I throw against him the cool and intrepid Mouton (Count Lobau), at the head of the brigade of the fusiliers of the guard. The enemy's grenadiers are everywhere defeated; one battalion is captured in the granary and another in the cemetery. The fury of this attack, which surpasses everything, proves to the Archduke that he can obtain no more trophies against men who have resolved to conquer or die. It is near four o'clock; for thirty hours his troops have fought almost incessantly even his reserves have been destroyed; he is satisfied with his successes, and this long and cruel tragedy degenerates into a cannonade, still well kept up by the enemy,

but very inferior on our side for want of munitions. This cannonade, though less dangerous, was still somewhat destructive; a spent ball, thrown from Enzersdorf, struck Marshal Lannes, the most intimate of my companions in Italy, breaking both his legs. Capricious fortune wished to spend all her shafts on me. This news dismayed me. It was time to end this deplorable contest, for our artillery horses were all slain, and a great part of the pieces dismantled; as the parks of reserve had not been able to cross over, the ammunition was exhausted; it was necessary to keep up a supply by successive passages in boats.

COUNCIL OF WAR AND NEW PROJECTS OF NAPOLEON.—We had now to extricate ourselves from this difficult position, and to secure our retreat. I had just examined plans of the island of Lobau, to ascertain its capability to afford us a shelter for two or three days. I also assembled some of my generals in council. Some advised the repassing the Danube, but to do this required a bridge; and even had there been a bridge, I should not have followed such advice, for I had no idea of a general retreat. Davoust, who was present, assured me that he could defend the right bank of the river against all the enterprises of the enemy, and give us time to reconstruct the bridges. Masséna said, that in case of need, if the enemy should place himself on our line of retreat, he could cut his way out sword in hand.

I then addressed them in a few words, reviewing the chances of our position:

“A retreat can be effected only by boats, which is almost impossible; it would be necessary to abandon the wounded, the artillery, and all the horses, and to disorganize the army; the enemy may then cross at Krems or at Presburg, to fall on the rear of our scattered forces, and drive us from Germany, by raising against us the inhabitants of the country. We still possess great resources; it will require only two or three days to reestablish our bridges, and to secure the means of either resuming the offensive or of effecting our retreat voluntarily and in good order. In a few days Eugene must descend from the Styrian Alps; Lefévre will be called from the Tyrol, with a half of the Bavarians, and, even should the enemy, by crossing the river at Lintz, threaten our present line of retreat, Eugene will open a new and safe line on Italy, and we shall then be able to renew our operations with the eight *corps-d'armée* of Eugene, Marmont, Macdonald, Lefévre, Bernadotte, Davoust, Oudinot, and Masséna, besides the imperial guard and the reserves. We must, therefore, remain on the island of Lobau. Masséna, you will com-

plete what you have already so gloriously begun; you can remain here alone and impose upon the Archduke sufficiently to retain him before you for the few days which will be required. The ground of Lobau, which I have just examined, will be favorable for this object."

At these words the eyes of my generals flashed with new fire; each one saw the extent of my resources, and the rapidity of my conception; it was agreed that a retreat should be begun at night, and that the last troops should fall back by two o'clock in the morning, preserving, if possible, the ponton bridge with the *tête-de-pont*, destroying only the small bridges of communication across the branch that masked the reëntering side of the island.

DEATH OF LANNES.—At the moment when I was arranging these dispositions they brought before me the body of Marshal Lannes; he lay stretched out on a litter, just ready to expire. I threw myself upon him, and clasped him in my arms, addressing him by epithets the most dear. Those who witnessed this affecting scene would hardly accuse me of having a cold heart, inaccessible to sentiments of affection, as has so unjustly been alleged against me. In my cabinet, and at the head of military and political affairs, I have generally been able to overcome my natural inclinations, which were far from cruelty and cold insensibility; those capable of judging me would rather accuse me of yielding to bias of friendship.\*

REMARKS ON THE NEW POSITION OF THE FRENCH.—But to return to my army. The retreat was effected in the manner fixed upon, without any obstacle on the part of the enemy, who had fallen back with the mass of his forces, leaving only his advanced guards in our presence. I established my head-

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\*For a more full account of this interesting scene between Napoleon and the dying Lannes, the reader is referred to the work of General Pelet on the campaign of 1809. While Napoleon often blamed the faults of his officers, and sometimes removed them from commands, he never treated them as the English did Admiral Byng. This is shown in his treatment of Baraguay d'Hilliers at Ulm, of Bisson at Friedland, and Berthier at Ratisbon.

Thiers says that Napoleon, "perceiving a litter made of some branches of trees, on which Lannes lay, with his legs amputated, ran to him, pressed him in his arms, spoke hopefully of his recovery, and found him, though heroic as ever, yet keenly affected at seeing himself so soon stopped in that career of glory. 'You are going to lose,' said Lannes, 'him who was your best friend, and your faithful companion-in-arms. May you live and save the army.'"

Napoleon, in his dictations to Montholon, at St. Helena, pays a merited tribute to Lannes and Saint-Hilaire.



quarters at Ebersdorf. The boats were employed the following days in carrying over our provisions and military munitions, and in bringing away the guards and the wounded. Masséna took the general command of all the forces on the island.

Our forces were now withdrawn to the island of Lobau; but our embarrassment was far from ended. Our communication with the right bank of the river was not yet restored; and my army was forty-eight hours on the island without provisions or ammunition. Fortunately, the Austrians did not trouble us. If they had attacked us the next day, the general opinion is, that we would have been unable to resist the fire of their three hundred pieces of artillery, and must have been destroyed. I, however, thought differently. The island of Lobau formed a real intrenched camp, surrounded by a ditch of running water, seventy toises wide, which could not easily have been crossed by the enemy in the presence of an army which had no other alternative than to conquer or die. The Austrian batteries were at a great distance, and they were ignorant of the destitute condition of our caissons. Moreover, these were partially supplied before night by the reception of several boat-loads of military munitions. Undoubtedly the enemy might have greatly annoyed us by his projectiles; but then we were partially covered by the woods on the middle of the island, and my soldiers, who had fought so bravely on the twenty-second without protection, were not likely to jump into the Danube at the approach of a few cannon balls. If the enemy's infantry had penetrated into the island, we should have been on equal terms; they would then have the river behind them as well as we, and I could have thrown myself upon them without hesitation, and have driven them into the Danube. It must be confessed, however, that an attack at this time would have augmented our embarrassment. It would not have cost the Austrians much, for we could not have attacked them, in turn, on the left bank. It is conceded that the Archduke did not attempt everything in his power to annoy us, but it by no means follows, as some of my enemies have endeavored to show, that such an attack would have effected our ruin.

The French army had surpassed itself; in the first day's battle thirty thousand men had fought heroically against forces triple in numbers and materials; and in the second day fifty thousand French had resisted ninety thousand men. Nevertheless, the Austrians and the Archduke Charles had done wonders; the most exacting could scarcely have desired more bravery than they exhibited in their grand attack. We did not recognize them as the same soldiers who had fought at Ratisbon.

The twenty-fifth of May, the bridges having been repaired, every thing was restored to order; and, the next day, the light cavalry put us in communication with the army of Italy.

<sup>1</sup> REPLY TO ROGNIAT'S CRITICISM ON THE BATTLE OF ESSLING.—Such was the bloody battle of Essling, which is to be classed, like that of Eylau, among the battles in which fortune opposed me, but in which I, nevertheless, succeeded by my obstinate perseverance and my superior combinations. This battle has not been wanting in critics, and, among others, General Rogniat has not spared me. He reproaches me with having made the attack on the twenty-second carelessly and without consideration. It may be sufficient to remark, in reply, that eight divisions, resting on the river, and to be immediately followed by four others, may very well begin a battle, in order to gain ground sufficient to maneuver larger forces. If the bridge had not been broken, Davoust would have debouched on the right of Lannes; and then, if this marshal, beaten in the center, as were the Romans at the battle of Cannæ, by the concave line of Hannibal, had been obliged to fall back, Davoust might soon have restored affairs by a change of front on the left of the enemy, like that which had been executed at Eylau, and which he repeated a few weeks after at Wagram.

Rogniat, moreover, imputes to me the fault of having formed the troops of Lannes in too deep masses on the center of the concave line of the enemy, whose superior artillery poured in upon us a concentric and decisive fire. The justice of these reproaches may, at least, be contested. I never was foolish enough to renew here the too famous English column of Fontenoy, by throwing a single deep mass against the middle of a line of concentric fires. The position between Essling and Aspern was calculated to favor an attack on the center, since our flanks were secured from attack by these two bastions. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that an army crossing a river in the face of a superior enemy has but few maneuvers from which to choose. Always, in debouching, it is necessary to rest the two wings on the river; otherwise you risk losing your bridges; you must also have room in rear of your center to form your debouching troops; this forces you to form either a semicircle or a salient angle on the center. There is one exception to this rule—*i. e.*, when the passage is made while the enemy is at a distance, or is so situated as to be unable to approach your flanks. In that case, by a change of front, you may take up your position parallel to the course of the river, as Turenne and Moreau did on the Rhine—the former against Montecuculli, and the latter against Starray. But such

was not our position at Essling. On the first day it was necessary to retain the position between the two villages; after getting our forces ready, we ought to have debouched under the protection of these two bastions, by an oblique movement, pushing forward the right wing, and refusing the left; which was exactly what Lannes and Masséna were intending to execute, if Davoust had been able to reach them. The only thing that can be said of this operation is, that possibly it might have been better to delay the offensive attack until the complete arrival of Davoust's forces, and then to direct it from Essling to Raasdorf. It was in this way that we afterward operated at the battle of Wagram. With respect to the *deep formation of troops*, which, it is alleged, Lannes employed against the enemy, I no more advised it than I do some of the other ideas of my critic. But had the troops of Lannes been drawn up according to the thin formation, there would not have been space for Davoust to form on his right; this would have delayed Davoust's coming into action, and have exposed my center, too thin for resistance, to the attacks of the enemy, while the third *corps-d'armée* was still moving into line. But, in fact, my center was not entirely of the deep formation; the troops were drawn up according to the mixed system. Claparède had his three brigades deployed, two facing to the north, and the third formed crotchetwise to cover themselves against Rosenberg; Saint-Hilaire was also deployed. In fine, Rogniat's criticisms on this battle partake more of the spirit of general denunciation than of a just and searching analytical examination.

#### GENERAL REMARKS ON THE TACTICS OF BATTLES.

—Strategy has been almost a fixed science; it is subject to rigid and almost invariable rules. But not so with tactics of battles—*i. e.*, the manner of drawing up troops on the field, and of bringing them into action. On this subject there is not the same unanimity of opinion among military writers. Indeed, there has been renewed, in our time, the old controversies on the respective advantages of thin and deep formations, subjects long since supposed to be exhausted.

There are various modes of drawing up troops on the field of battle; but none of them can be subjected to anything like invariable rules. The ground, the character of the troops, and various other circumstances, govern each individual case. The thin formation of troops deployed has been constantly followed by Wellington, and some have concluded that, since he triumphed over our columns, this must be the best. In the rugged positions of Spain and Portugal, a defensive line ought to be deployed, and to rely on its fire. If Wellington resisted our columns at Waterloo until the arrival of the Prussians, it was because the deep



mud destroyed the impulsion of these columns, and prevented our artillery from following them; under the circumstances, they were too deep. The principal merit of a column is its impulsion; if the nature of the ground, or its too great mass, prevents it from moving with facility, we experience all the inconveniences of the formation without its advantages. The formation proposed by General Jomini has much merit. It is simply a line of battalions, in columns of attack, ployed on the central division of each battalion. This formation has less depth and more mobility than the column of Folard, and has greater stability than the thin or deployed formation. We frequently employed it in our earlier campaigns; but afterwards, as our armies increased in numbers, the desire of having our troops more concentrated and disposable induced us sometimes to form them in too deep and heavy masses. Instead of forming columns of battalions by divisions, we formed heavy columns of grand divisions by battalion, each grand division composed of twelve battalions. This formation was a fault at Albuera, Moskwa, and Waterloo, but not at Essling.

It should be observed that when a deep column is formed, or a line of small columns of attack by battalions, it is indispensable that the flanks should be protected with troops marching by file. The greatest difficulty with a column is in being compelled to stop and repel an attack on its flank. But if each flank is protected by troops marching by file, these troops will cover it from the enemy's charges, while the column continues its offensive impulsion.

The system of small squares by battalion, followed by the English, is not without advantages. A battalion of eight companies may be formed into oblong squares, three in front and rear, and one on each flank, these last marching by file. This mode of formation presents a front greater by one company than the column of attack of battalions by divisions. It has, however, much less impulsion than the column, but it is more advantageous when it becomes necessary to employ the fire, inasmuch as it has one-half more fire and one-half less mass exposed to the enemy's artillery. It is preferable to the thin formation of deployed battalions, because it has more strength, and may be moved over ground of almost any character.

The general rules for the tactics of battle may be summed up as follows:

1st. In a defensive battle, the mixed formation of the first line deployed, and the second line in columns of attack of battalions by divisions, is deemed the most perfect.

2d. In an offensive battle, I prefer the formation in two lines of columns of attack of battalions by divisions on the central division, placing the columns of the second line opposite to the intervals of the first, so as to present less mass to the enemy's artillery, and to give greater facility for the movement of the columns in advancing and in retreat. The intervals between the battalions may be filled with sharpshooters or artillery.

3d. Where the troops are habitually formed in two ranks, each of these columns of attack will be composed of four divisions, and, therefore, eight files in depth; the column in this case has less depth in proportion to its front, and is less exposed to disorder, than when the troops are formed in three ranks, or the battalion is composed of more than four divisions.

4th. In order to give every possible advantage to the impulsive action, the command should be divided in depth; *i. e.*, each brigade should have its front and second line, so that every general officer will have the means at his disposal for forming a reserve without being obliged to seek it elsewhere.

5th. The formation of squares by battalions may be employed with advantage on very level ground. It has less solidity and impulsion than columns of battalions; but it possesses some advantages against cavalry and musketry. The parallelogram has the inconvenience of being more narrow and cramped on the flanks, but it has more mobility, more fire, and greater front than the perfect square.

6th. The deep formation of heavy columns of grand divisions with battalions formed in rear of each other should only be used when the space is too narrow for a more extended formation. And even then the flanks should be protected by troops marching by file and also by sharpshooters.

7th. These variations in *formations* should not be allowed to influence the general principles of grand tactics as applied to the several *orders of battle*.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ITALY.—But enough on this subject. Let us now return from our digression, and review the operations of the army of Italy, whose timely arrival at the appointed position effected so happy a diversion in our favor. In our previous relation we left it behind the Adige, after its ill success at the battle of Sacile; it was there reinforced by a division from the south of Italy. The Archduke John, forced to leave a corps to carry on the siege of Palmanova and observe Venice, advanced to Caldiero; but on hearing of the battles of Abensberg and Eckmühl, and of our march on Vienna, he feared that he might be cut off, and commenced a retreat. The Aulic Coun-

cil, far from expecting this, had flattered itself that he would continue his successes in Italy, and thus effect a powerful diversion to the affairs in Germany.

The Archduke, however, thought differently. Disquieted by the situation of Venice and the corps of Marmont, who was guarding Dalmatia, and by the attitude of the Viceroy, who was receiving reinforcements, he thought he might expose himself to probable ruin, and that it would be better to rally on the Archduke Charles and save the monarchy. Allowing that the circumstances of the case justified this retreat, it may, at least, be said, that it might have been better conducted.

**BATTLE OF THE PIAVE.**—Having fallen back behind the Piave, the Archduke thought that he would be able to defend the passage of this torrent, which, like the Tagliamento, runs in a deep ravine, fordable except in time of the great rains or the melting of the snow. He therefore halted behind this river, which Eugene passed with his army on the eighth of May; the operation was not simultaneous; his two advanced guards forded the stream a league apart. Desaix commanded the one on the left; it debouched with boldness and was vigorously charged by the imperial cavalry under the orders of Wolfskehl. Eugene had not his infantry in position to be disposable; the water was every moment rising from the melting of the snows; it had become necessary to employ rafts for the passage of the troops. Wolfskehl, at the head of three thousand horse, bravely charges the six battalions of Desaix formed in squares; the Archduke John advances with the infantry to sustain him; his columns move slowly, and Desaix opposes an immovable barrier against the cavalry. Eugene, seeing the danger, flies to the menaced point, harangues the dragoons of Sahuc and Pully, and hurls them against the enemy. A bloody combat ensues; Wolfskehl is slain and his artillery captured. Our brave dragoons, notwithstanding their inferiority in numbers, drive the enemy's squadrons back upon the infantry of Colloredo, which has advanced into the plain, and throw it into disorder. This exploit gains time, and enables Macdonald to debouch with the division of Lamarque; Grenier follows with the divisions of Abbé. The Archduke, who has lost the favorable opportunity, prepares for the main attack, at the moment when Eugene has united thirty-eight battalions of infantry and four thousand horse. Eugene directs his attack by the right; Grenier executes it with the assistance of Macdonald; the enemy is every where vigorously pushed; but, the country being cut up with dikes and canals, we are not able to profit by our success. The Archduke attempts to



pass the night behind a canal; the dragoons of Grouchy and Pully close, at eight o'clock, by a brilliant charge, the operations of the day. The Archduke falls back on Conegliano, after having uselessly sacrificed seven or eight thousand men, in a battle which he should never have fought, or which, if fought at all, should have been conducted offensively at the moment when the French were acting under the disadvantage of a difficult passage of the river, conducted by successive embarkations. The result of this contest caused him to relinquish the idea of making a stand behind the Tagliamento, and he, in all haste, regained the Noric Alps, by the valley of Fella.

EUGENE PURSUES THE AUSTRIANS.—The Viceroy, in imitation of my march in 1797, detached Macdonald with two divisions by the road to Laybach, in order to connect with Marmont; Serras took the central route to Predel; Eugene and Grenier marched to the left on Malborghetto and Tarvis. The Archduke John hoped to effect his retreat without molestation, under protection of the intrenchments or forts with which he crowned the defiles of Malborghetto, Tarvis, and Predel, on the two roads that lead to Villach, and of Prevald on the road to Laybach. He left small detachments in each of these places and retired twenty leagues to near Villach.

Eugene, who circumspectly followed in pursuit, on the seventeenth of May, captured the fort of Malborghetto, after a vigorous assault, not less honorable to the assailants than to the little Austrian garrison, most of whom died fighting.

Flitsch and Tarvis are carried in the same way, and Serras is equally successful at Predel, against a no less vigorous resistance. The troops of Macdonald easily gain possession of the intrenched camp of Laybach and the fort of Prevald. The commandants and militia garrisons of these posts surrendered after little or no opposition. We here took five thousand prisoners. Schilt made a sortie with the garrison of Palmanova, captured Trieste without opposition, and made several rich prizes there. These operations had the double advantage of isolating the Austrians from the English, by closing to the latter the ports of the Adriatic, and of facilitating the junction of Marmont. The previous retreat of Eugene behind the Mincio had left this corps in Dalmatia in a dangerous position. General Stoischwitz had at first observed Marmont with eight thousand men; Knesewich, at the head of the Croat militia which had been assembled at Agram, was to assist Stoischwitz; and Zach, governor of Istria and Trieste, gaining possession of Capo-d'Istria in concert with the English cruisers, was to completely cut off his communications.

Marmont, after the battle of Sacile, was summoned to surrender, and, as he could do no better, he refused to answer, and retired to the mountains to await the result. Numerous unimportant contests took place between this and the middle of May, when, hearing of the retreat of the Austrians, he marched toward Carniole to effect a junction.

**RETREAT OF THE ARCHDUKE JOHN ON GRATZ.**—The Archduke John, who had allowed his advanced guards to be crushed twenty leagues distant from himself, received at Villach, on the nineteenth of May, the letter of the Archduke Charles, directing him to march on Lintz. Although this movement was tardy, still it was possible of execution; the prince, however, deemed it dangerous to throw himself in the midst of my army, with the Viceroy in hot pursuit, and directed his march on Gratz. The division of Jellachich, which had operated in the Alps of Salzburg, in order to connect Hiller with the Archduke John, being hemmed in on the right and left by our columns, received orders to march likewise from Rottenmann on Gratz, by the valley of the Muhr. It is overtaken at Saint-Michel, on the twenty-fifth of May, by the divisions of Serras and Durutte. Jellachich received battle between the Muhr and the rocks which inclose the valley. He was turned by the heights and pierced in front by the cavalry, and, out of seven thousand men, escaped to Leoben with scarcely three thousand.

The Archduke John, instead of being reinforced at Gratz by the troops of Jellachich, as he had expected, found merely the wrecks of this division; and fearing lest he might be hemmed in between my army and that of Eugene, he took the road to Kormond, on the twenty-sixth, still ignorant, it is said, of the result of the battle of Essling, of which he heard the news of the twenty-seventh. This prince has been reproved for not executing the orders of his brother; some have even gone so far as to calculate the favorable results for the Austrian monarchy which would have been produced by a march on Lintz. Without pretending to deny the momentary embarrassment which sixty thousand men well conducted might have caused us, it must, nevertheless, be remembered that I had in part provided for this danger by the position, in echelons, of my troops. Bernadotte had just arrived at Lintz; the Bavarians had just entered Innsbruck victorious, and they still retained Salzburg; forty thousand Saxons and Bavarians would be found on the line of the Inn or the Traun, after they had destroyed the bridge at Lintz, in order to prevent the junction of Kolowrath and the Archduke John. The Viceroy would have followed on the heels of the latter, and put himself

in communication with the Bavarians on the one side and with me on the other. It is not difficult to imagine which, under these circumstances, would have been most embarrassed, myself or the Archduke John. After effecting my junction with Eugene, I would have turned upon the Archduke and made him experience the fate of Lusignan, of Provera, and of the other corps with which the Austrians have often attempted to surround me.

**JUNCTION OF THE ARMIES OF NAPOLEON AND EUGENE.**—Eugene, finding no obstacle on the road to Vienna, after the departure of his adversary for Kormond, pushed forward his vanguard to the mountain of Sommering, where they formed a junction with the light troops which Davoust had sent from Neustadt. This junction caused the greatest joy on both sides—a joy which was still further increased by the report that the bridges were restored; this completed the restoration of confidence. Eugene hastened to collect all his disposable forces to cross the chain of the Sommering, while the little division of Rusca guarded La Carinthia, and observed the Tyrol, and the division of Broussier besieged the castle of Gratz, guarded Styria, and observed the valley of the Linn.

**INSURRECTION IN WESTPHALIA AND PRUSSIA.**—The rapidity of my march on Vienna, and the importance of the operations that ensued, have forced me to omit all account of what was passing at this moment in Poland and the north of Germany, where a general insurrection was about to break out from the conspiracies of which I have already spoken. The plans of the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, of Dornberg, and Schill failed for want of concert in the execution.

According to the best accounts that can be obtained, the early part of May was fixed upon for this insurrection. Many accidents tended to derange a plan so complicated. Incited by the early successes of the Austrians in Bavaria, certain insurgents had assembled at Wolfshagen by the twenty-third of April. Jerome, informed of this event, directed Dornberg to march against the insurgents. Thinking his project discovered, and himself an outlaw, he fled and joined the rebels. Jerome was at first amazed at this news; then, presenting himself to his guards, he declared to them that he intrusted his person to their honor and loyalty. This generous appeal was addressed to brave men who knew how to appreciate it; and even those who were little disposed in his favor swore that they would not abandon him.

Jerome's minister of war was a man well known for his cool judgment and decision of character. So well had he made his



dispositions that his troops, from Wesel and Mayence to Cassel, all moved at once; and Dornberg, pursued, beaten, and dispersed by Rewbell, escaped with a mere handful of officers to join the Duke of Brunswick in Saxony.

Schill, exposed by the seizure of Dornberg's papers, determined not to await his arrest. Leaving Berlin on the twenty-ninth of April, at the head of his regiment of hussars, he found the Saxon troops at Wittenberg not disposed to join his projects. He marched to Magdeburg on the seventh of May, where the Westphalian battalions were prevented from joining him by the firmness of General Michaud and Colonel Wouthier. He now threw himself on the lower Elbe, expecting aid from the English, who had announced a considerable armament for the Baltic, and who had, in fact, made demonstrations with several vessels toward Stade. General Gratien, who commanded a Dutch brigade at Erfurth, started in pursuit, while General Eblé caused him to be followed on the other side by the Westphalians.

The Prussian cabinet at Königsberg hearing, at the same time, the illegal operations of Schill and our victories, hastened with great zeal to disavow what it had probably never authorized. Schill was condemned; if we had been beaten at Ratisbon, he would have been declared a hero! Nevertheless, it would be absurd to suppose that his operation was directed by the cabinet itself, with the intention of declaring either for or against him, according to the turn of affairs. Such a project would have been unworthy of the character of Frederick William.

Having collected only about twelve or fifteen hundred men, and being hotly pursued by the Westphalians, Dutch, and a brigade of Danes, he took refuge in the dismantled fortress of Stralsund. He was attacked here on the thirty-first of May, and completely defeated; being reduced to despair, he determined to sell his life as dearly as possible; but at last, covered with wounds, he fell lifeless upon the dead bodies of his enemies, which he had formed into a kind of rampart around him.\*

The Duke of Brunswick left Bohemia, the fourteenth of May, with his Legion of Death;† but, not finding in Saxony the support which he expected, he returned again to Bohemia. In fine, the victories of Abensberg, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon had spread terror throughout Germany, and held in check all who were disposed to join the conspirators.

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\*Some say that he fell by the hands of his own conspirators.

†So called from their uniform, which was all of black, with a death's head embroidered on their shakos, emblem of the eternal hatred which this prince and his soldiers had declared against the French.

**AFFAIRS OF THE TYROL.**—In the mean time the Tyrol had become the theater of important events. Chasteler, hearing of my victories in Bavaria, left Roveredo to return to the north. Marshal Lefébyre, after having driven Jellachich from Salzburg toward Rastadt, ascended the valley of the Inn on Kufstein; he defeated the advanced guard of Chasteler and the insurgents, in the defiles of Lomer, St. Johann, Feursinger, and finally at Grattenberg. The Bavarians, still full of enthusiasm from their successes at Abensberg, and indignant at the excesses committed on their comrades, precipitated themselves like madmen into the narrow defiles, and overthrew every thing before them. The main body of Chasteler's forces, completely defeated at Worgel and at Schwatz, fell back on the Brenner, where he received orders from the Archduke John to retire into La Carinthia. Chasteler now proposed a treaty of evacuation and an armistice; Wrede replied by sending him a decree offering a reward for his head! This insurrection had exasperated me against him; I stood on the brink of a volcano; his native country being now united to France, if he was resolved to still fight against me, he ought to have done so in legitimate warfare, and not in stirring up insurrection against me; I treated him as a bandit; his brain was affected by it.

The Tyrolese now gave up all idea of defense; and Lefébyre entered Innsbruck on the nineteenth of May. The insurrectionary committee resolved to send to the King of Bavaria promises of submission; nevertheless, a part of the country still remained in arms, and the presence of the Bavarians was scarcely sufficient to restrain the exasperated inhabitants of the valleys.

**OPERATIONS IN POLAND.**—In Poland our arms experienced some reverses. The Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of thirty-six thousand men, had marched on Warsaw. Poniatowski, after having bravely fought against forces double his own at Razyn, concluded a treaty of evacuation and fell back on the Narew, under the support of Modlin. The government took refuge at Tykoczin. After this fine beginning, Ferdinand extended his forces along the Vistula, threw a bridge across the river at Gohra, and ordered it to be intrenched; he then carried his vanguard, under Mohr, before Praga, whose *tête-de-pont* was defended by the Poles. Poniatowski profited by this fault, fell on Mohr, and defeated him at Grochow; he afterward sent Pelletier and Sokolnicki to seize upon the *tête-de-pont* which had just been begun at Gohra, and the two battalions charged with its construction. Ferdinand flew to their aid, but was too late;

he then decided to descend the Vistula and seize upon the *lête-de-pont* of Thorn.

In a military point of view, this eccentric expedition into Poland is entirely inexcusable; for even supposing that the Archduke Ferdinand had carried his successes to the gates of Dantzic, still Austria, defeated on the Danube, must have fallen. But in a political point of view, this incursion was not so blamable; for if they had succeeded in dissolving the little Polish army and gaining possession of the duchy and Thorn, they would flatter themselves that Prussia might be induced to join them by offering her the restitution of the provinces which were dismembered from her states by the treaty of Tilsit; but things turned out very differently.

Far from despairing because of the inferiority of his forces, Prince Poniatowski took, in conformity with my orders, the bold resolution to leave the enemy master of the left bank of the Vistula, to ascend the right and fall on Galicia. Encouraged by his successes at Grochow and Gohra, he threw himself on Lublin and Sandomir, and captured the former; General Sokolnicki took forcible possession of Sandomir, and General Pelletier carried Zomose by escalade, while Dombrowski threw himself with a single squadron into Posen, and incited the inhabitants of Great Poland, where he had exercised great influence since 1794. The Archduke Ferdinand retraced his own steps the more rapidly as a corps of thirty thousand Russians, under Prince Gallitsen, were advancing toward Lemberg, at the same time that Poniatowski consolidated his conquests in Galicia, and threatened the Austrian line of retreat. The militia levied by Zayonschech entered Warsaw the second of June. The Archduke, harassed in his retreat by Zayonschech, drove him back on the Pilica. Reaching Sandomir on the fifteenth, with his artillery of reserve, and hearing that this place was occupied only by the feeble brigade of Sokolnicki, Prince Ferdinand resolved to seize it in the night; the outworks are carried, and an Austrian column penetrates even into the body of the place; nevertheless, after ten hours of most noble defense, the Poles rout them with a loss of five hundred prisoners, and a thousand men *hors-de-combat*; but, as the garrison is destitute of almost every thing, Sokolnicki prefers to evacuate the place rather than compromise his brave soldiers in a new attack, and therefore rejoins the army. The Archduke, now master of Sandomir, marches on the Pilica toward Petrikau; Zayonschech occupies Gohra; Poniatowski is at Pulawy and Radom. A few days after, the Archduke again falls back on Sandomir; and finally, at the beginning of July, Poniatowski.



reinforced by Zayonschech, compelled him to march toward Cracovia, which he occupied on the ninth. The Russians extend along the San and also approach Cracovia. But they do not desire to make conquests which might tend to strengthen the grand duchy, to whose very existence they are opposed. This fact accounts for the operations of the Russians at this time in Poland—operations of which historians have been so much troubled to ascertain the motives.

SITUATION OF AFFAIRS IN GERMANY.—It is time to return to my army on the Danube. Although the immediate consequences of the battle of Essling might induce my enemies to think that they had gained a victory, still, as they allowed us time to reëstablish the great bridge, I was entirely satisfied respecting the ultimate consequences in a military point of view. But not so in its political results. All Germany might be shaken by it; they every where published the news of my defeat and subsequent retreat, giving all the details, and predicting my speedy and total overthrow. The Tyrolese, ready to make their submission, were again full of insurrection. General Amende got possession of Dresden, and, uniting with the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, marched on Leipsic, forcing the Court of Saxony to seek refuge in Frankfort. Another column, under General Radiwojewich, leaving Egra, penetrated to Baireuth and Nuremberg, and overran the country, to incite the people to insurrection. Minds which our victories at Ratisbon had cooled not a little again became excited, and the chiefs of the secret association did not lose the occasion to stir up insurrection. Nor did the Court of Vienna, on its side, fail to magnify their success at Essling, in order to induce Prussia to declare against me. The Emperor himself wrote to the King; M. de Stadion, through the Prince of Orange, urged this monarch to declare himself; the ambassador, Wessenberg, continued to negotiate. General Steigentesch, who had been to Königsberg, with the hope of concerting plans of operation, returned to Berlin, where he sought to incite not only the Westphalians, but also the people of Prussia. The fear of becoming compromised with Russia restrained Frederick William; nevertheless, his ministers, opposed to the solicitations of Austria merely the fear of a separate peace, which antecedents gave them good reasons to apprehend. This was good proof that but little further success on the part of Austria would be necessary to induce Prussia to declare against me. The advices which I received from England informed me of the near departure of a gigantic maritime expedition—a true *armada*, greatly superior to that with which Philip II. formerly menaced

Great Britain. Between forty and fifty thousand men, with one hundred field pieces, and an immense siege equipage, were prepared for embarkation; including the maritime forces, more than one hundred thousand men were engaged in this armament. These troops would probably act either in the north of Germany or in Holland. A few successes in either of these directions would undoubtedly decide Prussia, whose faith was already shaken by the demi-victory of Essling. An army of one hundred thousand Anglo-Prussians, which, by insurgents, Prussian militia, and Westphalians, would, in a few months, be increased to two hundred thousand combatants, might shake my power, and entirely change the face of affairs. The delays and egotism of the English cabinet, however, saved me at this crisis.

AFFAIRS IN ROME.—But my affairs were still more complicated by what was at this time passing in the south of Italy. The English and Sicilians threatened Naples with a great expedition fitted out at Palermo. The Pope, encouraged by the chances which the war in Spain offered to my enemies, had hurled many anathemas against me in his consistorial allocutions. After his refusal to adhere to the Italian league, and the loss of Ancona and Urbin, which resulted from it, the Holy See was naturally hostile to us; it entered the coalition against me. The English, in order to incite Italy, and favor their expedition, became more than ever the auxiliaries of Rome. The time to execute my grand project seemed to me to have arrived, and I determined to make an end of it. On my entry into Vienna, four days before the battle of Essling, I issued a decree uniting Rome and the states of the Church to the French Empire. The Pope, as the spiritual chief of the Church, was to retain his palaces and enjoy an annual revenue of two millions of francs, which was to be made up to him from the imperial treasury. This decree, which was communicated to Rome on the tenth of June, was followed the next day by a bull of excommunication—a measure which would have been merely ridiculous were it not for the war with Spain, but which, under the circumstances, might render that war the more obstinate. In this strange philippic Pius VII. did not hesitate to exhibit the principles of the disciples of Loyola and all the surly pride of a Gregory VII. or a Boniface VIII. His bull contained, among others, the following sentence: “*Let sovereigns learn once more that they are subjected by the law of Jesus Christ to our throne and to our command; for we, also, exercise a sovereignty, but a sovereignty much more noble, unless it be said that the soul is inferior to the flesh, and heavenly things to those of the earth.*”

**THE POPE TRANSFERRED TO SAVONA.**—Just at this time the news of the battle of Essling reached Rome, the success of the Austrians being magnified by the usual Italian exaggerations; every thing combined to excite the populace. I had withdrawn from this capital all the disposable troops to reinforce the Viceroy; and Murat had enough to do to defend his own capital from the expedition that was cruising against it. The governor of Rome, Miollis, had only a handful of soldiers. His reports of the state of things at Rome, and the indications of insurrection there, alarmed Murat. He charged Miollis to send away the Pope, so as to be more free to act in case of an actual outbreak in the city. This general transferred the Holy Father to Tuscany, within the domains of my sister Eliza; but the latter, fearing the responsibility of such a deposit, caused him to be conducted to Turin. On hearing of these events, I had the Pope transferred to Savona, where he would be treated with the respect due to his rank, until the favorable moment should arrive for executing my project of removing the chair of St. Peter and establishing it in France. The firmness of Miollis and the resolution of Murat saved the south of Italy; but the responsibility of the removal of the Pope I am willing to take, if need be; for, although I did not direct this removal, I had projected it two years before.

**MEASURES OF NAPOLEON FOR REPAIRING THE CHECK RECEIVED AT ESSLING.**—The storm which threatened the north, still more serious than that which troubled Italy, was tardy in its approach, and my adversaries thus gave me time to repair all my losses. In the accomplishment of this task I exerted all the vigor and rapidity of which I was capable. I had already given the prelude to these measures, by directing the construction of solid bridges, and the concentration of my forces about Vienna. The Viceroy descended the mountains of Styria on Neustadt. Leaving to the Tyrolese a momentary success, Lefebvre and Wrede, at the head of the Bavarian troops, received orders to fall back from Innspruck on Lintz; Bernadotte was to echelon on the Danube in such a manner as to join me in forty-eight hours.

As soon as our communications were reëstablished, I directed Davoust to place his divisions in echelons on Presburg, to oppose the preparations which the enemy was making to establish a passage there. The Archduke Charles, instead of marching there with his entire army, had merely detached the division of Bianchi, with orders to prepare a bridge, and to secure it by entrenchments, on an island separated from the right bank by



a very small arm of the river. Davoust found the enemy occupied in throwing up these works, and caused him to be attacked. But, as Davoust had no means of crossing this arm, of twenty toises, which separated him from the Austrians, he was unable to dislodge them, but he paralyzed all the advantages of their position by strongly occupying the village of Engereau, which almost entirely barred the reëntering angle formed by the Danube, opposite to the position occupied by the enemy's bridge.

On the Main, Junot assembled a *corps-d'armée* of contingents and provisional regiments, formed of French conscripts, in order to cover Saxony and Westphalia in concert with my brother Jerome. Augsburg, now the center of our *dépôts*, was placed in a state of defense, and secured by a strong division organized by General Lagrange. I urged forward the reparation and increase of the defenses of Passau. Our parks soon repaired the losses of the campaign.

In order not to awaken the attention of the enemy, I left my camp at Ebersdorf to return to the palace of Schönbrunn, where they imagined I was dosing beneath its gilded canopies. All the month of June was employed in arranging the means and measures for restoring victory. Fortunately for us, England and Prussia interfered with these measures only by hatching new plots and stupid conspiracies, or by the partial organization of legions of adventurers.

EUGENE MARCHES AGAINST THE ARCHDUKE JOHN.—This forced silence was, nevertheless, broken by a few military operations; the most important were those of the Viceroy against the army of the Archduke John. This prince in retiring on Hungary had added still more to his eccentric direction, by carrying the corps of Giulay into the Illyrian provinces, either because he feared that Marmont might invade these provinces, or because he wished to cover every thing in his retreat after the manner of Bülow.\* On the other hand, he expected to be reinforced in the direction of Kormond by the troops of the Hungarian insurrection. Situated as he was, with both my army and the Danube between him and the Archduke Charles, I could detach against him as many troops as I might deem proper.

It was now important for us to enlarge our theatre of action about Vienna, and to get rid of this troublesome neighbor. I directed Eugene to march against him, and to get possession of Raab, a place strengthened by an old bastioned *enceinte* with

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\*Bülow recommends an army in retreat to follow eccentric lines—the surest possible mode of securing its own total destruction!

some counter-guards and demilunes; in fine, to push the Archduke away so far as to enable the army of Italy to return to me when I should wish to begin operations. Eugene perfectly accomplished his task.

BATTLE OF RAAB.—The Austrian generalissimo had, in the mean time, dispatched orders to the Archduke John to march toward Presburg, and had detached ten thousand men in that direction to secure the junction, construct a bridge, and intrench the large island, which would give to the Austrians the same advantages as were secured to us by Lobau. But nothing of this was done in time. Eugene marched on Kommond; on his approach the Archduke John fell back on Raab, where his brother, the Archduke Rainer, had organized the Hungarian insurrection; he took a very strong position, connected by his right to the place and to an intrenched camp. He numbered about twenty-two thousand old soldiers and eighteen thousand militia. Eugene reached the enemy on the thirteenth, and determined to attack him the next day. It was a day of happy presage—the anniversary of Marengo, and the deliverance of Italy! His troops, animated by the recollection of these great events and of their recent successes, crossed the Pancha, and attacked the enemy with impetuosity. Eugene maneuvered to form his line of attack by echelons on the right, but this soon degenerated into a parallel order of battle. Grenier charged the left of the enemy at the farm of Kismegger with the division of Serras, while the cavalry under Grouchy and Montbrun sought to turn that wing. Durutte sustained them on the center; on our left, Baraguay d'Hilliers, with the Italians, attacked the village of Schabadegki, which was several times taken and retaken. Pauthod formed the reserve until the arrival of Macdonald, who was expected during the day. The enemy's reserves are now brought into action, which for a time renders the contest doubtful. The intrenched farm prevents our right from gaining any decided success. The Italians and Durutte are driven back. Eugene hastens to place himself at their head; he recalls to their minds the victories they have already won, and exhorts them to new efforts, and, better still, advances the division of Pauthod to their support. The impulse is given, the right of the Archduke is forced and separated from Raab. Durutte and Serras regain their lost ascendancy, and push the center. The enemy is routed, and retreats toward Comorn, leaving four thousand prisoners, and three thousand men *hors-de-combat*. The Archduke John covers his retreat with his grenadiers and the *landwehrs* of Styria. These last on the day of the battle rival the conduct of the best regiment; one

of their battalions defend the farm of Kissmegger to the death, the few that remain being sacrificed by our irritated soldiery. This victory of Raab, the more glorious for being gained over vastly superior forces, completed the consolidation of our position. The Archduke rallied his forces under Comorn.

**RESULTS OF THE BATTLE AND SIEGE OF RAAB.—**This success, though important in itself, derived an additional interest from the character of the epoch in which it was gained. The Tyrol was then, more than ever, on fire. No sooner had the Tyrolese heard of the result at Essling, related by the Austrians with the greatest exaggeration, than they retraced the steps taken by the committee for giving in their submission, and assumed an attitude more threatening than ever. The departure of Lefebvre for Lintz with two divisions left General Deroi alone in the center of the insurgent country; surrounded in the narrow valley of the Inn by forces quintuple his own, he deemed himself exceedingly fortunate in regaining Bavaria, by Rosenhaym, on the twenty-eighth of May.

The insurgents, now masters of the field, under the direction of Hormeyer, became intoxicated with their success, and made numerous incursions into the adjacent parts of the country. At the north, they annoyed Bavaria; in the south, they drove Rusca from the confines of La Carinthia; in the west, they made incursions into Swabia in concert with the insurgents of the Voralberg, and spread terror even to the Rhine. Chasteler, who had evacuated this country, leaving behind him only a single brigade of Austrians, under General Buol, crossed our posts of Carinthia and Styria to connect himself with the Archduke John. By connecting himself with the detachments of Zach and the corps of Giulay, he might give us trouble by debouching on our communications in concert with the Hungarian insurrection. The operations of Eugene and the victory of Raab dissipated these fears. It was important, however, for us to profit by the present success to gain possession of Raab itself. This place, situated near the confluence of the river Raab and the Danube, was fortified by an old *enceinte*, of seven bastions, constructed against the Turks; between this place and the Danube was an intrenched camp of some three miles in circumference; but none of these works were either in good order or well armed. The possession of Raab was of great importance to the enemy, as it gave him a *debouche* on the right of the Danube. I, therefore, resolved to take this place, cost what it might. The Archduke John had garrisoned it by only two thousand four hundred men, and half of these were militia. Eugene sent Lauriston to make the attack, with a



park sent from Vienna. The place fell on the twenty-fourth of June, at the very moment when the Archduke Charles was directing measures for its succor; but they were too late.

**THE ARCHDUKE JOHN'S DISOBEDIENCE OF HIS BROTHER'S ORDERS.**—The Archduke Charles had much cause to complain of his brother's conduct; he had neglected to execute the march on Lintz, which had been directed, in order to act in concert on my communications; nor had he so maneuvered as to connect himself with the grand army by leaving Kormond in time to reach Raab and Presburg, and avoid giving battle with his isolated corps. In fine, he had posted himself at Raab contrary to instructions; he had allowed himself to be forced into an eccentric retreat on Comorn, and had made no efforts to raise the siege of Raab. In truth, Prince John thought less of ranging himself under the colors of his brother, with a portion of his army, than of uniting in Styria and Carniola the several corps in the Illyrian provinces, under Zach, Chasteler, and Giulay. He hoped to form, in this way, an army of fifty thousand men, exclusive of the Hungarian levy, and to acquire glory on his own account, by acting against my extreme right and my communications. This, considered as an isolated plan, was not so very objectionable; but, by acting in this way on his own account, instead of obeying orders, he deranged the calculations of his generalissimio.

**BOMBARDMENT OF PRESBURG.**—After having deferred for a long time, he, at last, repaired to Presburg, at the moment when I was directing its bombardment. It was important for me to remove all fears of a passage of the Danube, by destroying all the materials collected by the enemy for this object, and all the works that were in any way calculated to facilitate such an operation. It was also essential to draw the enemy's attention from the more important to some secondary point. Davoust summoned the Austrians to suspend the works on the bridge, or, otherwise, he would bombard the city. The Emperor Francis was passing there at the time, to visit the remains of the army of Italy; Bianchi returned a sharp and provoking answer to Davoust's summons, and the firing immediately began. Our shells burned one-sixtieth part of the buildings. The Archduke Charles protested against it, and I promised him to stop the bombardment, which had no other object than to fix the enemy's attention in that direction. Davoust, at the same time, received confidential notice of the passage which I meditated, and orders to get possession of the *tête-du-pont* of Presburg, or the island of Stadt-aue, which flanked it. The latter place was carried on the thirtieth, with great valor, by the brave Colonel Decouz.

**MARMONT'S MARCH.**—The grand epoch of the campaign was approaching. I was now only waiting for a considerable convoy of artillery and munitions, an augmentation of our bridge equipage, and the arrival of Marmont's corps, which we had left on the frontiers of Bosnia, and which was coming rather slowly, it is true—to take part in the decisive battle. Being informed about the middle of May of our victories in Germany, and of the Archduke John's retreat before Eugene, Marmont assembled his forces at Zara, and advanced on the Save, in order to form a junction with the right wing of the army of Italy. After several pretty warm affairs on the banks of the Lika, on the twenty-first of May, and at Ottochatz, on the twenty-fifth, he marched by Fiume on Laybach, which place he did not reach till the third of June. At this moment Chasteler was evacuating the Tyrol, and endeavoring to effect a passage in rear of the Viceroy; he threatened Villach and Klagenfurth, which places Rusca guarded with very weak detachments. He would have been lost if Marmont had only accelerated the march of his corps; as it was, he effected his escape by Volkermark and Stein behind the Drave. Although Marmont had great obstacles to surmount, in order to reach Carniola, marching in the midst of three hostile corps, still, it was not impossible for him to have accelerated his march a few days. His greatest fault, however, was remaining at Laybach from the third to the sixteenth of June, and allowing the bands of Giulay to march on Marburg, and again prevent him from effecting his junction.

**OPERATIONS OF GIULAY.**—The Archduke John on leaving the Frioul had detached Giulay to Croatia, of which he was the military chief or *ban*. This general collected at Agram a division of seven or eight thousand men with a body of militia. He afterward received orders to march toward Marburg, in order to connect himself with the Archduke in the direction of Gratz. He was so tardy, however, in the accomplishment of this, that he did not reach that city till the fifteenth of June, after the defeat of the Archduke at Raab, which was distant about fifty leagues. He then collected the several detachments which were scattered through these provinces in consequence of the operations, and, finding himself at the head of twenty thousand men, he hoped to prevent at least the junction of Marmont. For this purpose he advanced, the twentieth of June, on Windischfriestritz, with the corps of Zach and Knesewich; but Marmont, hearing at Gonowitz of his approach, and now moving with as much activity as he had formerly been slow and circumspect, he passed the Drave, by a forced march, at Volkermark the twenty-second, and

reached the Kaynach near Gratz, on the twenty-fourth. He expected here to unite with Broussier's division, which had remained at the siege of the citadel of Gratz.

COMBAT OF GRATZ.—As Giulay had allowed Marmont to escape, he now determined to prevent his junction with Broussier, by preceding him at Gratz; he reached Kalsdorf on the twenty-fourth, and pushed forward his cavalry to the gates of the city. Broussier had at first raised the siege of the castle in order to fall back two leagues on the road to Vienna; but, on hearing that Marmont was about to debouch from Liboch on Gratz, he first drove the enemy from Kalsdorf and then resumed his position, with the understanding that he would reoccupy Gratz with a detachment, and effect a junction the following day at Kalsdorf. But the enemy was prepared to prevent the execution of this project, having eighteen thousand men encamped at the gates of the capital of Styria.

When the two battalions of the eighty-fourth presented themselves, on the twenty-fifth, Giulay attacked them with considerable forces. They threw themselves into a cemetery of the *faubourgs*, where they were surrounded and assailed on all sides; an active and bloody fight ensued. Broussier, on hearing the violence of the fire, detached three battalions to their assistance. These brave men cut their way through numerous enemies to join the eighty-fourth in the cemetery. The dead bodies with which the ground was covered proved the fierceness of the attack and the heroism of the resistance. At last the enemy yielded, and our brave men embraced each other; but, not satisfied with being delivered themselves, they carried the *faubourg* of Graben, took four hundred prisoners, and put twelve hundred men *hors-de-combat*.

This noble feat of arms, superior in some respects to any other in this campaign, commanded the admiration even of our enemies, and secured the junction of Marmont and Broussier.\*

Giulay, being unsuccessful against two battalions, deemed it useless to contend with three divisions, and fell back on Gnass.

Marmont continued his march on the road to Vienna, and received orders to depart on the first of July for the island of Lobau, where important events would render his presence necessary.

GENERAL SITUATION OF AFFAIRS.—Our repose of five weeks on the island of Lobau had been, in every sense, the sleep

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\*For this noble feat of arms, the Eighty-fourth were presented with a flag with the inscription, "*Un contre dix!*" ("One against ten!")



of the lion; I looked with a cool and tranquil eye upon the operations of the enemy by which they flattered themselves they would envelop me in their net. The incursion of General Amende and of the Duke of Brunswick on Leipsic, that of another Austrian division on Baireuth and Nuremberg, exciting insurrection as far as Mergentheim; the Tyrolese and the inhabitants of the Voralberg, who disturbed Bavaria and spread even to the frontiers of Switzerland—were all indisputably embarrassing, but of a character calculated to disappear at the first decisive blow which we should strike on the Danube. The firmness and activity of the King of Würtemberg contributed not a little to restore order in Germany; he marched in person against the insurgents of Mergentheim, and with the assistance of General Beaumont, who organized our reserves and *dépôts* at Augsburg, restrained the mountaineers of the Voralberg. On the other side a new corps, formed in Franconia by Junot, was to act in concert with the King of Westphalia, to drive from Saxony the enemies who had invaded it.

NEW PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE.—It was, however, in the plains of the Morava (Marschfeld) that the possession of Germany was to be decided. My army was now increased to one hundred and fifty thousand men; my artillery numbered four hundred pieces; my bridge equipage had been prepared on Lobau and the smaller islands, and I now waited merely for a convoy of munitions before effecting the passage. This passage was begun on the thirtieth of June, at the same place where we had crossed the river on the twenty-first of May. A bridge of pontons was thrown across in an hour and a half, under the protection of the artillery; every thing was now ready for erecting a pile-bridge which would be secure from floating bodies sent down by the enemy; and this bridge of timbers was prepared in even a shorter time than that formerly required for constructing a bridge of boats. I caused a field work to be erected to cover this bridge, and a regiment was found sufficient for its defense.

The Austrians had strongly intrenched Aspern, Essling, and even Enzersdorf, believing that we would again debouch by these same points; but they had neglected to fortify the eastern island between Enzersdorf and the Danube. Some have pretended that this was left on purpose by the Archduke, as a snare for us, and that he did not intend to oppose our passage a second time, but to let us begin it, and then attack us when it was half executed. This, at least, is certain: in a treatise on tactics, written by the Archduke some five years before, the plateau of Wagram, and of the Russbach, is presented as a model of positions for defend-

ing the passage of a river, and the circumstances of the present case were then foreseen and fully discussed. It would seem that the Archduke and his council had admitted, as a principle, that they ought not to prevent the beginning of a passage, but to attack us in the middle of the operation. For this purpose the army remained encamped about Wagram, from the Bisemberg to Glinzendorf; a corps of twenty thousand men only, under General Klenau, was left about the island of Lobau to guard the intrenched posts.

However this may be, I was ignorant of this project, and adopted a plan deemed, under all circumstances, best to secure the success of the enterprise. My first care was to fix the attention of the Austrians on the point where I had passed on the twenty-first of May, and where the erection of field works gave reason to suppose the enemy was waiting in force. On the second of July, Masséna caused the island of the Mill to be taken by his *aid-de-camp*, Pelet. A second bridge of boats was immediately thrown across the arm of the Danube, not far from the first; this bridge, of seventy toises in length, was completed in two hours, so great were the dexterity and perfection acquired by our pontoniers in their duties. The enemy increased his opposition; but nothing could restrain the ardor of our brave men. While this diversion was being effected, Eugene, Davoust, Wrede, and Bernadotte received orders to march rapidly on Lobau.

Having made sure of the result of these preliminary measures, it became necessary to think of dispositions for the grand enterprise. I had drawn up directions for this in an imperial decree of thirty-one articles, arranging every thing with the utmost precision, for the operation was of so delicate a character that the least accident might destroy every thing. On the evening of the fourth of July, after several movements, calculated to deceive the enemy, our troops were assembled on the eastern side of Lobau, where some battalions were thrown across in boats to get possession of the island opposite Mühleiten. In two hours a bridge was established, and Oudinot passed over it with celerity. More than a hundred pieces of cannon, in the field-batteries which had been thrown up on the side of Lobau, thundered at the same moment along the whole line, spreading fear in every direction, and facilitating the operation by distracting the attention of the enemy, and protecting the troops and works on the other side. The night was dark and stormy; the wind blew with violence, and the rain fell in torrents. The burning of the city of Enzersdorf, which was set on fire by our batteries, added to the terror and majesty of the scene. As soon

as Oudinot had passed over to the left bank, I ordered the principal bridges to be thrown across to the island of Alexander. One of these bridges was completely constructed in a secondary arm of the river, and so arranged, by being fastened to the shore at the lower extremity, that the current would bring it round into position. If this idea was not new, it was at least the first time, to my knowledge, that it was ever carried into execution. By three o'clock in the morning six bridges were completed, and our troops crossed over with a precision which was only interrupted for a short time, by a mistake which Berthier made in distributing my orders. Davoust was to form the right wing, and Oudinot the center; but, by Berthier's mistake, Oudinot passed over on the right, and Davoust on the bridge of rafts, at the center. This fault in the logistics of the major-general rendered it necessary for the columns to cross each other on the other side to take their assigned positions in the line of battle. Notwithstanding the tempestuous weather, I watched the operation with the greatest interest, flying from bridge to bridge, and from battery to battery; every thing was executed with such extraordinary precision that all the articles of my decree were as punctually executed as if it had been a simple maneuver on the field of practice.\*

OPERATIONS ON THE MORNING OF THE FIFTH.—The splendid day, which followed the frightful night, presented the superb spectacle of an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, with four hundred pieces of cannon, deployed majestically on the rich plains of the Danube. The village of Mühlleiten, the

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\*In the planning and constructing bridges across the Danube, in this campaign, Napoleon had the able assistance of General Bertrand, a distinguished officer of engineers, and, at that time, an *aid-de-camp* to the Emperor, with the rank of brigadier-general.

Count Henry Gratien Bertrand was born at Châteauroux, and first entered the military service in 1793. He accompanied Napoleon to Egypt as an engineer officer, and served with him in nearly all his subsequent campaigns. After Duroc's death, he was appointed Grand Marshal of the Palace, and commanded an army corps in 1813. He served with Napoleon in the campaign of 1814, and accompanied him to Elba; and again, after the campaign of 1815, he became the companion of his long exile in St. Helena. Nothing could induce him to leave his beloved Emperor till he had closed his eyes in death. In May, 1816, he was condemned to death for contumacy. On his return to France in 1821, the sentence was annulled, and Bertrand restored to his rank of lieutenant-general.

His long and devoted attachment to Napoleon, and his kind and amiable character, caused him to be greatly beloved everywhere. On his visit to the United States, in 1844, the people received him with great enthusiasm in all the large cities which he visited. He died a few days after his return to his home at Châteauroux, and his remains were placed near those of Napoleon, in the chapel of the Hôtel des Invalides.



château of Sachsengang, the village of Wittau, and the burg of Enzersdorf are quickly swept of the small Austrian detachments charged with their defense. General Klenau, who commands the enemy's advance guard, fixes all his attention on Aspern and Essling, where Legrand's division and the detachment of General Reynier threaten an attack. The light division of Nordmann is the only one which disputes with us the ground between Enzersdorf and the Danube; it is driven back on Rutzendorf, from which place he is routed by General Oudinot after a sharp contest. Klenau, his right being turned by the fall of Enzersdorf, disputes in vain with Masséna, Eugene, and Bernadotte for the possession of the intrenchments of Essling and Aspern: the enemy is everywhere driven back; Rosenberg, who has rallied on himself the vanguard of Nordmann, is afterward driven by Davoust and Oudinot on Glinzendorf.

The Archduke had not expected that our masses would be deployed with so much impetuosity and rapidity. In fact, there is no parallel in history. The armies of the Rhine, of the Sambre-et-Meuse, and of the Danube had made a passage by surprise at break of day, and forcibly established their bridges during the day, not completing the establishment of their forces on the opposite side before the second day; here, however, a formidable army, with an immense *matériel*, coming from Linz, Vienna, Presburg, and San-Polten to the general *rendezvous* of Lobau, had established six bridges, and crossed the Danube in a single night, notwithstanding the most terrible weather and numerous defiles and islands, and on the following morning was drawn up and in every respect ready to receive the enemy, if he should venture to make the attack. This was a most admirable operation, exceeding all the calculations founded on experience, and rendering our success doubly certain.

POSITION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.—So rapid and skillful was this operation, that the Archduke, instead of attacking us the next morning at the entrance to our bridges, was obliged to receive in the evening a defensive battle. His army numbered about the same as ours; but the Archduke John and the Prince of Reuss were detached, so that forty thousand men were not yet on the field. On the morning of the fifth the Archduke had in hand only Klenau, Bellegarde, and Hohenzollern, with his reserves of grenadiers about Gerasdorf, Kolowrath being still in rear of the Bisemberg, and Rosenberg being to the left of the *corps-de-bataille*. He had sent orders to the Archduke John on the evening of the fourth, directing him to approach the main body with his twenty thousand men, in order to be ready to give

battle the next day with the whole eight corps; if, however, the Archduke John should be engaged in the operation which had been prescribed opposite Presburg, he might not arrive before the morning of the sixth; but, at all events, it was presumable that he would be ready to enter into action before ten o'clock.

Notwithstanding the number of our bridges and the celerity of our passage, our right and center did not reach Raasdorf before three o'clock in the afternoon. This delay was due to the error in logistics already mentioned, making the corps of Davoust and Oudinot cross in their march. We thus lost the favorable opportunity of giving battle to the half of the Archduke's army on the fifth. Nevertheless, by six o'clock in the evening, our line was formed and the reserves in position, Masséna forming the left between Breitenlée and the Danube, Bernadotte opposite Aderklaa, Eugene between Wagram and Baumersdorf, Oudinot between this village and Groshoffen, and Davoust on the right toward Glinzendorf, flanked by Grouchy with his division of dragoons. The guard, Marmont's corps, Wrede with ten thousand Bavarians and the heavy cavalry, formed the reserve near Raasdorf.

The Austrians had placed their left, composed of Rosenberg and Hohenzollern, on the plateau between Neusiedel and Wagram, and along the Russbach, a deep rivulet, very muddy and difficult to cross, except by bridges; the center, formed of the corps of Bellegarde and the grenadiers, was around Wagram; and the right, composed of Klenau and Kolowrath, was near the Bisemberg. The left formed an obtuse and reëntering angle with the rest of the line, which extended from Wagram by Gerasdorf to the base of the Bisemberg.

PRELIMINARY ATTACK OF THE FRENCH.—As no forces were left to oppose the approach of the Archduke John, it was natural to suppose that he would arrive the next morning in time to take part in the battle. I now had five *corps-d'armée* opposite the Russbach and the plateau which overlooked the surrounding country; it was, therefore, important to profit by the present occasion. Notwithstanding the advanced hour of the day, I ordered an attack on this decisive position. The time required for the transmission of the orders, and the greater or less skill of the chiefs in executing them, made the attack somewhat disconnected. Oudinot did not succeed in forcing the passage of Baumersdorf, which General Hardegg bravely defended. Eugene debouched near Wagram; but being in the midst of the enemy's reserves, and without the support of Bernadotte, who was neither sufficiently prompt nor decisive in coming into action, the Viceroy was attacked in front and flank, and driven back upon my guard.

Notwithstanding all the efforts of Eugene, Lamarque, and Dupas, Bernadotte was also unable to maintain his position toward Wagram, and retired on Aderklaa, which place he also abandoned afterward. Davoust had not had time to enter seriously into action toward Neusiedel. The involuntary delay of the Archduke in meeting us had thus turned against us in the operations of this day; and it now became necessary for us to begin again on the following morning, with chances less favorable, inasmuch as the enemy might then be reinforced by fifty thousand additional men.

**BATTLE OF WAGRAM, JULY 6.**—The dispositions of both parties were completed during the night. I gave orders to my forces to concentrate more in mass; Masséna was to close up toward Aderklaa, and Davoust toward Groshoffen. By this means I would have them ready to strike in whatever direction it might be necessary.

The Archduke, on his side, resolved to make an offensive movement. Bellegarde, at the center, was to occupy Aderklaa; Rosenberg was to debouch on Glinzendorf, to facilitate the junction of the Archduke John by Leopoldsdorf; Kolowrath and the reserves, descending from the Bisemberg, were to unite with Klenau, and push our left so as to force it back on the bridges to Lobau. This order was given at midnight, and did not reach all the corps at the same time. Rosenberg began the combat by marching on Glinzendorf; this movement astonished me; Davoust attacked this corps in front, while I moved to the right, with the guard and the division of cuirassiers of the Duke of Padua and Nansouty. Rosenberg was driven behind the Rusbach with loss. In the mean time, Bellegarde has occupied Aderklaa in force. I profit by the concentration of Masséna's troops to throw them on this village, before the arrival of the Austrian right, which has to descend from the Bisemberg. The hero of Aspern, who had fallen from his horse the night before, is obliged to ride in a calash in this battle, where he is to gather new laurels. Masséna follows his column, which he can no longer lead in person, in the attack on the village; Aderklaa is carried; but, instead of occupying it in force, the head of the column debouches in front. Bernadotte advances to its right to assist it with Dupas and the Saxons. At this moment the right of the Austrians is seen toward Süssenbrunn, and draws half of Masséna's forces in that direction; while the Archduke himself advances with his grenadiers on Aderklaa, and drives out Cara Saint-Cyr, who falls back on the immovable Molitor. The Saxons are also forced to retreat.



The right wing of the Austrians, fifty thousand strong, under Kolowrath and Klenau, continues to advance on Breitenlée and Hirschtadten. Masséna has not a moment to lose to form in its front and cut off its access to Lobau. He flies along the road to Aspern, and encounters the enemy near Neuwirtshaus; he continues his flank march, notwithstanding several charges of the enemy. The fourth division, under Boudet, which had arrived at Aspern in the morning, debouches from that place; it receives the shock of the entire corps of Klenau; its right, which is without support, is forced, and its artillery captured; it is compelled to fall back within the *lête-du-pont*. The enemy pushes forward to Essling, and reoccupies his intrenchments.

The theater of the principal scene is thus completely changed; my masses had prepared to carry the position of the Russbach, right in front; now the main body of the enemy's forces is established crotchetwise on my extreme left, perpendicularly to the Danube, and menacing our bridges. This attack on one extremity, which furnishes to General Pelet the singular idea of comparing this battle with that of Lutzen, from which it differs in almost every respect, is a maneuver in war always skillful when it is directed on that extremity which is most advantageous and certain for the assailant. But such was not the case here: if it can not be doubted that it was very advantageous for the Austrians to direct their principal effort on the extremity near which lay our line of retreat, it must, nevertheless, be confessed that it is always very dangerous to make such a movement by gliding between a river like the Danube and an army of one hundred and forty thousand men, brave and warlike; under such circumstances, the thing is not even practicable. Leaving Masséna to hold this wing in check, without, however, engaging himself too far against unequal forces, I hastened to the center, where the troops which had assisted Davoust had just returned.

I had now but one of two courses to pursue: the first, to join Davoust with my reserves and the corps of Oudinot, and attack the extremity of the enemy opposite the Danube, in order to crush it, and take the place which the army of the Archduke had occupied in the morning, leaving the enemy to try his fortune on the Danube, over which I would have destroyed the bridges; the second, to throw myself on the center with the forces of Eugene, Bernadotte, Marmont, and Oudinot. The first plan was entirely the best; but it would require the delay of an hour, during which the success of the enemy might become too dangerous. I, therefore, determined to adopt the second.

Eugene, who had marched between Wagram and Baumers-

dorf, was to change direction to the left and take the place where Masséna had fought; Marmont and the Bavarians were to follow. To give time to execute these dispositions, I ordered a charge of the cavalry of Bessières; it advanced bravely, and its first charge was most successful; but, Bessières being injured by the fall of his horse, which was killed under him, the movement of the column was indecisive; Walther succeeds to the command, but does not know the object of the charge. This incident cools the attack and prevents its success; but it has suspended for an instant the progress of Kolowrath, who, however, soon resumes his march. It now becomes a matter of the highest interest for me to gain time to complete the movement which I directed the center to make, in order to defend the ground left by our left wing; this care is confined to the brave Drouot, who advances in rear of our cavalry with sixty pieces of réserve, and is soon left alone in front of the line, with his formidable battery. He unmasks his pieces and pours into the enemy a shower of grape and ball, thus giving a prelude to the great blow which my center is preparing to strike.

In the mean time, Davoust has received orders to attack and drive back the enemy's left. For this purpose, Friant and Morand pass the Russbach above Glinzendorf, and debouch between Siebenbrunn and Murgraf-Neusiedel. Davoust attacks this village with the other two divisions; Oudinot has orders to limit himself to checking Hohenzollern toward Baumersdorf. Rosenberg is turned and forced back, forming an angle with the right in rear. Davoust, Friant, and Morand seek to carry, by a vigorous blow, the tower of Neusiedel at the summit of the salient formed by the enemy's left. Here the most terrible combat is waged; the Austrians make every effort to prevent the debouch of Davoust; their bravest men, the emigrant Nordmann and the Hungarian Veczay, fall pierced with our bayonets. Rosenberg sends for assistance to Hohenzollern, who dispatches a part of his own corps to his aid.

At the same moment, Oudinot, impelled by military ardor and wearied with inaction while surrounded by the deadly fire of the enemy, determined to carry the passes of the Russbach and ascend the plateau. His first brigades are driven back; he puts himself at the head of the third and carries every thing before him. Rosenberg, warmly pressed by Davoust, turned by Montbrun and Morand, and threatened in reverse by Oudinot, retreats in disorder on the road to Böckfluss, not being able to form a junction with Hohenzollern. The firing is now heard to extend beyond Neusiedel; this is to me the pledge of victory. I imme-

diately direct Masséna to resume the offensive, and make all my arrangements for striking the decisive blow.

By means of these several attacks and the devotion of our artillerists, Eugene has been able to complete his movement. I now immediately form a formidable mass, placing Macdonald at its head; eight battalions are deployed, and thirteen others formed in close column on their two wings; in rear of these march the troops of Wrede and Serras; the light cavalry and cuirassiers of Nansouty are to cover the flanks; Durutte is to assist them on the left, and Pacthod on the right between Aderklaa and Wagram; Marmont and the Saxons are to sustain the army of Italy, a little to the right toward Wagram.

This formidable mass, deeper than that of Lannes at Essling, overthrows every thing that opposes its passage; it leaves Aderklaa on the right, and precipitates itself on the point of junction between the corps of the grenadiers and that of Kolowrath, to the right of the steeple of Süssenbrunn. The Archduke is here in person. Bravery, *coup-d'oeil*, activity, nothing is wanting to parry the menacing blow; but his efforts are of no avail. Notwithstanding the loss he sustains, Macdonald drives every thing before him as far as Süssenbrunn; but, attacked in front and flank by the grenadiers and Kolowrath, and his forces reduced to two or three thousand men, he is compelled to halt. I foresee this difficulty and direct the cavalry of Nansouty to charge in order to disengage the column; at the same time Durutte's division advances to the left and Pacthod to the right to second it; the Bavarians and Serras also enter into the line in their turn, and I advance the young guard to replace them as a reserve. Marmont and the Saxons charge at the same time on the corps of Bellegarde. Every thing yields to this vigorous effort; Macdonald and the corps that follow him resume the impulse of victory, and drive the enemy beyond Gerasdorf. In the mean time Davoust and Oudinot have continued their offensive march beyond the Russbach; the latter, master of Baumersdorf and the plateau, throws himself on Wagram, and thus, by threatening Bellegarde in reverse, favors the operation of Marmont and Bernadotte. The impulse is felt simultaneously along the entire line. Davoust, however, is drawn on by the diverging retreat of Rosenberg and Hohenzollern; a part of his corps pursues the former northward, while the remainder sustains Oudinot's attack toward Wagram; it had been better if the entire corps had been directed on Wolkersdorf.

Masséna, on his side, has reached Essling, and now carries the works of this place, in order to effect his junction with Boudet.



At the same time, learning, from the progress of Macdonald's cannon, our success at the center, he deems the favorable moment to have arrived for taking the offensive in his turn; he makes a vigorous attack on Klenau, and drives him back as far as Leopoldau; preceded by the cavalry of Lasalle, he pursues with ardor. The Austrians, formed in squares in the plain, face about for a moment; Lasalle charges them with vigor, but falls by a ball which struck him in the forehead; the enemy, however, is pierced, and pursued even to the base of the Bisemberg.

DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS.—For the last two hours the Archduke had seen the necessity of a retreat, and had given orders accordingly. Instead of being reinforced on the left by the Archduke John, he saw that wing overthrown by Davoust and Oudinot, and his center pressed down by an irresistible mass; success was no longer possible, and by persisting in maintaining his position he might endanger the two *corps-d'armée* engaged between the Russbach and the Danube; he, therefore, preferred to fall back in good order, and preserve his army in a condition to exert an important influence in the subsequent negotiations for peace. He had no motives for desperate acts, risking every thing on the result of a single contest. In fact, the Archduke John, at four o'clock in the afternoon, was not within less than three or four leagues of the field of battle, and could take no important part in it. The couriers of his vanguard appeared at this moment in the direction of Leopoldsdorf, and skirmished with the flankers of our cavalry; some of the latter were wounded, and fell back, spreading the most singular panic through our ranks. We had just established our bivouacs, the guards and reserves being near Raasdorf, when a general cry was heard from the right that the enemy had turned our flank and threatened the bridges. In an instant the equipages, wounded, and scattered troops take the road to Lobau; the alarm spreads from rank to rank till, for a moment, the conquerors doubt their own victory. The cause of the panic is soon discovered, giving rise to jokes on the military courtiers who had judged of our operations from the middle of the park of equipages!

The Archduke effected his retreat during the night, leaving me no other trophies than his dismounted artillery and some thousands of wounded and prisoners. His loss amounted to about twenty-five thousand men, and twelve generals, *hors-de-combat*. Our loss was nearly as great. The necessity of sending a part of our cavalry to the right prevented me from pushing vigorously the enemy that night. The Archduke Charles retired on Bohemia on the road to Znaim. Rosenberg, being separated

from him, took the road to Moravia. The Emperor of Austria, who had remained at Wolkersdorf during the battle, on learning the defeat of Rosenberg, and the approach of Davoust in pursuit, first retired to Znaim, and then departed for Hungary.

The army of Italy had covered itself with glory; on visiting it, I embraced Macdonald, who had here crowned the fame he had already won at Hooglède and Trebia, and I saluted him with the title of Marshal. The same rank was also conferred on Marmont and Oudinot.\*

REMARKS ON THE BATTLE.—In selecting his field of battle on the Russbach, to the north of Vienna, the Archduke had three lines of retreat from which to choose: the first, to his right on Bohemia; the second, at the center on Olmutz; and the third, at the left on Hungary. The first had the advantage of maintaining the Austrians in communication with the north of Germany, where they flattered themselves that the appearance of the English would finally induce Prussia and Westphalia to declare in their favor. In taking this route, they would base themselves on Prague, the city, next after Vienna, the most important in the empire for its military establishments and resources; but it would expose the army to be cut off from the heart of the monarchy by a simple movement against its left, and be thus thrown back between the Elbe and the Rhine, where it would experience

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\*Thiers says: "Marshal Bernadotte, who, through his own fault or that of his corps, had been unable to keep the post assigned to him between Wagram and Aderklaa, nevertheless published an order of the day, addressed to the Saxons, in which he thanked them for their conduct on the fifth and sixth of July, and attributed to them, as it were, the winning of the battle. This manner of distributing to himself and his soldiers praises which he ought to have waited to receive from Napoleon greatly offended the latter, because it offended the army and its leaders. To punish it, Napoleon wrote a most severe order of the day, which was communicated to the marshals only, but which was a sufficient reprimand for such an extravagance of vanity; for, being addressed to rivals, it was not probable that it would remain secret."

The following is a copy of this order: "His imperial majesty expresses his disapprobation of Marshal the Prince of Ponte Corvo's order, which was inserted in the public journals of the seventh of July. As his majesty commands in person, to him belongs the exclusive right of assigning to all their respective degrees of glory. His majesty owes the success of his arms to *French* troops, and not to others. The Prince of Ponte Corvo's order of the day, tending to give false pretensions to troops of secondary merit, is contrary to truth, to discipline, and to national honor. To Marshal Macdonald belongs the praise which the Prince of Ponte Corvo arrogates to himself. His majesty desires that this testimony of his displeasure may operate as a caution to every marshal not to attribute to himself more glory than is due to him. That the Saxon army, however, may not be afflicted, his majesty desires that this order may be kept secret."

the same fate as the Prussians after the battle of Jena. The line of Olmutz was no less dangerous, without, however, offering the same advantages; by eight days of retrograde march, the imperial army would be thrown beyond its limits on Silesia and the lower Oder. The retreat on Hungary led to their natural base at the center of the resources of the monarchy; it would secure a more vast theater of operations, and if the army, by a new campaign, should find itself forced within the confines of Podolia, it would not be impossible for it to rally, by a lateral movement, on Olmutz or Prague, as a last refuge. In the situation of affairs left by the battle of Essling, Austria still hoping to act on the offensive, it seemed that the base on Bohemia, though more hazardous, was conformable to the political and strategic interests of the movement; but when the great battle had been fought and lost, then this base became dangerous for a defeated army, and the Archduke should not have maneuvered in such a manner as to be exposed to be driven back upon it in spite of himself. The error which he committed in directing his efforts to the right on the Danube, and allowing his left to be forced, was calculated to throw him back on Bohemia, whether he wished or not. Undoubtedly, it would still have been possible for him to gain the road to Nicolsburg, and afterward that of Goding, so as to throw himself into Hungary; but this would have been acting on the circumference of a circle, of which we held the chord; and, even admitting that it had succeeded, we should still have confined the army in the gorges of the Krapacs, cutting it off from the center of the kingdom; this would have rendered its destruction none the less probable. If the Archduke had had superior forces, so as to guard the Russbach sufficiently, and still be able to turn our left by Breitenlée and Aspern, it would have been well to attempt it; but, on the contrary hypothesis, it would have been trusting too much to chance, and have given us the strategic and tactical key of the field, which was at Neusiedel. It was this circumstance which dictated all my combinations, as soon as I perceived the situation of the enemy's forces. Some have thought that I would have acted more in accordance with the principles of the art if I had directed my efforts between Aderklaa and the Russbach, or on Baumersdorf, after Davoust had got a footing beyond the Russbach. This would, in fact, have been a repetition of the maneuver of Frederick at Leuthen; it would have been directing the decisive effort on the most important extremity, supporting it successively and obliquely by the whole line, without troubling myself about the operations of Klenau and Kolowrath. I might have pursued this plan, if I had had the field



free around me; but having the Danube in my rear, and my bridges to preserve in case of defeat, I preferred a maneuver less brilliant, but more certain.

**RETREAT OF THE ARCHDUKE AND PURSUIT OF THE FRENCH.**—The Archduke, having retired with his forces, at the end of the battle, between Wolkersdorf and the Bisemberg, could still take either the road to Moravia or to Bohemia, as he might choose. The first, however, was somewhat menaced by the cannon of Davoust, Marmont, and Oudinot, who were encamped between Wagram and Böckfluss; and it would have been rather difficult for the troops to reach it from the Bisemberg by a lateral movement, without running the risk of being anticipated on Nicolsburg. The main body of the army took the road to Znaim; Rosenberg alone continued his retreat on the road to Brunn.

By daylight, on the morning of the seventh, the rear guard of the enemy was seen on these two roads. From the contradictory reports which I received, I was uncertain which had been taken by the main body; it was possible that the army had been divided in order to gain time, but I had reason to think that the Archduke would seek to gain Hungary by Nicolsburg, rather than to throw himself eccentrically on Bohemia. Davoust received orders to march on Nicolsburg; Marmont, reinforced by the Bavarians, first took the same road, but afterward turned aside on Laas; Masséna took the road to Bohemia by Hollabrunn. I marched to Wolkersdorf with my reserve and Oudinot. Eugene, whose army had suffered severely, was destined to observe the Archduke John and Hungary, covering Vienna, our bridges, and our line of communication. I reinforced him with the Saxons, the Würtembergers, and a Bavarian division. These precautions were the more necessary, as, on the very day of the battle, Generals Chasteler and Giulay, who had united their forces, after the evacuation of the Tyrol, reentered Gratz and Leoben, driving out the little corps of Rusca on Rottenmann; while the Archduke John, hearing the result of the battle, had repassed the Morava and halted at Marschek.

**BATTLE OF ZNAIM.**—Masséna, continuing to drive before him the main body of the army of the Archduke on the road to Znaim, sustained several important combats; especially at Hollabrunn and Schöngraben, where the Austrian troops of the Prince of Reuss, who had not previously been engaged, fought with great bravery. The march of Marmont on Laas threatened to precede the Archduke to Znaim, and hastened his retrograde movement to that position.

This city, situated in amphitheater on the slope of a spur of the Bohemian chain which commands all the environs, while the hillocks in rear are covered with vineyards, may be compared in its position with Caldiero. I did not learn till the tenth, at Wolkersdorf, the direction taken by the main body of the enemy. I immediately descended on Znaim, directing Oudinot, the guard, and Davoust to repair to the same place. Marmont had advanced as far as Thesswitz, almost in the middle of the Austrian army, with Masséna, however, only a day's march behind, hotly pressing the enemy's rear guard. The Archduke, thinking that Marmont was better sustained, did not venture to attack him. Arriving here in person and having examined the state of affairs, I now directed an attack to be made by our vanguards, in order to gain time for the remainder of my forces to come up.

The impetuous Masséna was already hotly engaged, and it was necessary to sustain him. I then directed Marmont to debouch from Thesswitz, ascend to the plateau, and relieve the fourth corps, which was alone exposed to the enemy's attacks. Davoust, coming from Nicolsburg, and Oudinot and the reserve, from Wolkersdorf, could not arrive in time to enter into action before the next day, and it was, therefore, important for me to conceal from the enemy our present inferiority of numbers; it was, nevertheless, necessary to keep him in the vicinity of Znaim, so that, on the arrival of Davoust and the cavalry, I might cut him off by Brenditz from the road to Prague.

ARMISTICE.—The Emperor of Austria had sent to me the Prince of Lichtenstein to propose an armistice. Under present circumstances, nothing could be more agreeable to me than a cessation of hostilities; every moment gained was now a decided advantage to me, and if the suspension led to peace, I should be delighted. It was with difficulty that the firing could be stopped, for so fiercely were the troops engaged on both sides that several officers were wounded in their endeavors to suspend the combat. The armistice was discussed during the night; my officers thought I now ought to complete the overthrow of a power like Austria, which was incessantly interfering with all our enterprises, and which was too lacerated ever to forgive the quadruple humiliation to which we had subjected her arms. Taking into consideration the uncertain state of Germany, the unfavorable news from Spain, and the serious preparations of the English, I was influenced by great national and political interests, rather than by the military opinions of these brave generals, who could not, however, then fully comprehend the crisis of my affairs. I, therefore, broke off the discussion, saying, "*There has been enough blood shed; I accept the armistice.*"

ITS CONDITIONS.—The negotiator was the same who had terminated the war of 1805; we soon came to an agreement on the conditions. The line of demarkation accorded to us the occupation of the circles of Znaim and Brunn; it followed the course of the Morava to the confluence of the Taya; thence along the road to Presburg, including that city; the great Danube as far as Raab, then the river of that name, and the frontiers of Styria and Carniola as far as Fiume. The citadels of Gratz and Brunn, the fort of Saxenburg, the Tyrol, and the Voralberg were surrendered to us. The armies of Poland were to retain their respective positions.

The limit on the north of Germany was the line of the Confederation of the Rhine. The surrender of Fiume completed the isolation of the Austrians from England, so that British subsidies, arms, and agents could no longer reach the former power, except clandestinely; we occupied with our troops a third of the Austrian monarchy, being thus in position to support war by war, and to supply the wants caused by the campaign in the several branches of service, especially in transportation, clothing, and equipments.

AUSTRIAN MOTIVES FOR RATIFYING THE ARMISTICE.—Nevertheless, this armistice was far from being a sure guarantee of peace. The Emperor Francis was hardly disposed to subscribe to all the sacrifices which I was in condition to impose; he therefore made some difficulties in ratifying the armistice. They proposed a new system of operations by reinforcing the Archduke John with the corps of Chasteler and Giulay, who, since the departure of Marmont, had occupied Gratz and Leoben, and by taking advantage of my march on Moravia to act on my communications, and advance on Vienna. The news, however, of my return to Schönbrunn, the march of Macdonald on Gratz, and still more the description of the situation of my affairs in Moravia, presented to him by the Prince of Lichtenstein, finally induced him to ratify the armistice on the eighteenth. This, however, was done less through pacific views than for the purpose of gaining time for a general movement of his armies. The court and diplomatic head-quarters were at Comorn; the Archduke John was called there for consultation. He advised renouncing the idea of basing themselves on Prague, so as not to lose their communications with Hungary and expose themselves to be thrown between the Elbe and the Rhine, but restore the theater of the war to its true base in Hungary, making the grand army march by Hradisch on Comorn; the Archduke John was to operate to



the left, with fifty thousand men, on Raab; while the corps of Croatia was to turn back so as to act more vigorously with the Austrian detachments, which had recently had some success in gaining possession of Laybach and Zara, and menacing Trieste. The Hungarian insurrection (militia levies) would form the connecting link between these two armies. The Archduke Charles, being forced to retire in disgrace, was to resign the command to the Emperor himself. This little politico-military revolution, which was attributed to Stadion, and was the result of strategic views more prudent than a retreat on Prague, instead of an obstacle to the armistice, rendered its ratification the more necessary for the execution of the projected movement.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH OF EUROPE.—This armistice put an end to the operations in Poland, where Poniatowski had just seized on Cracovia, and was preparing to connect himself with my right in Moravia by continuing to maneuver in that direction. The Archduke Ferdinand regained the frontier of Hungary. The Russians occupied Galicia, and extended themselves even to the sources of the Vistula.

The cessation of hostilities was the more timely for us in the north of Germany, where the Austrians had recently gained some success, and where the English had made a small debarkation. My brother Jerome had collected a corps of ten thousand men to drive the enemy from Dresden, by acting in concert with the few Saxons still remaining under the orders of General Thielmann. On the other side, Junot was coming for the same purpose from Franconia; they were to effect a junction in Voigtland. The Archduke had sent General Kienmayer into Saxony to give form and object to the insurrectionary operations which were attempted in that country. This general, uniting with the Duke of Brunswick and the division of Amende, and acting in concert with the corps of Radvojewich, sought to prevent the junction of Junot and the King of Westphalia. He encountered the former near Gefrées on the ninth of July, and drove him back on Baireuth. Jerome fell back on Schleitz, and, on hearing the victory of Wagram, and the descent of the English, decided to rally his corps on Erfurth. The Austrians, having entered Dresden on the twenty-first, refused to evacuate the place, under the pretense that the armistice was applicable only to the grand army. It required hostile demonstrations to induce them to return to Bohemia.

These events left the Duke of Brunswick-Oels in a false position on the frontiers of Bohemia, with his legion of adventur-

ers in British pay; but, worthy heir of his name, he took the resolution of joining the English, who finally effected a small debarkation on the North Sea. Expelled from these countries for the last three years, the English had still maintained a clandestine intercourse with the Hanseatic towns, whose sole existence depended on their maritime relations. Masters of the rock of Heligoland, they had transformed this arid island into a vast *dépôt* of colonial wares and all kinds of arms. It was at the same time an arsenal and a vast bazaar. The whole coast, from Amsterdam to the Sound, was full of English agents, who spread in all directions the news of the expected arrival of a considerable army. The agitation became general.

After having thus promised the expedition, which was now to descend at Antwerp, they finally sent two or three thousand men to debark on the coast from Cuxhaven to Bremerlée. Osnabruck and Hanover, in conformity to their promises, formed a partial insurrection. If ten thousand men had been landed a month sooner, the results might have been of the greatest importance.

The Duke of Brunswick now decided to leave Freyberg, in order to join the English on the coast. This plan, although favored by the insurrectionary state of the country, and the proximity of Prussia, where the prince could have found a refuge for his own person if reduced to the last extremity, was bold, and executed with energy. At the head of three thousand desperate adventurers, he passed Leipsic and took the road to Halberstadt. He here found only a regiment of Westphalians under the grand marshal of Jerome's court, an ex-officer of the navy, and more brave than experienced. After an honorable resistance, Meyronet was wounded and taken prisoner, and the remains of his regiment were incorporated into the ranks of the enemy. The main body of the Westphalian and Dutch troops were, at this time, observing the coast of the north. General Rewbel, on hearing of the defeat of Meyronet, marched in all haste from Bremen to Brunswick with five thousand men. The Dutch general, Gratien, and the same Thielmann who played so important a part against us three years afterward, pursued the Duke on Halberstadt. This prince reached the ancient capital of his father on the first of August, at the very moment when Rewbel was approaching on the other side. Having no time for hesitation, he attacked this general, whose infantry immediately took to flight, and would, perhaps, have joined the insurgents had not the enemy been arrested by the brilliant valor of the Westphalian cuirassiers and the regiments of Berg. Being unable to force a passage against

such unexpected resistance, and having already had two horses killed under him, the prince returned to Brunswick; hearing here that the English had just left Cuxhaven, he threw himself into the country of Oldenburg, reached Esfleth, embarked on the seventh of August with his few brave followers, and established himself at Heligoland, where he continued till 1813 to form projects for disturbing the tranquillity of the north of Germany.

**OPERATIONS IN THE TYROL.**—Affairs in the Tyrol had taken a more serious turn. General Buol, whom Chasteler had left there with three or four thousand men, on learning the conditions of the armistice, thought to comply with them by returning into Styria. This news enraged the Tyrolese to the utmost extent; they threaten to oppose by force the departure of the Austrians, and to massacre all the French prisoners, so as to render a treaty of peace impossible. The Austrians succeeded, however, by a little address, in retiring within the line of demarkation laid down in the armistice, having first surrendered Sachsenburg to the troops of Rusca. I directed Lefévre, with the Bavarians and some French troops, to return on Innspruck; Rusca ascended the Drave; and a Franco-Italian division advanced by the Adige. The Tyrolese, instead of yielding, seemed to acquire new energy by the departure of the Austrians.

Lefévre, after a decisive combat on the eleventh of August, was forced to retire into Bavaria; Rusca succeeded with difficulty in regaining La Carinthia, but the Tyrolese ventured to follow him even there; and the Franco-Italian division was driven back to the gates of Verona. I could not, at this moment, detach a force sufficiently numerous for the reduction of this country, for, notwithstanding the armistice, peace was far from being certain, and, instead of weakening my army, it was more important than ever to keep it in force. I, therefore, directed Rusca to negotiate with the insurgents, and propose to them to send a deputation to me to decide upon some plan for the future government of their country. He proposed to them, if they disliked the Bavarian rule, to unite with the kingdom of Italy, and even gave them some hope of establishing their absolute independence. They, however, rejected all his propositions.

**NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA, AND PREPARATIONS FOR A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES.**—Negotiations were opened at Altenburg, on the seventh of August, between MM. Champagny, Metternich, and Nugent. But they made very little progress. The Court of Austria, which had now retired to Buda, was in no haste to terminate them, for the descent of the



English on Belgium, the march of Wellington on Madrid, the success of the Tyrolese, and the new plan of operations which had been adopted, contrary to the advice of the Archduke Charles—all combined to raise the hopes of the Cabinet of Vienna, which now pretended to regard the overtures of Champagny as excessively severe. If the English had consolidated their operations in Castile, and had been successful in their descents on our coast, there is no doubt that Austria intended to renew hostilities. She continued to recruit her armies, to incite Prussia to declare against us, and to multiply her projects of future operations.

I employed these moments of respite in my usual way, of working with still greater ardor than during the war itself. It was at this time that, wholly influenced by my love for the brave men whom I commanded, I instituted the order of the *Trois-Toisons* (Three Fleeces). I thought to eclipse the Golden Fleeces of Spain and Austria, and all other orders of modern chivalry, by conferring this decoration on those only who had assisted at my three entries into Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid. My object was to consecrate the recollection of these great events; but the project would have been attended with injustice, inasmuch as some of the most valiant of my generals would have been excluded from this order. The decree was, therefore, never carried into execution. I also at this time directed my attention particularly to administrative matters for supplying the wants of my armies and regulating the affairs of my empire. I imposed on Austria a contribution of one hundred millions of francs, to be collected into the public chests from the ordinary revenues of the countries which we occupied.

I prepared the fortifications of Vienna, the *tête-du-pont* of Spitz, Raab, and Gratz, so as to prolong the defenses of these places if necessary, or to demolish the works in case we had to evacuate them.

I very much increased my bridge equipage, so as to act on the lower Danube and in Hungary, and organized a considerable flotilla to facilitate our transports and protect our operations on the banks of the river.

The reserves of conscripts, the provisional regiments, and the contingents of the Confederation were sent to the north to reinforce the eighth *corps-d'armée* under Junot, whose forces already numbered near thirty thousand men, exclusive of the Westphalians, who constituted the tenth *corps-d'armée*. My own army was also augmented at this time by some thirty thousand men, who were discharged from the hospitals, and more than six thousand from the *dépôts*.

Austria, in the meantime, had not neglected her levies; a large number of *landwehrs* (militia) had been organized and united with the troops of the line. Taking advantage of the present position of affairs, she now decided that the propositions of Champagne were inadmissible. The Emperor, Francis I., wrote a letter to me, by Count Bubna, declaring that the proposed conditions of peace would dishonor his throne and destroy his monarchy. I directed the Duke of Bassano to confer with his envoy, in hopes that they might come to a better understanding than the negotiations of Altenburg.

I had proposed to the Emperor Alexander of Russia to send a minister to take part in these negotiations. He declined the offer, but gave his assent to whatever I should do, recommending me, however, to not deal too harshly with his ancient ally. There was much tact and address in this refusal, for Russia did not wish to see Austria too much humbled, nor to assist in her dismemberment. This course was the result of good political policy; some writers, however, have mistaken its motives, and attributed it to a project on the part of Russia to ultimately abandon my alliance.

I now received the news of the failure of the English expedition against Antwerp and their consequent retreat. This was certainly no reason why I should abate my pretensions with Austria; I, therefore, replied to the Emperor, on the fifteenth of September, demanding the cession of a million and a half of inhabitants on the Inn and in Illyria, to reinforce the kingdom of Italy and give a suitable frontier to Bavaria. I also required New Galicia for the duchy of Warsaw.

**MARITIME EXPEDITIONS OF THE ENGLISH.**—The maritime expeditions of the English were so intimately connected with what was at this time passing in Austria, as to justify a brief account of them in this place.

England had done but little more, on this occasion, in favor of her continental allies, than she had done in 1807 for the war in Poland. In fact, the Cabinet of London, seeing that this war would occupy us at the same time in Austria and Spain, and oblige us to scatter our forces from the Tagus to the Danube, made immense preparations to profit by the circumstance; but it directed its views especially to enterprises calculated to advance its own private interests. If this power had not attempted so many things at the same time, it might have produced more important results; but, seeking to act merely in a capacity of an auxiliary, carrying on its operations on the territory of its allies, it thought to embarrass us the more by multiplying the

number of its expeditions. The danger with which she was threatened by the league of Tilsit had induced England to put forth all her resources, and to augment her troops by every means in her power. She was able to send abroad one hundred thousand men; and a thousand millions of money were employed in preparing immense amounts of provisions, artillery, arms, and military munitions, for numerous projected maritime descents. She spared neither gold nor iron, and the progress of the mechanical arts, acting as an auxiliary to the manual power of her artisans, had transformed England into a vast workshop. Such forces, if well directed and assisted by the armed inhabitants of Spain, Portugal, Holland, and all the north of Germany, were well calculated to effect a powerful diversion in favor of Austria.

Our colonies, and those of our allies, were not at this time sufficiently valuable for England even to deign to covet them. She could no longer desire to possess either Cuba or Spanish America, for both were now her allies. Cayenne, Martinique, Senegal, and San Domingo had all fallen, and the Isle-of-France, being blockaded, would also, sooner or later, be compelled to surrender. The British East India Company was preparing an expedition against Amboyne and Batavia, places which the Dutch were no longer in condition to sustain, since they had lost Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope. The garrisons of the Antilles were alone sufficient for the capture of the few ports which we still possessed there. These colonial interests, which, in 1783 had been matters of such high importance, were now so completely eclipsed by the mighty continental conflicts, that England employed in them only a few secondary detachments, and engaged in them merely as a pastime.

The increase which she had now given to her land forces enabled her to plan more extensive enterprises; to carry on war in the Spanish peninsula, and, at the same time, to act offensively on the banks of the Scheldt. By the month of April an immense armament was ready to act on the first favorable opportunity. Wellesley, who had returned from Portugal after the affair of Vimiera, was sent back to the peninsula with a corps of twenty thousand men, to take the command of the English divisions and revenge the defeat of General Moore. Another expedition under Gambier and Lord Cochrane, about the middle of April, attempted to burn our Rochefort squadron, which, reinforced by a detachment from Brest, lay at the anchorage in the roads of the Isle-of-Aix. An infernal machine of fifteen hundred barrels of powder and four hundred shells, directed by Cochrane himself, exploded without producing the slightest effect. They then



made an attack on the squadron, throwing Congreve rockets into it. This was the first time these projectiles were ever used against us. Four fine vessels were burnt while laying at anchor, but the others, having more skillful commanders, escaped into Char-ente. Gambier was subjected to a court of inquiry for not having destroyed our entire squadron and the ship-yard of Rochefort; and, with much more justice, I had our officers tried for having lost their vessels.

About the middle of June, twenty thousand Anglo-Sicilians, under General Stuart and Prince Leopold, appeared off the coast of Calabria near the rock of Scylla, whose castle was taken and again lost. A detachment of this army was sent to take possession of the little Ionian Islands, and to cruise before Corfu. Stuart hoped, as in 1805, to surprise some point of the coast, and land a body of men to form a nucleus for the insurgents. He took possession of the islands of Ischia and Procida, and showed himself with great ostentation before Naples and other points of the coast. But the inhabitants every where manifested their attachment to a government which had destroyed the abuses of its predecessors, and driven out the brigands which had previously infested this beautiful country. Murat was well suited to the Neapolitans, who on this occasion proved their devotion to his throne. Stuart returned to Sicily without venturing to land his troops.

A more serious enterprise was fitted out against our superb establishment at Antwerp; an immense fleet of thirty-nine ships of the line and thirty-six frigates, with smaller vessels and gunboats, and transports carrying a land force of forty thousand men, was sent to take possession of this place, burn our fleet, destroy our ship-yards and docks, and then fill up the channel of the Scheldt so as to render it impassable. The importance which England attached to this expedition is the best possible proof of the wisdom of my project of rendering this the first port in Europe. The English, however, before risking themselves on French soil, waited to learn the result of the first operations of the campaign on the Danube. Some, however, attribute this delay to a want of unanimity in the English ministry in the choice of a commandant, Wellington being then engaged in the Peninsular war. At last, on hearing the news of the battle of Wagram, they deemed it high time to act; and, on the first of August, the fleet of Admiral Strachan landed Lord Chatham's army on the island of Walcheren. The heir of this great name, the elder brother of Pitt, proved that generations succeed without resembling each other. He committed innumerable faults

in the execution of this enterprise, which, if well conducted, would infallibly have reached Antwerp. The most convenient route for reaching this place from the coast is the road leading from Blankenberg by Bruges and Ghent; it is paved for the distance of twenty-four leagues. The coast at this time was so entirely stripped of all means of defense that there was not the slightest obstacle to prevent the landing at this point of thirty thousand men, who could have reached Antwerp on the third day with the whole train of artillery, with which they were most amply provided. The remainder of the army and fleet might have entered the Scheldt so as to fix our attention on Flushing and the island of Cassand. Our fleet, taken unawares, would have found retreat impossible. Antwerp was almost completely destitute of a garrison;\* and the capture even of the fort, called the Tête-de-Flandre, on the opposite bank of the Scheldt, would have secured the success of the enterprise.

Chatham took the bull by the horns; fearing to compromise himself on the main shore, he maneuvered with his right before Breskens and the island of Cassand, which he did not venture to attack, and, on the thirtieth of July, landed his forces on the north side of the island of Walcheren, and laid siege to the city of Flushing. One of his divisions afterward captured Goes in the island of South Beveland, and, favored by the bad conduct of a Dutch general, succeeded in capturing Fort Batz,† which is situated on the point where the Scheldt is divided into two arms. This was a serious loss, but not sufficient to decide the result of the enterprise, so long as we retained possession of Forts Lillo, Frederick Henry, Leifenshoeck, and the Tête-de-Flandre, which are situated on the banks of the great Scheldt between Batz and Antwerp. General Rousseau, who had made such excellent dispositions at Cassand, now had time to throw, on the fourth of August, a reinforcement of two battalions into Flushing, which was commanded by General Monnet; the English fleet had thought to cut off the communication between this place and Breskens.

The defenses of Flushing were ill constructed and in ill condition; they consisted of a single *enceinte* without any covered way. General Monnet, seeing the indefensible condition of the place, thought to retard the operations of the siege by strong sorties. But, notwithstanding the intrepidity of General Osten,

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\*The garrison of this place consisted, at first, of only about two hundred invalids and recruits.

†No defense whatever was made of this place, the commandant allowing himself to be surprised.

these sorties against intrenched lines and well-armed batteries were vigorously repelled, and merely tended to discourage the garrison without producing any beneficial results. On the thirteenth of August the English opened a heavy bombardment, not only from their land batteries, but also from their flotilla of gun-boats. There were no bomb-proof casemates for the protection of the troops, and the town was set on fire in numerous places. After three days of heavy bombardment, Monnet capitulated (the sixteenth), surrendering himself and four thousand men prisoners of war.

As no part of the body of the place had been breached in the slightest degree,\* Monnet was afterward tried and condemned by a council of war.

If he could not remain exposed to such a fire, he ought to have attempted to open a passage from the place, or to have insisted on a free sortie for his garrison. It is certain that he did not do all in his power to save his command, but still the sentence of the court was rigorous.†

In the mean time the condition of Antwerp had very much changed. The King of Holland, hearing of the approach of the enemy, had marched there in all haste with his guards and five thousand troops, who took post in the environs on the twelfth of August; and the commanding generals in Belgium and Picardy collected a force of seven or eight thousand men.

Our fleet had ascended the Scheldt, and taken refuge under the guns of the forts. These means were sufficient to defend the place for a considerable length of time, but not enough to protect it from danger. My ministers, seeing the full extent of the danger, not only sent to the Scheldt all the men they could collect from the *dépôts* of the north, but also ordered a levy of thirty thousand national guards from the neighboring departments;

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\*Alison attributes the reduction of this place, in a considerable degree, to the fire of the shipping, and one or two recent writers of little authority, copying from him, have paraded this attack as a proof of the superiority of guns afloat over guns ashore. Nothing can be more absurd. An English officer, who was employed in the siege, says he "went along the entire sea-line the very next day after the capitulation, and found no part of the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, and only one solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, and which could not, of course, have been thrown from the line-of-battle ships, but must have been thrown from the land batteries."—(Colonel Mitchel.) This account of an eye-witness is fully confirmed by other historians; whereas, the statements of Alison are wholly without foundation.

†The surrender of this place was influenced by the sufferings of the inhabitants of the town, rather than to any want of efficiency in the garrison. Monnet acted from sympathy, rather than good judgment.



this levy was extended even to Burgundy. France responded to this appeal with noble enthusiasm, the single *Département du Nord* alone sending ten thousand men; and the battalions were soon marshaling there from all directions. Marshal Moncey commanded a part of them; and Bernadotte, who had left after the battle of Wagram, was appointed commander-in-chief, and reached his army on the sixteenth of August, the very day on which Flushing capitulated. Within six days he had under his command a force of thirty thousand men, and although these troops were not of a very military appearance, still they were full of zeal and ardor.

After having waited till the twenty-sixth of August, hesitating whether he should land on the right bank of the Scheldt and march on Antwerp, Chatham, seeing his blow parried, retook the road to England, leaving a third of his army at Flushing.

I had had cause to complain of the conduct of Bernadotte on the Danube, and was surprised at his nomination; I, therefore, caused him to be replaced by Bessières. This officer repaired to the island of South Beveland, and surrounded Walcheren with batteries, so as to prevent any excursions of the enemy.

The damp climate and marshy grounds of Walcheren produced fevers, which, in the rains of autumn, became a real pestilence; in a week's time the sick-list of the English numbered nearly ten thousand, exclusive of the sailors in the fleet, who were also subject to the contagion. The obstinacy of the English government in retaining a post so fatal to the lives of its soldiers was due either to the intention of renewing the enterprise, if the war with Austria continued, or to a desire to draw that power into a rupture of the armistice, by holding out this proof of the determination of England to effect her long-announced diversion in favor of her continental ally. But whatever was the object, it completely failed; for Austria decided to make peace, and England, after a useless sacrifice of her best troops in the hospitals of Flushing, finally ordered the evacuation of Walcheren. But before this evacuation took place, they destroyed all the works and naval basins at Flushing, with the establishments which had been made there for such heavy shipping as could not reach Antwerp, for want of sufficient depth of water in the port. The destruction of this arsenal was a misfortune, but we consoled ourselves with the preservation of the more important place of Antwerp.

**CHANGE IN THE BRITISH MINISTRY.**—The results of this expedition, contrasting so strongly with its enormous preparations, the largest, indeed, that England had ever made, and

the total loss of between eight and ten thousand men,\* furnished abundant materials to the enemies of the ministry for opposition to their administration. This ministry had certainly exhibited sufficient hatred to me, sufficient activity in their attempts to injure me, and sufficient solicitude for extending the influence of England; but a great want of skill in the employment of its means. The very day on which this expedition landed at Flushing, and fifteen thousand English were exhibiting themselves on the coasts of Naples, the army of Wellington, previously victorious at Oporto and Talavera, was very near being enveloped on the Tagus, and forced to pass under the Caudine forks. The news of these several operations reached me during the negotiations with Austria. I did not in any respect change my dispositions; but I must confess that, for a moment, I feared the combined movements of Wellington on Madrid, and Chatham on Antwerp, might induce Austria to continue the war, and this circumstance, connected with the course pursued by the Emperor Alexander, contributed not a little to make me desire a peace. But I was soon relieved from this perplexity by the double retreat from Talavera and Flushing.

The ministry which had directed these enterprises could not satisfy public opinion in England on the causes of their failure; Canning and Castlereagh imputed to each other the faults of these expeditions, and terminated their rivalry in a duel, which completed the dissolution of the cabinet. On the twenty-second of September the Marquis of Wellesley, brother of Wellington, succeeded Canning in the Department of Foreign Affairs; Lord Liverpool replaced Castlereagh in the War Office; Lord Chatham yielded the Department of Ordnance to Lord Mulgrave, whose place in the Board of Admiralty was filled by the Duke of York; Percival took the post of First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer.

**STABS' ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE NAPOLEON.**—While my negotiators were disputing about the spoils of Austria, I remained at Schönbrunn, employed in my ordinary occupations of administration. Spain, Belgium, France, and our colonies were all objects of my solicitude. I took relaxation from these occupations by daily parades in the court of the palace,

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\*Toward the middle of September, one-half of the garrison of Flushing was in the hospitals, and the average number of deaths was from two to three hundred a week. The actual number of men lost in Belgium was over seven thousand, and twelve thousand eight hundred and sixty-three of those who returned were reported sick, a large number of them afterward dying from the effects of the disease.

and by *simulacra* of battles, executed by my guards in the plains of Penzing. But this kind of recreation was very near proving fatal to me. One of those fanatical Teutons, whom the scholastic exaltation of the universities had exasperated against me, entered the circle of my generals and presented himself before me. Un-habituated to the commission of crime, he hesitated, muttered some words, and retired; then returned a second time. Rapp, in repelling this German Brutus, perceived that he carried concealed arms, and caused him to be arrested. On his trial before a military commission, this visionary confessed his project, and paid with his life the penalty of his crime. He was a Saxon by birth, and his name was Stabs.

AUSTRIA CONCLUDES TO MAKE PEACE.—The double negotiations between our plenipotentiaries at Altenburg, and between Maret and Bubna, failed to reconcile Austria to the conditions which I prescribed. She continued to exaggerate her own resources and our embarrassments; but the news of the retreat of the English, and his failure to draw Prussia into the coalition, and especially the address with which the Duke of Bassano informed the Austrian envoy of the reinforcements which I had received and which I still expected, finally decided the Emperor Francis to yield to the force of necessity. Toward the end of September, Bubna took to the Emperor Maret's *sine qua non*, and returned accompanied by the Prince of Lichtenstein, who had signed the armistice of Austerlitz. This prince was one of the bravest officers of cavalry, and a good citizen, but a mediocre politician. He now, however, had but one course to pursue, for he was obliged to submit to my demands. Prince John signed, on the fourteenth of October, the treaty of Vienna, but not without complaining of the heavy sacrifices it imposed.

TREATY OF VIENNA.—This treaty, more harsh than any of the preceding, cost Austria more than three and a half millions of inhabitants. I gave to Bavaria Salzburg, the Innviertel, with Braunau and Hausruch, an important district of the sources of the Traun; this secured to that power a superb, and even offensive, frontier against Austria. I united, under the name of the Illyrian Provinces, a part of Carinthia, Carniola, Dalmatia, and Croatia, which formed a warlike population of a million and a half of inhabitants, and extended my frontiers to the Drave. These acquisitions, more important in their political and military influence than in the mere increase of population, changed the face of Europe; they carried my eagles from the Noric Alps to within forty leagues of Vienna; the capital of Austria, dis-



mantled by my orders, was now exposed to my phalanxes; in six days' march I could even take it in reverse, by debouching by Lake Platten and separating it from Hungary. The Austrian monarchy would be a mere satellite, revolving within the orbit of my empire; it lay entirely at my disposal. Nor was this the only advantage. I might eventually renew my plan of the partition of the Ottoman Empire; and, if so, the acquisition of these provinces, extending my limits from the confines of Greece and Bosnia, would be of immense advantage in the execution of that grand project. And, if circumstances should induce me to renounce the dismemberment of Turkey, I would nevertheless find, in the possession of Illyria, the means of building up our fine maritime establishments at Venice and Corfu. At any rate, by gaining possession of the coast countries I would separate Austria from British influence, and force her to adopt the continental System. Thus had I, in four years, extended to the gates of Vienna and the shores of Greece the limits of France, to whom Pitt had contested the possession of Belgium. So far, all was well. But to these conditions I had added the cession of western Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw, contrary to the treaty of Tilsit. The secret articles of the treaty of Vienna stipulated for the reduction of the Austrian army to half its existing numbers; the discharge of all officers and soldiers belonging to the countries ceded to France and her allies; and, finally, the payment of eighty-five millions of francs.

**RESULTS OF THIS PEACE.**—This peace, at first sight, secured far more advantages than that of Tilsit; but, if we consider the article of the treaty which was calculated to offend Russia, and the family alliance which was afterward negotiated, it will not be doubted that it was less advantageous than it appeared. It was a question, however, which was decided in the negative at Moscow in 1812, and at Prague in 1813. It finally resulted in alienating both Austria and Russia, whereas, I ought to have attached to myself at least one of these powers. Already, as early as 1805, the famous Thugut, then in retirement at Presburg, but still exercising a powerful influence over the mind of Francis I., had indirectly hinted on the reciprocal advantages to the two courts of renewing the relations of 1756, preceded by a family alliance. The treaty of Presburg destroyed the effect of this vague proposal. But the Emperor Francis, in the letter which he wrote to me after the battle of Znaim, still spoke of the advantage of uniting the two powers. "*Their happiest days,*" said he, "*were those when they were most intimately allied!*" This

was enough to convince me that it only depended on myself to renew this grand alliance; but to make it a durable one, I ought not to have begun by destroying and humiliating him whom I wished to make my friend. I ought rather to have acted the magnanimous, to have entered into the spirit of the overture of the Emperor Francis, proposing to him the alliance offensive and defensive of 1756, leaving to him his states, and, if I still determined to reinforce the duchy of Warsaw, and restore, some day, the kingdom of Poland, to secretly stipulate indemnities for Galicia. It will be said that this would have abruptly broken off the alliance of Tilsit, in order to form another less advantageous. Not so. A renewal of the alliance of 1756 with Austria would have been no violation of the treaty of Tilsit. To reconcile the two, I had only to renounce my project of restoring the kingdom of Poland. Moreover, if the cession of Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw had not already weakened the alliance of Tilsit, it would have been broken by my marriage, six months later.

RECEPTION OF THE TREATY BY RUSSIA.—The secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit virtually forbade all aggrandizement of the duchy of Warsaw; and to give it, notwithstanding, near a million of inhabitants, was to announce to Russia that I purposed the restoration of Poland. I vainly flattered myself that I should be able to pacify Russia, by giving her the district of Tarnopol, and assuring her that I would not attempt the reestablishment of Poland; but she distrusted my promises. The Emperor Alexander, therefore, on receiving the treaty of Vienna, sent for Caulaincourt, and said to him plainly, that he saw my intentions; that he would not become the aggressor, but would prepare himself for whatever might happen, and be ready in case he were attacked. I might very well have justified the course I had pursued by alleging the conduct of the Russians during the campaign. In reality, the Russians were individually dissatisfied with the peace of Tilsit, and especially with that article which created the duchy of Warsaw, for they dreaded the restoration of Poland as much as the loss of their own empire, and were ignorant of the secret article which forbade its reestablishment. It was on this account that they were individually dissatisfied with the war, and ill-disposed to fight against the Austrians, and provoke the insurrection and emancipation of Galicia, seeing that this event might operate against themselves. The Russian government, however, knowing all the conditions of the treaty, were disposed to abide by its stipulations. I must, there-

fore, confess that in this matter I exhibited more independence and boldness than address and foresight. I desired the restoration of Poland, and I was not likely to exhibit, on this occasion, anything like a pusillanimous regard for the opinions of Russia.

Austria was conquered, and I held her fast in my talons. I had seen the hostility which directed her councils, and I thought less of gaining her by reciprocal advantages, than of chaining her submissive to my car; fear often makes, among nations, more friends than true interest. On the first outset of war, Austria would either be forced to declare for us, or I would begin the war by marching to her capital in eight days and effecting the dismemberment of her monarchy. The second campaign would be against those who should attempt to interfere between me and Austria, without being able to afford the latter any assistance in time. If the campaign of 1812 had not taken an unfavorable turn, my project would have been declared superb, and no one would ever have thought of discovering its errors. I must confess, however, when I reflect upon the situation of affairs of 1809, that the project was bold and audacious, rather than wise. It was in the end unfortunate, perhaps, for Russia as well as France and myself, that the Emperor Alexander declined my proposition to appoint some one to assist in the negotiations of Schönbrunn. In that case, the difficulties of the cession of Galicia would have been avoided; for, on the objection of the Russian minister, I should either have abandoned the project, or have made some other arrangements, satisfactory to that power. Moreover, we might have so modified the conditions imposed on Austria, as to have made us an ally of the House of Hapsburg.

But enough of these hypotheses; let us now return to a relation of facts.

The treaty of Vienna was so ill calculated to favor any ulterior alliance, that, until the last moment, I had doubts of its ratification, and made preparations for a renewal of hostilities. But, notwithstanding the opposition of both Metternich and Stadion, it was finally ratified on the twenty-second of October.

#### DESTRUCTION OF THE FORTIFICATIONS OF VIENNA.

—As soon as I learned that Austria had ratified the treaty, I set out from Munich for Paris, having first directed the demolition of the fortifications of Brunn, Raab, Gratz, Vienna, and Spitz. I had twice been made to appreciate the embarrassment which Vienna might have caused us had it been well defended, and the great advantages which we derived from its possession. Under our new relations, which resulted from the treaty, this capital would hardly decide for me *con amore*, although it might through



fear. I had caused all the bastions to be mined during the armistice, and I now directed their explosion. These bastions, which had formerly been the safeguard of the monarchy, now formed the most delightful promenades of the Viennese, who were both grieved and humiliated by their destruction. This measure affected the pride of the inhabitants more sensibly than the loss of two of their best provinces, and made me more enemies in Austria than two disastrous wars. On the supposition of a probable alliance, this measure was impolitic; but, at the time when I ordered it, there seemed no possibility of such an event, for my neglect to notice their two indirect appeals would seem to cut off all probability of a renewal of the subject, and the present sentiments of the Emperor and his cabinet were too decided to hope for any immediate change.

EXPEDITION FOR SUBJUGATING THE TYROL.—I now directed against the Tyrol forces sufficient for the subjugation of the country. General Drouet (Count d'Erlon), with the Bavarians and a French division, advanced by the north and the valley of the Inn, while Eugene directed some columns of the army of Italy by the valleys of the Drave and the Adige. The three divisions, under the orders of Baraguey d'Hilliers, were destined for the same object, and General Vial marched by Roveredo, in order to assist them. But the approach of these seven divisions did not intimidate these fierce mountaineers; our columns were concentrated after several combats; Wrede reached the Brenner, and Baraguey d'Hilliers the town of Brixen. But the columns which attempted to penetrate the lateral valleys were assailed by a fanatical multitude; two battalions were taken at St. Leonard, and our posts were assailed at Silian, at Prunecken, and at Brixen, so that Baraguey d'Hilliers had difficulty in saving them. It was found necessary to call the division of Durutte from Carinthia. Yielding at last to the evidence of their senses, these brave but erring men sent in their partial submission;—the chiefs of those who provoked the massacre of the Bavarians were tried and shot. Hofer still fought for a time with a few hundred men, and at last took refuge among the rocks; but, betrayed and discovered, he was arrested and conducted to the prison of Mantua, where he, also, was tried and condemned to death. If courage could be any safeguard against such a fate, certainly Hofer had been entitled to a pardon; but he perished, a victim to imperious necessity and the stern laws of war.

REMARKS ON THE CAMPAIGN.—This expedition, which terminated in January, closed the campaign of 1809, so new, so

extraordinary, and so rich in great lessons. This campaign in Austria had unveiled to me new dangers, and shown how precarious was my position amidst the adventurous passions and interests and ambitions of all Europe. The focus of resistance was not merely in Spain, Portugal, England, Prussia, Germany, Holland, or at Rome; it had also numerous ramifications even in France. The information which I received proved to me the dissatisfaction and ambition of Talleyrand and Fouché; the latter had betrayed himself in the council during my apparent embarrassment in the island of Lobau. He had taken upon himself to raise companies of the *élite* of the national guards in several departments, without the authorization of the Council of the Empire (which was composed of the ministers and grand dignitaries under the presidency of Cambacérès), saying that if I gave luster to France, France should show that my presence was not necessary to repel the enemy; a patriotic truth, without doubt, but an ill-timed and useless expression, accompanied by an illegal and factious measure. But it is time to return to the operations of Wellington in Spain, where the war was scarcely less fertile in important events than on the Danube.

## CHAPTER XV.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1809 IN THE SPANISH PENINSULA.

State of Affairs in the Peninsula—First Operations of Soult—Combats of Chaves and Braga—Assault of Oporto—Soult takes the left Bank of the Minho—Victories of Medellin and Ciudad-Real—Difficult Position of Soult—Combat of Amarante—New Descent of Wellington into Portugal—He attacks Soult at Oporto—Soult's Retreat—Ney's Operations in the Asturias—Misunderstanding between Soult and Ney, and the consequent Evacuation of Galicia—Wellington's Advance on Madrid—Joseph collects his Forces for an Attack—His Dispositions for Battle—Wellington's System of Battles—Battle of Talavera—Operations of Soult, Ney, and Mortier—Retreat of the Allies—Battle of Almonacid—Ney defeats Wilson—Remarks on these Operations—Soult succeeds Jourdan as Joseph's Chief of Staff—Combats of Tamames and Alba de Tormes—Arrizaga beaten at Ocana—Inaction of Wellington—Intrenched Camp of Torres Vedras—Romana quarrels with the Junta of Seville—Blake's Efforts to deliver Aragon—Operations of Suchet—Combat of Santa Maria—Combat of Belchite—Saint-Cyr's Operations in Catalonia—Siege of Gerona—General Remarks on the Operations of this Campaign—Operations of the Russians against Sweden—War between Russia and Turkey.

STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE PENINSULA.—In turning from the ensanguined banks of the Ebro to observe what was passing on the Danube, we left Saint-Cyr at Tarragona, nearly surrounded by the armed population of Catalonia; Junot, amidst the ruins of Saragossa, seeking to calm angry Aragon; Joseph, with the reserve, at Madrid; Mortier's corps, *en route* from Saragossa to join the King; Victor and Sébastiani, guarding the line of the Tagus; Ney, occupying Galicia; Soult, marching on Portugal; the division of Lapisse, at Salamanca; Kellerman, at Valladolid; and the other detached divisions, occupying and organizing Biscay, Navarre, Castile, and Leon. I have already explained the motives which induced me to send Soult into Portugal after the defeat of the English army under Moore; the chances of his success in subjugating this kingdom, and in avenging the defeat of Vimiero; the strong measures taken by the Prince Regent and his executive council to oppose us; and, finally, the dispositions



of the English, who remained under the orders of General Craddock.

**FIRST OPERATIONS OF SOULT.**—After having resigned Galicia to the troops of Marshal Ney, Soult marched on Tuy, in order to pass the Minho at that place. The heavy rains which fall in Galicia during half the year had swollen this river, and the overflowing of the marsh opposite this city greatly increased its width; the want of boats (all those in the vicinity having been removed by the enemy), and the proximity of Valencia, added so much to the difficulty of the enterprise, that Soult was forced to renounce his project, and, leaving the mass of his materials at Tuy, to ascend the river toward Orense.

**COMBATS OF CHAVES AND BRAGA.**—Romana had incited these provinces to insurrection, and his corps seemed disposed to defend them. After having defeated him at Ribadavia and Monterey, Soult advanced on Chaves and captured it, taking two thousand prisoners. The Anglo-Portuguese generals, not less alarmed at the march of Victor on the Tagus than at the approach of Soult, had concentrated between Leyria and Abrantès to complete the organization of the troops of the line in English pay and of the regular militia levied by Portugal. The defense of the mountains of *Tras-los-Montes* was left to the insurgent masses under General Freyre and the division of Silveira. Among these insurgents there figured a battalion of students formed by the Bishop of Braga. Frightful anarchy reigned in these assembled masses; all accused the chiefs who had allowed the French to enter and take Chaves; a crowd of peasants attacked General Freyre and massacred him, and also his *aids-de-camp*, the commanding officer of engineers, and even the *corregidor* of Braga, whom they accused of lukewarmness, or of connivance with us. The command of this insurgent multitude was given to a Hanoverian colonel, who was himself utterly astonished at the popular effervescence around him; but his only course was to submit to the demands of these fanatics who cried aloud for battle. He received the attack of Soult, on the twentieth of March, on the heights of *Lanhozo* and *Carvalho-d'Este* in front of Braga, where he was defeated and put to flight. Our troops had the generosity to treat the enemy as prisoners of war, notwithstanding they had mutilated many of our men with the most revolting barbarity. The inhabitants of the beautiful city of Braga, to the number of twenty-five thousand, were all put to flight.

**ASSAULT OF OPORTO.**—On the twenty-sixth, Soult's army advanced to Oporto, where fifty thousand insurgents had assem-

bled in arms under the orders of the Bishop, who had two generals as his lieutenants. The environs of this city are composed of a multitude of small hills, which give it a most agreeable aspect. These heights had been covered with redoubts, erected under the direction of the English and Portuguese engineers, and their ramparts were armed with two hundred pieces of artillery. To leave a city like this in his rear would have been feasible and proper only in case he were to effect a junction with Victor on a fixed day, to act in concert against the regular Anglo-Portuguese army in the valley of the Tagus. But as nothing of this kind had been concerted between the generals, Soult thought the only proper course for him to pursue was to assault Oporto and make himself master of the place. So exasperated were the militia and insurgents, that they tore in pieces one of their own chiefs, and the Portuguese generals were obliged to resort to subterfuge in order to receive a flag of truce. Soult begged them to save the city from the horrors inseparable from an assault; but while they were parleying, they captured, by an unworthy stratagem, General Foy, taking him from the front of his division. They were forced to place him in prison to protect him from the rage of the populace, by whom he had already been most cruelly treated, notwithstanding his escort.

Marshal Soult, seeing from the rejection of his propositions that force alone could decide the question, on the twenty-ninth of March ordered an assault. Three columns carry the redoubts on the center and two wings, while a fourth drives back the inhabitants who have sallied out of the city. They fire upon our troops from the houses and traverses constructed across the streets; but our troops surmount all obstacles, penetrate even to the superb bridge of boats across the Douro, on which the army of the Archbishop precipitates itself pell-mell with the inhabitants. A ponton is broken under the weight of the flying mass, but is again repaired; our troops throw themselves on the opposing batteries, and carry the convent of La Serra, while the dispersed enemy flies to Coimbra. We are, perhaps, more disposed to look with pity on the fate of these fanatical people, who shot our soldiers from the roofs and windows of their houses, than on that of the brave troops who were exasperated to resort to severe but justifiable retaliation. A carnage of six hours was followed by a moment of pillage, which is but too commonly the price of such resistance; our troops, however, showed moderation instead of exceeding the limits allowed by the laws of war.

This feat of arms—one of the finest in the whole war—procured us immense booty: one hundred and ninety-seven pieces of

ordnance, and a large quantity of military munitions. Only three hundred prisoners were taken.

**SOULT TAKES THE LEFT BANK OF THE MINHO.**—In any other country another such victory would have decided the fate, not only of Lisbon, but of Portugal: here, however, one success only rendered it necessary to gain another. The conquerors were now embarrassed by want of provisions, and actually ready to perish with famine in the richest country in Europe. Soult made every exertion in his power to restore tranquillity and reorganize the administrative service; but how could order be expected in a country given up to all the furies of anarchy, where a Portuguese general massacres a corregidor for surrendering to the Marshal!

Soult's first care was to capture Valenza and relieve Tuy, where the brave General Lamartinière had been besieged, with all the *matériel* of the army, by the fanatical bands of the Abbot Contho and some Portuguese militia. General Heudelet, assisted by the dragoons of Lorges, had the good fortune to get possession of Valenza without opposition. He thus effected the junction, and succeeded in rescuing this precious convoy. Viana and the strong places on the Minho were surrendered, and a temporary pacification of the country effected.

**VICTORIES OF MEDELLIN AND CIUDAD-REAL.**—My departure from Spain at first seemed to produce no unfavorable change in our affairs in the peninsula; the very day previous to the triumph of Soult at Oporto, Victor preluded that victory in such a way as to induce me to hope for the entire success of his enterprise. Having gotten rid, at Ucles, of the army of Andalusia, Joseph had left to Sébastiani the care of holding it in check, while the first corps, established in the environs of Almaraz on the Tagus, was opposed to the army of Cuesta, or of Estramadura. My plan was for this corps to descend the valley of the Tagus, so as to assist the march of Soult on Lisbon, flattering myself that the victories of Almonacid and Ucles had destroyed all the chances of opposition from the Spanish armies. But this calculation was erroneous; the supreme junta had exerted all possible activity in reorganizing the army of Cuesta, an old general of mediocre talent, but endowed with presence of mind, courage, and perseverance. Emboldened by the inaction of our troops behind the Tagus, Cuesta took possession of Almaraz, and blew up the bridge. His audacity, however, ended here, and he took a defensive line behind the river.

The Duke of Belluno, having collected the necessary means,



crossed the Tagus, and Cuesta retreated behind the Guadiana by Medellin. Victor followed in pursuit, crossing the river at Merida, and ascending the stream. A rencounter took place near Mengabriel, in rear of Medellin, and was one of the warmest contests that occurred during the war, at least with the Spaniards. The ephemeral success of driving back our first line for a moment gave occasion for exultation and boasting to the enemy; but soon, charged by the divisions of Leval, Ruffin, and Villatte, assisted on the left by the cavalry of the redoubtable Lasalle, and on the right by Latour-Maubourg, the Spaniards were everywhere beaten. The rout was the more complete, as, menaced by the left, Cuesta was unable to maintain himself perpendicular to the Guadiana, without being turned and thrown upon the river. Our troops, exasperated by the insults received from the Spaniards in their moment of victory, were at first inclined to give no quarter. From six to seven thousand men, killed and wounded, were strewed over the field of battle, and five thousand were taken prisoners. We paid pretty dearly for this success, which cost us not less than four thousand men *hors-de-combat*.

The day previous to this glorious victory (March 27th), Sebastiani had marched against the Duke of Infantado, completely defeating him at Ciudad-Real, and forced him to take refuge in the Sierra-Morena, where the Duke soon threw up his command and went to Seville.

The Spaniards were conquered, but they quickly sprung up again from their ashes; a part of the prisoners, through the assistance of the inhabitants, escaped from our escorts; and others, who had enrolled themselves under Joseph, deserted from us and rejoined their own colors. The junta pressed in the volunteers, or drafted men by lot, to fill up the skeletons of their regiments of the line. By the end of April, Cuesta had reorganized his army, and increased its numbers to about thirty thousand men, and Victor, cantoned between the Tagus and the Guadiana, was embarrassed to penetrate to Abrantès against the Anglo-Portuguese, while an army still more powerful than his own, debouching from Badajos on Alcantara, was coming to assail him in rear; he was in a precarious situation, and if he had now executed my orders, he would have been lost.

**DIFFICULT POSITION OF SOULT.**—Having received at Oporto the *matériel* which he had been forced to leave at Tuy, Soult applied himself to the pacification of the inhabitants of the province of Minho. By order and firmness he was partially successful. It is said by some that for the better success of his object, he thought to have himself declared sovereign of Portugal, as a

kingdom independent both of France and England; at least it is certain that proclamations of this character were issued by his chief of staff to the army. But from the good judgment and known patriotism of Soult, it must be believed that this project was designed merely as a means of creating a new party in Portugal; the idea of playing the part of a second Dumouriez, in my reign, was too absurd to be seriously entertained by a man of his judgment.\*

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\*Alison conveys the impression that Soult was at this time intriguing to place himself on the throne of Portugal, with or without the authority of Napoleon, and that the plan went even so far as to contemplate a revolt against the French Emperor. The statement is not sustained: Alison's account of Soult's operations at Oporto, and subsequently, is greatly discolored by prejudice. On the contrary, Napier's account is entirely fair and just. We copy his concluding remarks on Soult's conduct in this affair:

"Having repressed the disorders attendant on the battle, he adopted the same conciliatory policy which had marked his conduct at Chaves and Braga, and endeavored to remedy, as far as it was possible, the deplorable results of the soldiers' fury; recovering and restoring a part of the plunder, he caused the inhabitants remaining in the town to be treated with respect, and invited, by proclamation, all those who had fled to return. He demanded no contributions, and, restraining with a firm hand the violence of his men, contrived, from the captured public property, to support the army and even to succor the poorest and most distressed of the population.

"But his ability in the civil and political administration of the Entre Minho e Douro, produced an effect which he was not prepared for. The Prince Regent's desertion of the country was not forgotten. The national feeling was as adverse to Portugal being a dependency on the Brazils as it was to the usurpation of the French, and the comparison between Soult's government and the horrible anarchy which preceded it was all in favor of the former. His victories, and the evident vigor of his character, contrasted with the apparent supineness of the English, promised permanency for the French power, and the party, formerly noticed as being inimical to the House of Braganza, revived. The leaders, thinking this a favorable opportunity to execute their intention, waited upon the Duke of Dalmatia, and expressed their desire for a French prince and an independent government. They even intimated their good wishes toward the Duke himself, and demanded his concurrence and protection, while, in the name of the people, they declared that the Braganza dynasty was at an end.

"Although unauthorized by the Emperor to accede to this proposition, Soult was yet unwilling to reject a plan from which he could draw such immediate and important military advantages. Napoleon was not a man to be lightly dealt with on such an occasion, but the Marshal, trusting that circumstances would justify him, encouraged the design, appointed men to civil employments, and raised a Portuguese legion of five battalions. He acted with so much dexterity that in fifteen days the cities of Oporto and Braga, and the towns of Bacellos, Viana, Villa-de-Conde, Povo-a-de-Barcim, Feira, and Avar, sent addresses, containing the expression of their sentiments, and bearing the signatures of thirty thousand persons, as well of the nobles, clergy, and merchants as of the people. These addresses were burned when the French retreated from Oporto, but the fact that such a project was in agitation has never been denied; the regency even caused inquest to be made on the matter, and it was then asserted that very few

Be this as it may, Soult, before marching on Lisbon, waited to be joined by his brother, who was bringing him four or five thousand convalescents from Astorga, and to hear from the operations of Victor on the Tagus, and of Lapisse's division, which was to march by Almeida. He then hoped to be able to reach the capital, and to maintain himself there, till he could receive my instructions respecting the means to be taken to sustain the place. But my departure for France, the war with Austria, and the operations of the Anglo-Portuguese soon destroyed this illusion.

The corps whose coöperation was indispensable for the success of his conquest could no longer act. Victor, as has just been explained, feared, with some reason, to penetrate into Portugal. On the other side, Ney, charged with the subjugation and organization of Galicia, and of guarding Coruña and Ferrol, had his hands full, with eighteen thousand men to cover a coast a hundred leagues in extent, and an entire kingdom from Orense to Ribadeo. He had on his left the insurgent population of the bishopric of Orense; on his right, Romana held the Asturias, having retired there on the retreat of Moore, and reinforced himself with the levies of that province. The occupation of the Asturias was an important operation; for the English had made

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persons were found to be implicated. That many of the signatures were forged by the leaders may readily be believed; but the policy of lessening the importance of the affair is also evident, and the inquisitors, if willing, could not have probed it to the bottom.

"This transaction formed the ground-work of a tale, generally credited even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed at an independent crown. The circumstances were certainly such as might create suspicion; but that the conclusion was false is shown by the mode in which Napoleon treated both the rumor and the subject of it. Slighting the former, he yet made known to his lieutenant that it had reached his ears, adding, 'I remember nothing but Austerlitz,' and at the same time largely increased the Duke of Dalmatia's command. On the other hand, the policy of Soult's conduct on this occasion and the great influence if not the numbers of the Portuguese malcontents were abundantly proved by the ameliorated relations between the army and the peasantry. The fierceness of the latter subsided; and even the priests abated of their hostility in the Entre Minho e Douro. The French soldiers were no longer assassinated in that province; whereas, previous to this intrigue, that cruel species of warfare had been carried on with infinite activity, and the most malignant passions called forth on both sides.

"Among other instances of Portuguese ferocity, and of the truculent violence of the French soldiers, the death of Colonel Lameth and the retaliation which followed may be cited. That young officer, when returning from the Marshal's quarters to his own, was waylaid, near the village of Arrifana, and murdered; his body was then stripped and mutilated in a shocking manner. This assassination, committed within the French lines, and at a time when Soult enforced the strictest discipline, was justifiable



it a general *dépôt* for the immense quantity of arms and equipments sent for the Spanish army, and for the militia which had been raised in the provinces of the north, notwithstanding the presence of our bayonets.

Ney was the only general at hand to subdue this province; but to act with his whole corps would have exposed Corufia and Ferrol, and left all Galicia open to insurrection; and to act with only half of his troops would not only have exposed him to defeat with a divided army, but, even in case of success, would have been too small for the occupation of the province. I ought to have placed under the orders of this marshal the troops of Biscay and Castile, so that he might himself have combined some concentric movements to fall on the organized corps of the enemy, and sweep the provinces in his rear. There were sufficient troops between Bayonne and Astorga for this purpose, but they did not act in concert; the result was that Ney could neither go to Oviedo nor assist the army of Portugal.

Soult, thus abandoned to his own resources, saw himself, like Junot, with a storm gathering on all sides. In advancing on Oporto he had separated, rather than removed, the obstacles in his way. Already, Silveira, reappearing in his rear, had captured Chaves and collected threatening forces on the Tamega. General Boutheilo retook Braga and infested the country be-

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neither by the laws of war nor by those of humanity. No general could neglect to punish such a proceeding. The protection due to the army, and even the welfare of the Portuguese within the French jurisdiction, demanded a severe example; for the violence of the troops had hitherto been with difficulty restrained by their commander, and if, at such a moment, he had appeared indifferent to their individual safety, his authority would have been set at nought, and the unmeasured indiscriminating vengeance of an insubordinate army executed.

"Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the unhappy death of a personal friend, Soult directed General Thomières to march, with a brigade of infantry, to Arrifana, and punish the criminals. Thomières was accompanied by a Portuguese civilian, and, after a judicial inquiry, shot five or six persons whose guilt was said to have been proved; but it is certain that the principal actor, a Portuguese major of militia, and some of his accomplices, escaped across the Vouga to Colonel Trant, who, disgusted at their conduct, sent them to Marshal Beresford. It would also appear, from the statement of a peasant, that Thomières, or those under him, exceeded Soult's orders; for, in that statement, attested by oath, it is said that twenty-four innocent persons were killed, and that the soldiers, after committing many atrocious excesses, burned the village.

"These details have been related partly because they throw a light upon the direful nature of this contest, but chiefly because the transaction has been adduced by other writers as proof of cruelty in Soult; a charge not to be sustained by the facts of this case, and belied by the general tenor of his conduct, which even his enemies, while they attributed it to an insidious policy, acknowledged, at the same time, to be mild and humane."

tween the Minho and the Douro. As the waves of the sea, when separated by a ship, instantly close in its rear, so did the insurgents close around our troops and confine the army to the possession of the ground on which it encamped.

COMBAT OF AMARANTE.—The party which favored us in Portugal, and ventured to declare for me and against the House of Braganza, was the most intelligent, but not the most numerous. And the presence of Silveira on the Tamega and at Chaves could not fail to rekindle the flames of insurrection in the country which we occupied. It was important to get rid of him before we could complete the work of pacification. Generals Delaborde and Loison were sent to attack him at Amarante, where he had collected twelve thousand men. This corps had intrenched the stone bridge and placed themselves on the formidable heights near by, disputing the passage of the river, which was nowhere fordable, on account of its steep and rocky banks. All attempts to carry this bridge were unsuccessful, and Loison lost most precious time till the second of May, when he at last blew up the intrenchment and beat the enemy.

The Anglo-Portuguese derived much advantage from this delay of twelve days, to complete their organization; but it would be attributing too much importance to this circumstance to say that it alone decided the fate of the expedition. For Craddock and Beresford had thirty thousand good troops to oppose Soult, who, forced to guard Oporto, could appear at Coimbra with only eighteen thousand French troops.

NEW DESCENT OF WELLINGTON INTO PORTUGAL.—More serious obstacles were now rising to ruin all my hopes in the peninsula. England, instead of being discouraged by the ill-success of Moore's expedition, felt more sensibly than ever the importance of sustaining the peninsula and delivering Portugal. Encouraged by the more than energetic measures ordered by the Prince Regent of Portugal, at her instigation, she resolved to second these measures with all her power. All the resources derived from her perfection in the mechanical arts were put in play to accelerate the manufacture of arms and military munitions. England now resembled the forges of Vulcan, filling Europe with the thunderbolts of war. But the Cabinet of St. James did not limit themselves to these succors, but sent to Lisbon the same Wellington who had triumphed over Junot at Vimiera, and whose talents and fortune were destined to give a fatal direction to the war.

Wellington, who arrived at Lisbon with a reinforcement of

English troops on the twenty-sixth of April, made preparations for falling upon his adversary and taking advantage of the nature of the country to cut off his retreat. He assembled twenty thousand troops at Coimbra, and advanced on the Vouga to keep Soult in check near Oporto; while Beresford, at the head of the Portuguese army, passed the Douro near Lamego, and took the direction of Chaves, seconded by the partisan corps of Wilson. The plan was well conceived, and the disposition of the forces good. Soult's advanced guard, under the intrepid Franceschi, surprised and almost enveloped at Grijon, succeeded, by presence of mind, in regaining Oporto without any serious loss.

The position of Soult was critical; vague reports announced the coming tempest; but he could obtain no accurate information of the enemy; for, if the Spanish insurgents are good at keeping a secret, those of Portugal are still better. Hearing, however, on the eighth, of the arrival of Wellington at Coimbra, he began to collect his scattered detachments, and prepare either for combat or retreat. The news of the war in Germany had shaken the *morale* of his army; for every one seemed to see an open abyss before him in Portugal, while all the glory and honors were to be won by the army in Germany. Daily contests in an insurgent country does not suit the character of the French soldier; he is brave, but sanguine and impatient, and soon becomes tired of this kind of hostilities. Moreover, the great triumphs which he had gained in the last few years made him negligent of the details of field service, thinking it sufficient for him to be brave in the battle-field.

Finally, as a climax to his anxiety, Soult now discovered, by the plot of Major d'Argenson, that he had traitors in his army, who were in secret communication with the enemy. He then resolved to unite his army behind the Tamega, in order to reach the vicinity of Almeida and of the division of Lapisse. Loison was already preceded at Amarante; Lorges received orders to evacuate the province of Minho, and direct himself on that city; but he could not reach there before the fifteenth of May. Soult, after having rallied his advanced guard, placed the division of Mermet intermediate between him and Loison, broke the bridge of the Douro, and withdrew the boats to the right bank, hoping to maintain his position under shelter of the river; but he was soon undeceived in this respect.

WELLINGTON ATTACKS SOULT AT OPORTO.—Wellington, having passed the Vouga on the eleventh, advanced in three columns on the Douro. Murray's division was to cross



the river two leagues above; those of Paget and Hill at Villanova, and the left on the quays of Oporto. By means of an understanding with the inhabitants, they obtained a few boats which were negligently guarded. General Paget passed to the right bank without being perceived, and established himself in a large building, from which he could protect the successive passage of the several battalions of General Hill. Soult, deceived by the reports of his generals and the negligence of his outposts, was tranquil at Oporto when the alarm was given. The Portuguese boatmen profited by this circumstance to escape with their boats and join the left of the English. Soult left Oporto with the division of Delaborde. He would have taken the direct road to Braga, had not the necessity of rallying on Mermet and Loison, in the direction of Amarante, induced him to retire in that direction. He encountered the columns of Paget and Hill, ready to debouch on his line of retreat. He attacked them, and drove them back far enough to facilitate the successive passage of his troops on the road to Penafiel and Valisa.

**SOULT'S RETREAT.**—This surprise was the more fatal to Soult, as all his dispositions were made for a retreat on Loison's corps at Amarante, which place was no longer in our possession. Driven from Pavoia, on the tenth, by Beresford and Silveira, Loison had failed to inform his chief, and, on the night of the twelfth, had even decamped from Amarante on Guimarens. Soult's army was already on the road to Amarante when he heard this disastrous news. There was now but one means of escape: this was to throw all his *matériel* and baggage into the Souza, and march in all haste to Guimarens, by a path which was traveled only by the shepherds. He boldly decided to make this sacrifice, and had the good fortune to effect his junction with Loison. But he was not free from embarrassment, for it was probable that Wellington, taking the direct road from Oporto to Braga, would reach this city before the French. It was, therefore, not worth while to compromise the safety of the army in order to save ten or twelve pieces of artillery which belonged to Loison's division. Soult, therefore, directed his march across the mountains on the same field of Lanhoso, where he had defeated the Portuguese on the twentieth of March, thus reaching the great road in advance of the English. This desperate resolution saved his army. He continued his march on Salamonde and Ruivaens; but hearing that the bridge was cut and guarded by infantry, and that large parties of the enemy were near Chaves, and that Beresford was marching on that place, he resolved to

throw himself into the mountains of Montalégre. The great difficulties of this country were surmounted by our troops, whose march was facilitated by the entire destruction of their *matériel* and baggage train. After forcing the passage of the bridge of Lisarella, near Villa de Pons, Soult reached Montalégre. These frightful precipices, where they were obliged to force the successive passages of two bridges, so impeded their march that they ham-strung their draft horses and mules to get rid of the little baggage train that remained. The army finally reached Orense, with no further obstacle than being harassed by three or four thousand Anglo-Portuguese as far as Allariz; but it could not stop in this miserable country to punish the enemy, for fear of actual starvation; it, however, reached their rear guard, and headed them off by Monterey and Abemides.

Notwithstanding the disasters of this retreat, Soult might deem himself fortunate in having effected his escape, even with the loss of his artillery, and two thousand men who had fallen in the several combats in which he had engaged since he left Oporto. In fact, he reached Lugo in a still worse condition than that in which Moore had traversed the same town six months before. Soult found here the army of Romana who was besieging the brigade of Fournier, while Ney was invading the Asturias.

NEY'S OPERATIONS IN THE ASTURIAS.—Uneasy at hearing no news of the sixth corps for the last four months, I had directed Kellerman to advance from Astorga to communicate with it by Lugo, and to act in concert with it for the subjugation of the Asturias and the defeat of Romana. Ney accordingly left Mondonedo with one half of his corps to reach the coast from the west side, while Kellerman marched by Leon on Oviedo, crossing the high chain of mountains which extends from the Pyrenees along the coast, or rather is the prolongation of that range. Marchand's division was left alone to guard all Galicia. At the very moment when Ney was valiantly forcing the passage of the Navia, and entering victorious into Gijon and Oviedo, Romana found it convenient to come and take his place in Galicia. Our movements were so well known to the enemy, while his were kept from us with such impenetrable secrecy, that Romana passed, as it were, in sight of our columns while on the march to Oviedo, and fell on Lugo when he was least expected. The brave Sixty-ninth was valiantly defending itself in this city, determined to await the return of Ney, when Soult came to their relief. His return at this juncture was the more fortunate, as the divisions of Carrera and Morillo had attacked General Mau-

cune at Caldas-del-Rey, and taken possession of Saint Jago and threatened Coruña. The return of Ney, and his junction with Soult toward Lugo, soon drove the enemy from Galicia.

MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN SOULT AND NEY, AND CONSEQUENT EVACUATION OF GALICIA.—But these difficulties were dispersed, rather than conquered. Soult had supplied himself with arms, munitions, and some light pieces of artillery in the arsenals of Galicia; but as Romana was at Orense and the Anglo-Portuguese army were probably marching on Almeida or the Tagus, it was important to seek the enemy. Soult and Ney agreed to act in concert; the former was to cross the mountains of Val-d'Ores to Zamora on the Douro, in order to hear something from King Joseph, and to oppose the English if they should debouch by Almeida. Ney, on his side, had driven back Carrera and Morillo on Vigo. But, supposing that Soult had agreed with him to remain near Orense, he was astonished to find that he was not there. Seeing himself thus left alone in Galicia, surrounded by enemies and ignorant of the operations of the victorious army of Wellington, Ney took it upon himself to march on Estremadura. This resolution was premature, but a natural one, if the circumstances had been such as he supposed. The Anglo-Portuguese army had been increased to forty-five thousand men; Cuesta and Venegas commanded two other armies, making together more than sixty thousand combatants. The King had in the vicinity of Madrid only forty thousand men; he might be beaten and driven from his capital by one hundred thousand Allies, if our generals did not rally to his assistance. Ney, therefore, resolved to leave Coruña, where he had difficulty in subsisting his army. This voluntary abandonment of our maritime establishments at Ferrol was a serious affair, but Ney was advised to it by his generals; and the battle of Talavera proved that there was at least some justice in their calculations. In presenting the subject to his generals, however, for their opinion, Ney concealed from them the agreement he had made with Soult, and represented the disappearance of that marshal from Orense as a new source of disquietude and danger; whereas, in fact, Soult's movements had been agreed upon between them.\* In addition to other and more weighty reasons for his advance on Estremadura, Ney alleged the battle of Essling, the news of which he had just received; and my difficult position in the island

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\*Documentary evidence more recently published proves that the view taken by Jomini of Ney's conduct on this occasion is entirely correct. Ney either acted from want of judgment or from his well-known jealousy of Soult.



of Lobau. By concentrating our forces so as to receive the orders of the King, he thought he maneuvered as a skillful general; for the divisions of Romana, who were continually patrolling the Val-d'Ores and Villa Franca, rendered it impossible to receive a dispatch unless it was protected by at least four thousand men. Moreover, his departure from this province would place it neither more nor less in the hands of the junta than it was already, for it was continually traversed by bands of insurgents, even during Ney's occupation.

But whatever may be said in justification of this movement of the sixth corps, as a military maneuver to give Joseph the means of crushing Wellington on the Tagus, it certainly was unwise in its political relations. I myself was far from satisfied with his hasty abandonment of Coruña and Ferrol. His chief of staff (Jomini) advised him to throw six battalions in the strongest fortresses of Galicia, and to march with the remainder of his army to Astorga, returning again to that province as soon as he should ascertain that the King did not require his assistance against Wellington. But Ney was too much attached to his heroes of Friedland, and too uncertain of returning, to risk, in this way, the safety of his battalions. It was unfortunate, however, that he neglected this advice, for Mortier and Soult were abundantly sufficient to enable Joseph to force Wellington into Portugal, and Ney might have returned into Galicia. But, isolated in this kingdom, and separated from the remainder of the army by a *coupe-gorge* of forty leagues, with Romana on his left and the Asturians on his right, he would not probably have been able to maintain this position for more than six months.

For these reasons, which Ney deemed sufficient to justify the course he pursued, he left Coruña on the twenty-second of June, and reached Astorga on the eighth of July, in the very best order. The enemy, however, have not blushed to pronounce as a disorderly retreat what was in reality a voluntary maneuver, founded on military principles, and executed without the loss of a single soldier, or even a single one of the sick.\*

ADVANCE OF WELLINGTON ON MADRID.—Wellington, not deeming it best to waste his time in a vain pursuit of Soult in the mountains of Chaves, returned from Braga to the Tagus. After remaining more than a month at Abrantès to

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\*The order of relation in the preceding section has been slightly transposed in the translation; but the language of the original has been substantially preserved.

concert measures with the Spaniards and complete his own preparations, he advanced toward Alcantara and Oropesa, where he effected, on the twentieth of July, his junction with Cuesta, who had united the *élite* of the Spanish forces to the number of thirty-seven thousand men, eight thousand of this number being cavalry. Their object was to march together on Madrid, to which place Venegas was to move with twenty thousand men by Tolédo and Aranjuez; at the same time that Colonel Wilson, with his light corps, was to advance as partisans in the direction of the Escorial and Naval-Carnero, in order to threaten Joseph's line of communication with the north of Spain. The Portuguese, under Beresford, were to march on Almeida, and, by acting in concert with the Duke del Parque, who commanded about Ciudad-Rodrigo, to occupy the French on the Douro and at Salamanca.

This operation was skillfully conceived. It was natural to suppose that, in a country where we were kept in ignorance of operations beyond the view of our camps, Wellington might fall on our isolated corps and appear victorious at Madrid, before any efficacious measures could be taken to prevent him. The success of this plan would have been more certain if it had been executed by the end of June; but Wellington did not command the Spaniards, and it was necessary to arrange his movements with two generals and the junta, which was not the affair of a day. Nor was it long before discord showed itself between these different chiefs; and, as usually happens between armies which are not agreed, each pretended to be in the right. If we are to believe the Spanish version of the affair, the primitive plan was to fall on Victor, before he could join Joseph, and Wellington, instead of hastening the operation, remained inactive at the very time when he was to have effected his junction with Cuesta. They thus reproach the English general with having paralyzed Vanega's corps, by forcing it to pass in rear of the Tagus to Toledo, instead of marching by Arganda direct to Madrid, which, they say, would have prevented the junction of Sébastiani and Victor. The English historians, on the contrary, affirm that Wellington wished to make the attack immediately after the junction, and that Cuesta opposed it. It is certain, however, that Victor, having voluntarily left the Alberche at their approach, in order to unite with Sébastiani, the Spaniard, animated by a noble ardor, put himself in pursuit as far as Torrijos. The dilatory movements of the English general on this occasion gave me no very exalted opinion of his talent and military character. I considered him brave and ready, but not bold. I was either deceived

in him, or else his subsequent successes changed his character in this respect.

**JOSEPH COLLECTS HIS FORCES FOR AN ATTACK.**—The approach of the combined army created great alarm at Madrid—sure proof of the wisdom of the enterprise. Victor, at the head of the first corps, fell back from Talavera on Toledo. The King recalled Sébastiani from Aranjuez to Toledo, thus opening to Venegas the road to the capital. Joseph advanced with his guards and reserve to put himself at the head of forty-five thousand men; while Belliard, with only three battalions, was left to guard Madrid, which was then a volcano ready to burst forth; he established himself in the Retiro.

The army leaves Toledo, and advances on the Alberche, two thousand men remaining to watch the movement of Venegas. Joseph now rests all his hopes on the union of the corps of Soult, Mortier and Ney, to whom orders were given, on the twenty-second of July, to march in all haste on Plasencia. On this important operation depends the fate of the campaign. Joseph now, blindly and in direct contradiction to the principles of the art, decides to take the offensive alone, and before he can rely upon the coöperation of fifty thousand men led by Soult! He should rather have moved back obliquely toward the sources of the Alberche to induce the enemy to follow in pursuit, and again have fallen impetuously on him as soon as our two armies could enter in concert into action. Joseph and Jourdan, under the advice, it is said, of Victor, took the absurd resolution to march alone against Wellington, and to attack him. The fear of exposing his capital, by refusing his left wing, was the reason assigned by my brother for this resolution.

On the twenty-sixth the army passes the Guadarama and overthrows Cuesta, who has advanced to Torrijos; he is driven back behind the Alberche. On the twenty-seventh the army crosses this river at four o'clock in the afternoon, and reaches the enemy's position near the close of the day. Strange as it may seem, Victor, seeing the importance of the heights which supported Wellington's left, thought to carry them in the obscurity of the night, and directed Ruffin's division to assail them, at the same time that Lapisse threatened this left wing in front. The regiments of Ruffin, received by fresh and well-arranged troops, were beaten one after the other, as they successively arrived on the hillocks. This *début* was an unfavorable augury for the following day. Jourdan was of opinion that a battle should not be risked till they heard from Soult; but Victor, hop-



ing to obtain the honor of defeating an English army, objected that this circumspection would produce an unfavorable impression on soldiers accustomed to victory; and this pitiful consideration induced my brother to renew an attack condemned at the same time by reason, policy, and the rules of war.

**DISPOSITIONS FOR BATTLE.**—The only accessible point of the enemy's line being its left, it was necessary to assemble the mass of our army and the reserve on our right wing, to menace the position in front and to turn it by a deep valley, while sustaining the general movement to the right. By prolonging ourselves in this way in a line oblique to the Tagus, we would paralyze half of the enemy's army, or force it to make a change of front, and to fight with the river in its rear. We would base ourselves, in case of retreat on Avila and the Escorial, thus securing our communication with Soult. But instead of doing this, the King established his reserve on the left, near Sébastiani, and, with divisions in echelons coming successively into action without support, he attacked the hill where Wellington had placed his best troops and a numerous artillery. In accordance with these dispositions, Sébastiani, on our left, was to attack the point of the allied line where the troops of Wellington and Cuesta were united, thus assailing the left of the Spaniards and the right of the Anglo-Portuguese; while Victor reserved to himself the honor of carrying the advantageous heights occupied by the extreme left of the Allies. Their forces numbered sixty thousand men, while ours did not exceed forty thousand.

**WELLINGTON'S SYSTEM OF BATTLE.**—Wellington's system of combat was what is called the *defensive-offensive*; awaiting his adversary on chosen ground, he fatigued his assailants with his artillery and a murderous fire of musketry, and when they were about to pierce his line, he avoided this formidable movement by falling on them with his united forces. This system, under certain circumstances, may be as good as any other; it depends on the localities, the nature of the troops, and the character of your opponent. I received defensive-offensive battles at Rivoli and Austerlitz.

**BATTLE OF TALAVERA.**—Such was the system at Talavera; the infantry of the first corps attacking successively one division after another. Our brave men attacked the enemy's position with admirable boldness, but it only resulted in their destruction; reaching the enemy's line, out of breath and in disorder, they were cut to pieces by the fire of sharpshooters and platoons, and then borne down with the bayonet. The action

was begun by the division of Ruffin, which bravely ascended the height on the enemy's flank, while Lapisse directed his attack toward the center of that wing. Our regiments, successively engaged, were easily repulsed. A new effort, and one better combined, though rather tardy, was made about four o'clock; three divisions advancing together to the attack. Never did our soldiers fight more bravely; but the difficulty of the ground, the firmness and the deadly fire of the English triumphed over their efforts.

During this obstinate contest Sébastiani had assailed the enemy's right; Leval's division was pushing before it a Spanish division, when Wellington directed his reserve of English to drive them back. Cut up by a concentric and deadly fire, and opposed by superior numbers, this division was obliged to fall back. The remainder of the day was passed by engagements of the sharpshooters, which produced no result on the line. Victor sought in vain to prolong his right by the valley, so as to turn Wellington, who opposed these efforts with his well-sustained reserve of cavalry. This partial and tardy movement was without success, and night finally put an end to this useless butchery. The two armies remained in each other's presence the following day; but Joseph, on hearing that Wilson was gaining the environs of Naval-Carnero and threatening his capital, finally ordered a retreat. Victor returned on the twenty-ninth, behind the Alberche; Joseph and Sébastiani marched to Illescas, and, on the thirtieth, threw a division into Toledo, which place was threatened by Venegas. Wellington, although reinforced by the arrival of Craufurd's division, did not advance from his position;\* dissatisfied

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\*The march of Craufurd's division is thus described by Napier: "On that day (the twenty-ninth), General Robert Craufurd reached the English camp, with the forty-third, fifty-second, and ninety-fifth regiments, and immediately took charge of the outposts. These troops, after a march of twenty miles, were in bivouac near Malpartida de Plasencia, when the alarm caused by the Spanish fugitives spread to that part. Craufurd, fearing that the army was pressed, allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then, withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, commenced his march with the resolution not to halt until he reached the field of battle. As the brigade advanced, crowds of runaways were met with, and although not all Spaniards, all propagating the vilest falsehoods:—'The army was defeated,'—'Sir Arthur Wellesley was killed,'—'The French were only a few miles distant;' nay, some, blinded by their fears, affected even to point out the enemy's advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful scene, the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity of their pace, and leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body, having, in that time, passed over sixty-two English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the historian, Gibbon, known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about the 'delicacy of modern soldiers!'"

with the Spaniards, and paralyzed at his own losses, he wished to trust nothing to chance, and his circumspection was very natural. This battle, however, had restored the glory of the successors of Marlborough—a glory which, for the last century, had been on the decline; and it was here shown that the English infantry was capable of contending with the best in Europe. Our loss in this battle was eight thousand, killed and wounded; and the Allies confessed a loss of seven thousand.\*

OPERATIONS OF SOULT, NEY, AND MORTIER TO CUT OFF WELLINGTON'S RETREAT.—Joseph was wrong in fighting this battle, inasmuch as Soult was marching by Plasencia on Almaraz, with fifty thousand men, and Wellington would have retired at his approach. But after he had decided to give battle, he ought to have left one of Sébastiani's divisions and three thousand horse to annoy the center and right of the Allies, and then have united all the remainder of his army and his reserve to assail the decisive point and turn the left. Perhaps even then he would have failed of success, considering the superi-

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\*The following remarks of Napier on this battle are well worthy the attention of the military reader:

"1st. The moral courage evinced by Sir Arthur Wellesley when, with such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less remarkable than the judicious disposition which, finally, rendered him master of the field. Yet, it is doubtful if he could have maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on isolated attacks during the night of the twenty-seventh and the morning of the twenty-eighth.

"A pitched battle is a great affair. A good general must bring all the moral, as well as the physical, force of his army into play at the same time, if he means to win, and all may be too little. Marshal Jourdan's project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy of his reputation; and it is possible that he might have placed his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and then by a sudden and general attack, have carried the key of his position, thus commencing his battle well; but Sir Arthur Wellesley's resources would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such an occurrence, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy in check with his left wing and cavalry; while the right, marching upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter off from the Alberche. In this movement the Allies would have been reinforced by Wilson's corps, which was near Cazalegas, and the contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation. The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a complete victory, while the Allies would, even though defeated, have insured their junction with Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would thus have fallen to them, and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of operations, through the fertile country of La Mancha, might have been obtained. But these matters are only speculative.

"2d. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a single division was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be seen in the valley; how, then, could a single division hope to develop its attack upon the hill, when five



ority of the enemy and the nature of the ground. But if success had been possible, it would have been won by this maneuver, and by no other. In the mean time Soult was marching in the direction of Plasencia. He had not received the order for this movement till the twenty-seventh of July, and his troops were then extended over the country as far as the Douro, the fifth corps especially having a great distance to march in order to arrive in time. Soult satisfied himself with leaving a flying corps to watch Ciudad-Rodrigo, and, without troubling himself with the operations of Beresford and of the Duke del Parque, he marched on Plasencia, where his columns arrived successively between the first and fourth of August.

**RETREAT OF THE ALLIES.**—Wellington heard of Soult's march on the first of August, but incorrectly estimating his force at from twelve to fifteen thousand men, he at first marched against him, while Cuesta remained with twenty-five thousand before Victor, and removed five thousand wounded from Talavera. This false movement, and this important division of forces, were near proving fatal to the Allies. In fact, there was but one of two courses for them to pursue: to march against Soult with their whole army and attack him, or to promptly fall back behind the Tagus by Almaraz. In either case it would have been neces-

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thousand horsemen were hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin's and the half of Villatte's division were paralyzed by the charge of a single regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, the principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march of the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all before Soult reached Plasencia.

"3d. It has been said, that to complete the victory, Sir Arthur Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards to advance; this would, more probably, have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta nor his troops were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry of the first and the fourth corps were still above twenty thousand strong, and, although a repulse, by no means a discomfited force; the cavalry, the King's guards, and Dessolles' division, had not been engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat the Spaniards; a second panic, such as that of the twenty-seventh, would have led to the most deplorable consequences, as those who know with what facility French soldiers recover from a repulse will readily acknowledge.

"The battle of Talavera was one of hard honest fighting, and the exceeding gallantry of the troops honored the nations to which they belonged. The English owed much to the general's dispositions and something to fortune. The French owed nothing to their commander; but when it is considered that only the reserve of their infantry were withheld from the great attack on the twenty-eighth, and that, consequently, above thirty thousand men were closely and unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with sixteen thousand British, it must be confessed that the latter proved themselves to be truly formidable soldiers; yet the greatest part were raw men, so lately drafted from the militia regiments that many of them still bore the number of their former regiments on their accoutrements."

sary for them to march to Casa-Tejada, to reach the junction of the road to Plasencia with the great road to Badajoz. Learning from Cuesta at Naval-Moral, on the third, what the real force of Soult was, and the danger to which the Allies were exposed, Wellington was afraid to venture alone on the road to Almaraz, and fell back from Naval-Moral to Arzobispo, instead of pushing on to Casa-Tejada, so as to ascertain of his retreat on the road to Portugal. He might have reached this village on the fourth of August, whereas Soult did not present himself at that place till the following day. The idea of falling back on Arzobispo was good, on the supposition that Cuesta was still at Talavera; but this general, thinking that the English general would hasten his retreat on Almaraz, and that he himself would be compromised if he remained between Soult and Victor, resolved to fall back on Oropeza in order to follow Wellington. This *contre-temps* might have proved fatal to the combined army, if Victor had promptly directed himself on Arzobispo, which he fortunately neglected to do; and the Marshal hearing too late what was passing, and deeming himself fortunate that they had not attacked him on the Alberche after the departure of Joseph, did not venture to push an enemy who was superior in numbers to his own army.

The English army was very near paying dear for these hesitations and indecisions; their allies, already dissatisfied with the affair of Torrijos, and reproaching the English with leaving them in danger, hastily repassed the bridge of Arzobispo, thus leaving the combined army, on the fifth, hemmed in against the impassable mountain of Guadalupe. This army would certainly have been lost, if Wellington had not sent a detachment, in all haste, to blow up the bridge of Almaraz, while another partly destroyed a portion of the bridge of Arzobispo. As Soult was, nevertheless, coming to attempt the passage of the Tagus, it was all-important for the English to escape from the *cul-de-sac* in which they were engaged. With great labor, and by the aid of the Spanish peasants they constructed a road for artillery, so as to reach the great highway to Truxillo. Soult finally reached the Tagus, with his three corps; he himself passed the river by a ford against the Allies' right wing, composed of Spanish troops, while Mortier forced the bridge of Arzobispo against the center. Ney was to seek a ford near Almaraz, the bridge at that place having been destroyed; he would then maneuver against Wellington's left, and cut off his communication by preceding him on the great road to Badajoz. But Ney could find no ford; and the English consequently gained time to finish their cross-road and effect

their retreat; and the Spaniards, after a warm engagement of cavalry, fled, some to Naval-Moral and Toledo, and others to Deleytoza.\*

This event completed the discord of the Allies. Cuesta, being disgusted with the operations, and, in fact, far too old for so difficult a command, resigned it to General Egua, who, with one half of his army, moved to the right on Toledo to assist

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\*Napier's account of this combat of Arzobispo, and the military operations which followed are well worthy of perusal:

"The fifth and second corps and a division of the sixth were concentrated, to force this passage, early on the morning of the eighth; but Soult being just then informed of Victor's movement, and perceiving that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry, leaving only a rear guard in the works, judged that the Allies were retreating; wherefore, without relinquishing the attack of Arzobispo, he immediately sent the division of the sixth corps back to Naval-Moral, and, at the same time, transmitted a plan of the ford below Almaraz, directed Ney to cross the Tagus there, seize the Puerto de Mirabete, and be in readiness to fall upon the Allies as they came out from the defiles between Deleytoza and Truxillo. Meanwhile, the heat of the day had induced Albuquerque to seek shelter for his horsemen in a wood, near Azutan, a village about five miles from the bridge; and the Spanish infantry, keeping a bad guard, were sleeping or loitering about without care or thought, when Mortier, who was charged with the direction of the attack, taking advantage of their want of vigilance, commenced the passage of the river.

#### COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO.

"The French cavalry, about six thousand in number, were secretly assembled near the ford, and about two o'clock in the day General Caulaincourt's brigade suddenly entered the stream. The Spaniards, running to their arms, manned the batteries, and opened upon the leading squadrons, but Mortier, with a powerful concentric fire of artillery, immediately overwhelmed the Spanish gunners; and Caulaincourt having reached the other side of the river, turned to his right, and, taking the batteries in reverse, cut down the artillerymen, and dispersed the infantry who attempted to form. The Duke of Albuquerque, who had mounted at the first alarm, now came down with all his horsemen in one mass, but without order, upon Caulaincourt, and the latter was in imminent danger, when the rest of the French cavalry, passing rapidly, joined in the combat; one brigade of infantry followed at the ford, another burst the barriers on the bridge itself, and, by this time, the Spanish foot were flying to the mountains. Albuquerque's effort was thus frustrated, a general rout ensued, and five guns and about four hundred prisoners were taken.

"Soult's intention being to follow up this success, he directed that the first corps should move, in two columns, upon Guadalupe and Deleytoza, intending to support it with the second and fifth, while the sixth corps crossed at Almaraz, and seized the pass of Mirabete. This would undoubtedly have completed the ruin of the Spanish army, and forced Sir Arthur to make a rapid and disastrous retreat; for so complete was the surprise and so sudden the overthrow, that some of the English foragers also fell into the hands of the enemy; and that Cuesta's army was in no condition to have made any resistance, if the pursuit had been continued with vigor, is clear, from the following facts:

"First, when he withdrew his main body from the bridge of Arzobispo to Pealada de Garbin, on the seventh, he left fifteen pieces of artillery by



Venegas, while the Duke of Albuquerque, with the left, rallied on Wellington. The latter gained Truxillo with difficulty, and afterward fell back on Badajos. General Wilson, compromised at Naval-Carnero, had the good fortune to escape in rear of Soult, and take refuge in the mountains of Gredos.

**BATTLE OF ALMONACID.**—Joseph, encouraged by the retreat of the enemy, returned to Toledo, at the moment when

the road-side, without a guard. The defeat of Albuquerque placed these guns at the mercy of the enemy, who were, however, ignorant of their situation, until a trumpeter attending an English flag of truce either treacherously or foolishly mentioned it in the French camp, from whence a detachment of cavalry was sent to fetch them off. Second, the British military agent placed at the Spanish head-quarters was kept in ignorance of the action; and it was only by the arrival of the Duke of Albuquerque, at Deleytoza, on the evening of the ninth, that Sir Arthur Wellesley knew the bridge was lost. He had before advised Cuesta to withdraw behind the Ibor river, and even now contemplated a partial attack to keep the enemy in check; but when he repaired in person to that general's quarters, on the tenth, he found the country covered with fugitives and stragglers, and Cuesta as helpless and yet as haughty as ever. All his ammunition and guns (forty pieces) were on the right bank of the Ibor, and, of course, at the foot of the Meza, and within sight and cannon-shot of the enemy, on the right bank of the Tagus; they would have been taken by the first French patrols that approached, but that Sir Arthur Wellesley persuaded the Spanish staff officers to have them dragged up the hill, in the course of the tenth, without Cuesta's knowledge.

"In this state of affairs, the impending fate of the peninsula was again averted by the King, who recalled the first corps to the support of the fourth, then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also, was unable to discover the ford below the bridge of Almaraz, and, by the eleventh, the Allies had reestablished their line of defense. The head-quarters of the British were at Jaralcejo, and those of the Spanish at Deleytoza; the former, guarding the ford of Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying the Meza d'Ibor and Campillo, were on the right. The twelfth, Cuesta resigned. General Egula succeeded to the command, and at first gave hopes of a better coöperation, but the evil was in the character of the people. The position of the Allies was, however, compact and central; the reserves could easily support the advanced posts; the communication to the rear was open, and, if defended with courage, the Meza d'Ibor was impregnable; and to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself a difficult operation, would, while the Mirabete and Meza d'Ibor were occupied, have been dangerous for the French, as they would be inclosed in the narrow space between those ridges and the river.

"The Duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived that Sir Arthur Wellesley would endeavor to repass the Tagus by Alcantara, and so rejoined Beresford and the five thousand British troops under Catlin, Craufurd, and Lightburn, which were, by this time, near the frontiers of Portugal. To prevent this he resolved to march at once upon Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps, threaten both Beresford's and Sir Arthur's communication with Lisbon, and, at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad-Rodrigo; but Marshal Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation. He observed that Sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet in march for Alcantara; that it was exceedingly dangerous to invade Portugal in a hasty manner;

Venegas was bombarding that city from the left bank of the Tagus, and seeking to get possession of the passage of the river; but the Spaniard's hopes, in this respect, were soon terminated. The corps of Sebastiani, seconded by Dessolles' division, passed

and that the army could not be fed between Coria, Plasencia, and the Tagus; finally, that Salamanca, being again in possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting that the sixth corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes, to cover Castile. This reasoning was approved by Joseph, who dreaded the further fatigue and privations that would attend a continuance of the operations during the excessive heats and in a wasted country; and he was strengthened in his opinion by the receipt of a dispatch from the Emperor, dated Schönbrunn, the twenty-ninth of July, in which any further offensive operations were forbidden, until the reinforcements which the recent victory of Wagram enabled him to send should arrive in Spain. The second corps was, consequently, directed to take post at Plasencia; the fifth corps relieved the first at Talavera, and the English wounded being, by Victor, given over to Marshal Mortier, the latter, with a chivalrous sense of honor, would not permit his own soldiers, although suffering severe privations themselves, to receive rations until the hospitals were first supplied; the sixth corps was directed upon Valladolid, for Joseph was alarmed lest a fresh insurrection, excited and supported by the Duke del Parque, should spread over the whole of Leon and Castile.

"Ney marched on the eleventh; but, to his surprise, found that Sir Robert Wilson, with about four thousand men, part Spaniards, part Portuguese, was in possession of the pass of Baños. To explain this, it must be observed that when the British army marched from Talavera, on the third, Wilson, being at Nombella, was put in communication with Cuesta. He had sent his artillery to the army on the third, and on the fourth, finding that the Spaniards had abandoned Talavera, he fell back with his infantry to Vellada, a few miles north of Talavera. He was then twenty-four miles from Arzobispo, and, as Cuesta did not quit Oropesa until the fifth, a junction with Sir Arthur Wellesley might have been effected; but it was impossible to know this at the time, and Wilson, very prudently, crossing the Tietar, made for the mountains, trusting to his activity and local knowledge to escape the enemy. Villatte's division pursued him, on the fifth, to Nombella; a detachment from the garrison of Avila was watching for him in the passes of Arenas and Monbeltran; and General Foy waited for him in the Vera de Plasencia. Nevertheless, baffling his opponents, he broke through their circle at Viander, passed the Gredos at a ridge called the Sierra de Lanes, and, getting into the valley of the Tormes, reached Bejar; from thence, thinking to recover his communications with the army, he marched toward Plasencia, by the pass of Baños, and thus, on the twelfth, met with Ney returning to the Salamanca country.

"The dust of the French column being seen from afar, and a retreat to Ciudad-Rodrigo open, it is not easy to comprehend why Sir Robert Wilson should have given battle to the sixth corps. His position, although difficult of approach, and strengthened by the piling of large stones in the narrowest parts, was not one in which he could hope to stop a whole army; and, accordingly, when the French, overcoming the local obstacles, got close upon his left, the fight was at an end; the first charge broke both the legion and the Spanish auxiliaries, and the whole dispersed. Ney continued his march, and, having recovered the line of the Tormes, resigned the command of the sixth corps to General Marchand, and returned to France."



the Tagus on the ninth of August to punish the Spanish general for his untimely movement; he drove in his vanguard; and, on the eleventh of August, reached Venegas himself, at Almonacid, on the road to Mora and Madridejos. The Spanish forces amounted to about thirty thousand after receiving their reinforcements.\* They occupied a well-selected position; a good reserve, supported by forty pieces of artillery, crowned the formidable heights, on which is situated the old château of Almonacid. Encouraged by the enthusiasm of his troops, who requested, with loud cries, to be led against the enemy, and willing to give them all the honor of the victory, Sébastiani, without waiting for Dessolles, directed his attack on the hill occupied by the Spanish left; the Polish division, under Prince Sulkoski, attacked the position in front, while the German division, under Laval, turned it by the right. The French division, in order to favor this attack, assailed the center on the plateau of Almonacid. The front line of the Spaniards is everywhere forced. Venegas, in order to disengage it, throws his cavalry on the right flank of Sébastiani, and drives it back. This movement gives the enemy a temporary success; but the arrival of Dessolles' division soon restores the chances in our favor. New dispositions are made to complete the victory. Dessolles is to attack the enemy's left in front, while its flank is turned by the Polish and German divisions; a brigade is at the same time to assail the right wing. Everything falls before this well-combined effort; the position is carried; the chateau and the heights, occupied by the Spanish reserve, arrest our enthusiastic troops for scarcely a quarter of an hour; and the cavalry of Milhaud and Merlin carry terror and death into the broken battalions of the enemy. The Spaniards, routed with horrible slaughter, take the road to the Sierra Morena, leaving behind thirty-five pieces of artillery, two hundred carriages, four thousand prisoners, and an equal number *hors-de-combat*.

NEY DEFEATS WILSON.—This brilliant feat of arms, which crowned the campaign of Talavera, was well calculated to encourage Joseph; but he had already deprived himself of the means of profiting by it, as he could otherwise have done, by too soon detaching Ney's corps and directing it to return toward Salamanca. While on this march, Ney's vanguard encountered the partisan Wilson, at the hill of Baños, in the arid

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\*The number of this army is variously estimated at from fifteen to thirty-six thousand men. Napier says the force "was somewhat more than twenty-five thousand strong, with forty pieces of artillery."



mountains of Gredos. The Anglo-Portuguese general, notwithstanding the natural strength of his position, which had been rendered still more impregnable by all the artificial means in his power, was defeated and driven, with the loss of a thousand men, into the mountains of Gata on the confines of Portugal.

REMARKS ON THESE OPERATIONS.—Thus ended the short campaign of Talavera, one of the most remarkable episodes in this war. The military talents of Joseph were far from brilliant. Having got rid of the English, who retreated toward Badajos, but being still embarrassed by the danger with which the Spaniards threatened his capital, and not knowing how to profit by the imposing force which the union of five *corps-d'armée* had given him, his only thought was to despatch Sébastiani against Venegas, and Ney toward Salamanca! It is true that this point was without defense, and that Beresford, with the aid of the Duke del Parque, might, had he been of a more enterprising character, have threatened our communications in the north. But mere accessories like this, however important in themselves, must frequently be sacrificed in order to secure more important results. If Joseph had been a better general, and less anxious to return to his palace, he would not have given Wellington a moment's rest. Leaving a single *corps-d'armée* at Toledo, with his four others, he should have fallen on the English wherever they could be found, even if it were at Lisbon or Cadiz. Never was there so fine an opportunity for a decisive operation during the whole war in Spain. One of the greatest regrets I have felt in leaving my stormy career is that of not having been present at that time with my army on the Tagus. Even supposing Beresford had advanced to the Douro and Venegas had pushed forward to the capital, I should have troubled myself very little about their operations; for they would have deemed themselves exceedingly fortunate to escape safe and sound after the defeat of the principal army.

The news of the victory at Wagram, the armistice of Znaim, and the retreat of the English on the Guadiana, consoled Joseph for the loss of Galicia and his want of success at Talavera; but it was important not to sleep on the bosom of a negative victory. Marshal Soult, it is said, proposed to the King to advance on Lisbon by forced marches, at the moment when Wellington was seeking to repair, near Badajos, the losses which he had experienced in the defiles of Arzobispo and Guadalupe. The movement, indeed, seemed most favorable for anticipating the enemy in the capital of Portugal, and of thus overthrowing his whole

system of defense. But why go to Lisbon, and leave Wellington an opportunity to base himself on Badajoz and Cadiz? It was against *his* army that the King should have marched with four corps—a force sufficient to force him in front, and, at the same time, to maneuver so as to cut off his line of retreat. But the fear that Madrid might be exposed to the attacks of the Spaniards closed the eyes of Joseph to every other consideration.

The most experienced military men have generally agreed in the opinion that this was the decisive moment in the whole war, and that the unfortunate issue of that war was attributable to allowing this opportunity to escape unimproved. It is certain that all probable conjectures on the resulting operations fully confirm this opinion; and, especially, if they had been so directed as to give a mortal blow to Wellington's army before he could regain his vessels; but if he had succeeded in reaching Cadiz, and had based himself on that place and Gibraltar, he might still have prolonged the war. Although it would have been much easier for us to reduce him to the defensive in the island of Leon than at the mouth of the Tagus, still there would have been chances for him to carry on successful operations along the immense extent of coast from Coruña to Tarragona; and the contest might still have been continued, though under circumstances much more favorable for us.\*

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\*The following remarks of Napier upon the operations of the French during this campaign are both able and just:

"Joseph was finally successful; yet it may be safely affirmed that, with the exception of uniting his three corps behind the Guadarama, on the evening of the twenty-fifth, his proceedings were an almost uninterrupted series of errors. He would not suffer Soult to besiege Ciudad-Rodrigo with seventy thousand men, in the end of July. To protect Madrid from the army of Venegas, overbalanced, in his mind, the advantages of this bold and grand project, which would inevitably have drawn Sir Arthur Wellesley from the Tagus, and which, interrupting all military communication between the northern and southern provinces, and insuring possession of Castile and Leon, would, by its success, have opened a broad way to Lisbon. Cuesta and Venegas, meanwhile, would have marched against Madrid! Cuesta and Venegas acting on external lines, and whose united force did not exceed sixty-five thousand men! The King, holding a central position, with fifty thousand French veterans, was alarmed at this prospect, and, rejecting Soult's plan, drew Mortier, with the fifth corps, to Villa Castin. Truly, this was to avoid the fruit-tree from fear of a nettle at its stem!

"Sir Arthur Wellesley's advance to Talavera was the result of this great error; but he having thus incautiously afforded Soult an opportunity of striking a fatal blow, a fresh combination was concerted. The King, with equal judgment and activity, then united all his own forces near Toledo, separated Venegas from Cuesta, pushed back the latter upon the English army, and obliged both to stand on the defensive, with eyes attentively directed to their front, when the real point of danger was in the rear.



**SOULT SUCCEEDS JOURDAN AS JOSEPH'S CHIEF OF STAFF.**—All parties were dissatisfied with the results of the expedition on Talavera. Less displeased with the errors committed in the battle itself than in the subsequent operations, I gave to Soult the office of major-general to Joseph, hoping that he would conduct his operations with more skill than his predecessor.

**COMBATS OF TAMAMES AND ALBA DE TORMES.**—On arriving at Salamanca, Marshal Ney, who, like many others, quarreled with his colleagues when placed under their orders, left the country and returned to France, rather than obey the orders of Soult. General Marchand, who, in Ney's absence, was charged with the command of the sixth corps, was disturbed in his cantonments about Salamanca by the corps of the Duke del Parque (formerly Romana's army), which, by means of the fortifications

This, indeed, was skillful; but the battle of Talavera, which followed, was a palpable, an enormous fault. The Allies could neither move forward nor backward, without being infinitely worse situated for success than in that strong position, which seemed marked out by Fortune herself for their security. Until the thirty-first, the operations of Venegas were not even felt; hence, till the thirty-first, the French position on the Alberche might have been maintained without danger; and, on the first of August, the head of Soult's column was at Plasencia.

"Let us suppose that the French had merely made demonstrations on the twenty-eighth, and had retired behind the Alberche on the twenty-ninth, would the Allies have dared to attack them in that position? The conduct of the Spaniards, on the evening of the twenty-seventh, answers the question; and, moreover, Joseph, with an army compact, active, and experienced, could with ease have baffled any efforts of the combined forces to bring him to action; he might have covered himself by the Guadarama river and by the Tagus in succession, and the further he led his opponents from Talavera, without uncovering the line of La Mancha, the more certain the effect of Soult's operations; but here we have another proof that double external lines are essentially vicious.

"The combined movement of the French was desirable, from the greatness of the object to be gained, and safe, from the powerful force on each point; and the occasion was so favorable that, notwithstanding the imprudent heat of Victor, the reluctance of Ney, and the unsteady temper of the King, the fate of the Allies was, up to the evening of the third, heavy in the scale. Nevertheless, as the central position held by the Allies cut the line of correspondence between Joseph and Soult, the King's dispatches were intercepted, and the whole operation, even at the last hour, was thus baffled. The first element of success in war is, that every thing should emanate from a single head; and it would have been preferable that the King, drawing the second and fifth corps to him by the pass of the Guadarama, or by that of Avila, should, with the eighty thousand men thus united, have fallen upon the Allies in front. Such a combination, although of less brilliant promise than the one adopted, would have been more sure; and the less a general trusts to Fortune the better; she is capricious!

"When one Spanish army was surprised at Arzobispo, another completely beaten at Almonacid, and when Wilson's Portuguese corps was dispersed at Baños, the junta had just completed the measure of their folly by



of Ciudad-Rodrigo and the proximity of the English army, was enabled to harass our troops almost incessantly. Marchand attacked him on the sixteenth of October, at Tamames, in a position difficult of access, where the efforts of the brave division of Maucune were of no avail against an enemy sheltered behind rocks. At the end of the combat the Duke del Parque gained possession of Salamanca. As it was incompatible with the safety of the army to suffer this slight success to go unpunished, General Kellerman, leaving Valladolid at the head of a division of dragoons, rejoined the sixth corps, and on the twenty-eighth of November attacked and defeated the Duke del Parque at Alba de Tormes, without even waiting for a union of his own forces. He, therefore, was unable to cut up the beaten enemy, who escaped, during the night, from the resentment of the sixth corps,

quarreling with the British, which was the only force left that could protect them. The French were, in truth, therefore, the masters of the peninsula, but they terminated their operations at the very moment when they should have pursued them with redoubled activity, because the general aspect of affairs and the particular circumstances of the campaign were alike favorable. For Napoleon was victorious in Germany; and of the British expeditions against Italy and Holland, the former had scarcely struggled into life,—the latter was already corrupting in death. Hence, Joseph might have been assured that he would receive reinforcements, but that none, of any consequence, could reach his adversaries; and, in the peninsula, there was nothing to oppose him. Navarre, Biscay, Aragon, and the Castles were subdued; Gerona closely beleaguered, and the rest of Catalonia, if not quiescent, totally unable to succor that noble city. Valencia was inert; the Asturians still trembling; in Galicia there was nothing but confusion. Romana, commanding fifteen thousand infantry, but neither cavalry nor artillery, was then at Coruña and dared not quit the mountains. The Duke del Parque held Ciudad-Rodrigo, but was in no condition to make head against more than a French division. The battle of Almonacid had cleared La Mancha of troops. Estremadura and Andalusia were, as we have seen, weak, distracted, and incapable of solid resistance. There remained only the English and Portuguese armies, the one being at Jaraceijo, the other at Moraleja.

"The line of resistance may, therefore, be said to have extended from the Sierra Morena to Coruña—weak from its length; weaker, that the allied corps, being separated by mountains, by rivers, and by vast tracts of country, and having different bases of operation, such as Lisbon, Seville, and Ciudad-Rodrigo, could not act in concert, except offensively; and with how little effect in that way the campaign of Talavera had proved. But the French were concentrated in a narrow space, and, having only Madrid to cover, were advantageously situated for offensive or defensive movements. The allied forces were, for the most part, imperfectly organized, and would not, altogether, have amounted to ninety thousand fighting men. The French were above one hundred thousand, dangerous from their discipline and experience, more dangerous that they held a central position, and that their numbers were unknown to their opponents; and, moreover, having, in four days gained one general and two minor battles, their courage was high and eager."

who were anxious to revenge the affront which they had received a few weeks before at Tamames.

ARRIZAGA BEATEN AT OCANA.—The junta at Cadiz, dissatisfied with the dispersion of its armies and the failure of its project on Madrid, now ordered General Eguia to unite the army of Cuesta with the remains of Venegas' command. The Marquis of Arrizaga took command of these united forces, which numbered fifty thousand men. Proud of so imposing a force, the presumptuous Spaniard thought that he alone could accomplish what Wellington had failed to do. He advances on Aranjuez; a vanguard of the *élite*, preceding the Spanish army, debouches into the plain of Ocana, on the twelfth of November, and attacks Sébastiani. The Spanish cavalry even ventures to assail Milhaud, who draws it on to a square of a Polish regiment, whose fire makes terrible havoc in its ranks. Milhaud then throws himself on the enemy at the head of his dragoons, beats him, and destroys almost the entire corps of royal carabineers, the pride of Castile. By means of this success, Sébastiani maintains himself audaciously between Ocana and the Tagus, and covers the bridge of Aranjuez till the arrival of reinforcements. Soult and Joseph, on hearing of this combat, fly to the assistance of Sébastiani, at the head of Mortier's corps; Victor, also, receives orders to march from Vilamaurique on Ocana, where he will arrive on the eighteenth, until which time our troops are to suspend their attack. The Spanish army, united to its vanguard, either wishing to anticipate this junction, or taking our hesitation as an indication of fear, attack us on the morning of the eighteenth. Leval's division is obliged to fall back, and the presumptuous enemy pursues it across the ravine. Soult wishes to retire, in order to gain time for Victor to come up; but our troops are so eager for the fight, and Leval so seriously engaged, that all are directed to fall at once on the enemy, now puffed up with his temporary success. General Senarmont advances, as at Friedland, with a battery of thirty pieces of artillery, and thunders against the front, which Mortier attacks from his side. At this decisive moment the cavalry of Sébastiani charges the right of the Spaniards, whose squadrons, still terrified by the affair of the twelfth, remain quiet spectators of this movement; their infantry seek in vain to form squares in a wood of olive-trees, but are everywhere routed, sabered, or taken prisoners. The division of Latour-Maubourg, belonging to Victor's corps, arrives at this opportune moment, and completes the total rout of the enemy, who flies even to Guardia, leaving behind him



horrible traces of disorder and confusion. Fifty pieces of cannon, thirty stands of colors, and twenty thousand prisoners are the brilliant trophies of their victory, and furnish, at the same time, a glorious and irrefragable proof of the superiority of our soldiers over the Spanish. The flying enemy does not rally till he reaches the defiles of the Sierra-Morena, where Joseph, troubled by the presence of Wellington's army on the confines of Portugal, thought he ought not to follow them.

INACTION OF WELLINGTON.—It is quite remarkable that at this moment, when Spain was receiving such a terrible check, Wellington remained completely inactive on the confines of Portugal, although the dispersion of the second and third corps between the Tagus and Salamanca offered an opportunity for a powerful diversion. The fault of this inaction is attributed to English policy, and an excessive care for the preservation of an army, on which, according to them, entirely depended the success of the war and the deliverance of the peninsula. However excessive this prudence may appear in a military point of view, still it would be unjust to find fault with it; for it was, in fact, of very little importance to Wellington if the war should last for ten years, provided he did not hazard the safety of his own army; had it been *English* soil from which he was seeking to drive us, he should have risked everything to accomplish that object. But here the case was different. And to these plausible motives for inaction there must be added others still more powerful. Wellington, dissatisfied at the hesitation of the supreme junta to place the Spanish troops formally under his own orders, had repaired to Seville after the retreat to Badajos, and consulted with his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, then British ambassador, for the purpose of establishing the basis of some system which would secure greater unity of action. The risk he had to run at Arzobispo proved to the English general that, notwithstanding the great advantage derived from the *national* war in Spain, it would be dangerous for him to attempt any bold enterprises into the heart of the kingdom, until he had first secured a place of refuge, sufficient reinforcements, and a better system of coöperation on the part of the Spanish troops. Romana was called for this purpose to the junta of Seville, where it was hoped that his services and credit would give great additional support to the English influence.\*

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\*When remonstrated with by Lord Wellesley for abandoning the Spaniards at this period, Wellington replied:

"Want had driven him to separate from them, but their shameful flight at Arzobispo would alone have justified him for doing so. To take



The expedition of Arrizaga was in no way connected with the defensive plan of the English general; to march again into Estremadura, in time to act in concert, was diametrically opposed to his present projects. In fact, instead of again ascending the Guadiana to act in concert with Arrizaga, as soon as he had terminated the conferences of Seville, Wellington directed his army from Badajos by Albuquerque to the north of Portugal, to act in concert with the Duke del Parque, who was commanding the former corps of Romana, under Ciudad-Rodrigo, and with Beresford, who covered Almeida. This new plan of operations

up a defensive position behind the Guadiana would be useless, because that river was fordable, and the ground behind it weak. The line of the Tagus, occupied at the moment by Egula, was so strong that, if the Spaniards could defend anything, they might defend that. His advice, then, was, that they should send the ponton bridge to Badajos, and remain on the defensive at Deleytoza and Almaraz. But, it might be asked, he said, was there no chance of renewing the offensive? To what purpose? The French were as numerous, if not more so, than the Allies; and, with respect to the Spaniards at least, superior in discipline and every military quality. To advance again was only to play the same losing game as before. Baños and Perales must be guarded, or the bands in Castile would again pour through upon the rear of the allied army; but who was to guard these passes? The British were too few to detach, and the Spaniards could not be trusted; and if they could, Avia and Guadarama passes remained by which the enemy could reinforce the army in front,—for there were no Spanish troops in the north of Spain capable of making a diversion.

"But there was a more serious consideration—namely, the constant and shameful misbehavior of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We, in England, never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have heard Spanish officers telling of nineteen or twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of which, I believe, have never been published. In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not engaged—whole corps threw away their arms, and ran off, when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack. When these dastardly soldiers run away, they plunder everything they meet. In their flight from Talavera they plundered the baggage of the British army, which was, at that moment, bravely engaged in their cause.

"For these reasons he would not, he said, again cooperate with the Spaniards; yet, by taking post on the Portuguese frontier, he would hang upon the enemy's flank, and thus, unless the latter came with very great forces, prevent him from crossing the Guadiana. This reasoning was conclusive, but ere it reached Lord Wellesley, the latter found that, so far from his plans, relative to the supply, having been adopted, he could not even get an answer from the junta; that miserable body, at one moment shrinking with fear, at the next bursting with folly, now talked of the enemy's being about to retire to the Pyrenees, or even to the interior of France! and assuming the right to dispose of the Portuguese army as well as their own, importunately pressed for an immediate, combined, offensive operation by the troops of the three nations to harass the enemy in his retreat! but, at the same time, they ordered Egula to withdraw from Deleytoza behind the Guadiana."

was not without merit, since it carried the English army on the most important point of our communications, which had been stripped of its means of defense by the concentration of our troops on the frontier of Andalusia. To this important advantage it also added that of better covering Portugal, which constituted the essential base of all British operations for the deliverance of the peninsula.

**INTRENCHED CAMP OF TORRES VEDRAS.**—But Wellington did not stop here. He felt that a solid mass of forty thousand Anglo-Hanoverians, with as many more disciplined and devoted Portuguese, would contend with strong chances of success against an army like ours, compelled to greatly extend itself in order to procure provisions, cover its long line of communications, and repress insurrections; but the example of Moore proved to the English that, with adversaries so active and impetuous, they might encounter rude assaults. It was, therefore, important for Wellington to secure to his army a formidable place of refuge against a catastrophe like that of Coruña, to give him time to employ his forces to the best advantage, to enable him to receive reinforcements, and, in case of necessity, to embark his army in safety and descend again upon some other point of the vast peninsula. For this purpose, immediately after his return from Seville, he directed an immense intrenched camp to be laid out on the heights of Torres Vedras, which constituted the base of a vast triangle, the sea-coast and the Tagus forming the sides, with Lisbon for the vertex.

**ROMANA AND THE JUNTA OF SEVILLE.**—These measures seemed the more wise, as the presence of Romana at Seville failed to accomplish the desired object; this general being soon involved in a controversy with the junta. The latter was jealous of the national independence, and treated the English as auxiliaries who affected a false disinterestedness for Spain. It thought, with reason, that it was less for Spain than for England herself that they exhibited so much *empressement*; it had, therefore, refused to receive the English troops in Cadiz. Wellington attributed to this jealousy the conduct of Cuesta and the ill success of the enterprise against Madrid. Both had good reasons for their opinions; but such a difference of interests might assist our cause as much as the force of bayonets. The English having obtained complete influence over the mind of Romana, they persuaded him that the junta would lose all through their ill-placed jealousy and national vanity, and determined him to dissolve that body and establish in its place a less numerous regency. He

issued proclamations in which he reproached the junta for the same faults with which I had charged the Directory on my return from Egypt. He seemed ready to effect a political revolution and seize on the helm of government; but his trifling character ill-fitted him for playing the part of Cromwell, or even that which I had acted on the eighteenth Brumaire. Let us leave these intrigues as foreign to the object of the present narrative, and complete our hasty sketch of the military operations of the peninsula.

**BLAKE'S EFFORTS TO DELIVER ARAGON.**—The obstinate defense of Saragossa had given additional *éclat* to its fall;—it was a second Numantia reduced. Satisfied with these results, my generals deemed the question decided, and that there was no need of great efforts to consolidate their success. But the more prompt we were to proclaim our success as decisive, the more active were the Spaniards to counteract its moral influence on the people. No sooner were they informed of my departure for France and that of Mortier's corps for Castile, than they perceived the advantages that would result from their falling in force on the third corps, which alone remained to guard Aragon. The regency took advantage, without delay, of this circumstance. Their troops in Catalonia and at Valencia were placed under the orders of General Blake, who was, at the same time, made commandant of Aragon. He soon collected a disposable *corps-d'armée*, and formed the bold and important plan of driving us from Aragon by raising and again arming the inhabitants of the country against us; if he should obtain complete success in this, he would afterward march by Navarre, reascending the Ebro toward Miranda, in order to establish himself between Bayonne and Madrid, threatening all our lines of operations and interrupting all communication between the capital and France. The latter part of this plan, although hazardous, will appear less rash if we reflect that I was at this time engaged in a new contest with Austria, and that Marshal Soult was moving from Coruña toward the center of Portugal, where the English were beginning to organize an army for the defense of the peninsula. But Blake had first to fight the French corps, who were defending Saragossa; and, if he failed in this attempt, he succeeded but too well in reviving the resistance of the populace. Levies and armaments were prepared in all parts of Aragon; Villa-Campa, Durand, Ramon, Gayan, on the right bank of the Ebro; Mina, on the frontier of Navarre; Renovalis, Sarrara, Perena, Pero-Duro, Cantarero, and others in upper Aragon,—formed successively around the third



*corps-d'armée* a circle of partisans and guerrilla bands which did not cease, till the end of the war, to fetter its movements and oppose its operations.

**OPERATIONS OF SUCHET.**—The troops of this corps were mainly composed of recruits collected from different nations, and the severe labors of the siege had both fatigued and disgusted them. They did not exceed fifteen or sixteen thousand combatants, and their moral force was still less than their numbers. Happily, General Suchet had just replaced Junot in this important command. When this general reached Saragossa, on the nineteenth of May, his predecessor was still entirely ignorant of the movements and projects of Blake; but the next day after his arrival he learned that General Leval had been attacked at Alcanitz, and obliged to retire before considerable forces; at the same time General Robert, posted on the Cinca, having passed eight companies of the *élite* to the left bank of that river, was prevented by the rise of water from going to their assistance, and reported that they had been surrounded and captured by the armed inhabitants with the aid of the garrison of Lerida, after a glorious combat of three days. The loss of these brave men was to be regretted, but could not be repaired. The movement of Blake on Alcanitz demanded serious attention and prompt resolution; that general, at the head of eighteen thousand men, was entering Aragon and menacing Saragossa. The third corps was scattered; General Suchet hastened to recall General Habert to the right bank of the Ebro; he took away all the reserve at Saragossa, and, marching on Puebla d'Ixar to the support of Leval's division, encountered the enemy on the twenty-third of May. The Spaniards had taken an advantageous position, and had a numerous and well-served artillery; and Suchet, notwithstanding all his efforts, could not bring his troops to the charge. He withdrew them at the close of the day, and a panic terror was near causing a total rout; the authors of this were tried and shot; order was restored, and Suchet marched his army to Saragossa.

His position was critical; if he should risk a decisive affair and be beaten, he would compromise all the center of Spain; if he should now abandon Saragossa, whose defense had covered the enemy with so much glory, Europe would not fail to contrast his conduct with the heroism of Palafox, without taking into consideration the difference of situations and of the elements of defense. Suchet encamped his troops on Mount Torero and caused them to maneuver; he excited their enthusiasm by pre-

senting to them the disgrace of yielding in energy to the defenders of Saragossa, and merely waited for the return of the five battalions which had escorted the prisoners to France to punish Blake for his audacity. Fortunately, the Spanish general allowed him time for all his preparations; either wishing to surround the third corps, or fearing to attack it in front, he took fifteen days to go round from Alcanitz by Ixar, Belchite, Botorte and Muela.

**COMBAT OF MARIA.**—The battalions from France were not expected to return till the fifteenth of June. But on the thirteenth, Blake, advancing by the valley of the Huerba, had separated from the *corps-d'armée* and driven on Epila a detachment commanded by General Fabre, thus threatening Alagon and our line of retreat. Suchet carried the brigades of Musnier and Habert with his cavalry to the convent of Santa Fé, avoiding, however, a general action. General Leval was left on Mount Torero with a part of his division, and a reserve occupied Saragossa under Colonel Haxo. The interval till the fifteenth was occupied with skirmishes; Blake then deployed twenty-five thousand men and offered battle. His position was taken in front of the village of Maria, his right resting on the Huerba and the great road, which at this place crosses by a bridge a small affluent of the Huerba, his center and his left resting on heights which were cut up by ravines. A knowledge of the ground instantly determined the dispositions of General Suchet. After waiting till two o'clock in the afternoon for the arrival of the troops returning from France, and hearing that they were within a league of him, he determined to regard them as a reserve and to engage all the troops he had on the field of battle. He established his line parallel to that of Blake, and attacked the left and center; then, making a vigorous charge on his right, he carried the bridge and road, which was the only defile by which Blake could retire with the artillery with which he had well furnished the front of his line. The contest on the heights was prolonged by a violent storm, but the retreat and flight of the Spanish infantry closed it, leaving in our hands twenty-three pieces of cannon and a small number of prisoners, among whom were a colonel, and General O'Donoju.

**COMBAT OF BELCHITE.**—The victory of Maria saved the third corps and also Saragossa; but, in order to deliver all Aragon from the hands of the enemy, Suchet desired to cut up and destroy the army of Blake; he therefore pushed it with all possible rapidity in the direction of Belchite, to which place it had retreated. Blake took position in front of this little town on the

eighteenth, and awaited his approach; to attack the enemy in front, and to turn and force his left, was only the work of an hour. The new levies were seized with panic. The regiment of Valencia, in attempting an orderly retreat, was sabered by our cavalry and taken prisoners; the remainder fled to Alcanitz. Blake reached Tortosa with the loss of twenty-three pieces of cannon, and four or five thousand men killed and taken prisoners.

**SAINT-CYR'S OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.**—Our troops had also been successful in Catalonia, although the successes there had not been attended with the same results, on account of the magnitude of the obstacles to be overcome and the immense resources furnished to the insurgents by sea. Saint-Cyr had been before Tarragona since the month of February; in the impossibility of holding out a long time before this place, he asked for the means of besieging Gerona, for without the possession of that place our position in Catalonia would always be precarious. It was almost impossible to maintain our communications; the correspondence was carried on by sea with the greatest difficulty, and not less than six or seven battalions were required to convey an order from Perpignan to Barcelona. Saint-Cyr therefore resolved to march toward Vich, both for the purpose of supplies and to facilitate the siege of Gerona. On learning the obstacles which opposed us in this province, I had resolved, near the end of 1808, to send there the fourth *corps-d'armée*, under the orders of Masséna. He had already crossed the Rhine on his march to Spain when the war with Austria forced him to return to Germany, where the conquerors of Eylau proved themselves worthy of their ancient glory. This diversion was peculiarly unfortunate, and contributed not a little to the unfavorable issue of the war in Spain. However, measures were taken to supply the deficiency as soon as possible; a siege park was assembled at Perpignan; General Verdier replaced Reille at Figueras, and formed a corps of eighteen battalions destined to conduct the attack on this place.

**SIEGE OF GERONA.**—Gerona has become illustrious in history for a defense no less extraordinary than that of Saragossa. It is true that this place was more regularly fortified than the capital of Aragon; but it is also indisputable that the obstinacy of its defense was due as much to the bravery of its inhabitants as to the resources of art. More fanatical still than their neighbors, the Geronians gave to Saint-Narcisse the command not only of their battalions and the inhabitants of the place, but also of all Spain. Proud of the support of this generalissimo, the in-



habitants, and even the women, armed themselves against our attacks. If the resistance of the Spaniards had been the result of a patriotism, at the same time heroic and enlightened, they would undoubtedly have resorted to other means of resistance and have appointed different generals to command them! Fortunately for them, Saint-Narcisse had a lieutenant worthy of the command; for General Alvarez was in every respect a brave man, and not less determined than Palafox to render his name immortal by a desperate defense; the enthusiasm of the inhabitants assisted this natural resolution.

Gerona is situated on the Ter, at the foot of a gorge through which passes the road to Perpignan. The city has an *enceinte* of mediocre character; but the mountains which surround it on the north and east are crowned with four forts, which render its investment difficult and of considerable extent. In order to attack it on the south side, it was necessary to open a road for the artillery, for the only practicable carriage-road passes by the city. Men were wanting for such a work; moreover, it would have been difficult to maintain ourselves in the city, in case of its capture, against a hostile population, if the forts had not first been reduced. The most expeditious and natural plan was to take those first.

Verdier was reinforced to the number of eighteen thousand men, and Saint-Cyr remained at Vich to assist him. The Spaniards were not idle; Reding having died at Tarragona, the junta had confided to Blake the command of the kingdoms of Grenada, Valencia, and Catalonia. His first effort to justify the confidence thus reposed in him was to deliver Saragossa. We have just seen how Suchet received him at Santa Maria; Blake now sought to avenge himself for this by delivering Gerona. He began by attempting to throw provisions into the place, and his very rich convoy fell into the hands of our soldiers. Saint-Cyr now saw the importance of taking from the insurgents the support of Port Palamos, which facilitated their receiving succors by sea; the place was carried by the Italians with great bravery. This capture rendered the provisioning of Gerona more difficult, and also enabled us to push forward our works with more security.

After a first assault had failed, and several efforts of the enemy to succor Gerona had been repelled, Blake himself finally appeared on the first of September to provision the place. By pretending to attempt the deliverance of Gerona by open force, he succeeded in deceiving Saint-Cyr, and drawing away the mass of his army toward Bellona, while Brigadier Garcia-Condé introduced two thousand men, with a grand convoy of provisions

and munitions. Saint-Cyr marched after Blake to offer him battle, but the latter fell back; our troops now returned to Gerona, but they were too late, for the enemy had deposited their convoy in the place and effected their escape. On the nineteenth of November a practicable breach was effected in the *enceinte* of the place, and an assault attempted; but it was unsuccessful. On the twenty-sixth Blake made a third attempt to succor the place; but this time Saint-Cyr made his dispositions so well that the convoy, coming from Abisbal, was completely surrounded and captured. This brilliant affair, which cost the Spaniards three thousand men, took place in full view of Blake's army, which was encamped near San-Pelago.

The great length of the siege of Gerona appeared to me to argue against the energy and efficiency of Saint-Cyr, and I resolved to replace him by Augereau, who had rendered himself illustrious in this country by the celebrated battle of Figueras, in 1794. This general took command of the army a few days afterward, but he did nothing to justify my choice. He allowed O'Donnell to escape from Gerona, where his presence had become superfluous after the loss of his convoy of provisions. On the eleventh of December this place, pushed more and more warmly, and reduced to the last extremity, finally determined to capitulate. One half of its garrison and of its population had fallen in this glorious contest.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE CAMPAIGN.—This event terminated the campaign of 1809, in which we had gained great successes and committed great errors. The worst error was, undoubtedly, that of leaving the command of the army to a king without energy and without military talents. Our forces should have been divided into three independent armies, with a reserve forming a corps of occupation on their rear. The King should have been empowered to order the junction of two of these armies, in case it had been necessary to attack the English, or in case a serious check had required a concentration of forces. The most skillful of my marshals should have been given to the King as a major-general, to guide this mass to victory. In every other case each army should have acted independently within the limits assigned to it. But divided as our troops were into eight or ten isolated corps, their power was paralyzed by the jealousy and rivalry of their chiefs. Ney, for example, lay six months in Galicia with his arms folded, without being able to communicate either with Madrid or Bayonne, because he commanded neither at Valladolid, nor at Leon,

nor in the Asturias, and could form no plan of coöperation. All the troops between Burgos and the ocean should have been put under the orders of a single chief. In the east there should have been an army of the Oriental Pyrenees, to operate in Aragon and in Catalonia.

The King was too anxious to enjoy the pleasures of royalty at Madrid; he should have waited till Spain was subjected to his power; his capital should have been at the head-quarters of the army of the center, until his kingdom was conquered. But he wished, at every cost, to spare his country, and he rendered many of the military operations subordinate to this object. He acted the Spaniard more thoroughly than Philip V. in his war with the Regent. In truth, it was necessary to act well for Spain in order to create a party in his favor, and his only error was in beginning this course of policy two years too soon. Joseph had four or five thousand French guards, but he wished an army; regiments were organized from the Spanish prisoners taken in different parts of the kingdom, and armed and equipped. But this was merely giving arms and equipments to the insurgents, for all deserted on the first opportunity and rejoined their comrades. Instead of this course, all prisoners should have been sent to France, until the pacification of the country; they could then have been employed to some purpose. The occupation of all the provinces at the same time was also unfortunate, as it prevented the King from levying contributions; this rendered it necessary for me to allow him an annual subsidy from the French treasury of six millions for the support of his household.

Soult was advanced into Portugal with insufficient forces; the embarkation of Moore's army had deceived me respecting the resistance we were likely to meet in Portugal; I thought that the fame of our victories of Burgos, Tudela, Espinosa, and Corufia, and the slight assistance received from the English, would disgust the Portuguese with their destructive contest. But the inhabitants of the peninsula knew nothing but what was told them by their priests, who took good care to represent our victories as so many reverses; the war with Austria and my departure from the country were described to them as certain pledges of their speedy deliverance. Ten thousand English still remained in Portugal, and, when united with the regular and militia forces of the kingdom, were more powerful than Soult's army of twenty-six thousand men. This army should have been reinforced by the sixth corps, leaving some seven or eight thousand men to occupy Ferrol and Corufia. The plan to be pursued was to attack the enemy incessantly with movable armies, without stopping to administer



the laws, till the whole country was conquered and its pacification completed; but my brother and his lieutenants did not comprehend the policy of such a course.

The unfortunate issue of this contest resulted mainly from the declaration of war by Austria, which effected more for the peninsula than all the succors of England, both by the moral influence on the contending forces, and by compelling me to be absent from the theater of the war, thus causing the most fatal results in the want of union among my generals, and in the false direction of their operations. As the Spaniards had driven the army of Joseph behind the Ebro before my arrival, they believed themselves capable of doing the same after my departure, considering my presence as the instrument of our victories.

Those who have compared this war with that of 1704-9, which Louis XIV. carried on in Spain, are but little acquainted with history. The French under Philip V. had three-quarters of the population of the kingdom in their favor; only Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia had declared in favor of the House of Austria. If I had had in my favor one-half of the force which supported the arms of Louis XIV., my enemies and the English would have disappeared before my eagles like a breath, and the war would have ended in two campaigns. With such a party in our favor, and having plenty of provisions, and no reason for a military occupation of each province, we could have directed all our efforts against the English army and the few additional forces which Spain could have supplied; in a word, we could have conducted the war in strict accordance with the rules of military science; as Vendôme and Berwick were able to do at their ease, having never had more than thirty thousand Anglo-Austrians, and perhaps as many Spaniards, to contend with, while nearly eight millions of the Spanish people were in their favor.

OPERATIONS OF RUSSIA AGAINST SWEDEN.—While my arms were triumphing in Spain and Austria, those of the Emperor Alexander were not idle, and although their operations may appear somewhat foreign from the object of these commentaries, still they were so intimately connected with my policy as to justify a brief sketch of these several events.\*

The little Russian army, which had entered Finland in 1808, and captured Sweaborg, had not been able to reduce that province; but when reinforced to forty thousand men, it finally suc-

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\*As the relation of these events must be still less interesting to American than to French and Russian readers, the translator has considerably abbreviated the matter of this article.

ceeded in effecting the expulsion of the Swedes. But as it was necessary to menace the capital of Sweden in order to effect the cession of this province, the Russians took advantage of the severe winter of 1809 to send across the frozen gulf two corps under Bagration and Barclay de Tolly. The former took Åland and menaced Stockholm, while the latter marched on Umeo to form a junction with Schuwalof. This double operation offers the new spectacle of an entire army crossing the sea on the ice, carrying with it its artillery, its magazines, and even wood for the fires of its bivouacs; a remarkable instance of audacity and devotion, for the slightest wind from the southwest would have engulfed its entire columns! Consternation spread to Stockholm at the news of the capture of Åland; the Swedish nobility, wearied with the rule of Gustavus IV., dethroned that king and elected his uncle, the Duke of Sudermania, in his place; this prince being a partisan of the French alliance, it was thought that he might save the monarchy from inevitable ruin. He was crowned with the title of Charles XIII., and, on the seventeenth of September, he purchased peace with Russia, by the cession of Swedish Finland. Peace with France, and the reconciliation between Sweden and Denmark, soon followed. Sweden adopted the Continental System, with the exception of the restrictions on salt. I restored to her Pomerania.

**WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY.**—The affairs of Turkey now attracted the attention of Europe. Feeling at liberty, after the conference of Erfurth, to push her projects in that direction, Russia had employed the first part of 1808 in preparations for carrying on the war with vigor, if she did not succeed, by the negotiations of Jassy, in obtaining the principalities. The Ottoman Empire at the end of the year had become a prey to the most horrible convulsions. The party which had wished to subject the janizaries to discipline, and to shelter the throne from their insolence, by giving them a European organization, had not been discouraged by the imprisonment of Selim; Mustapha Bariactar, at the head of this party, had overthrown the existing government, imprisoned the Sultan, and proclaimed Mahmud in his place. But the janizaries soon effected a counter-revolution amidst the most horrible massacres and conflagrations. Constantinople became one vast field of carnage; the janizaries set fire everywhere, in hopes of enveloping their adversaries; men, women, and children fell a prey to the flames, or to the rage of the combatants.

This state of things seemed to leave Constantinople exposed to the inroads of Russia; but the latter was not prepared to profit

by the circumstance, and the Turks had the following winter in which to organize their resistance. The relations entered into between the Porte and England and the result of the negotiations at Jassy leaving no hopes of effecting his objects without an appeal to arms, the Emperor Alexander reinforced his army with sixty battalions, and ordered it to pass the Danube.

Prince Prosorowski was not well suited for conducting this war, which was of a peculiar character, and more resembled than any other that which I was waging in Spain. The Turkish forces might be overthrown in the field, and their immense masses of cavalry be put to flight and apparently destroyed, but still it was found impossible to advance without besieging their fortresses, and their troops, so little to be feared in the open field, are the most redoubtable behind their ramparts, which they defend with the greatest tenacity. To this peculiar character of the Turks, and the almost impossibility of obtaining supplies of provisions in their country, we must add the difficulties of the Balkan, and of the Danube, which is here like an arm of the sea; and the configuration of the frontier, shut in by Transylvania on one side, but soon widening out to the confines of Dalmatia and Montenegro.

The assaults of Ismail and Oczakof had been so successful for the Russians that this system had become the fashion in their army; they thought to conquer the Turks by escalades and squares. These escalades, often ill-directed and always premature, cost them enormous losses—losses which might have been avoided by the expenditure of a hundred barrels of powder and a delay of a week for the operations of the miners; for in that time the engineers might have effected breaches practicable to an assault in any of the miserable works of the Turks; and an assault under such circumstances is a very different affair from attempting an escalade as soon as the place has been reconnoitered.

The Russian army took the field with one hundred and twenty-five battalions, ninety-five squadrons, and ten thousand Cossacks. Prosorowski resolved to lay siege to Brahilov, but, while the preparations were making for this purpose, he directed the escalade of Giurgevo, which was fortified with a bastioned *enceinte* that might readily have been reduced with heavy artillery. The escalade was unsuccessful, and the Russians lost from two to three thousand men in the attempt. The marshal next directed the escalade of Brahilov; but, after the useless sacrifice of three or four thousand men more, he found it preferable to resort to the slower but more wise system of regular sieges.



The passage of the Danube was effected in the early part of August near Galatz, and Ismail invested; but Prosorowski now died, and Bagration was placed in temporary command of the army. After various unsuccessful operations against the enemy, this general directed Brahilov to be again attacked by ten thousand men under Essen, while, with twelve thousand men, he protected that operation from the direction of the rampart of Trajan, at the right of the Danube. The place, being battered and invested, capitulated on the twenty-first of November. The army then retired to winter quarters on the left of the Danube, leaving only its advanced guards on the right bank.

In Asia the Russians, under Tormasof, had gained possession of Poti, notwithstanding the efforts of the Pacha of Trebisond to succor the place. This city, situated on the eastern shore of the Black Sea at the mouth of the Euphrates, was indispensable to the Russians for securing their possessions in Abasia, and protecting their relations with Persia.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1810; CONTINUATION OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

Napoleon's Marriage with an Austrian Princess—He again offers Peace to England—Preparations for a new Campaign in Spain—Napoleon's Plan of Operations—Soult's Plan—Division of the Army—Invasion of Andalusia—Joseph's fatal Delay—Capture of Seville—Sébastieni takes Grenada and Malaga—Remarks on Joseph's Operations—His Return to Madrid—Internal Dissensions in Spain—The English Faction triumphs—Military Organization of the Provinces of the North—Soult neglects to take Badajos—Inaction of Wellington—Soult invests Cadiz—His Occupation of Andalusia—Operations in the North—Chances of Napoleon's Success—Masséna's Expedition against Portugal—Sieges of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida—Position of Wellington—Third Invasion of Portugal—Battle of Busaco—Masséna turns the Position—Devastating System of the English General—Lines of Torres Vedras—Masséna's Position—Sufferings of his Army—Junction with Drouet—Remarks—Suchet's Success in Catalonia—Combat of Margalef—Sieges of Lerida and Mequinenza—Operations of Augereau—Siege of Tortosa—General Remarks on the War—Bernadotte elected Prince Royal of Sweden—Reunion of Holland—Consequent Negotiations with England—Annexation of the Mouths of the Ems, the Elbe, and the Weser—Napoleon's Tour in Holland—*Senatus-consultum* on the Reunion of Rome—Council of Paris—Religious Fanaticism—Continuation of the War between Russia and Turkey.

NAPOLEON MARRIES AN AUSTRIAN PRINCESS.—The result of the war of 1809 proved that I had not miscalculated in my attempt to carry on operations at the same time against Austria and the Anglo-Spaniards in the peninsula. I had now to profit by these astonishing successes in order to consolidate my empire; a grand family alliance seemed to me the most certain means of securing this object. I had no children; and the restoration of the Bourbons seemed inevitable at my death; they alone had claims to it, and none of my brothers were capable of disputing them; even I myself, in elevating Joseph, Jerome, and Louis to thrones, had been unable to give them the consideration and merit necessary for maintaining their position; and Lucien had dishonored himself by a ridiculous opposition and a scandalous

marriage. The entire male population of France were deeply interested in the preservation of my empire; not that the princes of the House of Bourbon were not personally good men, but because their return would be attended by a *cortège* of men avaricious of power and wealth and hateful to the people. If the restoration of these princes at my death should produce intestine war, would not foreign powers be certain to profit by the circumstance to overthrow my edifice in Poland, Germany, and Italy? If, on the contrary, this restoration should be effected by foreign war, would not the consequences be still more dangerous for France?

I thus foresaw the humiliation of France, and, above all, of that million of brave men who had shed their blood in their country's cause. Of what importance was it to me personally, whether or not I left a dynasty after me? Would that render my glory any more brilliant or lasting? Was Alexander any the less great because he had no successor and the empire of Macedonia was divided after him? It was the good of France alone that I sought, and if I was deceived in this matter, not only my council, but the whole French nation, partook of the same error.

My divorce having been completed, it was now necessary to decide between a Russian and an Austrian princess. As the Grand Duchess Catherine had been married to the Prince of Oldenburg, negotiations were opened for her younger sister, the Princess Anne; here a difficulty arose; it was the erection of a Russian chapel in the Tuileries, a condition strongly insisted on by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. I was never very orthodox, and even at this time was in a controversy with the clergy, and I wished no new subject for religious disputes. Moreover, the Russian cabinet asked for time on account of the youth of the princess and the repugnance of the Empress-mother to the marriage; this was sufficient to determine my decision in favor of an Austrian alliance.

The question was both delicate and complicated, and the future of France perhaps depended on its solution. The first point to be considered was, whether a distant and powerful ally would be more useful and lasting than one more near, but of a more limited character. If I had purposed conquests, the first would be preferable, for the other would be rather an obstacle than an auxiliary. If, on the contrary, I purposed only defensive operations, the nearer power would be the most suitable, as it would cover our frontier and act in concert with our arms. But these axioms of general policy were subordinate to others not less powerful. In the first place, we had both defeated Austria and



stripped her of a portion of her territory; whereas Russia had by her relations with us gained Finland, Bialystok, and Tarnopol. The Austrians were, therefore, not so likely to become our allies in good faith, unless we indemnified them for their losses, which was not an easy matter. The Russians had lost no province by us, and might gain much by a community of interest; they had fleets, sailors, and seaports, and their frontiers on the Caspian Sea and Grand Bucharica opened to us the road to India, which was a great point against England. An alliance with Austria and war with Russia would render it necessary to decide the contest on the Dwina, or at least in Poland; whereas an alliance with the Russians against the Austrians would transfer the field of battle to the superb valley of the Danube and the center of the Austrian monarchy. These motives were strong in favor of the Russian alliance; but, on the other hand, the maritime interest of the great landed proprietors and merchants of that empire were too seriously compromised by the closing of the ports to hope for a continuance of their friendship. The Russian nobility, devoted to the profession of arms, pretended that the treaty of Tilsit had been imposed by victory, and was therefore odious; and not the less so because it closed up the outlets of their agricultural products, the source of all their private wealth; it is not every one who is willing to suffer in private fortune, for a term of years, for the future prosperity of their country. I was not ignorant of this cause of opposition at St. Petersburg to my alliance, and was not a little piqued at the unfavorable dispositions toward me exhibited by a part of the royal family. I had on my side the Emperor Alexander, Count Romanzof, and a small number of the intelligent men of the empire; but even this influence had been somewhat weakened by the unfortunate dispositions of the treaty of Vienna, opposed to the stipulations of Tilsit.

In this relation there were less inconveniences in the alliance with Austria; she had very little commerce; her manufactories were sufficient for her own wants; her cities offered a suitable market for her agricultural products, and Hungary and Moravia supplied her with wines. She had no military or commercial marine, and might remain in hostile relations with England without any sensible injury. In this respect I might calculate upon a more durable alliance with her than with Russia. France, within the limits of the Rhine, might be the natural ally of Russia, but an empire like mine, extending its influence to the Niemen, would find it difficult to maintain friendly relations with the Russian government. The unfortunate circumstance which had rendered

this treaty of Vienna equally odious to Russia and Austria, placed me in an embarrassing situation toward these two powers, rendering the choice of alliance dependent upon the relative amount of hostility likely to be encountered.

Let us add to these considerations the influence this marriage was likely to produce on Spain. Russia was too distant from the peninsula to take any active part in this war; Austria, on the contrary, when allied to my family, might become interested in it. Under Charles V., and in the war of the succession of Charles II., Austria had played an important part in the affairs of Spain. This motive alone appeared of much weight. If Austria reproached us for her losses, she might also console herself with the assurance that my alliance would give her a secure harbor against the tempest which, for the last fifteen years, had threatened her ship of state. We had antecedents for this alliance in the treaty of 1756, of which I have already spoken; if that treaty had been declaimed against at the beginning of the Revolution, it was because, under Madame Pompadour, it had had a vicious application, and not because the primitive treaty was not wise and positively advantageous. But now there could be little fear that my policy, like that of Louis XV., would become subordinate to the Cabinet of Vienna. The motives which had then induced the Cabinet of Versailles to secure a powerful ally against the rivalry of England were now more powerful than ever. These motives influenced the majority of my council, and, finally, determined my own decision. There was one consideration, however, which made me hesitate for a moment; it was the idea that, after the intimate relations which I had so recently contracted at Erfurth with the Emperor Alexander, it might appear perfidious on my part to so abruptly abandon his friendship. But such scruples must yield to reasons of state. I, however, might consider myself secured from any such reproach by the slight inclination exhibited by the Russian government for the alliance, and the little importance attached to the preference I had given to it. I therefore resolved on a union with an Austrian princess.

Subsequent events have apparently authorized the opinion that I committed a fault in this decision, and that a Russian alliance would have been more advantageous. It is certain that it would have avoided the disastrous campaign of 1812; but was my march on Moscow a necessary result of my alliance with Austria? All things, however, taken into consideration, it must be confessed that the Russian alliance would probably have been the preferable one.

But I determined differently; and the negotiations entered into with Prince Schwartzberg were soon terminated, for the Emperor Francis hastened to give me his daughter, Maria Louisa. Some have attributed this union with a daughter of the Cæsars to my inordinate pride; nothing could be more absurd. Josephine was no longer capable of child-bearing, and, in dissolving my connection with her and forming a new alliance, was it not important to France that I should form such a one as would effectually destroy the line of demarkation between the old dynasties and my own? It was of little use to have put the crown on my head, unless I could fix it there permanently; and nothing could consolidate it better than the ties of consanguinity with the noble houses of Hapsburg or Romanof. By leaving my dynasty isolated from the rest of Europe I would have condemned it to a kind of reprobation, or to maintain its high position by new victories. There is no statesman who would not have approved a resolution which in no respect added to my glory or dignity, but which was calculated to consolidate my empire.\*

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\*Alison thus describes the second Empress and her unenviable fate: "Born in the highest rank, descended from the noblest ancestry, called to the most exalted destinies, the daughter of the Cæsars, the wife of Napoleon, the mother of his son, Marie Louise appeared to unite in her person all the grandeur and felicity of which human nature is susceptible. But her mind had received no lofty impress; her character was unworthy of the greatness of her fortune. She had the blood of Maria Theresa in her veins, but not her spirit in her soul. Her fair hair, blue eyes, and pleasing expression bespoke the Gothic race; and the affability of her demeanor and sweetness of her manners at first produced a general prepossession in her favor. But she was adapted to the sunshine of prosperity only; the wind of adversity blew, and she sunk beneath its breath. Young, amiable, prepossessing, she won the Emperor's affections by the *naïveté* and simplicity of her character; and he always said that she was innocence with all its sweetness—Josephine, grace with all its charms. All the attractions of art, says he, were employed by the first Empress with such skill that they were never perceived; all the charms of innocence displayed by the second with such simplicity that their existence was never suspected. Both were benevolent, kind-hearted, affectionate; both, to the last hour of his life, retained the warm regard of the Emperor; and both possessed qualities worthy of his affection. If her husband had lived and died on the imperial throne, few empresses would have left a more blameless reputation; but she was unequal to the trials of the latter years of his life. If her dubious situation, the daughter of one emperor, the wife of another, both leaders in the strife, might serve her excuse for not taking any decided part in favor of the national independence on the invasion of France, the misfortunes of her husband and son had claims upon her fidelity which should never have been overlooked. (The wife of the Emperor should never have permitted him to go into exile alone; the mother of the King of Rome should never have forgotten to what destinies her son had been born. What an object would



My marriage took place at Paris on the second of April. The *fêtes* to which this great event gave rise eclipsed all those which had marked my reign; France saw the dawn of a happy future, and a pledge of that peace which she so much desired. The preponderance which this marriage gave me in Europe was well calculated to discourage my enemies, and every one believed that my throne was secure from all danger when Providence crowned my wishes by giving me a son on the twentieth of March, 1811. The continent was tranquil, and had apparently become reconciled to my reign. The respect borne to the House of Hapsburg legitimized my reign in the eyes of European sovereigns, and sanctioned it in the eyes of the different nations which had become a part of my empire. My dynasty now took rank with the highest in Europe, and I flattered myself that they would no longer dispute the throne with the son to which the Empress had given birth. My marriage and the erection of a new nobility were the bonds to unite the Revolution and the enemies of its doctrines; that revolution now seemed to be completed, for, from this moment, France resumed her ancient line of intercourse with the other powers of Europe. But in the eyes of the French refugees in England, of the one hundred thousand broken-down families of the old *régime*, and of the fanatics of the Church, the quarrel was not yet ended. Such is the force of legitimacy that the Bourbons, of whom no one now spoke, gave me more trouble than the greatest power in Europe. I pity states who have pretenders in the ranks of their enemies.

HE AGAIN OFFERS PEACE TO ENGLAND.—I now desired peace, and wished my empire to be recognized by the English government; for I desired to give some relaxation to my people, who had as yet been unable to enjoy the benefits they had derived from the Revolution. We were no longer the protectors of propagandism or of popular insurrections, and to accustom Europe to the nature of my power, it was important to appear less in a hostile attitude. Moreover, my system of repression against the English supremacy had imposed great sacrifices by the closing of the ports. From St. Petersburg to Cadiz, and from Cadiz to Trieste, not a hamlet on the coast but had suffered from this restriction; the reaction which the closing of the ports had produced on our manufactures and agricultural products (wines) it

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she, after such sacrifices, returning from St. Helena after his death, have formed in history! Force may have prevented her from discharging that sacred duty; but force did not compel her to appear at the Congress of Vienna, leaning on the arm of Wellington, nor oblige the widow of Napoleon to sink at last into the degraded wife of her own chamberlain."

was not in my power to avoid. My enemies took good care to profit by the advantages of this position; they proclaimed themselves the avengers of the independence of nations; and by an extravagance peculiar to the age, *the despots of the seas pretended to fight me in order to restore the liberty of commerce!!!* These insinuations made dupes among the unreflecting part of the community, and gradually diminished the popularity of my administration, by inducing people to believe that I did not desire peace. I, nevertheless, proposed it every time that there was an occasion, but England persisted in her refusal. This obstinacy on her part showed her possessed of more resources than I had at first supposed.

In truth, a reconciliation was not easy. Since the treaty of Amiens, England had conquered twenty millions of subjects in India, which she was not disposed to surrender, while at the same time she was unwilling to allow us even Belgium, for fear of the use we might make of Antwerp! How had she yielded me the crown of Italy, and how had I resigned it, after I had placed it on my brow? The nature of the contest between us rendered it interminable. Instead of reducing my army, I was compelled to maintain it on a war footing and thus disturb the quiet of Europe. If I won the glory, my enemies gathered all the honor of the contest; for they assumed the innocent air of one fighting for legitimate objects; while I was made to appear the aggressor by destroying old institutions and building up new. I was thus made to bear the entire weight of the accusation. My personal enemies, the T—, the L—, and the C—, profited by this circumstance to represent me to France as the only cause of evils which were in reality the legitimate results of the Revolution, and of the position in which it had placed the different nations of Europe toward each other, by destroying their most natural political relations. I defy my enemies to point out any epoch after the peace of Amiens when it had been possible to make an honorable and durable peace with England. The negotiation of Lauderdale was the only occasion that gave the slightest hopes of such a result; and we have already seen that this was a mere lure, designed to involve us at the same time with Russia and Spain.

PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN.—England, although deprived of her most powerful allies, was not carrying on the war alone; for she had on her side all the enemies of the Revolution and of my power. We had plenty of room in Spain to fight out the contest. I sent there a part of the conquerors of Wagram, but did not go myself. If we are to judge from the appearance of things, it was unfortunate that I did not

return, for if I had terminated the war in Spain and avoided the contest with Russia, I should have died on my throne, feared and respected; I should have given France time to breathe, and to recover her strength, so as to sustain my work. I fell, by attempting to finish the most difficult part myself before the proper time had arrived. I have said that twenty years were required, whereas I attempted to accelerate, by seven or eight years, the termination of this great drama. But appearances are often deceitful, and before deciding whether I committed an error in not returning to Madrid, it is but just to weigh the motives of my conduct.

In the first place, I did not expect that the affairs in Spain would take so unfavorable a turn; the advantage gained by Wellington at Talavera had proved him a dangerous adversary; but the promptitude with which he had retreated into Portugal, and the victories of Joseph at Almonacid and Ocana over the Spanish army, had deceived me into the belief that Soult and Masséna would be sufficient to oppose the English in the peninsula, if I only sent them new reinforcements. Some have attributed this decision to the fear that the Emperor Alexander, dissatisfied with my alliance with Austria, might fall on the duchy of Warsaw as soon as I should be engaged beyond the Pyrenees, and that he might draw after him Prussia and all the north of Germany. This was his game, and, in his place, I should have hardly hesitated to adopt such a plan. And it was the more natural to expect him to seize upon such an opportunity, inasmuch as my marriage and the treaty of Schönbrunn were grave subjects of dissatisfaction to Russia; there was no very close union between us. But, on the other hand, the frank and loyal conduct of the Emperor Alexander at the time of our reverses in Spain, and the assurances of my ambassador, the Duke of Vicenza, were sufficient to dissipate such fears as chimerical. Moreover, Russia was at this time at war with Turkey, and Austria being now allied to my interests, Alexander could hardly trouble the north of Europe with the probability of success.

But there were other and less visionary reasons to prevent my return to Spain at this time. The country was filled with religious fanatics, who sought an opportunity to destroy my life in order to terminate the war; this contest was now waged, not against large organized bodies, but against troops scattered throughout the whole peninsula. Our forces moved in separate armies, the communications between them being frequently impossible, so that I could not myself have directed them all at the same time; but I considered my lieutenants were capable of conducting an army, and they proved themselves so by the constant successes which they gained during the campaign. I therefore



merely announced my intended return to Spain, and sent there a half of the old guard, and a part of the young guard, which had been increased by several regiments of voltigeurs and sharpshooters. The strength of this reserve already amounted to eight or nine thousand men; I now increased it to twenty thousand, so as always to have a part of it disposable either at the north or at the south. This was a most valuable body in itself, and at the same time produced a good influence on the rest of the army, for this guard being an object of my special care, the French strove among themselves for the honor of forming a part of it. These troops formed the *élite* of the army of the north of Spain under the orders of Marshal Bessières; in addition to the battalions of recruits which were sent to all the regiments to which they already belonged, I also sent there the entire eighth *corps-d'armée* under the orders of Junot.

NAPOLEON'S NEW PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.—We have already seen how Joseph, after the affair of Arzobispo, neglected to profit by the union of eighty thousand men on the Tagus, in order to fall without delay on the English, who then had no fortified fort to favor their reëmbarkation; and, also, how successfully Wellington had profited, by the repose of eight months allowed him by my generals, to form a suitable system of defense for Portugal. I at first resolved to make a strong effort to repair this fault, and to intrust this task to Masséna, who was to advance with three *corps-d'armée* by the right bank of the Tagus on Lisbon, while Joseph and Soult marched by the left bank with two or three other corps. The moment appeared the more propitious, as the English had just lost ten thousand men in the island of Walcheren; and as they had now few troops to send to the continent, another disastrous campaign might disgust them with the war.

SOULT'S PLAN.—With this view, I directed the King to collect his forces between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and prepare them for a renewal of operations early in the spring. Soult, anxious to distinguish himself in his new position of major-general, and fearing, perhaps, that he would be placed subordinate to Masséna, thought to anticipate my wishes and begin the campaign with the subjugation of Andalusia. Joseph, who was more desirous to reduce the provinces of his own kingdom than to drive the English from Portugal, was easily persuaded to this plan. The decisive victory of Ocana rendered the success of this enterprise almost certain, and then, after the dispersion of the Spanish army of the south, the expedition would seem more easy

and certain. But, in order to do this, it would be necessary to fall with impetuosity on the Spaniards, and either cut off their retreat or enter pell-mell with them into the island of Leon and Cadiz, and then to immediately march the victorious army on Badajoz and Evora. If Soult and the King had acted in this way, they would still have carried out the spirit of my plan of operations. But they deviated from my project to fail before Cadiz, and, by the untimely occupation of an immense territory, to lose the means of concentrating a sufficient force against Wellington.

**DIVISION OF THE ARMY.**—The army in Spain was now organized as follows:

The 1st corps	under	Victor;
“ 2d	“	Reynier;
“ 3d	“	Suchet;
“ 4th	“	Sébastieni;
“ 5th	“	Mortier;
“ 6th	“	Ney;
“ 7th	“	Augereau and Macdonald;
“ 8th	“	Junot.

There was also the army of Marshal Bessières, which occupied the north of Spain, and the ninth *corps-d'armée*, which was organizing, at Bayonne, from the four battalions of the army of the south. The army of Andalusia, which Joseph united between the Guadiana and the Sierra Morena, was composed of the first, fourth, and fifth corps, King Joseph's guards, and the reserve of General Dessolles; the second, sixth, and eighth corps were to march on Portugal, and cover Madrid; while the other two corps were detached in Catalonia and Aragon. The army of Andalusia, with an effective force of fifty thousand men, took the field about the middle of January, to attack the remnant of Arrizaga's forces, which had escaped the disaster of Ocana and intrenched themselves in the defiles of the Sierra Morena.

**INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.**—Victor, on the right, debouched by the mountains of Pedrehohes on Cordova; the King, with Mortier and the reserve, at the center, crossed the defile of Despena-Perros, and followed the road to Andujar; Sébastiani, on the left, took the direction of Infantes on Ubeda. It was here that Arrizaga had fixed his principal attention, and had defended the intrenched heights of Montizon. Pierced in the center, and vigorously pushed by the right, he was completely put to rout. Montizon was taken with its garrison of three thousand men, and the division of Castejon, about five thousand strong, also laid down their arms at no great distance from that place. The

victorious Sébastiani received orders at Jaen to direct himself on Grenada and Malaga; he entered the former of these cities after a slight combat at Alcala Real.

**JOSEPH'S FATAL DELAY.**—Joseph, at the head of Mortier's corps, the guard and the reserve, after having forced the defile of Despena-Perros, descended, without any great obstacle, by Carolina on Andujar, on the twenty-first of January; Victor debouched the following day on Cordova. These two corps had merely to hasten their march by Acija directly on Seville, before the Spanish left, engaged near Zafra, could reach that place. Instead of giving this order, Joseph stopped at Andujar to issue proclamations and plan useless maneuvers, and then slowly resumed his march. The left of the Spaniards, which was now isolated under the Duke of Albuquerque between Badajos and Zafra, was thus allowed time to reach San-Lucar and Cadiz, where it arrived on the fourth of February.

My brother must have had his imagination strongly affected by the catastrophe of Baylen, to act with so great circumspection. If I had commanded the expedition, I should have presented myself, on the twenty-seventh of January, before Santi-Petri and the island of Leon, and from what was then passing within Cadiz, it is probable that I should have entered that city without opposition. Terror reigned there; at the news of our march on Seville, the junta of government, forced to yield to a popular insurrection, resigned their powers, and fled to Cadiz. A portion of the members attempted to regain their power, but public opinion, incited by the proclamations of Romana, again put them down; there was no longer any regularly constituted authority; the most influential families in Andalusia fled in disorder into Cadiz; and this place was without a garrison. What result then should we expect from an impetuous attack? But even suppose we should not have obtained an entrance into that city, had we not plenty of time to blockade it and to reduce Seville?

**CAPTURE OF SEVILLE.**—Joseph, instead of marching rapidly from Cordova to Cadiz, directed all his forces on Seville, the entrance to which place was defended by intrenchments, armed with one hundred and twenty old pieces of artillery, served only by armed peasants. Nevertheless, Joseph stopped to negotiate with them until the thirty-first, without making any use of the thirty-six thousand men which he had uselessly collected on this point. At last our troops advanced to Chiclana the fifth of February, twenty-four hours after the arrival of the Duke of Albuquerque, who made active preparations for their reception.



SÉBASTIANI TAKES GRENADA AND MALAGA.—Sébastieni, on his side, entered Grenada on the twenty-eighth, and hotly pursued the enemy into the defile between Antequera and Malaga. A part of the *débris* of Arrizaga had taken the road to Murcia; seven or eight thousand fugitives, with two battalions of monks and the armed population of the country, sought in vain to dispute Sébastiani's passage; he drove everything before him, and reached Malaga at the head of three thousand horse and six battalions of infantry. The enemy had the audacity to march out with six thousand men to give him battle. To charge upon this body, to overthrow it, and enter pell-mell with it into Malaga, was, for our dragoons, the affair of only a quarter of an hour. The enemy, however, made fight in the streets of the city until the arrival of our infantry put an end to all resistance. A part of the insurgents dispersed, and the remainder laid down their arms. The place was armed with one hundred and forty pieces of cannon, and was capable of a good defense.

REMARKS ON JOSEPH'S OPERATIONS.—However brilliant and rapid these successes, our army had failed, by the unparadonable slowness of its movements, to secure the important key of all the southern provinces. It is not positively certain that Cadiz would have surrendered if we had presented ourselves some days sooner before that place; but there was every probability that, in the stupor of a surprise, and an entire want of the means of defense, the operation would have been completely successful; and, in that case, we can hardly venture to fix a limit to the consequences that would have followed. In that rich city were the soul and the strength of the government; the Columns of Hercules were at that epoch regarded as the palladium of Spanish liberty, and even if the regency had been removed to Carthage, Alicante, or Corufia, it would only have been the less powerful and the more easily attainable with our bayonets.

HE RETURNS TO MADRID.—Joseph, after the capture of Seville, returned to Madrid, and left Soult in command of the army of the south. Notwithstanding the fatal delay that had allowed Cadiz to escape us, the conquest of Andalusia was important in its political as well as military relations. Seville had an artillery school of much celebrity, a superb arsenal, foundries, and powder-mills. We found here a considerable quantity of provisions and two hundred and forty pieces of artillery, exclusive of the armament of the intrenchments. Besides, this invasion was made at the proper moment, when anarchy was beginning to reign in the Spanish councils of administration.

**INTERNAL DISSENSIONS IN SPAIN.**—The junta was dissolved, and the administration intrusted to a regency of five members—the Bishop of Orense, General Castaños, the Ex-minister Saavedra, Admiral Escano, and Councillor Ardizabal; they also convoked the Cortes. Each party attributed to the other the evils which had befallen their county; and the germs of discord were becoming serious. The people attributed all their ills to their chiefs. In this respect the junta of Seville was rather to be pitied than blamed; the people were absurd enough to attribute to this body all the disasters of Spain, although it had contended against these disasters with all the firmness and activity possible in the generally disorganized condition of the kingdom. Nor could the new regency under these grave circumstances direct the helm of state in a manner to satisfy all parties; it was already reproached with seeking to evade the convocation of the Cortes.

**THE ENGLISH FACTION TRIUMPHS.**—These petty internal revolutions, to which no doubt Wellesley, the English ambassador, was privy, centralized for a moment all power in hands wholly devoted to the Cabinet of London. The English troops were permitted to assist in the defense of Cadiz, and a division under General Graham was destined for this object. Romana, directed to return to Estremadura, placed himself without hesitation under the orders of Wellington; there was now more unity in the military operations; but Spain was not yet an auxiliary which the English general could direct at his pleasure.

Informed of the coming session of the Cortes at Cadiz, I authorized my brother to sound the views of that assembly; it would not have been impossible, by speaking to them of the future interests of Spain and by leaving them free arbiters in the choice of their king, and in the selection of their system of government, to calm their effervescence and to attach them to our party. It was a matter of little importance to me whether Joseph or Ferdinand was nominated King of Spain, provided Spain and Spanish America adopted the Continental System and closed their ports to the English.

**MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE PROVINCES OF THE NORTH.**—While, on the one hand, I was offering them the hopes and the means of reconciliation, I thought it necessary, on the other, to show myself formidable, in case Spain persisted in repelling my advances. I then directed the organization of the provinces between the Pyrenees and the Ebro into military governments, under French generals; thus giving them to understand that these provinces would be united to my empire, unless

quiet should be restored in the peninsula; this was arming my generals with temporary and dictatorial power over the provinces of Joseph. The measure was authorized by the laws of conquest, and might turn to the account of the inhabitants, by protecting them from the partial vexations of the crowd of civil vampires who followed the army, and by establishing order in these provinces by means more effectual than those employed by the King; in a word, this measure would prove to the Spaniards that the integrity of their soil would depend upon their own resolutions. Nor is it to be denied that the measure was also influenced in some degree by the consideration that these provinces, thus becoming accustomed to our government, might in time be exchanged for Portugal if Joseph should continue king, or become consolidated with my empire, in case it became necessary for us to give up the rest of Spain. In conformity with this system, Bonnet was made governor of the Asturias, Caffarelli of Biscay, Reille of Navarre, Baraguay d'Hilliers of Upper Catalonia, Maurice Mathieu of Lower Catalonia, while Aragon remained under the direction of Suchet, who was there both feared and esteemed. Each of these generals commanded, in his department, a strong division of troops. Marshal Bessières commanded the army of the north; and his active divisions guarded the country between the Ebro and the Douro. These measures, however, did not have the complete success that I anticipated; it required one or two more successful campaigns to give them their desired effect. They, however, caused loud cries against the partisans of Joseph, on the ground that they attacked the integrity of the Spanish soil.

**SOULT NEGLECTS TO TAKE BADAJOS.**—Soul, who was now invested with the command of the three *corps-d'armée* in Andalusia, ought to have hastened to repair the error committed in not having, in the preceding October, fallen on Wellington and cut up his army, or at least have reduced Badajos before entering Andalusia. The garrison of that place, situated on the left bank of the Guadiana, not only threatened the rear of the army of the south, but also enabled the Spaniards to light up the fires of insurrection in the very heart of the kingdom. Such a fortified base, sustained as it was by the intact army of Wellington in its vicinity, demanded all the attention of Soul, for he could not remain quietly before Cadiz and guard the coast of ancient Bætica, so long as there remained on his line of communication so important a place of arms, from which the enemy might at any time debouch in force against his troops, which were necessarily divided in order to observe Cadiz and Gibraltar and occupy Gren-



ada and Malaga; but this marshal did not decide in time to act with vigor on the banks of the Guadiana; he directed his attention to the submission of the country before he had destroyed the hostile masses which might dispute its possession. The want of a suitable park for the siege of Badajos might have been an admissible excuse, before the capture of the arsenal of Seville and the heavy artillery in the Sierra Morena.

WELLINGTON REMAINS INACTIVE.—Wellington, on his side, did not take full advantage of this dispersion of our forces. His march to the environs of Ciudad-Rodrigo, which might have produced important results at the beginning of the campaign of 1810, if he had in time resumed the offensive, became of no importance when he decided to remain at that place. From his intermediary position it would seem that he might have acted with more vigor, either against Ney at Salamanca, or on the rear of Soult by debouching by Badajos. We have already mentioned the motives of this inaction, which for eight months left the whole weight of the war on the Spaniards; the system had been agreed upon at Seville between Wellington and his brother Wellesley; they asked of the Cabinet of London a reinforcement of from twelve to fifteen thousand men, augmented the levies of Portugal, and pushed forward with activity the works of the vast intrenched camp of Lisbon. Until these objects were accomplished, it suited Wellington's policy to remain inactive; he had no object in bold and adventurous enterprises for the relief of a foreign soil, and waited for the force of events to display the advantages of his system. Soult, not comprehending the motives of his adversary's conduct, thought to profit by his distance and inaction to establish firmly his own position in Andalusia, adjourning, for the present, the reduction of Badajos.

SOULT INVESTS CADIZ.—His first care was to blockade by land the important place of Cadiz, which he had allowed to escape by his dilatory march. Three hundred pieces of cannon, taken in the Spanish *dépôts* of Seville, and in the intrenchments of Sierra Morena, served to arm a line of contravallation, which was not less than ten leagues in length, extending from Rota to the tower of Bermeja. He flattered himself that, by the aid of these formidable lines, he could shut up the Anglo-Spanish forces within this narrow tongue of land; as though Gibraltar, Carthage, and twenty other ports on the Mediterranean and the ocean did not permit the enemy to carry even the defenders of Cadiz to any point they might select for operating against our troops.

On learning what was passing in Andalusia, I deemed it best,

as the error had been committed, not to evacuate where we had already experienced the check of Baylen, and where our reception by the population, who were already fatigued with revolutions and losses, had been more favorable than we expected. Nevertheless, as this occupation would change the nature of my projects against Portugal, I directed Masséna to act with caution, and to first reduce the places of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida; while Soult was to second these operations by pressing the reduction of Badajos, so as to make a diversion in Alemtejo.

Although I was well aware of the slight advantage likely to result from a land investment of Cadiz without the naval means required for the blockade of a place thus situated, still I thought it possible that a bombardment might induce the inhabitants, and perhaps the regency also, to surrender. I caused mortars of a new model (called *à la Villantroys*) to be cast and sent to Cadiz, which would carry shells to the distance of three thousand toises. A convoy of these mortars, with the shells and munitions, left Toulon, took in some troops at Porto Ferrajo, and sailed for Malaga; others were sent by land. I did not anticipate any great result from this attempt; but it was worth the trial. It was essential either to withdraw this army, or to take measures to consolidate its position in Andalusia; and one of the very first conditions for securing this consolidation was either to reduce Cadiz, or to mask it so as to prevent any sorties from the place against our scattered troops. Victor was charged with this task. Mortier was to guard Seville and observe the road to Badajos; the old division of Dessolles occupied Cordova and Jaen; Sébastiani had his hands full in occupying Grenada and Malaga, and in watching Gibraltar on the one side, and, on the other, the numerous assemblings which the enemy was forming in the kingdoms of Murcia and Valencia. Joseph had returned to Madrid with his guard.

**HIS OCCUPATION OF ANDALUSIA.**—Soult employed the entire year of 1810 in seeking to obtain these several results; and it must be confessed that if Soult had neglected to employ his forces in a more useful manner against the English on the Tagus, he did everything in his power to repair this fault, by the care he devoted to his establishments at Grenada and Seville, and to his preparations at Cadiz. There was a short time when our efforts appeared on the point of being crowned with success, and when the Spaniards themselves regarded our power as definitively consolidated in Andalusia. Soult at Seville, and Sébastiani at Grenada, maintained sumptuous courts; placed on the classic soil of

the Moorish chivalry, they made every effort to revive the bright days of the Abencerrages, and by *fêtes* to draw this voluptuous people of Andalusia from the horrors of insurrection; but this seducing Bætica, without being exactly a Capua for our army, nevertheless paralyzed fifty thousand, or rather engaged them in mere accessories, while Wellington was quietly laying the foundation of a defensive system which he ought never to have been allowed time to organize.

If the head-quarters of these two generals offered all the charms of peace and the *agréments* of a happy conquest, their cantonments were not always thus tranquil. The dispersion of our troops necessary to secure the quiet of the country gave the allied generals an opportunity to fall on our isolated brigades and to expose them to all the horrors of partisan warfare. Romana, Ballesteros, and Mendizabel, on the borders of Portugal and Estremadura, Blake and Ellio in the direction of Murcia, and lastly, Lascy and many others, leaving Cadiz to land on the coast near Moguer, engaged in numerous partial combats, in which they were at first successful against detached parties, but immediately after beaten and put to flight. The very names of these combats would occupy a space greater than can here be devoted to this particular subject; but the names of the heroes who fell in these contests are already written in the temple of Fame.

Romana and Ballesteros distinguished themselves by their activity and perseverance. The former had left to the convoked Cortes and the regency the reins of a state given up to anarchy, and returned to the army in the middle of 1810. Some have attributed to Romana the honor of forming the plan of Spanish resistance; without wishing to detract in any degree from the fame of that general, I am inclined to believe that that resistance was rather the result of circumstances and of the character of the war; for the provincial juntas comprised, in all their different proclamations, the only system of resistance that was employed in the peninsula.

The enemy, acting under the protection of Gibraltar, Cadiz, Badajos, and Ciudad-Rodrigo, and aided by the inhabitants, continued to annoy and fatigue our troops with the harassing operations of partisan warfare. To aid these efforts, the English had planned an attack on Malaga in concert with the army of Murcia. Lord Blenheim landed, the thirteenth of August, on the coast of Almeria, but was himself captured with seven or eight hundred of his men by Sébastiani, while the remainder with difficulty regained their vessels.



OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.—During this time, nothing remarkable occurred in the northwest. The eighth corps, under Junot, had retaken the important post of Astorga, which Ney in his advance on Talavera had abandoned to the army of Galicia. General Bonnet, guarding the Asturias, was daily skirmishing with the corps reorganized by the Spaniards in Galicia immediately after the evacuation of that province. Porlier, a nephew of Romana, operated against this division in the Asturias, and those which guarded the kingdom of Leon. Other partisans successively attacked the several points of Navarre and Castile which were exposed, keeping the troops left to guard these provinces in continual watchfulness. Ney had returned from Paris to take command of the sixth *corps-d'armée*, after the affair of Tamames, and established himself at Salamanca to observe Beresford, who was soon joined by the entire army of Wellington. Reynier, at the head of the second *corps-d'armée*, was fighting against the English division of General Hill, and the troops of Romana, on the left of the Tagus.

NAPOLEON'S CHANCES OF SUCCESS.—Notwithstanding the presence of this army, which from day to day became more threatening, the brilliant successes of Soult and Suchet, the victories of Ocana, Sierra Morena, and Santa Maria, joined to the subjugation of the provinces of the south, confirmed me in the hope that success would crown our perseverance. I thought that the patience of the Spaniards would finally become exhausted; but I was deceived in the character of this people, and in the importance of the English army, estimating its efficiency from its operations in Holland and Flanders. Although the Spanish regency was shut up in Cadiz, it nevertheless continued to give its orders throughout the monarchy. Priests were the staff officers who transmitted these orders, and watched over their execution; speaking in the name of heaven, they were obeyed; and even admirals were sent to serve in the insurgent infantry. Resistance sprung up everywhere, and although we were continually victorious, still we were always engaged in partial combats; for no sooner was one place conquered, than we were obliged to put down the new forces that sprang up in another.

MASSENA'S EXPEDITION AGAINST PORTUGAL.—In the meantime Masséna prepared to execute his part of the project which I had formed for the overthrow of the English army, and which had been partially disarranged by the untimely invasion of Andalusia. I gave him the corps of Ney, Reynier, and Junot, numbering together about fifty thousand men.

**SIEGE OF CIUDAD-RODRIGO.**—Before advancing far in this expedition, it was necessary to reduce those fortifications behind which Wellington had been allowed for the last ten months to prepare his means of offense and defense. Junot had already captured Astorga, and it was now necessary to reduce Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida. This task was confided to Ney, who, notwithstanding his want of proper means, succeeded beyond the most sanguine hopes. To collect and move his *matériel* for a siege two hundred leagues from his frontier, in the midst of an insurgent and hostile population, who pillaged the convoy and massacred the escorts, was a most Herculean task. The place was surrounded with an old and irregular *enceinte*, but one capable of a pretty good resistance; it also possessed one of those excellent artillery schools for which Spain was indebted to Charles III. The garrison of eight thousand men, under Brigadier Herasti, announced its intention of doing its duty, to which it was doubly incited by the fanaticism of the administrative junta. It sustained for a long time the destructive fire of our batteries, which caused great havoc in the city, and blew up the arsenal; but these batteries were too distant to destroy the masonry of the fortifications; it therefore became necessary to establish them nearer. The breach was finally made practicable, and the ditch filled up by the explosion of the counterscarp; and, on the tenth of July, after an attack of forty-five days, the garrison capitulated as prisoners of war.

**SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.**—Our troops now marched to the investment of Almeida, and dislodged the English rear guard which was posted in the vicinity. Six thousand Portuguese, half regulars and half militia, prepared for a desperate defense; but the explosion of an immense powder magazine blew up the citadel and a part of the city, so that the governor surrendered the same day.\* Masséna, under the persuasion of the Marquis of Alorna, and forgetting what had already happened to Soult and Junot, had the misplaced generosity to release the Portuguese prisoners and incorporate the regulars into his own army. He remembered that a Portuguese brigade had been distinguished in our ranks in the Wagram campaign; and he now thought to gain

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\*Napier thus describes this terrible explosion: "On the eighteenth, the trenches were begun under cover of a false attack, and on the twenty-sixth (the second parallel being commenced), sixty-five pieces of artillery, mounted on ten batteries, opened at once. Many houses were soon in flames, and the garrison was unable to extinguish them; the counter-fire was, however, briskly maintained, and little military damage was sustained. Toward evening the cannonade slackened on both sides; but just at dark the ground suddenly trembled; the castle, bursting into a thousand

over the Portuguese by good treatment. But the general hatred was too violent, and his misplaced confidence resulted in the virtual surrender to our enemies of four or five thousand of their captured soldiers.

**POSITION OF WELLINGTON.**—Wellington remained immovable during these two sieges, although the corps of Ney and Junot did not number over thirty-six thousand men, and half of these were engaged in the operations of the sieges. For some reason not known, the forces of the English general were divided; there were only thirty thousand men at Celorico, at the head of the valley of the Mondego; General Hill, with fifteen thousand men on the right, was at Portalegro, on the left bank of the Tagus, against Reynier's corps, which was observed by a light corps of Portuguese and that of Romana; the reserve of ten thousand men, under Leith, remained at Thomar, thirty leagues from the army, and twelve thousand Portuguese were thrown upon the frontiers as partisans. It would seem that Wellington might readily have united these means, and, by taking the initiative, have greatly troubled our operations, without compromising the system on which he had based his hopes. But he remained immovable in his position.

**THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL.**—Having completed all his preparations for invasion, Masséna drew to himself the corps of Reynier, about the middle of September, and directed himself on Celorico. The enemy now fell back, descending the left of the Mondego, where ten affluents with deep ravines presented as many good lines of defense. But as Masséna descended by the right bank on Viseu, the English general crossed the Mondego, marched rapidly on the mountains of Acoibar, where he also directed, at the same time, the corps of Hill and Leith, by the road to Espinoha. He thus hoped to cover Coimbra and the road to Lisbon, by taking position with his united forces on the plateau of Busaco, at the summit of that chain, three hundred feet above the surrounding valleys. This important junction was effected on the twenty-sixth of September, at the very moment that the French army arrived at Busaco. Ney, who was the first

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pieces, gave vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin. Treason or accident had caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. The ramparts were breached, the greatest part of the guns thrown into the ditch, five hundred people were struck dead on the instant, and only six houses left standing; the stones thrown out hurt forty of the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally."



to present himself, was inclined, it is said, to attack immediately, but was persuaded to await the arrival of the commander-in-chief. It is asserted that the junction of Hill and Leith was not then effected, nor even when Masséna made his reconnoissance. If this be true, the delay was a deplorable fatality. However, the heroes of Essling and Genoa, accustomed in the Alps and Apennines not to fear rocks, however difficult of access, determined to make the attack the next day, although the union of the enemy's forces would then be consummated.

**BATTLE OF BUSACO.**—There were only two roads by which the English could be reached—that by the convent of Busaco, and that by San Antonio de Cantaro. The sixth corps took the first road in deep columns by echelons, the rocky escarpments not permitting them to attack in any other order, or even allowing the cannon to follow the infantry. Reynier attacked, in the same way, by San Antonio. Our troops ascended the heights with their accustomed impetuosity, but were exposed to a most horrible fire. After driving back the enemy's first line on the slope, they reached the summit by brigades, but out of breath and a little disordered by their vigorous effort. They were here exposed to a concentric fire of grape, from a numerous artillery, and of musketry from the enemy's battalions; and charged in front by fresh troops, and in flank by a crowd of Portuguese, they descended the mountains with a sensible loss and without inflicting much injury on the enemy. General Simon was killed, and General Ferry wounded at the head of the column of the sixth corps. The intrepid Foy and the brave Graindorge, who led Reynier's corps, were severely wounded, without obtaining any better success. For a moment they deemed themselves successful, when Hill's entire corps, acting as a reserve, assailed them, and, after a murderous combat, drove them back to the foot of the mountain. This butchery, which cost us six or seven thousand men *hors-de-combat*, was the more to be regretted, as it changed the relative *morale* of the two armies, and might have been avoided, either by making the attack before the junction of Hill and Leith, or by maneuvering so as to dislodge the enemy.

**MASSENA TURNS THE POSITION OF WELLINGTON.**—But the evil had now been committed, and the position of Masséna was most critical; he could not remain without provisions at the foot of the mountain, nor could he retreat in the face of an enemy who was watching all his movements. To repass the Mondego, to act on the left bank, was also impracticable, since Wellington had a direct line there, by which he could anticipate him.

Fortunately, a peasant pointed out to Masséna a road two leagues further north, still better than the one he had attempted, which led to Coimbra by Avelans de Cima and Soardo. Wellington had assigned the defense of this post to the Portuguese corps of Trant; but, for some reason not known, that corps had not arrived. Masséna took this road without hesitation. This flank movement, executed between the English army and the sea, was bold and audacious; but Wellington, satisfied with his victory, although a passive one and without results, preferred to regain his intrenched camp, rather than to venture an engagement with our troops in the open country, where he might be seriously cut up.

#### DEVASTATING SYSTEM OF THE ENGLISH GENERAL.

—The French army followed him by Coimbra. Here, as at Viseu, we found no inhabitants. These two rich and flourishing cities were deserted and abandoned, as was also the whole country. The unfortunate inhabitants had been forced to fly, under pain of death, by the orders of the English general, the regency, and an exasperated clergy. Wellington's orders of the twenty-fourth of August, directing this measure, are an historical monument of this cruel war.\*

Thus applying to a country mountainous, difficult of access, and possessing but little grain, the precepts given by Lloyd for the defense of England, Wellington had transformed the whole country from Celorico to Lisbon into one vast artificial desert. Fortunately for us, this vigorous order had not been literally executed; the inhabitants had fled with a part of their provisions, but, not having the means of transportation, they had buried the remainder; a part of these were discovered by our soldiers, and, although an insufficient resource for the entire army, they served as a means of subsistence for some weeks.

**LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.**—By a singular fatuity of which there is no other example in all the continental wars, Mas-

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\*To lay waste a country in this manner is permitted by the severe rules of war, or, in other words, is within the extreme limits established by the laws of war; but such measures are justifiable only by the extreme necessity of the case. Vattel characterizes them as "savage and monstrous excesses, when committed without necessity." We are to understand by the word *necessity*, a military necessity, or great military advantage to be gained toward accomplishing the object of the campaign or of the war. The laying waste of a district of country, or the destroying of a city, sometimes produces a greater result than a victory gained. Napoleon's campaign in Russia furnishes a striking illustration. The general must decide according to the circumstances of each particular case.—*Halleck's Int. Law, and Laws of War, Ch. xix., § 23.*

séna did not learn till he reached Leyria the existence of these formidable lines on which Wellington had been laboring for the last ten months! Two lines of redoubts, the greater part of which were closed at the gorge and palisaded, and thus presenting eighty-seven separate forts, armed with two hundred and ninety pieces of heavy cannon, offered one of the most formidable positions mentioned in the annals of modern history; a third line, serving as a citadel to the other two, was so arranged as to cover an embarkation in case the others were forced. Taking refuge in this redoubtable asylum, resting on the sea (which for the English alone was a good base), and therefore certain of provisions, he could brave all our attacks.\*

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\*The defenses of Torres Vedras, from the important influence which they had upon the Peninsular war, deserve a more full description than that given in the text. We copy the following from Napier:

"The lines of Torres Vedras," he says, "consisted of three distinct ranges of defense.

"The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the hills, twenty-nine miles long.

"The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length.

"The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from Passo-d'Arcos on the Tagus to the tower of Junquera on the coast. Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of three thousand yards, inclosed an intrenched camp designed to cover the embarkation with fewer troops, should the operation be delayed by bad weather; within the second camp, Fort St. Julians (whose high ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade) was armed and strengthened to enable a rear guard to protect both itself and the army.

"The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles from these works, at Passo-d'Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two long marches distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the embarkation.

"Of these stupendous lines, the second, whether regarded for its strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal; the others were only appendages; the one as a final place of refuge, the other as an advanced work to stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or pressure. Masséna having, however, wasted the summer season on the frontiers, the first line acquired such strength, both from labor and from the fall of rain, that Lord Wellington resolved to abide his opponent's charge there.

"The ground presented to the French being, as it were, divided into five parts or positions, shall be described in succession from right to left.

"1st. *From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix.* This distance of about five miles was a continuous and lofty ridge, defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered inaccessible by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high, executed along the brow. It was guarded by the British and Portuguese division under General Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla of gun-boats, manned by British seamen.



**EMBARRASSING POSITION OF MASSÉNA.**—Although Masséna was no more fond of retreating than I was, still he did not dare to risk an attack, as it would have been too hazardous. The enemy had taken at Coimbra some four thousand of our sick and wounded, so that our army was reduced to forty thousand combatants, while the enemy numbered more than sixty thousand. Masséna sent to me, by General Foy, for orders and reinforcements. In the mean time he hoped to fatigue his adversary by his perseverance. In this he miscalculated; but he could do no better under the circumstances. The English army, having two hundred vessels at its disposal, had always an abundance; it passed five months in its camp, completing its intrenchments and exercising and instructing its troops. The Portuguese

"2d. *From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pé-de-Monte.* This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in the mouth of the pass. only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here, and the defense of the ground was intrusted to General Craufurd and the light division.

"3d. *The Monte Agraca.* This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent country in such a manner, that from its summit the whole of the first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated from the Aruda position by a deep ravine, which led to nothing; the left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira; the center overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of this mountain was crowned by an immense redoubt, mounting twenty-five guns, and having three smaller works, containing nineteen guns, clustered around it. The garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack's brigade; and on the reverse of the position, which might be about four miles in length, the fifth division, under General Leith, was posted in reserve.

"4th. *From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras.* This position, seven miles long, was at first without works; because it was only when the rains had set in that the resolution to defend the first line permanently was adopted. But the ground being rough and well-defined, the valley in front, deep and watered by the Zizandre, now became a considerable river; it presented a fine field of battle for a small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth division formed of troops just arrived from England and from Cadiz, were there posted, under the immediate command of Lord Wellington himself whose head-quarters were fixed at Pedro Negro, near the Secorra, a rock on which a telegraph was erected, communicating with every part of the lines.

"5th. *From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre.* The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town of Torres Vedras were secured, first, by one great redoubt, mounting forty guns; secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the sea a range of moderate heights were crowned with small forts; but the chief defense there, after the rains had set in, was to be found in the Zizandre, which was not only unfordable, but overflowed its banks, and formed an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the foot of the hills, ran along the whole front; that is, from

militia were here instructed and disciplined till they rivaled the regulars; so that the army came out of the camp more formidable than ever. Masséna, on the contrary, was ruining his army in order to subsist it; his troops were divided into movable columns, and exposed to attacks by the inhabitants and the Portuguese partisans. They ravaged the country through which they were soon to make their retreat; sickness, daily combats, and assassinations diminished their numbers, while the obstacles were increasing before them. In a word, they were so situated as to render it necessary to either attack the enemy immediately or to retreat. Informed of these circumstances by General Foy, I advised Masséna to attack the enemy if the thing was practicable, and if not, to keep him within his lines. I promised to

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Torres Vedras, by Ruña, Sobral, and Aruda, to Alhandra. This was the nature of the *first* line of defense; the second was still more formidable.

"1st. *From the mouth of the St. Lourenca to Mafra.* In this distance of seven miles, there was a range of hills naturally steep, artificially scarped, and covered by a deep and in many parts impracticable ravine. The salient points were secured by forts, which flanked and commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive, a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a road leading from Ereceira to Cintra.

"2d. *On the right of the above line the Tapada, or royal park of Mafra.* Here there was some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of fourteen redoubts, constructed with great labor and care, well considered with respect to the natural disposition of the ground, and, in some degree, connected with the secondary post spoken of above; in front, the Sierra-de-Chypre, covered with redoubts, obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself.

"3d. *From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas.* In this space of ten or twelve miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is choked by the Monte-Chique, the Cabeca, or head of which, is in the center of, and overtopping, all the other mountain masses. A road, conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold than any other parts of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeca, and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was extremely difficult, and a second and stronger range of heights, parallel to and behind the first, offered a good fighting position, which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting road in front; and to reach that, either the Sierra-de-Chypre, on the left, or the pass of the Cabeca-de-Monte-Chique, on the right, must have been carried. Now, the works covering the latter consisted of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in advance of the Cabeca, and completely commanding all the approaches, and, both from their artificial and natural strength, nearly impregnable to open force. The Cabeca and its immediate flanks were considered secure in their natural precipitous strength; and, in like manner, the ridges connecting the Cabeca with the pass of Bucellas, being impregnable, were left untouched, save the blocking of one bad mule-road that led over them.

"4th. *From Bucellas to the low ground about the Tagus.* The pass of Bucellas was difficult, and strongly defended by redoubts on each side. A



send him the ninth corps, under Drouet, which had just entered Spain, and gave him hopes of being seconded by Soult, who was operating on the Guadiana. Being so far from the theater of the war, I could not presume to give any definitive orders, and therefore left Masséna to act according to his own judgment. In the mean time Wellington had completed his works and armed them with additional batteries, while his force had been increased by fifteen thousand additional English and Spanish troops.

There was but one means left by which we could operate against Lisbon: this was to construct a bridge at Santarem, to cover it with a strong *tête-de-pont*, draw Soult from Badajos on Setuval, and to bombard Lisbon from the heights on the opposite bank of the river. To accomplish this object, there was required not only great activity and unity of action, but also means which

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ridge, or rather a collection of impassable rocks, called the Sierra-de-Serves, stretched to the right for two miles without a break, and then died away by gradual slopes in the low ground about the Tagus. These declivities and the flat banks of the river offered an opening two miles and a half wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened by redoubts, water-cuts, and retrenchments, and connected by a system of forts with the heights of Alhandra; but it was the weakest part of the whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its proximity to the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda.

"There were five roads practicable for artillery piercing the *first line* of defense—namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, there were, in fact, only four points of passage through the *second line*—that is to say, at Mafra, Monte-Chique, Bucellas, and Quintella in the flat ground. The aim and scope of all the works was to bar those passes and to strengthen the favorable fighting positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army. Those objects were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the *first line* would not have been injurious, save in reputation, because the retreat was secure upon the *second and stronger line*; and the guns of the first were all of inferior caliber, mounted on common truck-carriages, and consequently immovable and useless to the enemy.

"The movements of the Allies were free and unfettered by the works. The movements of the French army were impeded and cramped by the great Monte-Junta, which, rising opposite the center of the first line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra-de-Baragueda in a slanting direction, so close up to the heights of Torres Vedras that the narrow pass of Rufia alone separated them. As this pass was commanded by heavy redoubts, Masséna was of necessity obliged to dispose his forces on one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could not transfer his army to either without danger; because the Sierra, although not impassable, was difficult; and the movement, which would require time and arrangement, could always be overlooked from the Monte-Agraca, whence, in a few hours, the allied forces could pour down upon the head, flank, or rear of the French while on the march. And this could be done with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by the engineers to all important points of the lines, and a system of signals was established, by which orders were transmitted from the center to the extremities in a few minutes."



we did not possess. Masséna fortified Punhete near the mouth of the Zezere, and devoted all his efforts to the construction of a bridge equipage that would enable him to maneuver on either side of the Tagus. The pontoniers and sappers, with the assistance of a battalion of sailors which he had with the army, succeeded, at the end of six weeks, in completing this task to the satisfaction of the commander-in-chief. But these equipages had now become unnecessary, for Soult did not appear on the Tagus, and Masséna could not venture alone to attempt so perilous a passage in the presence of Hill and Romana. It is evident that if Soult had reduced Badajos at the same time that Masséna took Almeida, and the two armies had advanced in concert on Lisbon by both banks of the Tagus, the chances of success would have been greatly in our favor. But without the possession of Badajos, and without a suitable bridge equipage on the Tagus, it is not so certain that Soult's coöperation would have been entirely successful. Even allowing that Soult's march in Alemtejo had not decided the evacuation of Lisbon, it, however, cannot be doubted that that march would have effected a favorable diversion, and afforded Masséna an opportunity to attack the lines of Torres Vedras, by drawing off a part of Wellington's troops. The bombardment of Lisbon from the heights of Almada might have caused great damage to that city, but could hardly have induced Wellington to abandon his formidable camp, which was situated at the distance of four leagues from the city, and out of the reach of batteries on the left bank of the Tagus.

**SUFFERINGS OF HIS ARMY.**—Modern history offers no example of an army in such a condition as that of Masséna. Placed two hundred leagues from its own frontiers, in the midst of two warlike and insurgent nations, deprived of all maritime means of subsistence, in a country deserted by its inhabitants, it could subsist only like a nomadic horde, devouring everything within the reach of its camp, and then moving to some other place. In all preceding wars, an army, even in a hostile country, could procure provisions by paying for them their weight in gold. Neutral commerce, avaricious of large profits, is ever ready to carry its grains and provisions necessary for the support of life wherever the chances of want promise certain gain. But in our contest, so great was the preponderance of the English marine, and so stringent and arbitrary the rules which this tyrant of the ocean had imposed on neutrals, that she had destroyed all neutral rights of commerce and liberty of the seas; and, on a coast of eight hundred leagues in extent, not a single coaster had ventured to make its appearance.

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**HIS JUNCTION WITH DROUET.**—After having sojourned a month near Alenquer opposite the enemy's lines, Masséna moved toward Santarem, the middle of November, in order to facilitate the subsistence of his army, which he drew from the valley of the Zezere; this also favored his junction with Drouet, who was coming by Celorico and Castel Franco. This junction was effected near Leyria on the twenty-sixth of December. Wellington, reinforced by the troops of Romana, advanced as far as Cartaxo, and the two armies secured themselves behind their intrenchments.

**REMARKS ON THE POSITION OF AFFAIRS.**—It was certainly very unfortunate that the strength of this position was such as to prevent our expelling the English from the peninsula by a single decisive blow; but the situation of affairs was such as to leave us but few combinations from which to choose. It may be said that when we found an assault impossible, we might either have blockaded his lines or have maneuvered to draw him into the interior of Spain. But there were other positions on the frontier of Portugal as strong as that of Torres Vedras; and by retiring we would merely have extended the sphere of his activity from the Ebro to the Guadalquiver. A larger force would have been necessary to hold him in check behind the Agueda than to observe his lines; he could always keep the field with advantage, against troops which were now under the necessity of extending themselves so as to cover the immense space between Salamanca and Cadiz, and which he might threaten on any part of this line, by operating from his intrenched camp, either to the right or to the left. If beaten, he could always take refuge behind the works of Torres Vedras; so that, under any circumstances, this would be the point from which he was finally to be driven. As we now held him at this point, it was evidently our policy to keep him there. Fifty thousand French troops holding the Anglo-Portuguese in close blockade would demonstrate the incapability of that army's delivering the peninsula; it was the same as if that army did not exist, if we deduct the offset of fifty thousand men from our forces, or, what was the same thing, add that number to the army required for the reduction of Spain. Some unworthy Frenchmen who have undertaken the task of undervaluing my glory, in order to elevate to the clouds that of the enemies of France, and to make Wellington *the man of Providence*, have not been able to comprehend this simple question, and have consequently represented Masséna as an imbecile; and me as a madman, who lost all through his violence and obstinacy.

In fine, we may lay this down as positive: we were obliged either to attack Wellington two days after our arrival, or to act precisely as we did. And if we had had the means of supplying our army in their position in this devastated and insurgent country, Wellington would never have left his lines, except to embark his troops and land them again in some other point of the peninsula.

**SUCHET'S BRILLIANT SUCCESS IN CATALONIA.**—My army in Aragon was more fortunate. Having returned to Saragossa in triumph after the victory of Santa Maria over the corps of Blake, Suchet had succeeded, by his wise administration, in restoring abundant supplies as well as discipline among his troops, which were composed of different nations as well as new levies. He regulated the pay of the troops, and forbade any person in this army becoming a charge to the inhabitants, and, what was still more extraordinary, succeeded in reducing to quiet submission those same Aragonese who had exhibited so much energy and ferocity in the defense of Saragossa. Provided with everything requisite for this object, and being able to descend the Ebro with his convoys, he was silently preparing to attack the places on the lower Ebro, which alone would decide the fate of Catalonia, when Joseph, in marching for Andalusia, directed him to advance to Valencia in order to support that movement. The King, relying on the understanding he had with some of the Valencians, announced that the gates would be opened at our approach. The army of Aragon moved, the early part of March, in two columns, which united at Murviedro; it defeated the advanced guard of the Valencian army, captured nine pieces of cannon, and occupied the *faubourgs* of the city; but the gates did not open, notwithstanding a summons supported by threatening demonstrations.

**COMBAT OF MARGALEF.**—Convinced that this enterprise was immature, Suchet hastened to return to Saragossa to commence an operation from which he hoped greater success, and rapidly completed his preparations against Lerida. On the twelfth of April he presented himself before that place, and effected its investment. He did not open the trenches, because he had received information of the approach of a corps of the enemy from Tarragona under the orders of General Henry O'Donnel. On the twenty-third this general thought to surprise our troops on the left bank of the Ebro, and advanced boldly toward the *tête-de-pont* of Lerida, by the plains of Margalef. The garrison of the place at the same time made an unsuccessful effort at a sortie; and



while General Harispe was repelling the head of O'Donnel's column, the thirteenth cuirassiers, sustained by Musnier's division, charged the first Spanish division in flank and forced it, after a hot combat, to lay down its arms; the other division took to flight. The enemy lost five thousand prisoners, in addition to those killed and wounded.

**SIEGE OF LERIDA.**—The operations of the siege were now begun with vigor. The trenches were opened on the twenty-ninth of April, and on the seventh of May the batteries opened against the north front of the place. The assault was made on the thirteenth, and the city and bridge carried by the bayonet. In the mean time, Suchet, seeing that the garrison took refuge in the citadel, directed that all the population should be driven in there also. By driving them from street to street and from house to house, this adroit maneuver succeeded. The citadel became filled with a useless crowd, who not only consumed their provisions, but also became more terrified at the sight of our shells than at the fanatical discourses of their priests. Embarrassed and intimidated by this useless multitude, the governor found himself forced to capitulate. General Suchet thus avoided a second siege, which, in 1707, had cost the Duke of Orleans twenty-five days. The garrison were taken prisoners, to the number of seven thousand men. We found in the place large magazines, and one hundred and five pieces of cannon. The occupation of Lerida rendered us masters of the vast and fertile plain of Urgel, which procured us great resources for provisioning the army.\*

**SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA.**—The siege of Mequinenza was undertaken immediately after that of Lerida. It was necessary to construct a road across the mountains, at the extremity of which this fort is situated. The trenches were opened on the first of June, and the assault made on the eighth, when the fort capitulated. We took there fourteen hundred men and forty-five pieces of cannon, and, what was most important of all, made ourselves masters of the navigation of the Ebro from Saragossa to Tortosa.

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\*The conduct of Suchet in driving the inhabitants at Lerida into the citadel along with the garrison can be justified only by the overruling necessity of the case. It, however, was not contrary to the laws of war. It is a singular circumstance that while Alison and Napier so severely condemn Suchet's conduct on this occasion, they are silent in regard to Wellington's devastation of the country in front of Torres Vedras. Both are to be justified, if justified at all, upon the same ground—the necessities of the war.

AUGEREAU'S OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.—But if I was satisfied with the operations of Suchet, the submission of Aragon, and the taking of Lerida, I was the less so with Augereau, who did nothing in Catalonia, notwithstanding the advantages he derived from the possession of Gerona. His first operation had been to approach Barcelona and invest Hostalrich; the Spaniards made useless attempts to supply this fort, and the garrison finally took advantage of the negligence of the investing corps to effect their escape. The taking of this fort rendered us masters of the road so indispensable for our communications and the transportation of our *matériel*. But Augereau seemed to derive no advantages from this important acquisition. He made demonstrations in the direction of Lerida, when that place was besieged by Suchet, but he did not carry out the operation. In fact, the want of provisions, and the difficulty of communications, added to the general insurrection of the province, fettered all his movements, and rendered them dangerous. I neglected nothing in my power to assist him: a great convoy, which I sent him from Provence by sea, could not enter Barcelona; it was captured and dispersed, and the three ships of the line which escorted it had to run ashore to avoid being taken by the English. The troops of Augereau having been beaten in two encounters, I saw plainly that the conqueror of the Mougá and of Castiglione was not suited to this kind of war, in which talent and activity were more requisite than courage. I therefore replaced him by Macdonald.\*

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\*Napier, in speaking of the siege of Lerida, and the opportunity presented to the Spaniards to attack Suchet, says:

"It was to obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take such a position on the Lower Ebro as would keep both O'Donnel and the Valencians in check. Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do this; and Saint-Cyr asserts that the seventh corps could never safely venture to pass the mountains and enter the valley of the Ebro. On the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon's instructions could have been obeyed without difficulty. Saint-Cyr himself, under somewhat similar circumstances, blockaded Tarragona for a month; Augereau, who had more troops and fewer enemies, might have done the same, and yet spared six thousand men to pass the mountains. Suchet would then have been tranquil with respect to O'Donnel, would have had a covering army to protect the siege, and the succors, fed from the resources of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia.

"Augereau has been justified, on the ground that the blockade of Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The danger of this could not have escaped the Emperor, yet his military judgment, unerring in principle, was often false in application, because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own capacity, and Napoleon's standard only suited the heroic proportions. One thing is, however, certain, that

**SIEGE OF TORTOSA.**—The success of Suchet induced me to intrust him with an important operation, on which, in my opinion, depended the reduction of Catalonia. There are only two great roads in this province—the one running from Barcelona to Saragossa, and the other from Perpignan to Valencia, by Tarragona, Tortosa, and Peniscola, all of which were fortified sea-ports. It was important for us to get possession of this direct route, so as at the same time to cut off the communication of the insurgents with the sea, and to secure ours between the Ebro and France. Suchet, being charged with this task, precluded it by the siege of Tortosa, while Macdonald, acting as a corps of observation, was to hold in check the hostile divisions which were scattered among the mountains, from Cerdagne and the confines of Aragon to the limits of the kingdom of Valencia. All the upper valleys of Vic, Manresa, Cervera, and Puicerda, however often passed over by our columns, still remained in the power of the Spaniards, and their chiefs, far from suffering themselves to be discouraged by our success on the Ebro, often appeared in a threatening attitude in the French Cerdagne, at the gates of Mont-Louis, and in the Ampurdan.

The difficulty of drawing our convoys from France across a country so full of obstacles rendered all the operations of our troops exceedingly hazardous. Having collected at Lerida the *matériel* necessary for the siege of Tortosa, Suchet resolved to hasten this operation, for fear that Macdonald might not be able to hold for a long time the positions necessary for covering this siege. He opened a practicable road from Mequinenza and Carpe to Batea and Gandesa, and then established himself before Tortosa, the last of the month. But the army of Catalonia was not ready to act in concert with that of Aragon. Macdonald held an interview with his colleague at Lerida near the end of August, and immediately afterward moved with his corps in the direction of Barcelona and Gerona, to meet a convoy coming from France, which was necessary for the combined operations with Suchet. The latter now regretted having so soon established himself before Tortosa, but fearing the influence of a retrograde movement, he determined to continue the blockade on the right bank of the

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Catalonia presented the most extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military organization of the Migueletes and Somatenes, the well-arranged system of fortresses, the ruggedness and sterility of the country, the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population thrown out of work, and, finally, the aid of an English fleet, combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task. Nevertheless, the French made progress, each step planted slowly indeed and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making another."



Ebro. During this interval, a continual contest was waged against the Valencians and the garrison, who attempted numerous attacks on the blockading troops, or against the enemy's corps from Tarragona or the camp at Falcet and its environs, or against the parties which were spread along the Ebro to intercept our convoys of artillery. The long-expected coöperation was not effected until the month of December. Marshal Macdonald, to whom Suchet had given Lerida and its magazines, established himself with the main body of his forces between Tarragona, Tortosa, and Mora, and one of his divisions passed temporarily under the orders of Suchet, to take part in the siege. Thus reinforced, this general invested Tortosa on both banks of the river, and occupied the hill of Alba on the fifteenth of December. The attack was directed against the front of the place between the Ebro and Fort Orleans inclusively. The works of the engineers were pushed forward with extraordinary rapidity, notwithstanding the sorties of the garrison. The covered-way was crowned on the first of January, and the descent of the ditch executed at the same time that the work was battered in breach. The governor proposed a capitulation, which he afterwards hesitated to conclude, although he could not have been ignorant that our miners were about to attack the body of the place. The following day (January 2d) everything was prepared early for the assault. The white flag reappeared, although neither the governor nor his messenger presented themselves. The negotiations of the previous day had already affected the garrison so that they advanced from all sides to the glacis, and entered into conversation with our soldiers. Seizing upon this opportunity to prevent a useless effusion of blood, General Suchet, followed by some officers, rode to the first group of Spaniards and caused the barrier-gate to be opened; seeing some officers, he went to them, and complained of the hesitation of the governor and the fate to which he exposed the city. At his words the cannoneers left their pieces, the French collected on the ramparts, and the governor, a little confused, was brought before him, and the capitulation of the previous day was concluded, signed, and executed at the same instant. The garrison, numbering over eight thousand men, were sent into France by Saragossa, as prisoners of war; and a hundred and seventy-seven pieces of artillery were found in the place and captured. This conquest separated the Valencians from the Catalans, and, by this division, greatly weakened their means of defense. No sooner was Suchet in possession of Tortosa than he prepared to attack Fort St. Philip on the hill of Be-

laguer. General Habert made a successful attempt to carry the place by a *coup-de-main*: our voltigeurs intimidated the garrison, scaled the walls, and took the fort. This was a most valuable *point-d'appui* for ulterior operations against Tarragona.

**GENERAL REMARKS ON THE WAR.**—Notwithstanding these disasters, the Spanish government was very far from regarding their cause as desperate. The Cortes of the nation, convoked as has been already remarked, at the moment of the dissolution of the central junta, finally assembled at Cadiz in September, 1810. From the spirit manifested by this assembly, it was evident that they could not long agree with the regency: in fact, this body was soon dissolved, and a new one appointed in its place, at the head of which figured the Duke of Infantado and General Blake, who, like Romana, enjoyed more popularity than his colleagues, without being any more successful in his military operations. Under this new organization, some efforts were made to obtain success in the east under the protection of Tarragona; in the south, by the aid of Carthagena, Murcia, and Cadiz; in the west, by means of Badajos and Wellington's army, which still lay behind their intrenchments at Lisbon. Romana had here joined the English general with a force of seven or eight thousand men.

The Cabinet of London, on its side, encouraged by the success of its arms and the influence which the appointment of Wellesley to the ministry had given to the war party, obtained from Parliament subsidies for the succor of Spain! The efforts of my enemies were naturally calculated to increase mine also: and after the success of Suchet in the east, and of Soult in the south, I hoped to see the resistance of Spain cease sooner or later: this war did not give me much uneasiness, for I had resolved to be still more obstinate than the Spaniards, and I was certain of ultimate success. The Empire was strong enough to sustain such a contest, with the aid of its powerful allies, without being exhausted by it. This war did not prevent me from undertaking such enterprises as I deemed beneficial to the prosperity of France. I improved the administration of the government; I organized new institutions which were calculated to give permanency to the Empire by raising up a generation interested in sustaining it. Maritime commerce alone was wanting to revive the prosperity of our ports and draw upon me benedictions greater than any other mortal ever received.

**BERNADOTTE ELECTED PRINCE ROYAL OF SWEDEN.**

—With the exception of the Peninsular war, France enjoyed, in

profound quiet, the fruits of my labors. My Continental System had been embraced by nearly all Europe. Sweden had adopted it on the accession of Charles XIII.; this prince, having no heirs, had adopted the Prince of Augustenburg of the Holstein branch, which connected him, at the same time, with the houses of Russia and Denmark. But no sooner was he recognized as the Prince Royal than he died a sudden and violent death. The people accused General Fersen of this act and massacred him in a riot. They required a successor to the throne of Sweden, and thought to strengthen their bonds of connection with France by nominating a member of my family. Bernadotte was very remotely connected with me by being the brother-in-law of King Joseph; this was a very frail bond of connection, but, in addition to it, Bernadotte had gained the esteem of many Swedes in his different commands in Pomerania and at Rugen. The Diet, assembled at Oerebro, proclaimed him the adopted son of Charles XIII. and Prince Royal. We had not been on good terms since the campaign of Wagram; although I did not provoke his nomination, yet I readily gave it my assent, when the proposition was made to me, and it must be acknowledged by all parties that he was entirely indebted for it to his connection with my brother. I flattered myself that if he did not have for me the devotion of a *Seide*, he would at least remember that he was a Frenchman, and that in this capacity, as well as that of a Swede, he would appreciate the value of the alliance with France, since all the kings of Sweden, with the exception of Gustavus IV., had followed this system for the last two centuries. But I was deceived; Bernadotte retained for me the rancor of the eighteenth Brumaire, and Sweden was less attached to me under him than it would have been under a Swedish prince. Even supposing that my policy was too rigorous, and that he left my system to return to a neutrality toward England, I was far from expecting to see him at the head of the armies of the enemy at a time when we were defending the national independence on the banks of the Rhine and even on the soil of France.\*

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\*The course pursued by Bernadotte during the invasions of his native country in 1814 and 1815 has made his name odious in France. Although made Crown Prince of Sweden through French influence, it by no means followed that he was not bound to do everything in his power to promote the interests of his adopted country. But it by no means followed that the interests of the two were incompatible, or that, as a Swede by adoption, he was bound to oppose his native country and do all in his power to injure the man to whom he was mainly indebted for his elevation. History will judge of Bernadotte by his course before, as well as after, he became Crown Prince of Sweden.

After Napoleon's return from Egypt, Bernadotte, while pretending



REUNION OF HOLLAND.—Four events, equally remarkable, signalized the year 1810; the first was the donation of the grand duchy of Frankfort to Prince Eugene, in reversion at the death of the Prince Primate. If I should have a second son, I projected giving him the crown of Italy and Rome; but Europe, not knowing my intentions, did not understand the object of this new arrangement, and supposed that I intended Germany, or at least the Confederation of the Rhine, for my adopted son. A still more important affair was the re-annexation to the French Empire of Holland and the mouths of the Ems, of the Weser, and of the Elbe, as far as Lübeck.

The contest with England daily becoming more complicated by the chances of the war in Spain, I looked around me for means to force the Cabinet of St. James to dispositions more pacific, and adopted the project of annexing territory to the Empire as a means of retrocession to be offered as an inducement for peace.

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great friendship, was engaged in various intrigues against him. These were afterward discovered, and their author was at one time disgraced and exiled. But, through the influence of his wife and his brother-in-law, Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon forgave and restored him to a command. He afterward made him a Marshal of France and Prince of Ponte-Corvo. At the battle of Austerlitz his corps did good service, and he was complimented by the Emperor. But in the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, and at the battle of Wagram, his course was such as to cause him to be several times reprimanded, and to raise strong suspicions of his good faith. Nevertheless, his connection by marriage with the Bonaparte family caused all these offenses to be forgiven, and when offered the rank of Crown Prince of Sweden, Napoleon not only gave his consent, but gave him large sums of money as an outfit for his new position, saying that a prince of his family and government should not appear in Sweden as a beggar. Bernadotte seemed very grateful for the compliment, but no sooner did he reach Sweden than he renewed his intrigues against Napoleon. The Swedes elected Bernadotte as a compliment to Bonaparte, and as a pledge of future friendly relations, and it was so regarded by Napoleon. But the enemies of France who influenced the arrangement had a very different object in view.

Bernadotte had always been more popular with the northern and German soldiers than with the French. In most of his campaigns he had commanded foreign troops. Neither the French marshals nor the French troops liked him. This was particularly the case after the campaign of Wagram. At the same time he was popular with the Allies, and on every occasion courted their good-will. He, moreover, sought the friendship of Fouché and other old Republican enemies of Napoleon. These facts should have been sufficient for the Emperor to distrust him. Where a general is popular with the enemies of a government either at home or abroad, there is good cause to distrust his loyalty to that government. It is now incontestable that while Bernadotte was serving under Napoleon, he was already intriguing for his overthrow and the restoration of the Bourbons, conduct which can be justified in no possible way.

Of all those who were the temporary victims of the Continental System, none complained more than the Dutch. This nation, whose industrious, speculating, and enterprising character rendered its prosperity dependent on the advantages of commerce, could not submit to our maritime code without the ruin of these interests. It was necessary to close our eyes to the daily infractions of this code committed by the inhabitants, or to restore to the sea the land which they had conquered, and still defended with so much care and so many sacrifices. My brother Louis had not hesitated to espouse the interests of the Batavian commerce; he felt that he could not have the love of his people unless he acted with them and for them. He published my decrees, but openly allowed them to be violated. This state of things was destroying my system. Of what use was it that I had conquered the coast of Europe, and closed its ports to the English, if the members of my own family were to become the brokers of the enemy's commerce? My representations of this abuse not producing the desired effect, I was forced to interdict all importation into Holland; my brother retaliated by interdicting the admission of all French merchandise into his kingdom. This manner of governing Holland did not at all suit my policy; by taking the helm of the government myself, I might direct its resources wholly towards my object. Holland would suffer by it for some years, perhaps ten or twenty, but it would be amply repaid for these sacrifices if we should succeed.

**CONSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ENGLAND.**—Independently of these powerful considerations, I wished to prove to England that in the course which she forced me to pursue, every year in which she delayed to make peace would lead to the aggrandizement of my empire: no power in Europe was now prepared to oppose my project. Nevertheless, before deciding on it, I resolved to make one more effort to negotiate peace with the Cabinet of London.

My brother Louis came to Paris, in the early part of 1810. After declaring to him that he had carried out my intentions in Holland even less than the old Batavian government, I assured him that I would allow no deviation from the system I had formed against England, and hinted to him the possibility of re-annexation. I gave him to understand that the only means of avoiding the overthrow of his throne was to induce England to make peace. In accordance with these instructions, Louis informed his ministers of the danger which threatened Holland; and directed them to send a reliable man to England to induce

the Cabinet of London to enter into negotiations in order to avoid a catastrophe equally injurious to both countries. He solicited that government to make some modification in its maritime code which might be the first step toward a treaty of peace.

The Marquis of Wellesley was at this time minister of foreign affairs; and M. Labouchère, who was charged with this important embassy, failed to effect any negotiations. A singular circumstance came to light during this discussion. Fouché, tormented with the spirit of intrigue which formed a part of his composition, had also attempted, on his own account, to open negotiations for peace with England, the bases of which did not agree with the assurances given by Labouchère. Wellesley made this a pretext for rejecting propositions which he accused of being insincere. The brother of Wellington was the most decided advocate for the continuance of the war: he carried his hatred of me to the extent of wishing to emancipate the Irish Catholics, not only to dispose of the English troops necessary for guarding that island, but also to embody the Irish militia itself. He thus hoped to send fifty thousand of these Irish troops to his brother in Spain, so as to push the war with vigor, and to attach to his party the religious opinion of Spain, by showing them an entire army of Catholics under British colors. I do not mention these things as matters of reproach or blame against an English minister, but merely as a proof that between me and the men who had resolved upon possessing the trident of the seas, or the scepter of the world, there was little possibility of a treaty of peace: it was necessary that one of these two parties should succumb to the other.

Informed by the English of Fouché's intrigue, I replaced him in office by Savary; but instead of bringing him to trial as he deserved, I sent him away in a sort of disgrace as governor of the Roman states. However, in order to give the English ministry time for reflection, I determined to postpone the reunion of Holland, and to try another means which would lead to the same result in case the Cabinet of St. James remained inflexible. I therefore concluded, in March, a treaty with Louis, by which he ceded to me Zealand and Dutch Brabant to the first arm of the Meuse, and consented to the establishment of the French customs in his kingdom. This condition, so severe upon the interests of the Dutch, was near effecting a revolt; the suite of my ambassador was insulted; and I therefore resolved to end the matter by sending into Holland a corps of twenty thousand men.



My brother hesitated whether he should not imitate the example of the Regent of Portugal, by retiring to Batavia, but was persuaded from it by General Tarayre, the commandant of his guard, he abdicated and retired to Austria. On the ninth of July I declared the reunion of Holland to the French Empire, but this reunion was not consummated by a *senatus-consultum* till the thirteenth of December, when the silence of the English government proved that she would not be influenced by the ruin of her ancient allies.

ANNEXATION OF THE MOUTHS OF THE EMS, THE ELBE, AND THE WESER.—In order to complete this great measure, I also decreed the re-annexation of Oldenburg and a part of Westphalia as far as Lübeck, including the cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The object of this measure was to put an end to the illicit commerce which was here carried on. The English had got possession of the island of Heligoland belonging to the Danes, and situated some leagues from the coast of Holstein. Although of limited extent, this island had been transformed into an immense magazine, where the coasters of the Baltic and the North Sea supplied themselves with English and colonial merchandise. This was a sufficient motive to justify a military occupation of the country, but not for its formal annexation to the Empire. I, however, did not intend to retain this as a permanent acquisition, but to restore it as soon as I could force England to confine herself within the limits of moderation. It was evident that, after the restoration of the independence of Holland, the departments beyond that country could no longer remain as French provinces. In the mean time I would destroy these nests of smugglers of English goods, augment my maritime means and my Continental System, and, by gaining a footing in the Baltic, increase my influence over Denmark and Sweden. But in order to connect these departments of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe to the Empire, I had also decreed the annexation of the States of the Duke of Oldenburg, the brother-in-law of the Emperor of Russia. It was to be expected that the Emperor Alexander would demand an explanation for so high-handed an act of authority. As we were already punctilious and formal in explanations, there was reason to believe that if he did not object to the reunion of Holland and the Hanseatic towns, he would at least expect some explanation for this encroachment on the states of his sister.

NAPOLEON'S TOUR IN HOLLAND.—In the mean time I sought to deceive Europe respecting my real projects, and to

give an idea of my confidence and security. Not being able to restore to the Belgians and the Dutch the advantages of maritime commerce, I thought to turn their attention to works of internal improvement, and to dazzle them with the spectacle of my glory, by visiting their provinces. No time in my whole career was employed to greater advantage than this tour. I inspected the superb works of Antwerp, and encouraged the commerce of Amsterdam to still sustain with firmness the last efforts of a contest which would finally give liberty to all. I proved to them that by my perseverance and vast solicitude we might construct twenty-five large vessels per annum, so that in six years I should have one hundred and fifty ships of the line at Genoa, Venice, Toulon, Brest, Cherbourg, Antwerp, and the Texel, and that if the continent would continue to second my efforts, we would soon restore the freedom of the seas. Canals, roads, and public works of all kinds were equally the objects of my solicitude. I employed numerous Spanish prisoners in the construction of the Canal of Napoleon, which was to connect the Soane with the Rhine, and the Mediterranean with the North Sea. In order to complete this work, I ordered the opening of the Canal of the North, which connected the navigation of the Rhine with Hamburg, and thence, by Lübeck, with the Baltic Sea; important works, calculated to secure, in time of war, the transportation of our products into the north of Europe, and, in return, the products of the north necessary for the navy. The Canal of St. Quentin, which Louis XVI. had abandoned on account of the difficulties of its construction, was completed, and immense tunnels, securing the navigation of the Scheldt to the Seine by the Oise, proved to Belgium and France that to me nothing was impossible which was calculated to promote their prosperity.

*SENATUS-CONSULTUM ON THE INCORPORATION OF ROME.*—I, at this time, had some difficulties with the Pope; although wholly at my discretion at Savona, the pontiff was firmly opposed to all reconciliation. The principles which he manifested in his bull of excommunication showed that, although a prisoner, he still arrogated to himself the right to dispose of thrones. It was necessary to oppose to these pretensions solemn acts of state calculated to destroy their effect. The Senate accomplished this object by the act of February 17th, 1810, which contained the following stipulations:

1st. The Roman states were to form two departments, and be entitled to be represented by seven deputies in the legislative body.

2d. Rome was to be regarded as the second city of the Empire.

3d. The Prince Imperial was to bear the title of King of Rome.

4th. Rome was to have a resident imperial prince, holding there the court of the Empire.

5th. The emperors were to be crowned at Paris, and also at Rome.

6th. All sovereignty was declared incompatible with the spiritual authority in the interior of the Empire.

7th. On their exaltation, the popes were to take an oath never to act contrary to the four propositions of the Gallican Church.

8th. These propositions were declared common to all the churches of the Empire.

The remaining articles established a palace for the Pope at Paris, and another at Rome; fixed his salary at two millions per annum; and directed the expenses of the Sacred College and of the Propaganda to be paid from the imperial treasury. Conformably to these measures, all the archives of the Vatican were to be transferred to Paris. *The grand project of making this city the capital of Catholic Europe was half accomplished: I would by the same act reinforce the Empire with all theocratic influence, and free religion of all ultramontane Jesuitism. Europe would have been for ever secured from religious fanaticism: the pure religion of the early Christians would only have been the more venerated, and the more useful both to the people and to their governments.*

The profession of these doctrines so conservative of the rights of the throne was not of a nature calculated to calm the hostility of the Pope, who, not being able to defend his temporal power, attempted to revive the absolute privileges of the Holy See. I was excommunicated, and my nominations to the vacant sees not confirmed: the canonical institution was refused. Being thus engaged in a new kind of warfare, I appointed for my guide an ecclesiastic council composed of the most worthy prelates, among whom figured the Cardinal Maury and the Bishop of Nantes. As the Pope persisted in refusing the canonical institution, I was obliged to provide for the vacant sees by spiritual administrators, designated by the name of *bishops capitulaires*. Pius VII. forbade their exercising the office, and appointed vicars apostolic in their places. Such an act of authority, establishing in my empire a power superior to my own, was well calculated to irritate me; the cardinals who instigated this assumption of



authority were conducted to Vincennes, and also P. Fontana, one of the members of my council.

COUNCIL OF PARIS.—This state of schism could not long continue. To make an end of the matter, I assembled, in the early part of 1811, a council of the bishops of France; the ostensible object of this council was to provide for the canonical institutions, but in reality I wished to establish an ecclesiastic authority superior to that of the Pope, in order that one might counterbalance the other. My new ecclesiastic council, feeling the necessity of a reconciliation with the Holy See, sent a solemn deputation to him at Savona to ask his blessing and to offer a reconciliation. The Pope, being free from his perfidious counselors, and influenced solely by his own philanthropic feeling, promised the institution and authorized the council. It assembled on the ninth of July, 1811. The bishops did not comprehend my policy, and declined the very power which they had so often sought. They declared themselves incompetent. I was under the necessity of immediately dissolving this council, to avoid the appearance of yielding the point. A second council, which was assembled only to pronounce on the canonical institution, decided it. The Pope sanctioned their resolutions, and sent me letters of reconciliation.

RELIGIOUS FANATICISM.—Nevertheless, the impression which I wished to avoid had been made. The zeal of devotees became more active than ever; a little church which had ventured to form itself even in France, after I had been crowned by the Pope, and which then put itself above the pontiff whose authority it contested, had again rallied itself to the Pope as soon as it thought he could be made to serve its own ambitious views. This church again raised the banners of opposition, as soon as he appeared to yield to my ascendancy. Thus, in the nineteenth century, France also had her fanatics; and if we are astonished at the apostolic junta of Spain, what shall we say of this *ultra catholic* sect, in the very bosom of the most enlightened nation! At its voice the Jesuits resumed their activity; it was a secret action, but quick, active, and powerful against me. Notwithstanding all my precautions, these devotees succeeded in communicating with Savona, and in receiving instructions from that place. The Trappists of Freyburg served as the agents in this correspondence; they printed pamphlets among themselves and circulated them, from curate to curate, throughout the whole empire. The focus of these troubles had ramifications in France, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain. The clergy, the malcontents of all kinds, the parti-

sans of the old *régime*, were everywhere intriguing against my authority and seeking to embarrass my administration. They no longer appeared in the shape of conspirators; they had borrowed the banners of the Church, the most formidable of all against the throne; they fought with its thunders, and not with cannon; they had their secret signs and rallying-words. It was a kind of orthodox masonry, whose compact structure and polished surface presented nothing by which I could grasp it. It attained its object the more securely as it could not be attacked without the appearance of religious persecution. To act by force against disarmed men would have given them the character of martyrs.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY.—While I was extending the limits of my empire from the Tiber to the Baltic, the Russians were slowly operating in the Balkan and in Roumelia. The campaign of 1810 had been active at the mouth of the Danube. General Kamensky (the younger) had succeeded Bagration in the command; he was a man in the flower of life, well-informed, but without experience. A fine army of one hundred and forty-three battalions, one hundred and twenty-two squadrons, and twenty-seven regiments of Cossacks, forming a line of one hundred thousand combatants, constituted a force more considerable than Russia had ever before sent against the Ottoman Empire. This seemed sufficient to march to Constantinople; I would have asked no more to deliver it from the Bosphorus to Moscow.

Kamensky resolved to direct his efforts by Hirsova on Shumla, while, on his right, forces were directed to besiege Silistria and Roudschouck. Bazardjik was carried after a vigorous resistance, and Silistria, Tourtonkai, and Rasgrad also fell into the hands of the Russians. While these cities were falling before the enemy, the Grand Vizir remained, with Ottoman gravity, in his camp at Shumla. Kamensky advanced to this place on the twenty-second of June. An attempt was made to storm this fortified city from the rocky heights above, but it proved unsuccessful. The place was now invested, but as the Turks succeeded in introducing a large convoy by the road to Constantinople, all hopes of starving out the garrison were at an end. Raising the investment of Shumla, and leaving his brother with thirty thousand combatants in observation before the Grand Vizir, Kamensky joined in the siege of Roudschouck with twelve thousand men. Without waiting to breach the walls of the place, an assault, or rather an escalade, was ordered on the fourth of August, but, after a useless loss of eight thousand men killed and wounded, the attempt was given up, and Kamensky resolved to

proceed more methodically. The Seraskier of Sophia attempted to raise this siege with an army of thirty thousand men, but was met and totally defeated at Batin on the seventh of September. The capture of Sistow was the immediate result of this victory. Being reinforced by a new division under General Suwarrow (the younger), the Russian general renewed the sieges of Roudschouck and Giorgiovo, which are situated on the Danube almost in the same way as Mayence and Cassel on the Rhine. The sides of the two cities bordering the river were not fortified, and the Russians, by getting possession of the island which divides the river at this point, succeeded in cutting off all communication between them, and finally forced them to surrender. After having also reduced Nicopoli and Loweza, near the end of October, the Russian army went into winter quarters.

In Servia, Czerni-Georges also defeated the Turks on the Dwina. In Asia, Tormassof took Soukoum-Kalé and Soudjouk-Kalé; a landing was also attempted near Trebisond, but without result. Notwithstanding these successes, I saw that this war was advancing but slowly and at great cost, both in blood and treasure. As my relations with Russia seemed on the point of changing, I was not displeased at the slow progress of its arms against the Turks, for, in case of difficulty with that power, the Ottomans would make a useful diversion in my favor.



## CHAPTER XVII.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1811; CONTINUATION OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

General Review of the Foreign Relations of France—Faulty Relations with Prussia—Proposed Alliance—New Difficulties with Russia—Prospects of closing the War in Spain—Dissensions between Joseph and my Generals—New Cortes to be assembled at Madrid—Critical Situation of Masséna—Soulth marches on Badajos and Olivenza—Siege of Badajos—Remarks on the Operations of Soulth—Attempt to raise the Siege of Cadiz—Affair of Chiclana—Retreat of the Allies—Soulth marches to the Support of Victor—Masséna evacuates Portugal—Battle of Fuente-d'Honore—Masséna retires to Salamanca—Remarks on Masséna's Retreat—Beresford threatens Badajos—He captures Olivenza and lays Siege to Badajos—Soulth marches to its Succor—Battle of Albuera—Napoleon directs the Junction of Soulth and Marmont—Wellington renews the Siege of Badajos—He is again forced to retire into Portugal—Operations of the Spaniards in Andalusia—They are Defeated by Soulth—Wellington and Marmont near Ciudad-Rodrigo—Hill Surprises Girard—Suchet on the Ebro—Figueras Surprised by the Catalans—Suchet prepares to Attack Tarragona—Memorable Siege of that City—Further Operations of Suchet—He prepares to attack Valencia—Siege of Saguntum—Battle of Saguntum—Investment of Valencia—Siege of that Place—Reduction of Peniscola and Gandia—Remarks on Soulth's Operations in the South—Winter Campaign of Wellington in Estremadura—He captures Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajos—Remarks on these Operations—Insurrection in Spanish America—General State of Affairs in Spain—Continuation of the War between Russia and Turkey.

**FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.**—Notwithstanding our success in Aragon and Andalusia, and the retreat of the Anglo-Spaniards under the walls of Lisbón and Cadiz, the position of Europe was far from offering the result which I had hoped from the treaty of Tilsit, and especially from my marriage. While I was seeking to interdict the English commerce from the North Sea and the Baltic, they opened a vast outlet on the American continent, and, by the insurrection of America, inundated the peninsula; they reduced the islands of France and Bourbon, after

a long blockade and a formal attack, which the inhabitants sustained with great glory; they also took possession of Amboin, and even of Batavia. Equally fortunate in the West Indies, they captured Guadeloupe, St. Eustacia, and St. Martins. For more than two years San Domingo had been lost to us, and divided between the black empire of Christophe and Dessalines and the mulatto republic of Pethion and Boyer. Our only possession here was Martinique; all our colonial hopes had long since been destroyed.

On the other hand, my federative system seemed to embrace the whole European continent: I was now connected with Austria by the ties of blood; but she had entered into my system as a power of the first rank, without any alliance, offensive or defensive. My temporary connections with Russia were weakened; Prussia had made at Tilsit only a nominal peace; Spain had escaped from my hands to throw herself into the front rank of my enemies. I ruled on the Vistula, but the country between that river and the Rhine was exasperated against me; the South had risen in mass, and from the North a violent storm had threatened my empire.

**FAULTY RELATIONS WITH PRUSSIA.**—My whole system was defective, because I had alienated Prussia, when I might so easily have attached her to me, and when her geographical position was most advantageous for restoring the kingdom of Poland and paralyzing the power of Austria. Possessing Dantzic and Graudentz on one side, and Schweidnitz and Glatz on the other, Prussia formed the corner-stone on which might have been based all my operations, either against Bohemia or Lithuania. With the aid of Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, and the kingdom of Italy, I might have embraced Austria like a new Anteus, and after having reduced it to the impossibility of injuring me, I might have dictated law to the North. But the fault of 1806 was now irreparable; being placed in a false position towards Frederick William and his nation, without the ability of now gaining their good-will, it was necessary to chain them to my car. The rising generation of Prussia, brought up in the school of adversity, with a liberal, solid, and patriotic education, had imbibed as strong a hatred for the destroyer of the public liberties, as for the conqueror who had destroyed the heritage of the great Frederick. It was not enough that some represented me as a Tarquin to these new Brutuses, and others invoked the names of the first sons of Teuton in favor of Germanic liberty; all the living interests of commerce were raised up against me. I was, ac-

ording to their representations, a new Genghis Khan, who swept over Europe to bind it in chains, without any real utility to France, or advantage to my crown, and against all the interests of other nations. Secret societies, under the title of *Fédérés de la Vertu*, daily made proselytes; and the resistance of Spain encouraged them in their projects to throw off the yoke. If their efforts had failed in 1809, it was only a motive for additional precaution in their future projects. The skillful artificer of this conspiracy was only waiting for a favorable moment to bring it out into action; he was watching for the opportune moment to light up the general conflagration, whose progress and result no one could predict.

#### THE KING PROPOSES AN ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE.

—It was under these circumstances that the King of Prussia proposed to me an alliance offensive and defensive. I eluded giving a direct answer to this offer, which, under other circumstances, I would have accepted with eagerness, because I did not wish to give offense to Prussia by a treaty which could only have had reference to that power; moreover, the alliance would merely have given me Frederick William, for his people would have been none the less hostile to me; in fine, I was quite certain to find the disposition of the King the same when the time should arrive for using this alliance. If the Prussians hated me, I reciprocated their dislike, and instead of wishing to bind myself by a treaty which would have been beneficial to them, I would have been delighted to injure them; for our hatred had arrived at that pitch when reconciliation seemed impossible. All these circumstances prove at least the following truths:

1st. That after the great coalition of 1805, the idea of becoming preponderant in Europe by my federative system was legitimate and natural;

2d. That to succeed in this object, it was necessary to attach to myself, by benefits conferred, a population of twelve or fifteen millions in the north of Europe, and that, in default of Austria, who had been stripped at Campo-Formio, Lunéville, and Presburg of a portion of her territory, Prussia was the only power who could satisfy this condition;

3d. That if the passions which divided us in 1806 have been as fatal to France as to Prussia, and if I initiated this division by my negotiation with Lauderdale in relation to Hanover, it is not the less true that our enmity rose more from the inconsiderate exaltation of the Prussians against me in 1806, than from all other causes;

4th. That after that fatal war, I was never in position to find



*an ally of twelve or fifteen millions of people, who derived their prosperity from me, and was thus irrevocably attached to my cause; and*

5th. That for want of such an auxiliary, I was obliged to connect myself with Austria, although she was far from being attached to me by any benefits which I had conferred on her.

NEW DIFFICULTIES WITH RUSSIA.—In the mean time a storm was beginning to rise in the North. The obligation of maintaining the Continental System led to numerous difficulties with Russia, difficulties which were daily increasing; she was in want of manufactured articles, which, brought over land, were sold at exorbitant prices; while the products of her own soil, being of too bulky a nature to be transported otherwise than by water, encumbered the ports of the empire without finding sale, even at the lowest prices. I, nevertheless, insisted that all which had touched the English soil, or which had submitted to her visit, should be prohibited; in the eyes of the Russians, this rigor was an absurdity, but it was indispensable to the success of the system. There was a moment when the silks of France found their way into London by Archangel and the Frozen Ocean. Afterward, however, the contraband system was regularly organized; I had foreseen this, because the Russian government could not well watch her whole coast, and it was too much interested in allowing contraband to have done so had it been possible; but as it is always easier to pass free ports than those which are closed, the amount of contraband merchandise was less than what would have been introduced through the same ports if they had been free. I, therefore, partly accomplished my object. I, nevertheless, complained to Russia of these violations of the treaty; she justified herself, punished the smugglers, but the smuggling itself was continued. These complaints and rejoinders were mutually calculated to irritate; and it was evident that this state of things could not long continue.

In fact, our relations had not been very amicable since my alliance with Austria. It was evident to Russia, from the moment that this alliance was contracted, that she must either lose her rank and influence in Europe, or fight; she was too powerful to consent to the former, and therefore determined to risk the result of a war. The annexation of Holland and Lübeck, giving me footing on the Baltic, and especially the augmentation of the duchy of Warsaw, were sufficient ostensible causes for declaring war against me.\*

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\*Jomini here combats with much warmth the opinions of Mr. Fain on the causes of the rupture with Russia. As the discussion is repeated at the beginning of the next chapter, the contents of this article have been slightly condensed.

I therefore had good reason to expect the coolness which soon manifested itself in my relations with the Court of St. Petersburg: they refused to prohibit their ports to neutrals loaded with colonial goods for English commerce; they complained, and with justice, of the occupation of Oldenburg; finally, on the thirtieth of December, 1810, they imposed on French commerce a series of prohibitions which put us on about the same footing as the English. It was, therefore, evident that hostilities must ensue between us, for we were both ready for the contest: the affairs of Spain gave me about the same occupation as those of Turkey gave to Russia.

**PROSPECTS OF CLOSING THE WAR IN SPAIN.**—The campaign of 1811 in the peninsula was begun under the most favorable auspices. If the expeditions against Portugal and Cadiz had not entirely attained the object I had proposed, the success of Suchet on the Ebro and of Soult in Andalusia had compensated for this disappointment, which might be only temporary. It was natural to suppose that after having reduced the provinces of the East and South, they would unite all their forces towards Estremadura for the expulsion of the English.

Dissensions continued to exist between the different parties; the proceedings of the Cortes were opposed both by the apostolic junta and by the grandees. The regency, at the head of which was placed the Duke de l'Infantado, did not agree with the projects of the Spanish reformers; and it was possible that in time the dissenters would unite with the party of King Joseph.

**DISSENSIONS BETWEEN JOSEPH AND MY GENERALS.**—Unfortunately, the best understanding did not, at this time, exist between my brother and my generals. Joseph, dissatisfied with seeing his authority daily passing into the hands of my lieutenants, sent me, by the Marquis of Almenara, his formal abdication, if I persisted in making the chiefs of the French army independent of his authority. A party was formed in his favor even in the Cortes, and he deceived himself into the belief that by warmly espousing the interests of the Spaniards he would so increase the number of his partisans as to end the war, and dispense with the further assistance of my troops.

**NAPOLEON ADVISES THE ASSEMBLING OF NEW CORTES AT MADRID.**—I had induced my brother to treat with the Cortes of Cadiz; but from what I had now learned of their composition and debates, I was convinced that they could not long enjoy the consideration of men of reflection, who were really more numerous in Spain than has been supposed. I flattered my-

self with the hope that we might oppose to this collection of fanatics an assembly of intelligent men, whose public deliberations, being circulated throughout the kingdom, might gradually calm the effervescence of the Spaniards, by enlightening them with these solemn debates on the general interests of the nation, and by giving them assurances on the future destiny of the monarchy and my intentions respecting it.

Joseph adopted this advice; but the order for the convocation of this assembly was not transmitted to the provinces till the middle of the following year, the battle of Salamanca having then rendered it illusory.

This delay was not the least error in the administration of my brother: it did not require a whole year to promulgate a decree with the necessary instructions for conducting the elections. It is now impossible to say positively what would have been the result of such an assembly; but I am persuaded that it would have improved our affairs, and accelerated our reconciliation with the Cortes of Cadiz, of which we shall speak hereafter.

**CRITICAL SITUATION OF MASSÉNA.**—Masséna, after having lain five months before the lines of Torres Vedras, and exhausted all the resources of patience, resignation, and obstinacy, saw the critical moment approaching when he must either fight or retreat. His troops had thus far supported themselves by prodigies of industry, activity, and individual bravery; but they had now ravaged the country for fifty leagues round, and there was no further resource; moreover, the soldiers, by being habituated to this organized marauding, had dissolved the bonds of discipline. While this system of subsistence was occupying the attention of our army, Wellington had not once attempted to trouble us, although his forces had been increased in December, by reinforcements from Sicily, England, and Malta, to forty thousand English and forty thousand Portuguese regulars, exclusive of the several corps of *Ordonanzas*, who acted on our rear.\*

In truth, he himself was not without anxiety respecting his provisions, for if the supplies of his own army were abundant,

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\*Jomini says that an English pamphlet published at the time in London estimates the forces of Wellington at forty thousand Anglo-Hanoverians, forty-five thousand regular Portuguese, and thirty-five thousand militia. M. de Montverran estimates the Anglo-Portuguese regulars at one hundred thousand and the militia at fifty thousand. Napier, who is the most reliable authority in this matter, gives the total English and Portuguese cavalry and infantry on the first of October, 1811, at ninety-two thousand, of which over fifty-eight thousand were for duty. The artillery force is not included.



the numerous population of Lisbon, doubled by the forced emigration from the country, suffered much from famine, and could obtain supplies only by sea. England was obliged to provide for these wants, and succeeded by her activity and money. But so considerable was the crowd collected behind the lines of Torres Vedras, that a horrible epidemic broke out during the winter, and carried off, it is said, more than one hundred thousand persons; the deplorable result of the rigor with which the English general had ordered the depopulation of the surrounding country!

**SOULT MARCHES ON BADAJOS AND OLIVENZA.**—The double motive of seconding Masséna by the left bank of the Tagus, and of delivering the armies of Portugal and Andalusia from the important and troublesome influence of the fortifications of Badajoz, had induced me to advise Soult to turn his whole attention in the direction of the Guadiana; he himself felt too deeply interested in repairing the precious time which he had lost to neglect any longer the reduction of this place. After augmenting his reserves (consisting of the ancient division of Dessolles and the cavalry division of Latour-Maubourg) with all possible reinforcements, he directed it with Mortier's corps on Olivenza, leaving Sébastiani to observe the army of Murcia and Gibraltar, and Victor to continue the blockade of Cadiz, watch Tarifa, and guard Seville.

The corps of Ballesteros and Mendizabal, being too weak to hold out against the twenty thousand troops which Soult was bringing against them, took refuge in the mountains; the latter imprudently threw four thousand men into Olivenza, without provisions; and when attacked by Soult, the garrison, in less than ten days (January 22d) were compelled to lay down their arms. The siege-equipage having in the mean time arrived from Seville, it was immediately directed against Badajoz.

**SIEGE OF BADAJOS.**—This city was then, by its position, the most important place of arms in the theater of the war; it served as the principal arsenal of the Spaniards in Estremadura, and the base of all the enterprises of the combined forces against the center of the monarchy; it contained a garrison of ten thousand men under the orders of the brave Manecho, who was determined to resist whatever efforts the French might direct against him. Mortier was charged with the investment of the place; while they pressed, with great activity, the arrival of the enormous equipage indispensable for beginning the siege. Romana, who had joined Wellington on the Tagus, on hearing the danger which threatened his lieutenants on the Guadiana, was about

marching to their succor, when he died at Cartaxo, the twenty-third of January, from apoplexy. Mendizabal, who was appointed to succeed him, advanced at the head of ten thousand men to deliver Badajos.

Soult's position now became embarrassing. While all his convoys of provisions and munitions were coming from Seville across the rough and inhospitable country of the Sierra-d'Arroche, he was forced to send out detachments to protect its arrival and reconnoiter on his flanks, so that he had only fifteen thousand combatants left to form and cover the siege. The Spaniards, emboldened by the arrival of reinforcements which increased their numbers to more than twenty thousand men, made a general sortie against the trenches. After a temporary success, they were forced to retire again within the place. Fearful of exhausting the magazines of the garrison, and perhaps of being invested if he remained in the city, Mendizabal determined to encamp on the right bank of the Guadiana, behind the Gehora, three hundred toises from Fort San Christoval. Soult immediately conceived the audacious project of passing the Guadiana in two columns, on the night of the nineteenth of February, so as to crush the right flank of the enemy, which rested on the fort, and to turn the opposite wing with three thousand horse under General Latour-Maubourg. These dispositions were executed with rare accuracy and crowned with complete success. Girard's division assailed the right of the Spaniards, and precipitated them into the half-ruined lines of Berwick; it thus cut off all retreat on the *tête-de-pont*, while Latour-Maubourg turned their left and took the line in reverse. Mendizabal escaped to Elvas with only a thousand men; as many more fell on the field of battle, and eight thousand were taken prisoners.

Governor Monecho, instead of being discouraged by this disaster, prepared to imitate the example of Saragossa and Gerona; but he was killed some days after on the rampart where he was directing a sortie, and his successor, being in want of provisions, or perhaps being of a less determined character, capitulated the eleventh of March with a garrison of nine thousand men.

REMARKS ON THE OPERATIONS OF SOULT.—Thus, in less than two months, Soult had destroyed or captured more of the enemy than he himself had combatants on his departure from Seville, and had reduced two important places. The departure of Masséna from Portugal at the very time that Badajos fell did not allow him to reap the fruits of this success; and some hypercritics have taken occasion to blame the time consumed in a reg-

ular attack of that place. They pretend that Soult should have marched on Abrantès, without stopping to take a city which, a year later, he did not hesitate to leave behind him. The reproach is more specious than just. It is true that Masséna, thus seconded, might have crossed the Tagus, and avoided a difficult retreat, have threatened Lisbon from the heights of Almada, have subsisted his troops some months in Alemtejo, and fought Wellington with advantage, if he had presented himself. But was this project without its dangers? If Wellington, ascending the right bank of the Tagus, had destroyed our bridge-equipages, would he not have maneuvered at his ease into the heart of Castile, and destroyed all our establishments at the north of Sierra Morena? Against whom could the united forces of Masséna and Soult have been employed? Of what use had been this imposing union on the plains of Evora? Would they not have been under the necessity of marching in all haste to the succor of Joseph, Madrid, and Castile, as in 1812? Moreover, Soult, having left two of his corps in Andalusia, could not penetrate with the third alone into the midst of the whole army of Wellington and Romana, leaving behind him garrisons as numerous as his own *corps-d'armée*.

It is true that after the surrender of Olivenza on the twenty-second of January, with four thousand men, it was possible to march direct by Jurumenha to Abrantes, but what would have been the result? Would he not have been crushed by the superior forces of Hill and Romana, who were certain of being sustained, if necessary, by Wellington's *corps-de-bataille*? No movement could have been better, if Soult had had his whole fifty thousand men, and felt certain that his march would have induced Wellington to leave the right bank of the Tagus and the lines of Torres Vedras, and receive a decisive battle in Alemtejo against the two French armies united. But was such a step at all probable, considering the character and manifest interest of the English general? Soult did much better to reduce Badajos than to run off on such Quixotic adventures.

It was in the beginning of 1810, and not at this period, that a concentrated movement of the two should have been made to bombard Lisbon, and attack the enemy before the completion of the lines of Torres Vedras and of the defensive system of Wellington.

In March, 1811, things had changed: it no longer appeared reasonable to evacuate the lines of Cadiz, abandon three hundred pieces of cannon, and give up Seville, Grenada, Cordova, and Malaga to the regency, in order to march into Alemtejo, without the



slightest hope of bringing Wellington to a decisive battle. To leave an enemy, equal in numbers, master of the right bank of the Tagus, and, in a considerable degree, on our line of retreat, would have been a hazardous maneuver in an ordinary war, with a neutral population, but in a national war, where a vast kingdom was to be reduced, the operation was the more rash, as it would have required the evacuation of a considerable portion of the conquered country.

**ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE SIEGE OF CADIZ.**—The events which actually occurred in the early part of March prove the correctness of these views and the extent of the obstacles which we would have encountered. Hardly had Soult reached Badajos when he heard that Victor and the first corps were seriously assailed before Cadiz. Generals Graham, La Pena, and Zayas, wishing to profit by the departure of Soult for Estremadura, thought to raise the siege of Cadiz by landing at Tarifa and taking our lines in reverse. Ten thousand Spaniards and six thousand English were thus to act in concert with a sortie of six or seven thousand men from the island of Leon, while Ballesteros, crossing the Rio Tinto at Niebla, threatened Seville.

**AFFAIR OF CHICLANA.**—After a fatiguing march, the troops of Graham and La Pena left Conil, on the morning of the fifth of March, directing themselves along the coast on the heights of Chiclana. Victor, forced to leave Villatte with two thousand men to guard his lines, had thought it prudent to also establish some battalions at Medina Sidonia, for reconnoitering, in the direction of Gibraltar, so that he could unite only seven thousand men under Ruffin and Leval. With this handful of men, he had no other course than to fall on the enemy's right and rear, and drive them into the sea, by cutting them off from the heights of Barrosa, where he threw the brigade of Ruffin. General Graham saw the danger to which he was exposed, and attacked with impetuosity the French columns, which, astonished at so much vigor, fell back. General Leval, charged with the double task of sustaining Ruffin and maintaining his communications with Villatte, could not join in the engagement till his colleague had been mortally wounded and his troops driven back; he fought in an olive wood with firmness, and retired in good order to the heights of Chiclana. Thinking that Villatte might be surrounded before Cadiz, Victor ordered him to join the main body, thus leaving the enemy at liberty to open his communications with the island of Leon.

During this time the main body of La Pena's forces had re-

mained near the town of Barmeja, undecided whether to advance on the canal of Santi Petri, or to return to the support of Graham. Zayas, on his side, favored by the squadron of Admiral Keith, had landed near Puerto-Real and Santa Maria, and gained possession of a redoubt, without any other result. The combat did much honor to the English general and his infantry; but it must be confessed that the English, sustained by one Spanish brigade, had more battalions engaged on the decisive point than the French, the troops of Ruffin and Leval not being both engaged at the same time.

**RETREAT OF THE ALLIES.**—The position of Victor was a critical one; he was hesitating whether to retreat on Seville or to give battle with his united forces behind Puerto-Real, when his reconnoitering parties announced that the enemy was retiring into the island of Leon. An impenetrable mystery still covers the action of Graham. It is true that his infantry had suffered cruelly and had reason to complain of La Pena for not having joined him and completed the victory; on the other side, Sébastiani, on hearing of his debarkation, had assembled troops on the Guadiaro, and might restore the chances in favor of the French. Nevertheless, the English general was victorious, and, on the sixth and seventh, might have brought La Pena into action before the arrival of Sébastiani; it is therefore impossible to conceive the motive of his retreat.\*

**SOULT MARCHES TO THE SUPPORT OF VICTOR.**—Sout, on hearing at Badajos the first result of this contest, left to Mortier the care of reducing Campo-Mayor and Albuquerque, and took, in haste, the road to Seville, with some battalions of the reserve. He there learned at the same time the danger of his lieutenant and his fortunate escape; and also that Darricaud had arrested Ballesteros at Niebla. Nevertheless, the arrival of the general-in-chief at Seville was not useless; for a few days afterward, the Spanish government, not discouraged by the ill-success of this enterprise, again pushed forward the corps of Lardizabal and Ballesteros to the capital of Andalusia; General Maranzin forced the first to reëmbark at Moguer, and afterward completely defeated the second at Frenejal, on the twelfth of April.

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\*Jomini's remarks on this battle are based on the supposition that Graham was in chief command, and that La Pena was subject to his orders. On the contrary, La Pena was the ranking officer, and Graham had consented to obey his orders. The conduct of the Spanish general on this occasion was highly censurable. For a full account of these operations, the reader is referred to Napier, who entirely exculpates Graham. He calls it the battle of Barosa.

In the mean time a more threatening storm was rising in the direction of Badajos. Mortier, after the reduction of Campo-Mayor and Albuquerque, was expecting to quietly enjoy his conquests, when he heard of Masséna's retreat from Portugal, and the approach of a considerable portion of Wellington's army.

**MASSÉNA EVACUATES PÓRTUGAL.**—Masséna, whose critical position we have already described, had but two courses from which to choose—to see his army perish by famine and the arms of the Anglo-Portuguese, or to resign himself to the humiliation of a voluntary retreat. This retreat was rendered difficult from the nature of the country, the general insurrection of the inhabitants, the absolute destitution of his army, and the numerical superiority of the enemy. Masséna might direct his retreat by Coimbra, by the valley of the Zezere on Sabugal, or by that of Castel-Franco. He had also the means of floating his bridge-equipage down the Zezere into the Tagus, of crossing this river, and of marching by Portalegre on Badajos. He had been advised to this last course, but the fear that Hill might dispute the passage of the Tagus had deterred him from it. He had not time to attempt the operation, for, if unsuccessful, he would have exposed his army. The road by Castel-Franco was too difficult, and, moreover, ran across a sterile country. Masséna decided to take the same road by which he had advanced, fearing that those by Sabugal and Castel-Franco might not offer the same facilities for his *matériel*.

Thus far the conduct of Masséna had been without reproach; he had shown all the tenacity which formed so prominent a trait of his character; but he suddenly seemed to act without any well-digested project. The Coimbra road, running at first from south to north and inclining to the east along the Mondego, forms a right-angled triangle, of which the road from Espinhal to Ponte-Murcella by the slope of the Estrella mountains is the hypothenuse. This cross-road was, therefore, much shorter than the grand route, and we might have been anticipated on the Alva if it had been left uncovered. The *corps-de-bataille* and the *matériel* took the Coimbra road, while the rear guard followed this cross-road. The second corps, under Reynier, was directed by this route.

Masséna remained at Pombal, either to impose on the enemy, or with the design of really accepting battle; the fault of this delay is, however, attributed to his lieutenants, who asked for more time to rally their troops and equipages and regulate the order of their movement; in the mean time the enemy maneuvered by his right to precede him on the Ceira. To this first *contre-*



*temps* was soon added a second. On hearing that the English had reinforced the garrison of Coimbra, and were marching in that direction another corps which had been landed at Figueras, and not venturing to risk an attack on that city with an enemy close on his rear, Massena decided to turn aside by Miranda-del-Corvo. This information was false, and there is every reason to believe that he might easily have forced Coimbra. This fatal resolution tended to break the *morale* of his troops, and to introduce disorder in their movements. Forced to return toward the enemy, he was near being anticipated on the Ceira and seriously cut to pieces at Foz-d'Aronce, where a panic terror got possession of the best regiments of his rear guard. The firmness of Ney at the head of the rear brigade saved the army from total rout. Thus closely pressed, he finally reached the sources of the Mondego, but in a situation truly deplorable. The stragglers who fell into the hands of the English inspired them with respect for the heroic firmness of their adversaries, by showing the condition to which famine had reduced them.

On reaching Celorico, Massena resolved to retire on Guarda; the hope of maintaining himself in this intermediate position by the aid of the troops with which Soult and Joseph might act between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and the advantage of putting himself into more immediate contact with Madrid and Seville, militated strangely in favor of this project. But Ney flatly refused to comply, directing the march of his own army on Almeida, where he could more easily find shelter, provisions, and time to reorganize his troops. The general-in-chief, irritated by a refusal which compromised his authority, deemed it his duty to order that marshal to leave the army, in order to reestablish subordination by an example of severity against one of his highest officers.

Wellington closely pursued the army in the new direction which it had taken; after a warm combat near Sabugal between the enemy and Reynier's corps, this army decided to regain Ciudad-Rodrigo, both to avoid disastrous engagements, and to put an end to the frightful want of provisions from which they were still suffering. Massena afterward retired to Salamanca, the better to accomplish this object and recover his troops from their fatigues.

**BATTLE OF FUENTE-DI-HONORE.**—This new retreat proved that Ney was right in opinion, though censurable for the manner of his conduct. By the circuit which our army had taken, so much time was lost that the enemy had preceded us to Almeida, and immediately invested the place, which had been dis

mantled during Masséna's operations before Lisbon, and which we had not been able to occupy since his retreat. The brave General Brenier commanded here; but being unexpectedly invested, he was without a supply of provisions: the place must now be revictualled or lost. Masséna, who had found in Estremadura some reinforcements for his regiments, and a fine cavalry division of my guard, finally determined to advance to its relief, with the apparent resolution of revenging his affront. Wellington placed himself in advance of the Coa to cover the siege. This river, which is a considerable stream, runs through a deep ravine with high and very steep banks. With such a ravine in his rear, the position of the English general, though advantageous by the difficulties in front, would have become fatal in case of a reverse. His left, composed of two divisions, was lodged in the ruins of Concepcion, which place had been captured; the center, composed of a single English division, held the plateau of Almeida; the main body, composed of three strong divisions, occupied the plateau of Fuente-di-Honore. A Spanish corps covered the right flank at Naval-di-Avar, near the head of the ravine of Duas Casas, where the heights, being less elevated and less steep, offered a more easy access. Loison, who had taken the command of Ney's corps, burning to wipe off the disgrace of a retreat, unhesitatingly ordered the attack on the third of May. He had only reconnoitered the position of the English directly in his front, and made his attack on this point, as if he feared they might escape him if he delayed to maneuver. In a word, he took the bull by the horns, without waiting for Masséna's orders.

The sixth corps succeeded in carrying the lower part of Fuente-di-Honore; but three English divisions, formed in rear of the village on a slope which was difficult of access, and defended by fifty pieces of cannon, repelled all their efforts against the upper post. As at Busaco, they fought against the main body of the English forces in close column, and were exposed to the fire of the enemy's whole line, without the slightest result. Masséna, after reconnoitering the enemy's position, directed different dispositions for the following day; he ordered the sixth corps to the left, to fall on Naval-di-Avar, and force the English right in concert with the cavalry of Montbrun and the guard; while the ninth corps attacked Fuente-di-Honore, and the second corps, under Reynier, held in check the enemy's left from Almeida to Concepcion.

Although these dispositions were defective, inasmuch as too many forces were employed in observation, and the flank move-

ment to our left was executed in full view of the enemy, they were nevertheless crowned with success. The sixth corps carried Posabella, drove back the enemy's flankers, and forced the Spanish corps into an eccentric retreat: Montbrun overthrew the Anglo-Portuguese cavalry, and hotly pursued it to a distance from the line. The seventh English division at the center, which had marched parallel to our left, seeing its first brigade driven back, held fast with the second, which had distinguished itself by its immovable firmness. It required but one more effort to drive back the enemy's left on the ravine of the Coa. The soldiers of the sixth corps were the same who three years before had precipitated themselves into Friedland against adversaries more numerous and not less formidable. A charge like that which Ney executed on Bagration's corps in 1807 would inevitably have destroyed the army of Wellington; but Ney no longer commanded these men, and they were no longer animated by his presence. Instead of falling on the half-beaten enemy, our left halted, and the chiefs hesitated how to act: Massena, who remained at the center, was absent from the decisive point; the Spaniards had time to rejoin Wellington's right by a detour; the English reserve came to the support of this wing, which formed *en potence*, and presented a front of iron at a point where the plateau forms a defile difficult of access in front. The favorable moment had now escaped; and Masséna, who, instead of supporting his left, had made vain efforts to carry Fuente-di-Honore at the center, came to this point too late, and saw himself forced to renounce his project.

Although Masséna had committed a real fault in not himself taking the direction of the wing which was to strike the decisive blow, it must be confessed that fortune was against him in this battle; General Loison, who commanded the sixth corps, was to be replaced by Marmont, and recalled to Paris; he was aware of this, and did not display the same zeal which he had exhibited on a hundred other occasions. The ninth corps, which attacked Fuente-di-Honore, was going to join the army of Andalusia, of which it formed a part; finally, the dispute between Ney and Masséna had rendered the latter unpopular with the soldiers; there was neither unity nor enthusiasm in their attacks.\*

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\*Napier says: "Both sides claimed the victory. The French, because they won the passage at Poco Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank, obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced Lord Wellington to relinquish three miles of ground, and to change his front. The English, because the village of Fuentes so often attacked, was successfully defended,



**MASSÉNA RETIRES TO SALAMANCA.**—The Prince of Essling disliked to return to Salamanca and sacrifice the brave garrison of Almeida. A few brave men offered to penetrate into the place; one of these succeeded in passing the English and Spanish lines amidst a shower of bullets, and gaining the ditches of the fort. He took an order to Brenier to attempt to cut his way through. Having completed the preparations for blowing up the place, the garrison set fire to the trains of the mines which were to destroy the ramparts, and, taking advantage of the darkness, threw themselves upon the least guarded point of the camp of the besiegers; placed between the bayonets of the enemy and a volcano ready to explode in his rear, Brenier directed his movements so well as to drive everything before him and reach the Coa at the very moment that a *corps-d'armée* had advanced to receive him. He effected his junction amidst the acclamations of the army. This feat of arms, not less glorious than a victory, deserves to be recorded on the pages of history.

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and because the principal object (the covering the blockade of Almeida) was attained.

"Certain it is, that Masséna at first gained great advantages. Napoleon would have made them fatal! but it is also certain that, with an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to that arm, the Prince of Essling having, as it were, indicated all the errors of the English general's position, stopped short at the very moment when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been attributed to extreme negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont; but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his army had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would not charge at his order, Junot did not second him cordially, Loison disregarded his instructions, Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight, and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of battle was shaken, and would not work.

"General Pelet censures Lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry against Reynier after the second position was taken up. He asserts that any danger, on that side, would have forced the French to retreat. This criticism is, however, unsustainable, being based on the notion that the Allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas, including Sanchez Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It may be, with more justice, objected to Masséna, that he did not launch some of his numerous horsemen, by the bridge of Secerías, or Sabugal, against Guarda and Celorico, to destroy the magazines, cut the communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport belonging to the allied army. The vice of the English general's position would then have been clearly exposed, for, although the second regiment of German hussars was on the march from Lisbon, it had not passed Coimbra at this period, and could not have protected the *dépôts*. But it can never be too often repeated that war, however adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly a series of errors and accidents. All the operations, on both sides, for six weeks, furnished illustrations of this truth."

REMARKS ON MASSÉNA'S RETREAT.—Although Masséna's retreat from Portugal had been attended with some sad results, it is certain that these might have been worse. If it had been delayed two days longer, it might have resulted in the entire ruin of his army.\* Its most injurious effect was the reaction produced on the public mind of the Spaniards; the approach of Wellington relighted the flames of insurrection. The guerrillas of Porlier, Mina, Empécinado, Longa, etc., kept our troops continually on the alert, carried off our best escorted convoys, and spread terror amongst the inhabitants of the cities which were most disposed to give in their submission. Nevertheless, the armed regulars of the Cortes, which were recruited with great difficulty, were neither more formidable nor more disciplined; they were bands of soldiers without experience; and I would still have had the means of overcoming these obstacles if my relations with Russia had allowed me to direct all the efforts of my empire against Wellington, and expel him from his last refuge.

BERESFORD THREATENS BADAJOS.—The English general, when he had heard of the fall of Badajos, and the subsequent disasters of the Spaniards, and was convinced that Masséna would return to Estremadura without giving battle, determined to turn his attention to Soult. For this purpose he had detached General Beresford with three divisions of Anglo-Portuguese, which left the main army at the heights of Villa-Velha, and, on the twentieth of March, directed themselves by Portalegro on Elvas. His vanguard reached Campo-Mayor on the twenty-third of March, at the very time that Mortier had directed the evacuation and dismantling of the place. Latour-Maubourg had not time to complete this operation, and with difficulty saved his convoy. Mortier, who had some days before been recalled to France, now resigned the command of the fifth corps to this general; the circumstances were critical, and there seemed but one course to pursue—to throw a garrison into Badajos and march toward Seville for reinforcements. Accordingly, Latour-Maubourg left a garrison of two thousand five hundred men in

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\*Napier says: "Masséna entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men, his reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand, and he repossessed the frontier with forty-five thousand; hence the invasion of Portugal cost him about thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand were lost during the retreat; but had Lord Wellington, unrestrained by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda-de-Corvo, half the French army would have been lost. It is unquestionable that a retreating army should fight as little as possible."

Badajos, and a detachment of four hundred in Olivenza to attract the enemy's attention toward this paltry town, while, with the remaining nine thousand combatants, he retired in good order on Llerena.

**HE CAPTURES OLIVENZA AND LAYS SIEGE TO BADAJOS.**—On learning his superiority over his adversaries, Beresford formed a junction with the troops of Castafios and Ballesteros, and decided to cross the Guadiana. He left an entire division to act against Olivenza, directed another against Badajos, and pursued the fifth corps with eighteen thousand men on Zafra, Usagre, and Fuente-de-Cantos, but soon returned toward Elvas, when the fall of Olivenza gave him the means of continuing the offensive, or of directing his efforts against Badajos. Wellington came in person to preside at this siege; having reconnoitered the place with his lieutenant, he directed its investment, which, after a delay of some days from rains, took place on the third of May. Having assisted at the opening of the trenches, he departed on the seventh for his army, which was still opposed to Masséna on the Agueda.

**SOULT COMES TO THE SUCCOR OF THAT PLACE.**—Soul, on his side, was too much disquieted by these events to remain inactive; but to succor Badajos required an army of at least thirty thousand men, and to collect this number of troops required the evacuation of his important positions in Andalusia. To present himself, on the contrary, with inferior forces on the Guadiana, was to release at the same time Badajos, Seville, and Grenada. Soul did everything in his power to avoid these two dangers. He succeeded in forming two strong brigades of Sebastiani's corps, from the different commands in the interior and the reserve. Immediately after the union of these forces and the necessary *matériel*, he left Seville on the tenth of May, and having joined General Latour-Maubourg at Fuente-de-Cantos on the thirteenth, he presented himself at Santa Maria on the fifteenth, within six leagues of Badajos, at the head of eighteen thousand foot and five thousand horse.

**BATTLE OF ALBUERA.**—Although the enemy's forces was reported at thirty-six thousand, Soul did not believe that he would give battle before the arrival of a reinforcement of ten thousand Spaniards, which Blake was to bring from Murcia by the mouth of the Guadiana. Soul, however, afterward learned that this junction had just taken place, and in reconnoitering he found the Anglo-Spaniards drawn up on the plateau of Albu-



era; having examined their position, the marshal did not hesitate to make the attack.

There was every reason for this resolution; he could not expect any further reinforcements without raising the blockade of Oadiz, and withdrawing all his forces from Andalusia; whereas he supposed that the enemy were still waiting for the junction of ten thousand Spanish troops. Moreover, Badajos was not well supplied with provisions, and the sooner he raised the blockade the less liable would he be to lose the place and the garrison. The enemy's left was supported on the village of Albuera, the right and center being prolonged on a chain of heights which were steep on the side toward the French, but of a gentle slope on the opposite side. This local advantage was more than counterbalanced by a serious fault of position, the line of battle being formed on the prolongation of the road to Olivenza, which was Beresford's only line of retreat in case of defeat. The least success on the enemy's right wing would be decisive, and necessarily secure the loss of the left and center, which would be thrown back on Badajos. It is true that the English had thrown temporary bridges across the river near this place; but in case of our success the garrison, with the aid of the army, would be most likely to render the passage disastrous.

Soult's plan of attack was to make a feint by his right against the village of Albuera, on the morning of the sixteenth, in order to draw the attention of Beresford on this point, at the moment when the mass of our forces were falling on the right of the English and carrying their line of retreat. The plan was skillfully formed, but, unfortunately, it failed in the execution. Godinot debouched against Albuera too late to attract the attention of the English, while the principal attack moved with too much precipitation; for Godinot had hardly reached this village when Girard crossed the rivulet with the fifth corps, and precipitated himself at the head of his two divisions in deep columns on the right of Beresford.

The first line of the English yielded to this vigorous effort; but being soon sustained by three brigades of reserve, it opposed a murderous fire of musketry to our columns, to which only the first battalion of each column could reply. The same cause which had proved fatal at Vimiera, Busaco, and Fuente-di-Honore was still more disastrous on this occasion. The troops of Girard fought with the utmost bravery under the direction of this valiant officer; but it was in vain that Brayer, Maransin, and the chief-of-staff—the impassible Gazan—were wounded at the head of their brave men; nothing could counterbalance the effect

of a false position; disorder already began to make its appearance. Girard now attempted to deploy his columns under the enemy's fire of grape and ball; the movement could only be effected by the flank, thus exposing our men to the concentric fire of the English musketry and cannon. Our two massive columns experience the same fate as the famous Anglo-Hanoverian column of Fontenoy; the different regiments become mingled together, and soon form a confused mass; retreat is now attempted; but the difficulties of recrossing the stream which they had passed in the morning render the disorder complete. Fortunately, Soult brings up the reserve in time to sustain the combat and arrest the success of the enemy. This circumstance relieves our troops for a moment, but does not restore victory. This brigade, drawn away by the *débris* of Girard, and partially broken by the enemy's fire, and discouraged by the death of its chief, General Werlé, also beats a retreat, which, however, is conducted in better order. The French artillery, concentrated on this point, was now unmasked, and by its admirable conduct arrested the advance of the English, by sowing death in their ranks. Godinot still held fast in the village of Albuera, but this was a secondary point and its occupation no longer of any use. Two hours after the engagement commenced, the victory was decided, and Soult led back the wreck of his army into the position which it had occupied in the morning.

This murderous combat, costing us one-third of the troops engaged—that is, a loss of six thousand men out of twenty thousand combatants—ought to have decided for ever the superiority of infantry deployed in line and well-practiced in firing, over troops drawn up in very deep columns. But failing to profit by experience, we afterwards made still further proof of this truth. After such a check, the only course left for Soult to pursue was to approach Seville, and rally on him all his disposable troops.

After an unfortunate cavalry combat at Usagre, brought about by the ill-directed impetuosity of General Bron, Soult took up his position at Llerena.\*

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\*Napier's criticism on the battle of Albuera is worthy the attention of the military reader. We give the following extract:

"No general ever gained a great battle with so little increase of military reputation as Marshal Beresford. His personal intrepidity and strength, qualities so attractive for the multitude, were conspicuously displayed, yet the breath of his own army withered his laurels, and his triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who followed his car. Their censures have been reiterated, without change and without abatement, even to this hour; and a close examination of his operations, while it detects



**NAPOLEON DIRECTS THE JUNCTION OF SOULT AND MARMONT.**—But seeing the inefficiency of Soult's measures to restore matters, I myself directed my attention to the application of more efficacious remedies. As soon as I heard of these events, I directed the march of the ninth corps, composed of the fourth battalions of each division of Soult's army, and which had gone to the assistance of Masséna in Portugal. This corps, reduced to eight thousand men, succeeded in gaining the camp of Llerena, and in supplying the losses in Soult's army. But this reinforcement was not sufficient; I therefore directed Marmont, who had just succeeded Masséna in the command of the army of Portugal, to maneuver by his left on the Tagus, so as to connect himself more intimately with Soult, and to operate in concert with him for the relief of Badajos.

**WELLINGTON RENEWS THE SIEGE OF BADAJOS.**—Wellington, on his side, deemed it necessary, notwithstanding

many ill-founded objections, and others tainted with malice, leaves little doubt that the general feeling was right.

"When he had passed the Guardiana, and driven the fifth corps upon Guadalcanal, the delay that intervened, before he invested Badajos, was unjustly attributed to him; it was Lord Wellington's order, resulting from the tardiness of the Spanish generals, that paralyzed his operations.

"But when the time for action arrived, the want of concert in the investment and the ill-matured attack on San Christoval belonged to Beresford's arrangements; and he is especially responsible in reputation for the latter, because Captain Squire earnestly warned him of the inevitable result, and his words were unheeded.

"During the progress of the siege, either the want of correct intelligence or a blunted judgment misled the marshal. It was remarked that, at all times, he too readily believed the idle tales of distress and difficulties in the French armies, with which the spies generally, and the deserters always, interlarded their information; thus he was incredulous of Soult's enterprise, and that officer was actually over the Morena before the orders were given to commence the main attack of the Castle of Badajos. However, the firmness with which Beresford resisted the importunities of the engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and orderly removal of the stores and battering-train, were alike remarkable and praiseworthy. It would have been happy if he had shown as much magnanimity in what followed.

"When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, the alternative of fighting or retiring behind the Guadiana was the subject of consideration. The Spanish generals were both in favor of giving battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he had arrived, without danger of having his march intercepted, was particularly earnest to fight, affirming that his troops, who were already in a miserable state would disperse entirely if they were obliged to enter Portugal. Castaños was of the same opinion. Beresford also argued that it was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, and ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura; that a retreat would endanger Elvas, lay open the Alentejo, and encourage the enemy to push



the success of Beresford at Albuera, to march with the main body of his army on the Guadiana, leaving General Spencer with eighteen thousand Anglo-Portuguese in observation near Sabugal. This resolution, influenced by the importance of Badajos and the probability that Soult would collect the army of Andalusia to revenge the check he had suffered, merits the approbation of all judges of military operations.

All the preparations being completed, and the parallel opened, on the second of June, the siege of Badajos was pushed with all possible vigor. The English established their batteries on a rock, and for want of earth they used sacks of wool for forming the epaulements of their works—an operation of rare occurrence in the history of sieges.\* The siege of Badajos is also remarkable for furnishing full proof of the superiority of iron cannon over those of brass, the latter becoming sooner heated, and consequently not sustaining so rapid and continuous a fire. The intrepid Philippon defended the place with valor and intelligence; while the siege was pressed with no less energy by Wellington. Impatient at the slow progress of the siege, and learning the movements of our troops preparatory to the relief of the place, the English general directed an assault to be made on Fort

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his incursions further, which he could safely do, having such a fortress as Badajos with its bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear. A battle must then be fought in the Alemejo, with fewer troops and after a dispiriting retreat; there was also a greater scarcity of food in the Portuguese than in the Spanish province; and finally, as the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might again rise before the stores were carried over, when the latter must be abandoned, or the army endangered to protect their passage.

“But these plausible reasons were but a mask. The true cause why the English general adopted Blake’s proposals was the impatient temper of the British troops. None of them had been engaged in the late battles under Lord Wellington. At Busaco the regiments of the fourth division were idle spectators on the left, as those of the second division were on the right, while the action was in the center. During Masséna’s retreat they had not been employed under fire, and the combats of Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been fought without them. Thus a burning thirst for battle was general, and Beresford had not the art either of conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a very violent and unjust clamor would have been raised against him, and this was so strongly and unceremoniously represented to him, by an officer on his own staff, that he gave way. These are what may be termed the moral obstacles of war. Such men as Lord Wellington or Sir John Moore can stride over them, but to second-rate minds they are insuperable. Practice and study may make a good general as far as the handling of troops and the designing of a campaign, but that ascendancy of spirit which leads the wise, and controls the insolence of folly, is a rare gift of Nature.”

\*The use of bales of cotton at New Orleans by General Jackson is a parallel case.

San Christoval, which is situated on an eminence on the right of the Guadiana; but the attack was repelled with a considerable and useless loss of life on the part of the assailants.

**HE IS AGAIN FORCED TO RETIRE INTO PORTUGAL.**  
 —Marmont had but just relieved Masséna in the command of the army of Portugal, after the battle of Fuente-di-Honore, when he received orders to unite with Soult for the succor of Badajos. On hearing that Wellington had moved in that direction, leaving behind him only the corps of Spencer, Marmont marched with two divisions on the upper valley of the Coa to reprovision Ciudad-Rodrigo, and mask the movement which the rest of the army was executing at the same time by Plasencia on Almaraz. This marshal soon took the same road and advanced on Merida, while Soult, hearing of this movement, left Llerena and moved toward Almen-dralejo, in order to open the communication. This important junction was effected on the seventeenth of June, and the two armies, numbering from fifty-five to sixty thousand combatants, advanced against the enemy. But Wellington, *always anxious to hazard nothing, had raised the siege of Badajos on the night of the sixteenth* (after having vainly attempted a second assault on the side of the citadel), and retired into Portugal by Olivenza and Campo-Mayor.

It would, of course, have been imprudent for Wellington to remain at Albuera while Marmont was advancing from Albuquerque on Badajos; but it is difficult to conceive a reason why the English general did not throw himself by Campo-Mayor on Albuquerque against Marmont, in concert with Spencer, who had advanced from Almeida parallel with the Duke of Ragusa. If Wellington had maneuvered as I did at Castiglione, he would have successively beaten Marmont and Soult, as I did Wurmser and Quasdanowich. Badajos would, perhaps, have been succored as Mantua was in 1796, but victory would soon have re-established the Allies within its walls.

**OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH IN ANDALUSIA.**—Soult's withdrawal of the mass of his forces from Andalusia, in order to maintain himself at Llerena after the defeat of Albuera, had decided the Spanish generals to attempt to crush our scattered detachments and reconquer that province. Cadiz, Seville, and Grenada were the first objects of their attention. Encouraged by the success of Albuera, Blake descended on the lower Guadiana, near Moguer, and attempted to carry the post of Niebla, which covered the passage of the Rio Tinto and Seville; but the noble defense of a Swiss battalion defeated all his efforts. Bal-



lesteros at the same time maneuvered on the left of the Guadalquivir, and threw himself into the mountains of Ronda, to raise these ferocious mountaineers, and cut off all communication between Seville and Grenada; a multitude of partisans soon inundated the environs of Seville and were reinforced by all the malcontents of the province. General Darricaud took refuge in a monastery, and found himself blockaded in the capital. Sébastiani's corps had been reduced, by the troops sent to the succor of Badajos, to seven or eight thousand men, who were scattered in Malaga, Grenada, and Jaen; so that instead of being able to march to the relief of Darricaud, he found himself shut up in Grenada by a multitude of insurgents, who were sustained by troops from the army of Murcia or from Ballesteros.

**THEY ARE DEFEATED BY SOULT.**—The junction of our armies, and Wellington's retreat into Portugal, changed the face of affairs in Andalusia. Soult now hastened to carry his reserve, under Godinot and Latour-Maubourg, to the assistance of his cantonments. Blake, after his unsuccessful attempt at the escalade of Niebla, menaced by the return of our forces, reëmbarked at Ayamonte for Cadiz; Ballesteros took refuge in the mountains of Ronda. Having thus delivered Seville, Soult had now to succor Sébastiani's corps, which was exposed to a threatening storm near Grenada. The regency of Cadiz, without being discouraged at their unsuccessful efforts against Soult's right, directed Blake, in concert with the corps of Murcia, to make a similar attempt against the left. Having formed a junction with the corps of Murcia at Baza, Blake now found himself at the head of eighteen or twenty thousand good troops. Soult marched against him by Guadix, and encountered him at the Venta-de-Bahul, in a position apparently impregnable. The marshal was to approach him in front with the fourth corps and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg, while that of Godinot, coming from Jaen by Meda, would take him in reverse. The attack took place on the 9th of August; but Godinot, instead of imitating the example of Ney at Friedland and Richepanse at Hohenlinden, feared to throw himself in the midst of the enemy, and moved round by Baza. Blake now perceived his danger and hastened to retreat on Lorca, hotly pursued by Soult. Having returned to Seville, the marshal directed his attention to Gibraltar, where Ballesteros was threatening our communications with the blockading corps of Cadiz. Godinot, who had been detached against him, drove him back on the camp of St. Roque. On the approach of three brigades of Soult, Ballesteros evacuated this position



and took refuge under the cannon of Gibraltar. The enemy now landed at Tarifa to disengage Ballesteros. Godinot marched against this city, but after a useless loss of many brave men, he fell back again on Seville; where, being warmly blamed by Soult, he committed suicide. Ballesteros returned to St. Roque and resumed the offensive; but Leval soon forced him to again seek refuge under the fire of the English at Gibraltar. As the enemy from his position at Tarifa continued to threaten our corps at Cadiz and our cantonments from Gibraltar to the Guadiaro and Ronda, Laval received orders to reduce that place. He arrived there with some siege pieces, and opened the trenches on the twenty-fifth of December; after an unsuccessful assault, he received orders to abandon the enterprise.

**OPERATIONS OF WELLINGTON AND MARMONT NEAR CIUDAD-RODRIGO.**—In the mean time the army of Marmont, returning from Badajos towards Salamanca, had encountered enemies still more dangerous than those of Soult. Wellington, on his return towards Almeida, had invested Ciudad-Rodrigo, on the fifth of September, and was waiting the arrival of his siege artillery, which had been ordered from Lisbon by Oporto and the Douro. This place was the key of our positions in Estremadura. Marmont had left one of his divisions near Alcantara to communicate with the fifth corps, which remained on the Guadiana, to guard the space between Olivenza and the mountains of Caceres. Having decided to succor Ciudad-Rodrigo, Marmont recalled this division, and also opened communication with the army of the North of Spain. This army had passed under the orders of General Dorsenne after the departure of Marshal Bessières, who brought back to France a part of the guard destined for the army of Russia. This general had been operating between the Douro, Astorga, and the mountains of Asturias, in order to second General Bonnet and drive the army of Galicia into the mountains of Lugo.

Marmont and Dorsenne effected their junction at Tamames on the twenty-second of September; their united forces advanced to the succor of Ciudad-Rodrigo; Wellington fell back with his advanced corps on Guinaldo. Marmont now presented himself before this intrenched camp, but Wellington withdrew his forces to Sabugal; and the former, proud of having his offer of battle declined by the enemy, and deeming it proper not to pursue him further into these desolate and inaccessible countries, established his army in cantonments, to give his troops some repose. He received orders, however, a few days after, to detach a thousand

men under General Montbrun, to second the enterprise of Suchet on Valencia.

**HILL SURPRISES THE DIVISION OF GIRARD.**—The valley of the Tagus being stripped of its defense by Marmont, in order to offer battle to Wellington, the English right, under Hill, profited by this circumstance to attack the divisions of the fifth corps which had remained between the Tagus and the Guadiana; he surprised a brigade of Girard's division at Aroyo de Molinos, and was on the point of capturing that general himself with all his troops. Girard, however, saved himself by a wide detour on Merida, where he crossed the Guadiana, but, for want of proper precautions, lost a thousand men. A series of uninterrupted successes, and the security which they had formerly enjoyed in the cantonments of Germany and Italy, had rendered our troops careless of their laurels, and all our *corps-d'armée* had some loss of this kind, which was to be attributed to an excess of self-confidence. This event was the only one of importance that occurred in the West during the autumn; if we except the operations of the divisions of Biscay, Navarre, and Castile, against the guerrillas of Porlier, Mina, and Empecinado.\*

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\*Napier gives a detailed account of the operations of the armies of Marmont and Wellington about Ciudad-Rodrigo, and closes with the following observations:

"1st. Lord Wellington's position behind Soita has been noticed by two recent authors. The one condemns the imprudence of offering battle on ground whence there was no retreat; the other intimates that it was assumed in contempt of the adversary's prowess. This last appears a mere shift to evade what was not understood, for if Lord Wellington had despised Marmont, he would have fought him beyond the Agueda. But sixty thousand French soldiers were never to be despised, neither was Wellington a man to put an army in jeopardy from an overweening confidence; and it is not difficult to show that his position was chosen well, without imprudence and without presumption.

"The space between the Sierra de Mesas and the Coa was less than six miles, and the part open to attack was very much reduced by the rugged bed of a torrent which covered the left. Forty thousand men were quite able to defend this line, which was scarcely more than one-third of their full front; and as the roads were bad, the country hilly and much broken with woods and ravines, the superiority of the enemy's horse and guns would have availed him little. Lord Wellington had a right to be bold against an adversary who had not molested him at Guinaldo, and it is always of importance to show a menacing front. It was also certain that great combinations must have been made by Marmont, before he could fight a general battle on such ground; it was equally certain that he could only have a few days' provisions with his army, and that the neighborhood could not supply him. It was, therefore, reasonable to expect that he would retire rather than fight, and he did so.

"Let us, however, take the other side, and suppose that Marmont was

OPERATIONS OF SUCHET ON THE EBRO.—Our affairs succeeded best in the East. Suchet, who had returned to Saragossa after the taking of Tortosa, arranged with Guillemint, Macdonald's chief of staff, the means of securing the siege of Taragona: it was agreed between them that Macdonald's corps should conduct the siege, while Suchet both reinforced and covered his operations. Guillemint came to me at Paris to ask for the means of pushing this siege with vigor, but I preferred en-

prepared and resolute to bring on a great battle. The position behind Soita would still have been good. The French were indeed too strong to be fought with on a plain; yet not strong enough to warrant a retreat indicating fear; hence the Allies had retired slowly for three days, each day engaged, and the enemy's powerful horse and artillery was always close upon their rear. Now the bed of the Coa, which was extremely rugged, furnished only a few points for crossing, of which the principal were: the ford of Serraleira behind the right of the Allies; the ford of Rapoulha de Coa, behind their left; and the bridge of Sabugal, behind their center. The ways to those points were narrow, and the passage of the river, with all the baggage, could not have been easily effected in face of an enemy without some loss and perhaps dishonor: and had Lord Wellington been unable to hold his position in a battle, the difficulty of passing the river would not have been very much increased, because his incumbrances would all have been at the other side, and there was a second range of heights half a mile in front of Sabugal favorable for a rear guard. The position of Soita appears, therefore, to have been chosen with good judgment in regard to the immediate object of opposing the enemy; but it is certain that the battering-train, then between Pinel and Villa Ponte, was completely exposed to the enemy. Marmont, however, had not sufficiently considered his enterprise, and knew not where or how to strike.

"2d. The position of Aldea Ponte was equally well chosen. Had the Allies retreated at once from Guinaldo to Soita, baggage and stores would have been lost, and the retrograde movement have had the appearance of a flight; the road from Payo would have been uncovered, and the junction of the fifth division endangered. But in the position taken up, the points of junction of all the roads were occupied, and as each point was strong in itself, it was not difficult for a quick-sighted general, perfectly acquainted with the country, and having excellent troops, to check the heads of the enemy's columns, until the baggage had gained a sufficient offing, and the fifth division had taken its place in line.

"3d. The position at Guinaldo was very different from the others. The previous entrenching of it proved Lord Wellington's foresight, and he remained there thirty-six hours (that is, from midday of the twenty-fifth until midnight of the twenty-sixth), which proved his firmness. It is said that Sir George Murray advised him to abandon it in the night of the twenty-fifth, and that arrangements were actually made in that view; yet, anxious for the safety of the light division, he would not stir. The object was certainly one of an importance sufficient to justify the resolution, but the resolution itself was one of those daring strokes of genius which the ordinary rules of art were never made to control. The position was contracted, of no great natural strength in front, and easily to be turned; the intrenchments constructed were only a few breastworks and two weak field re-



trusting this enterprise to Suchet, who had thus far perfectly accomplished my wishes; I, therefore, decided that the army of Aragon should form a new siege-park of the artillery of Lerida and Tortosa, and attack Tarragona; I also ordered this army to be reinforced by a French and Italian division of the army of Catalonia. But hardly had they begun to execute these new dispositions when Marshal Macdonald returned from Lerida to Barcelona, and announced that Figueras had just been surprised by the Spaniards.

doubts, open in rear, and without palisades; not more than fourteen thousand British and Portuguese troops were in line, and sixty thousand French veterans with a hundred pieces of artillery were before them! When Marmont heard of the escape of the light division, and discovered the deceit, he prophetically exclaimed, alluding to Napoleon's fortune, '*And Wellington's star, it also is bright!*'

"4th. The positions of Aldea Ponte and Soita are to be commended, that at Guinaldo to be admired rather than imitated, but the preceding operations are censurable. The country immediately beyond Ciudad-Rodrigo offered no covering position for a siege or blockade; and the sudden floods, to which the Agueda is subject, rendered the communications with the left bank precarious. Nor, though bridges had been secured, could Wellington have ventured to encamp round the place with lines of contravallation and circumvallation, on both sides of the river; because Marmont's army would then have advanced from Placencia to Castello Branco, having seized the passage over the Tagus at Villa Velha, and, in concert with the fifth corps, endangered the safety of Hill. This would have obliged the Allies to quit their entrenched camp, and Dorsenne could then have revictualled the place. It was therefore necessary to hold a strong central position with respect to Marmont and Dorsenne, to keep both in check while separate, and to oppose them when united. This position was on the Coa, and as Salamanca or Bejar, the nearest points where convoys could be collected for Ciudad-Rodrigo, were from fifty to sixty miles distant, Lord Wellington's object (namely, the forcing the French to assemble in large bodies without any adequate result) could be and was obtained by a distant as well as by a close investment.

"So far all was well calculated, but when Marmont and Dorsenne arrived with sixty thousand men at Ciudad-Rodrigo, the aspect of affairs entirely changed, and as the English general could not dispute the entrance of the convoy, he should have concentrated his army at once behind Guinaldo. Instead of doing this, he kept it extended on a line of many miles, and the right wing separated from the center by a difficult river. In his dispatch he says that, from some uncertainty in his estimate of the enemy's numbers, it was necessary to ascertain their exact strength by actual observation; but this is rather an excuse than a valid reason, because, for this object, which could be obtained by other means, he risked the loss of his whole army, and violated two vital rules of war, which forbld—

"1st. The parceling of an army before a concentrated enemy.

"2d. The fixing of your own point of concentration within the enemy's reach.

"Now, Lord Wellington's position on the twenty-fourth and twenty-

**THE CATALANS TAKE FIGUERAS.**—The junta and the captain-general of Catalonia, encouraged by the success of their petty operations, and certain of the assistance of the inhabitants of the cities against which they might operate, now redoubled their activity and audacity, in hopes of wearying out our patience and forcing us finally to evacuate the province. O'Donnel had already fallen, with his united forces, on an isolated brigade at the Abisbal and captured it, without the army's being able to save it.

fifth extended from the ford of the Vadillo on the right of the Agueda to Mariálva on the Azava; the distance either from the Vadillo or Mariálva to Guinaldo was as great as that from Ciudad to Guinaldo, and by worse roads; and the distance from Ciudad to Elbodon was as nothing, compared to the distance of the wings from the same place. Wherefore, when Montbrun attacked, at Elbodon, the Allies' wings were cut off, and the escape of the third and light divisions, and of the troops at Pastores, was a matter of fortune and gallantry, rather than of generalship; that is, in the enlarged sense of the last word, for it cannot be denied that the actual movements of the troops were conducted with consummate skill.

"But what if Marmont, instead of being drawn by circumstances into a series of ill-combined and partial attacks, had previously made dispositions for a great battle? He certainly knew, through the garrison, the real situation of the Allies, and he also knew of the camp at Guinaldo, which, being on their line of retreat, was the important point. If he had issued from the fortress before daybreak on the twenty-fifth, with the whole or even half of his forces, he could have reached Campillo in two hours with one column, while another fell on the position at Pastores and Elbodon; the third division, thus attacked, would have been enveloped and captured, or broken and driven over the Agueda, by the ford of Zamara, and would have been irretrievably separated from Guinaldo. And if this division had even reached Guinaldo, the French army would have arrived with it in such overwhelming numbers, that the fourth division could not have restored the battle; meanwhile a few thousand men thrown across the ford of Caros near Robleda would have sufficed to keep the light division at bay, because the channel of the Robleda torrent, over which their retreat lay, was a very deep and rugged ravine. The center being broken, the French could, at choice, have either surrounded the light division or directed the mass of their forces against the reserves, and then the left wing under Graham would have had to retreat from the Azava over the plains toward Almeida.

"It may be said that all the French were not up on the twenty-fifth, but they might have been so, and as Lord Wellington was resolved to see their number, he would have been in the same position the twenty-sixth. It is, however, sufficient to remark that the Allies, exclusive of the fifth division, which was at Payo, did not exceed thirty-five thousand men of all arms; that they were on an irregular line of at least twenty miles, and mostly in an open country; that at no point were the troops more than eight, and at the principal point (namely, Pastores) only three, miles from a fortress from whence sixty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, with one hundred and twenty guns, were ready to issue. Finally, the point of concentration at Guinaldo was only twelve miles from that fortress. The Allies escaped because their adversary was blind! Lord Wellington's

While Macdonald was concentrating his forces towards the Ebro for the projected expedition, General Campo-Verde, on the night of the nineteenth and twentieth of March, attempted to surprise Fort Montejou. Maurice Mathieu allowed the enemy's grenadiers to descend into the ditch, and then opened upon them a fire of grape and musketry. Eight hundred men were killed in the ditches, while others took to flight, but were pursued by a sortie party, and several hundred brought back prisoners. This reception, however, did not entirely discourage the enemy; a few weeks after, a troop of *Miguelets* surprised General Guillot in the city of Figueras, and got possession of the citadel by a *coup-de-main*.

On hearing of these events, Macdonald renounced his projects and returned in haste to Gerona, in order to invest Figueras before the Spaniards could provision the detachment which had been thrown into that place. General Baraguay d'Hilliers left Gerona with all the forces which he could collect in Upper Catalonia, but he could not prevent Campo-Verde from reinforcing the place with three thousand men, although he had defeated him on the third of May. Macdonald informed General Suchet of this

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conduct at Guinaldo was above rules, but at Elbodon it was against rules, which is just the difference between genius and error.

"5th. In these operations Marmont gave proof that as a general he was rather shining than great. He was in error throughout. Before he comenced his march, he had desired Girard to advance on the side of the Alemejo, assuring him that the whole of the allied army, and even the Spanish troops under Castaños, had crossed the Tagus to operate against Rodrigo; but in fact only one brigade of Hill's corps had moved, and Girard would have been destroyed if, fortunately for him, the Allies had not intercepted the original and duplicate of the letter containing this false information.

"6th. When Marmont brought his convoy into Ciudad, it would appear he had no intention of fighting; but, tempted by the false position of the Allies, and angry at the repulse of his cavalry on the lower Azava, he turned his scouting troops into columns of attack. And yet he permitted his adversary to throw dust in his eyes for thirty-six hours at Guinaldo, and at Aldea Ponte his attack was a useless waste of men, because there was no local advantage offered, and he did not intend a great battle.

"7th. The loss incurred in the different combats was not great. About three hundred men and officers fell on the part of the Allies, and on that of the French rather more, because of the fire of the squares and artillery at Elbodon. But the movements during the three days were full of interest and instruction, and diversified also by brilliant examples of heroism. Ridge's daring charge has been already noticed, and it was in one of the cavalry rencounters that a French officer in the act of striking at the gallant Felton Harvey of the Fourteenth Dragoons perceived that he had only one arm, and with a rapid movement brought down his sword into a salute, and passed on."



event, insisted on the return of the two divisions which he had lent him, and even asked for his assistance with the army of Aragon.

**PREPARATIONS OF SUCHET TO ATTACK TARRAGONA.**—But Suchet very properly refused to comply with this demand, deeming it useless to collect so many troops for a simple blockade, and in a part of the country destitute of resources; he even considered it dangerous to remove his active forces from the important valley of the Ebro, at a moment when the enemy, multiplying his efforts around Tarragona, might become the assailant, and take from us not only a part of Catalonia, but also of Aragon. In fact, at the moment when the junta placed a garrison of twelve thousand chosen men in Tarragona, and General Contreras, former director of the artillery school of Segovia, and a man of skill and energy, was making every disposition for a long resistance, Campo-Verde collected an army of twenty thousand men between that city and Gerona, and the corps of Valencia and the partisans of Navarre were preparing to annoy the garrisons left by Suchet in Aragon.

Notwithstanding the unexpected loss of Figueras, the vigor of the enemy's preparations and the imperfect state of his own, Suchet formed his resolution without hesitation. After consulting his chiefs of engineers, artillery, and administration, examining his resources, and calculating his forces, and leaving in Aragon troops necessary for maintaining our establishments there, he sent to Tortosa orders for forming the siege-park, and directing it by Balaguer on Cambrils, established magazines of provisions, and secured the means of transportation to Caspe and Mora; finally, he marched with all his disposable forces on Lerida, where he rallied the divisions of Freyre and Palombini, and, instead of marching in the direction of Figueras, moved rapidly on Tarragona, and invested the place on the fourth of May. This resolution was a wise one, and was crowned with the most happy result; Campo-Verde, not knowing whether he ought to deliver a place which was simply blockaded, or fly to the assistance of one which was more seriously attacked, did neither one thing nor the other; and Contreras, instead of completing his means of defense, saw his resources and his troops daily diminish.

**MEMORABLE SIEGE OF THAT CITY.**—Tarragona, strong in its natural position and by its ancient defenses, had been connected by a line of new works with the port and lower town. Mount Olivo, which had been fortified, covered the approaches on one side, while on the other the sea always furnished them the

means of succor or retreat. - An English fleet, carrying two thousand troops, was lying in the harbor for this purpose, to annoy the flank of the besieging army. But Suchet commenced by establishing a strong redoubt on the shore, from which, with a few mortars, he soon drove the shipping to a distance, and then directed his attack upon Mount Olivo.

But this last was a difficult operation, for the trenches had to be constructed on a bare rock, and against a numerous garrison which was daily renewed, and which disputed the ground inch by inch. We lost in these combats General Salm and numerous officers and soldiers killed or wounded. When the batteries had breached the walls of the fort, an assault was made, on the night of the twenty-ninth of May, at the moment when a detachment from the city had come to relieve the garrison of the place. This circumstance, instead of being favorable to the defense, was decidedly injurious, by crowding within a small space a greater number of men than could be employed to advantage. The fort was carried, and the enemy lost one hundred and eighty men killed or taken prisoners. Suchet now resolved to push his attack by the Francoli against the lower town, as he would thus separate the main defenses of the place from the port, and at the same time cut off all succor from the garrison and all means of retreat. The works were, consequently, pushed with great vigor; a second assault was made, on the seventh of June, against Fort Francoli; a third, on the fourteenth, against the bastion of the Chanoines; a fourth, on the twenty-first, against Fort Royal and the remainder of the lower town. These several successes greatly increased the ardor of our soldiers; for without the stimulus which the success of one night gave to the perils of the following day, they must have yielded to the fatigues of the siege and the heat of the weather. The works were not only of a fatiguing character, but required incessant labor; chosen sharpshooters were continually occupied in the trenches firing upon the cannoneers of the place, while the garrison, on its side, kept up an incessant fire on our batteries; for fifty-four days there was one continual engagement, like a long-continued battle. The governor, astonished at so much perseverance, and despairing of any assistance from the Spanish army, which lay inactive in the field, wrote to the junta that he could not answer any longer for the place if they did not send him succor. Campo-Verde, who had failed in his attempt to succor Figueras, now yielded to the solicitations of the junta and of Contreras, and approached Taragona, at the moment when we had opened the third parallel and established our breaching batteries against the body of the place.

Our firmness imposed on him, and he retired without any effort to raise the siege, although his attack would have placed us between two fires. The English Colonel Skerret landed from the fleet for the purpose of reinforcing the garrison with his two thousand troops, but, on seeing that the taking of the lower town would cut off his line of retreat, he renounced his project. The garrison, therefore, after a momentary hope of being delivered, saw itself abandoned to its fate.

The moment seemed favorable for a final blow. On the twenty-eighth of June, Suchet deemed the breach practicable, and threw against the ramparts of Tarragona sixteen companies of the *élite*, commanded by General Habert, and supported by numerous reserves. A most furious contest followed; but nothing could arrest the impetuosity of our soldiers; a bloody combat was waged on the ramparts, in the streets, and even in the houses; it ended in the massacre of a part of the garrison. The remainder, to the number of ten thousand, cut off from retreat by sea, attempted in vain to escape by the gate of Barcelona; but being pursued, surrounded, and driven upon the shore, they finally laid down their arms. The governor, Contreras, wounded with a bayonet, surrendered with all his staff; three hundred and twenty-two pieces of cannon fell into our hands. The sack of this unfortunate city was the inevitable result of such a resistance. Party spirit, the deplorable infirmity of human nature, has made every effort to detract from the glory which the French arms won on this occasion; by unworthy declamations against our brave men, because some excesses succeeded to an assault without example in the history of the war. Where have these philanthropic writers seen cities taken after five separate assaults, without any loss to the inhabitants, especially when these inhabitants join with the garrison in the defense of their ramparts.\*

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\*The accounts which were at first published of this affair by English writers were exceedingly unjust to Suchet and his officers. The resistance of the inhabitants after the breach was carried necessarily led to numerous excesses on both sides; but these were stopped as soon as possible under the circumstances.

The following is Napier's account of the final assault:

"At five o'clock in the evening the French fire suddenly ceased, and fifteen hundred men, led by General Habert, passing out from the parallel, went at full speed up against the breach; twelve hundred, under General Ficartier, followed in support; General Montmarie led a brigade round the left, to the bastion of Rosario, with a view to break the gates there during the assault, and thus penetrating, to turn the interior defense of the Rambla. Harispe took post on the Barcelona road, to cut off the retreat of the garrison.



**FURTHER OPERATIONS OF SUCHET.**—The fall of Tarragona produced the same effect in Catalonia as that of Saragossa in Aragon. To make this influence still more decisive, Suchet marched rapidly on Barcelona and Vich. This movement served both to coöperate with the blockade of Figueras and to favor a project which he had formed against Mont Serrat. Leaving Harispe's division in the environs of Vich, he returned to organize the garrisons and government of Tarragona and Tortosa; then, directing the mass of his forces on Lerida as though he intended to remain in Aragon, he marched with a detached division on Igualada, while General Harispe, on the appointed day, executed a similar movement. He thus enveloped and attacked the celebrated mountain of Serrat, where the Baron of Eroles had intrenched himself in a position reputed impregnable. The redoubts and convent were turned and carried; the Spaniards effected their escape across the precipices.

We established a garrison in this defensive point, which completed the reduction of southern Catalonia.

**HE IS MADE MARSHAL.**—Fully satisfied with the operations of Suchet, I sent him the bâton of Marshal of France, and gave him the command of southern Catalonia; Macdonald was called to the army of Russia, which was organizing, and the command of the corps of occupation of Upper Catalonia was given to

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“The columns of attack had to pass over an open space of more than a hundred yards before they could reach the foot of the breach; and when within twenty yards of it, the hedge of aloes obliged them to turn to the right and left, under a terrible fire of musketry and of grape, which the Spaniards, who were crowding on the beach with apparent desperation, poured unceasingly upon them. The destruction was great, the head of the French column got into confusion, gave back, and was beginning to fly, when the reserves rushed up, and, a great many officers coming forward in a body, renewed the attack. At that moment one Bianchini, an Italian soldier, who had obtained leave to join the column as a volunteer, and whose white clothes, amidst the blue uniforms of the French, gave him a supernatural appearance, went forth alone from the ranks, and gliding silently and sternly up the breach, notwithstanding many wounds, reached the top, and there fell dead. Then the multitude bounded forward with a shout, the first line of the Spaniards fled, and the ramparts were darkened by the following masses of the French.

“Meanwhile Montmarie's sappers cut away the palisades at Rosario, and his light troops, finding a rope hanging from the wall, mounted by it, at the moment when the assailants at the breach broke the Spanish reserves with one shock, and poured into the town like a devastating torrent. At the Rambla a momentary stand was indeed made, but the impulse of victory was too strong to be longer resisted, and a dreadful scene of slaughter and violence ensued. Citizens and soldiers, maddened with fear, rushed out in crowds by the Barcelona gate, while others, throwing themselves over the ramparts, made for the landing-places within the Milagro;

General Decaen. This officer had served with distinction in the army of Moreau in 1800, and at the peace of Amiens was appointed governor of our public possessions in India, which he had defended with all the means in his power.

**HE PREPARES TO ATTACK VALENCIA.**—The resistance of the Catalans was now weakened; Andalusia was reduced, and I thought that if we should succeed in reducing Valencia and Murcia, we might unite all our means against Wellington. No one was more capable than Suchet of directing the important operations in the East; I therefore ordered him to take Valencia.

His preparations were made with wisdom; he deemed it necessary to strike a sudden and decisive blow, so as not to exhaust the provinces from which he was to draw his resources; while at the same time he might envelop and capture the army which the enemy had assembled for the defense of that place.

To accomplish this double object the army of Aragon required reinforcements, having been considerably reduced by the severe operations of the sieges it had carried on, and by the detachments required for the new garrison; but while strongly soliciting reinforcements, Suchet prepared to obey my orders; he rapidly collected his disposable forces, and on the twentieth of September marched before Saguntum.

**SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM.**—At four leagues from Valencia, and at the junction of the roads to that city from Saragossa by

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but that way also had been intercepted by General Rognat with his sappers, and then numbers throwing themselves down the steep rocks were dashed to pieces, while they who gained the shore were still exposed to the sword of the enemy. Those that went out by the Barcelona gate were met by Harispe's men, and some being killed, the rest, three thousand in number, were made prisoners. But within the town all was horror; fire had been set to many houses; Gonzales, fighting manfully, was killed; Contreras, wounded with the stroke of a bayonet, was only saved by a French officer; and though the hospitals were respected by the soldiers, in every other part their fury was unbounded. When the assault first commenced, the ship-launches had come close into the Milagro, and now saved some of the fugitives, but their guns swept the open space beyond, killing friends and enemies, as, mixed together, they rushed to the shore; and the French dragoons, passing through the flaming streets at a trot, rode upon the fugitives, sabering those who had outstripped the infantry. In every quarter there was great rage and cruelty, and although most of the women and children had, during the siege, been removed from Tarragona by the English shipping, and though the richest citizens had all gone to Sitjes, this assault was memorable as a day of blood. Only seven or eight hundred miserable creatures, principally soldiers, escaped on board the vessels; nine thousand, including the sick and wounded, were made prisoners; more than five thousand persons were slain, and a great part of the city was reduced to ashes."

Terruel and from Barcelona by Tortosa, lie the ancient and numerous ruins of the celebrated Saguntum, which is situated on a steep and isolated rock above the town and the river of Murviedro. Some recent works had strengthened this post sufficiently to intercept the passage. It was large enough to receive a garrison of two or three thousand men, and to reduce it required a regular siege. Valencia had also been covered by a vast line of intrenchments in front of the *enceinte* of the place; its bridges had been cut, its *faubourgs* raised, and a good intrenched camp behind the Guadalaviar secured the defense of the place, which the regency had entrusted to General Blake. To his title of captain-general were added unlimited powers, and the command of all the Spanish forces in the east of the peninsula. These forces were composed of the remains of the old regiments of the line. Blake had stationed General Andriani at Saguntum, while he himself remained in his intrenched camp watching our movements.

On arriving before Saguntum, Marshal Suchet immediately occupied Murviedro; and, as a part of the *enceinte* of Saguntum appeared incomplete, he directed an escalade to be attempted in the night, in hopes of avoiding a siege; but the enemy was on the alert and repelled our columns. It was now necessary to establish batteries on the only accessible side of the mountain; but there was no earth here except what was carried by our troops, and the plunging fire of the fort rendered our trenches scarcely tenable. A breach was opened on the eighteenth of October, and an assault attempted; but the steep rock and the obstinate resistance of the Spaniards rendered this attempt also unsuccessful. The batteries were now doubled and established nearer the place, and everything prepared for renewing the attack, when General Blake left his intrenchments in order to succor the place, and on the twenty-fifth of October offered us battle.

**BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM.**—To take from the enemy the moral advantage of the initiative, Suchet resolved to march against him, leaving some battalions to continue the siege. Blake's line extended from the heights of Puch toward the two little mountains of Germanel. He charged with vigor by the road and gained possession of a height on which we had placed some field-pieces. Suchet at this moment discovered that the enemy had too much extended his front in order to maneuver by both wings. In imitation of my movements at Rivoli and Austerlitz, he ordered a rapid attack on the Spanish center, pierced it and put to flight the left wing; the right sustained an obstinate



combat on the heights of Puch; but was finally forced to yield, and retreated with the others in disorder to Valencia, in full view of the English squadron and the garrison, who remained impassive spectators of the battle. Saguntum capitulated the next day, surrendering to us nineteen pieces of cannon and two thousand five hundred men. We had taken in the battle four thousand prisoners, four stands of colors, and twelve pieces of cannon. Nothing now prevented our march on Valencia; Oropesa was in our power; Peniscola was masked, but still held out.

INVESTMENT OF VALENCIA.—But Suchet now waited for the promised reinforcements, and did not yet approach Valencia; during the month of November he defeated the two corps of the enemy which showed themselves, one in advance of Gaudalaviar near Betera, and the other on the road to Segorbia. Near the middle of December he was informed that General Reille was bringing him a French and an Italian division from Pampeluna by Terruel, and that Marshal Marmont had received orders, at the same time, to detach a division across Castile on Valencia. He immediately made his dispositions to maneuver against Blake. These dispositions bear the stamp of a skillful and experienced *coup-d'oeil*. Seeing that the enemy's forces were extended in their lines from Manisses to the sea-shore, and that Valencia was too far from the water to favor an embarkation (for which, however, no preparations had been made), he deemed that a successful attack against their left, would be decisive. Their only line of retreat was on Alicante, which, however, could be reached by the French before them.

The corps of General Reille having arrived, three divisions of cavalry crossed the river, on the twenty-sixth of December, two leagues above the city; while on the left bank the whole camp of Blake from Manisses to the sea-shore was attacked in front. This attack gave place to a warm and bloody combat; but in the mean time the marshal had passed the river, gained the extreme left of the enemy, defeated and driven back all the troops which were successively brought to oppose him, so that the whole Spanish army found itself driven within the fortifications of Valencia, except a corps which escaped between Albufera and the sea, and which was pursued to St. Philip.

SIEGE OF THAT PLACE.—The siege commenced immediately after the investment. Under the circumstances, it could not be of long duration; the exterior *enceinte*, being a mere field-work of earth, and having too much development for a regular defense, was abandoned after eight days' resistance, with eighty

pieces of cannon. Blake, shut up in Valencia, now attempted a sortie, but only a small column under cover of the night escaped into the mountains. Shells were now thrown into the city in order to intimidate the inhabitants; and Blake, being summoned to surrender and threatened with the fate of Tarragona if he exposed this rich city to the consequences of an assault, finally capitulated on the ninth of January, surrendering to us himself and staff, his army of nineteen thousand men, twenty-one stands of colors, three hundred and seventy-four pieces of cannon, besides immense magazines and military munitions. The Spanish general did not sustain on this occasion the reputation which he had previously acquired; to surrender a city in order to save it is certainly an act of weakness; but to surrender it with an army within its walls is an act of cowardice.

**REDUCTION OF PENISCOLA AND GANDIA.**—Suchet employed three days in establishing order within the city, and afterward moved the mass of his forces in the direction of Alicante. On the eleventh of January, he learned of General Montbrun's march on this point with the division from Portugal, and recommended this general to return immediately to Marmont, his assistance being no longer required. Montbrun, being disgusted with marching entirely across Spain for no purpose, and not wishing to return without doing something, presented himself before Alicante, and threatened to bombard the place. But as the Spaniards did not allow themselves to be imposed on by the few howitzers which he carried in his train, he resumed his march to Estremadura, where his absence had been disastrous to Marmont. Soon after this the capture of Peniscola and Gandia completed the submission of the kingdom of Valencia.\*

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\*Napier's observations on these events are brief and instructive:

"1st. The events which led to the capitulation of Valencia were but a continuation of those faults which had before ruined the Spanish cause in every part of the peninsula; namely, the neglect of all good military usages, and the mania for fighting great battles with bad troops.

"2d. Blake needed not to have fought a serious action during any part of the campaign. He might have succored Saguntum without a dangerous battle, and might have retreated in safety behind the Guadalaviar; he might have defended that river without risking his whole army, and then have retreated behind the Xucar. He should never have shut up his army in Valencia, but, having done so, he should never have capitulated. Eighteen thousand men, well conducted, could always have broken through the thin circle of investment drawn by Suchet, especially as the Spaniards had the power of operating on both banks of the river. But the campaign was one huge error throughout, and was pithily summed up in one sentence by the Duke of Wellington. Being accused by the regency at Cadiz of having

So many successes merited a recompense and an encouragement; I therefore conferred on Suchet the title of Duke of Albufera, and gave to his army a donation of two hundred millions of francs, levied on the provinces which they had conquered with so much glory.\*

#### REMARKS ON SOULT'S OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH.

—These events formed a contrast with what was passing in the rest of the peninsula; nevertheless, it must be said in Soult's praise, that he had skillfully maintained himself in his delicate position. Arrested in front by two impregnable cities—Cadiz and Gibraltar—one of which served as the focus of the whole Spanish resistance; menaced on the left by the army of Murcia, and in rear by Wellington and Badajos, he had, nevertheless, extricated himself by his activity. Viewed, however, in their strategic relations, his operations were open to criticisms; he should have operated more on his wings, especially by the right. On learning the affair of Chiclana, I had recommended him to attach less importance to the occupation of the territory, and to concentrate all his attention on Cadiz, Seville and Badajos, the occupation of Malaga and Grenada being only accessories, which could be accomplished by movable columns. But the hope of preserving these superb provinces induced him to not abandon them. He thus had a hundred leagues of territory to protect against indefatigable guerrillas and organized forces, which, having nothing to cover, could concentrate anywhere and operate in any direction, while any movement of Soult's forces seriously interfered with his occupation of the conquered provinces.

Taking all things into consideration, our affairs in the penin-

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caused the catastrophe, by permitting the army of the North and that of Portugal to send reinforcements to Suchet, he replied thus: "The misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to Blake's ignorance of his profession, and to Mahi's cowardice and treachery."

\*Napier says of this general:

"On the fourteenth of January, Suchet made his triumphal entry into Valencia, having completed a series of campaigns in which the feebleness of his adversaries somewhat diminished his glory, but in which his own activity and skill were not the less conspicuous. Napoleon created him Duke of Albufera, and his civil administration was strictly in unison with his conduct in the field—that is to say, vigorous and prudent. He arrested all dangerous persons, especially the friars, and sent them to France, and he rigorously deprived the people of their military resources; but he proportioned his demands to their real ability, kept his troops in perfect discipline, was careful not to offend the citizens by violating their customs or shocking their religious prejudices, and endeavored, as much as possible, to govern through the native authorities. The archbishop and many of the clergy aided him, and the submission of the people was secured."



sula had been improved during this campaign, notwithstanding the unfortunate retreat from Portugal. There seemed no doubt that, if successful in my enterprise against Russia, I might soon terminate the war in Spain by going there myself. But the events of 1812, and the double disaster of Moscow and Salamanca, entirely changed the face of affairs, and broke the double scepter of Charles V. and of Charlemagne.

**WINTER CAMPAIGN OF WELLINGTON IN ESTREMA-DURA.**—The satisfaction which I derived from the brilliant successes of Tarragona, Saguntum, and Valencia was destined to be of short duration. It has already been said, that, after the momentary junction of Soult and Marmont for the relief of Badajoz, these two armies had again separated, the former returning to Andalusia, and the latter to Ciudad-Rodrigo, where Wellington was threatening a serious attack. I had in the mean time taken efficacious measures for the reinforcement of my army; on hearing the news of Masséna's retreat, and the events of Chiclana and Albuera, I had sent into Spain all the troops which I could spare without seriously interfering with my preparations against Russia. A corps of reserve, formed in old Castile under Count Dorsenne, was ordered to march on Salamanca to second Marmont, while their place in the north was temporarily supplied by the detachments destined for the reinforcement of the regiments of the different arms.

By the aid of these powerful reinforcements, Marmont had no difficulty in raising the siege of Ciudad-Rodrigo. Wellington was not a man to engage his troops unless the chances were in his favor. He retreated to the impregnable position of Guinaldo and Sabugal. Marmont's advance to offer him battle, and his retirement to his own cantonments, when a battle was declined by the English, and finally his detachment of Montbrun's division in the direction of Alicante to second Suchet, have already been mentioned. Wellington, who was promptly informed of all our movements, determined to profit by the detachment of Montbrun, and the retirement of Marmont's troops into their cantonments, to strike some decisive blows in Estremadura.

My lieutenant had supposed that his adversary would not attempt a campaign at a season of the year which is always exceedingly rigorous in this latitude, especially among the mountains, and consequently he was not prepared to repel his attack.

**HE CAPTURES CIUDAD-RODRIGO AND BADAJOS.**—But, notwithstanding the great depth of the snow, the cold was not so great as to prevent the English army, which was abundantly supplied with everything, from taking the field. Wellington passed the Agueda on the eighth of January, approached

Ciudad-Rodrigo, and pushed forward the siege so that two breaches were made practicable by the twenty-first. The masonry of the body of the place was uncovered, so as to expose it to be breached by the English artillery, which threw against it solid shot of large size and ninety-six-pounder shells fired horizontally from iron carronades. The assault was made the next day, and sustained by the garrison with a bravery worthy of a better fate; the place, however, was carried, and the garrison of seventeen hundred men taken prisoners. Marmont, who in the meantime had laid quiet in his cantonments, advanced toward Salamanca a few days after the capture of Ciudad-Rodrigo; but the English had in the meantime repaired the breaches and garrisoned the place. This loss was the more to be regretted as Marmont had no means of carrying on a siege.

Wellington now retired behind the Agueda, passed the Guadiana the sixteenth of March, and appeared before Badajos. It was hardly to be supposed that Soult would be as dilatory in securing this place as Marmont had been in relieving Ciudad-Rodrigo. Wellington's project was based on the possibility of carrying Fort Picurina, opening the second parallel at its base and breaching the masonry in the same way as at Ciudad-Rodrigo. The place was defended by four thousand men under the same Philippon who had covered himself with so much glory in the first siege. Fort Picurina was attacked on the night of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of March, and, after a heavy bombardment, carried without opposition; the second parallel was immediately established and the breach batteries opened with so much success that, on the fifth of April, three large breaches were made practicable; the assault was made the next day. Two divisions assailed the breaches, while two others attempted an escalade on the opposite side toward the castle; the latter, however, was intended as a feint to divide the attention of the garrison rather than with any expectation of success on this point.

The attention of the commandant and of the garrison was wholly directed toward the side of the breaches; all their preparations were made with skill, and the English after two murderous assaults, saw themselves forced to retreat. But, by a most unexpected chance, the columns which were to attempt an escalade on the opposite side, which had been deemed invulnerable, succeeded in making a lodgment on the rampart, and in suddenly assailing our brave men, who had just covered themselves with so much glory. A severe combat was engaged in hand to hand; but as the enemy had already penetrated in considerable numbers and as our men fought without order or concert, the garrison was finally forced to surrender. The brave Philippon was above all

suspicion; but either his measures were not well taken or one of his officers failed in his duty. If he had had a suitable and well-disposed reserve, it is probable that this misfortune would not have happened. The English, however, lost two hundred officers and three thousand four hundred men killed and wounded, which is an incontestable proof of the vigor and brilliancy of the defense.

Soult arrived the next day at the head of his army, and, on hearing the fate of the place, fell back on Seville, which place had again been threatened by the Spaniards during his absence.

REMARKS ON THESE OPERATIONS.—The loss of these two places, which covered the center of our immense line of operations from Bayonne to Cadiz, was a bad omen. Marmont, supposing that Soult had sufficient forces for the protection of Badajos without his assistance, as in the first siege, had preferred to remain and seek to repair the affront which he himself had just received. He consequently invested Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida, and then advanced into Portugal as far as Castel-Franco. He intended either to destroy the bridge of Villa-Ucha, or to pass the river at that place and cooperate with Soult in the rescue of Badajos, by threatening Wellington's line of retreat. If this movement had been concerted with Soult, it would have been wise; but, being isolated, it could effect nothing. On hearing that Badajos had fallen, and that his adversary was returning upon the Tagus, Marmont again fell back upon his *dépôts*.

INSURRECTION IN SPANISH AMERICA.—Many other memorable events occurred in 1811; the insurrection of Spanish America by Miranda, the creation of the republic of Venezuela and Caràcas, the preliminary acts of the independence of Mexico and Peru, announced in all parts of this hemisphere the dawn of a new political era. A formidable counterpoise was forming in the new world, and threatening the overthrow of the colonial system of the Europeans. Europe was at this time so occupied with me that it could give but little attention to these important events, which were calculated to eventually effect a complete revolution in the maritime, commercial, and political affairs of the old world.

GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN SPAIN.—The loss of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajos annoyed me, less by the real importance of the places themselves, than by the talent displayed by my new adversary in their capture and the manifest negligence of my lieutenants in obeying my instructions. I had directed the two marshals to furnish these places with sufficient garrisons and provisions for six months; Marmont, in particular, was inexcusable for leaving Ciudad-Rodrigo with too feeble a garrison. I felt these reverses the more sensibly, as I was on the eve of



my expedition against Russia. Fortunately, Suchet's successes amply compensated for these disasters, and I flattered myself that, after disposing of the enemy in the east of Spain and north of Europe, I would be able to take my revenge by concentrating all our means for a decisive blow against the English in the peninsula. Many skillful judges, however, are of opinion that I would have done better to repair to Spain myself, recapture our lost fortresses, and drive Wellington from the peninsula, rather than engage in the expedition to Russia. I will explain hereafter the reasons which decided my course.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY.—The events of the latter part of the campaign of 1811 in Turkey were not calculated to authorize me to hope as much from this diversion as I had previously expected. I was not ignorant of the famous Roman maxim, *never to undertake two wars at the same time*. If Spain furnished occupation for a half of my army, Turkey also occupied one hundred thousand Russians.

Kamensky, being reinforced during the winter by twenty-five thousand recruits, took Loweza in the month of February, the Turks having lost in its defense four thousand men killed and prisoners. The Emperor Alexander now ordered five divisions of this army to return to the frontiers of Poland, and Kutusof, on the death of Kamensky, took command of the remaining fifty thousand. After several undecisive battles, this general dismantled the works which had cost his predecessor so much blood, and retired behind the Danube. The Vizir passed the Danube above Roudschouck, but found himself opposed to a line of field-works which Kutusof had constructed to intercept his advance. Seeing himself opposed in front by a well-defended line of fortifications, with the Danube and the corps of Markof in his rear, the Vizir abandoned his army and effected his escape in a boat. Ismael-Bey had crossed the river at Widden, but on seeing that Zass had also erected a line of intrenchments to prevent his advance, he retired behind the Danube. Russia profited by the perilous position of the Vizir's army to negotiate for peace, which had now become necessary on account of mysterious preparations in the North. An armistice was concluded; and, during the negotiations for peace, the remains of the army of the Vizir capitulated, and were carried prisoners into Russia. I hoped to intercept these negotiations by declaring war against Russia; but, unfortunately, Sébastiani, who enjoyed the full confidence of the Turks, had left Constantinople, and the Sultan, whose capital he had saved in 1807, had perished, the victim of fanaticism and anarchy. My new minister, Latour-Maubourg, neglected nothing to carry out my instructions, but he had not the same title to the confidence

of the Ottomans. Informed by my enemies of the stipulations of Erfurth, and by Austria of the project of partition, the Turks abandoned themselves without reserve to the counsels of England. The British minister became all powerful with the Divan, and every effort was resorted to to induce it to make peace with Russia; while I sought to prevent this consummation by a declaration of war against the enemy of the Porte.

The campaign against Persia had been attended with success; the Russians, who had for three years been in possession of Anapa, captured the Allies' camp at Ascholkalaki on the seventeenth of September, 1810, and carried their victorious banners to the walls of Poti and the mouth of the Euphrates; while in the East they pushed their success along the borders of the Caspian Sea to the walls of Lankaran. This war was for them a relaxation rather than a serious diversion.

It is time to turn from these distant countries to the grand enterprise which was to put Europe at my feet, or to wholly ruin the immense edifice which I had erected with so much care and labor.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## WAR OF 1812, OR CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA.

Causes of the War with Russia—Opinions of Napoleon's Counselors—Military Chances of Success—Negotiations with Russia—Fruits of the Continental System—Occupation of Swedish Pomerania—Alliance with Prussia—Pacific Proposals to the Emperor Alexander—Offensive and Defensive Alliance with Austria—Result of the Negotiations with Russia—Proposals of Peace to England—*Ultimatum* of Russia—Napoleon repairs to Dresden—Return of Narbonne—Pradt's Mission to Warsaw—Ligneul's Mission to Sweden—Preparations for opening the Campaign—Diversion of the Turks—Dispositions of the Russian Army—Its Organization—French and Allied Army—Plans of Napoleon—Passage of the Niemen—The Russians retreat on Drissa—Napoleon's Delay at Wilna—Mission of Balaschof—Reply of Napoleon—Poland—War between England and the United States—Operations against Bagration—Napoleon advances on Polotsk—Camp of Drissa—Alexander retires to St. Petersburg—Operations of Barclay—Combats of Ostrowno—Operations of Bagration—Affair of Mohilew—Halt at Witepsk—Operations of Napoleon's Wings—Tormassof defeats the Saxons—Operations of Oudinot—Turkey, Sweden, and England—Council of War—Barclay takes the Offensive—Napoleon Marches on Smolensko—Battles of Smolensko—Retreat of Barclay—Results of the Campaign—Ney passes the Dnieper—Hazardous March of Barclay—Pursuit of Ney and Murat—Battle of Valoutina—Retreat of the Russians—Position of Napoleon—Battle of Gorodeczno—Affairs of Polotsk—Napoleon resolves to advance—Character of the Country—New Generalissimo of the Russian Army—Preparations for Battle—Position of the Enemy—Plan of Attack—Battle of Borodino or the Moskva—Remarks on this Battle—Napoleon enters Moscow—The Russians burn the City—New Projects of Napoleon—The Russians march on Taroutina—Embarrassing Position of the French—Napoleon finally determines to retreat—Attack on Murat—Departure from Moscow—Retreat on Borowsk—Position of the two Armies—Battle of Wiasma—Approach of Winter—Conspiracy of Mallet and Lahorie—Disaster of Krasnoi—Desperate Efforts of Ney—New Difficulties of the Retreat—March of Kutusof on Elvira—Projects of the Russians—Battle of the Beresina—Remarks on this Passage—Continuation of the Retreat—Napoleon departs for Paris—Motives of this Departure—Gen-



eral Causes of the Failure of this Campaign—Continuation of the Retreat under Murat—He resigns the Command to Eugene—Final Refuge of the Army behind the Elbe—Summary of the Campaign of 1813 in Spain—The English destroy the Bridge of Almaraz—Capture of Salamanca—Wellington enters Madrid—His unsuccessful Siege of Badajos—He retires into Portugal—Operations in the East of Spain—Conclusion

**CAUSES OF THE WAR WITH RUSSIA.**—The great enterprise which was to decide the fate of Europe, or rather the empire of the world, was preparing amid songs of victory. The cannon on the Tower of London were announcing the success of Wellington at Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajos; while the Russians were celebrating the success of Kutusof on the Danube, and the French were consoling themselves with the victories of Suchet at Valencia. Negotiations still continued with Russia, but the discussion of merely incidental questions tended to embarrass rather than clear up the main causes of the dispute.

I have already partially explained the motives which drew the two countries into this war. It is not exactly true that the Russian and French cabinets were in favor of war, while the two emperors were opposed to it, for it is well known that Alexander constituted his own cabinet, while I directed that of the Tuileries. The alleged motives of the war, on both sides, were pretences; the real objects were different. It must be confessed, however, that if the two sovereigns had consulted their own individual wishes, they would have preferred to avoid, or at least to postpone, this contest. But, unfortunately, the interests at stake were so great that such a result was scarcely possible; to attempt anything like a permanent reconciliation, it would have been necessary to go back to the treaty of Vienna in 1809, and to the union of the mouths of the Weser, the Elbe, and the Trave with the French Empire.

I had long felt that this war was inevitable, but I wished to postpone it till a favorable opportunity occurred for carrying it on.\* It was, in my opinion, the only means of terminating forever the contest to which I devoted my life. It was evident to the most simple that Russia was too powerful to ever adhere to the

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\*The reader will not find in this chapter the exact impartiality which characterizes the preceding portions of this work. It would be too much to expect that Jomini's opinion of this war should not be somewhat discolored by his attachment to the cause as well as to the person of the Emperor Alexander. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that these opinions are expressed with a moderation and candor seldom to be found in the writings of those who were opposed to Napoleon.

European system of which France was the pivot. My edifice had risen too high for its base; Russia pressed with all her immense weight upon its summit; Alexander, younger than myself and full of energy, would probably outlive me, and on my death the French Empire would be dismembered. It was, therefore, necessary to place Russia in such a condition that she could not destroy the unity of my system, and to give new political boundaries to my frontiers sufficiently strong to resist the weight of the entire power of the czars. Such an attempt would require not only the strength of my own empire, but also that of my allies. It was not without its dangers; but at the same time there were, at least, many chances of success; and, moreover, it was the only means of consolidating my work.

To render this plan successful, it was necessary to reconstruct Poland, and to compel the Russians to accept the new frontiers thus traced with the point of the sword. Russia might then renew her alliance with England without danger to my empire, which would be separated from the power of the czars by an immense extent of country and a guard of two hundred thousand men. Our success would, therefore, not only consolidate the present, but also serve as a sure guarantee of the future. This would be my last war, and decide the political fate of Europe. Some have attributed to me the project of marching into India through Persia. I do not deny having thought of the possibility of sending an expedition there; but it would have been only a secondary object, totally subordinate to such arrangements as we might make with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. I had no idea of going there in person. No great force was required to destroy the monstrous edifice of the English company; twenty thousand good soldiers, a large number of officers, a little money, and a good understanding with the Mahratta chiefs would have been sufficient to accomplish this object.

The essential base of my project was the resurrection of Poland, a subject as delicate to treat upon with Austria as with Russia. It was necessary to guarantee Galicia to the former, or to offer her ample indemnities in Italy and Germany. But this was to abandon possessions useful, certain, and contiguous to my empire, for distant and uncertain acquisitions,—a sacrifice which I made dependent on the success of the war. It was so arranged in the secret articles of the treaty with Austria. I knew that a formal proclamation of the reestablishment of Poland would form an insurmountable obstacle to any arrangement with Russia; if I took away from her, by a public act, Lithuania, Podolia, and Volhynia, it made it necessary to carry on the war till the cession should be sanctioned by a treaty of

peace, and at the same time announce to Alexander that he must conquer or die. In attacking a colossal power like Russia, it would have been madness to destroy in advance all chance of a reconciliation, and to dispose of provinces which were as yet unconquered. All that I could do was to prepare this emancipation and to tranquillize Austria, reserving to myself the right to exchange the remainder of Galicia for the Illyrian provinces; this was to admit the principle of the future reunion of ancient Poland into one consolidated power; which would have been an immense step in favor of the Poles, but they did not appreciate it, and a hundred pamphlets have reproached me with having sacrificed them to my own private views and interests. This project was the cause of all my disasters, and posterity will blame me for having undertaken it; but, even now, I do not well see how the war could have been avoided, and I preferred conducting it myself to leaving it for my successor.

If it had depended on me to determine the time of this war with Russia, everything continuing as had been arranged at Tilsit, I should certainly have delayed it for two or three years, till I could end the war in Spain. But in these three years Russia might entirely destroy my Continental System—the ruling motive of my policy. If she should augment her forces and overthrow my power in the north of Germany, while I was personally engaged in Spain, I should lose more than I gained by postponing the war. It seemed better to delay for a couple of years the termination of the war in Spain; for by this time the grand question of the North would be settled, and we might then definitely arrange the affairs of the South. By sending an annual reinforcement of twenty-five thousand recruits to my army in Spain, I hoped to enable it to maintain its present position in the defensive; this was all I required. The question was, therefore, reduced to these two points: If I first directed my efforts to the North, the South could give me no serious cause for fear; but if I first went to the South, the North might rise and render the condition of affairs still more doubtful than in 1809. By deferring the subjugation of Spain for two years, I was merely prolonging a guerrilla war which could have no dangerous consequences; but by deferring for two years the war in the North I could gain no advantage which would be decisive in determining the main question at issue; even had I become master of Lisbon, Cadiz, Carthagen, and Oporto, it would still have been necessary to hold them militarily, and no additional troops could have been drawn from the army of occupation in Spain to march against Russia; whereas, in the mean time, the English policy, dominant at St. Petersburg and Stockholm, might have reached Berlin; it



might even have shaken Vienna at the moment when I was attacking Torres Vedras.

I held Prussia by her proposition of an alliance. Fear, my marriage, and the hope of gaining new indemnities gave me a temporary assurance of Austria; Sweden still hesitated; although Bernadotte and myself were not the best of friends, still he was a Frenchman, and the interests of Sweden and France had been identical for a century past; with our aid, he might reconquer Finland and restore it to his kingdom. The rather abrupt occupation of Pomerania was indeed a temporary grief, but not one for which the Swedish interests should be sacrificed, or still less the French sentiments of this government. I had every reason to believe that I had only to show to Sweden the road to Abo and Sweaborg to make certain of her coöperation. Turkey had recently sustained reverses and entered into a treaty; but there was no reason to think that when the Porte should be certain of our armaments against Russia, it would not resume a hostile attitude toward that power.

By deferring this enterprise in order to go myself to the Spanish peninsula, I might lose all these advantages; and the new chances of the war might change my doubtful allies into open enemies, and render the others but lukewarm in their friendship. Independently of these motives, I had full confidence in the issue of this war; a confidence which was authorized by all the preceding events of my history.

OPINIONS OF NAPOLEON'S COUNSELORS.—But there was no want of objections to my project; if many of the public functionaries and generals whom I consulted adopted my opinion, by far the greatest number recoiled from the difficulties of the enterprise. The grand usher, Caulaincourt, who had recently been ambassador of the Court of Russia, was not the least ardent in opposing it. He endeavored to demonstrate that it was authorized neither by interest nor necessity, and drew a frightful picture of the obstacles which the climate and the immense extent of the Russian Empire would oppose to our success. He represented the advantage which the Russian soldier, inured to that rigorous climate, would have over our southern soldiers, one-half of whom would encumber our hospitals before the termination of the enterprise. Even the Muscovite horses, by their half savage training, would be found superior to those of Germany and Normandy, which were accustomed to an abundant and regular supply of food, and were, therefore, less fitted for the fatigues and privations of such an enterprise. The severe discipline, the impassible character, the constancy and firmness of those soldiers who have no country or friends but their colors,

give to the Russian army a solidity which is elsewhere sought for in vain. Of course they are subject, like ourselves, to the chances of war; but with them sickness is more rare than with any other army; desertion is with them unknown; and the dispersion of organized corps is prevented by an instinct which makes them huddle together like sheep in case of danger; an instinct originating partly in the docile character and severe discipline of the soldier, and partly in the habit of never separating from their colors, which they had formed in their wars with the Turks, where every straggler was certain to be cut off by the enemy's cavalry. The grand master of ceremonies, M. de Segur, who had been the French ambassador to Russia in the reign of Catherine, and who was the author of the advantageous commercial treaty of 1787, supported with all his eloquence the party that opposed the war; Duroc also joined in the opposition.

Those of my counselors who approved the enterprise, said: "If we neglect to profit by the ascendancy of the Emperor Napoleon over his adversaries, and the military superiority which he has exhibited in all his battles, from the Niemen to the Nile—if we now defer taking from Russia the power to injure us, who will dare, after Napoleon's death, to oppose the efforts of that empire to destroy his work? What captain can be found capable of sustaining, with a French army, the feeble duchy of Warsaw, against which Austria herself will then conspire, the alliance of that power being entirely dependent on the life of the Emperor? Austria has too many losses to repair, and too many injuries to avenge, not to turn against us on his death. Why should we defer consolidating this immense edifice and placing it on an immovable base, now that there is a fit occasion? It is no augmentation of this power that is sought, but merely a consolidation of that which exists and a guarantee of the future. What is now required to complete this glorious edifice? Would not a second Friedland on the fields of Wilna suffice? And are we not certain of victory, if we but look at the past, and consider the numerous phalanxes that march under our colors?"

To these arguments the opponents of the war replied: "Who will compel the Russians to give us battle in the old Polish provinces, when it is evidently their interest to fight only on the Dwina? Lithuania is little better than the deserts of Asia. Unlike Courland and Samogitia, it is covered with vast forests and marshes, and human habitations are there as scarce as cultivated fields. The enemy can surrender to us such provinces without in the least compromising his safety; we shall be as ill at ease in the marshes of the Beresina, the Lepel, and the Pripetz as in the mud of Pultusk and Ostrolenka. Obstacles will multiply in our

way if the enemy, led by a second Fabius, only temporizes and falls back on the center of his power and resources. The first war of 1807 owed its success, in a considerable degree, to the numerous cities and immense resources of old Prussia; it was Dantzic, Elbing, Thorn, Braunsberg, Osterode, Allenstein, Eylau, Gustadt, Holland, Bischofswerder, the Island of Nogat, that enabled us to support an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men. But the hamlets of Lithuania, peopled by miserable Jews, can furnish us no supplies for our troops, our hospitals or *dépôts*; cantonments will there be nothing better than miserable bivouacs. Will it be prudent to throw our army into these distant deserts, across countries made insurgent by this invasion, or by the ravages of preceding campaigns? to support our base on Prussia, already humiliated and trodden upon? Is it wise to trace a line of operations five hundred leagues in extent through a hostile country, where the embers of ill-extinguished fires are ready to burst forth into a volcano? And during all this long and perilous enterprise, shall we leave France exposed to the attacks of her enemies, and endanger her security and internal tranquillity by again rousing from sleep the tiger of party spirit?"

**MILITARY CHANCES OF SUCCESS.**—All these arguments were not sufficient to deter me from the enterprise. I could not dispute the existence of numerous obstacles, but my genius consisted in comprehending the difficulties of an affair, and in seeing, at the same time, the means by which these difficulties could be overcome. I must confess, however, that fifteen years of uninterrupted success had made me overconfident in my own resources. I saw all the obstacles, but I did not attach to them sufficient importance. I was not ignorant that Russia, based on the Frozen Ocean and the deserts of Great Tartary, was difficult to subjugate, and that it would be impossible to pursue her army and her government, if they should retreat before our eagles to the Ural; but, at the same time, I was aware that the very extent of her empire rendered it the more dependent on the center of its vitality, and that this source or center of vitality was Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the army.

I held the Russian army in the highest estimation; and if the contrary opinions are drawn from my bulletins and the *Moniteur*, it must be remembered that such expressions were intended for a particular object. But the greater my estimation of that army, the more was I convinced that it constituted the real strength of Russia. I thought that the self-esteem of the Russians would not suffer them to evacuate Lithuania without a general battle; and if I could gain, at Wilna, Smolensko, or Witepsk, a victory like that of Friedland, all Europe would be at my disposal.



Could I ever give battle with a greater object, where the probabilities of success were so positive, or the results of that success so immense? I had decided the fate of Europe at Austerlitz and Friedland with eighty thousand men, and now was it not still more probable that, with four hundred and fifty thousand, I would definitely fix that destiny? Even if the first battle should be undecisive, like that of Eylau, and I should lose an equal number of brave men without result, would I not still have an army of four hundred thousand men with which to retrieve a fortune which had attended me for the last twenty years?

With so many probabilities in my favor, ought I to leave to my successor the task of sustaining, on the Vistula, an imperfectly organized Poland, and to contend, at the same time, with England and the other powers who, at my death, would attempt the restoration of the Bourbons? Undoubtedly it would have been better to leave to my son the chance of this uncertain contest in the North, than the destiny which I finally bequeathed him; but, in judging of my conduct in this case, it is necessary to consider all the chances which militated in my favor. I certainly deemed the result less doubtful, with Austria and Prussia on my side, than it was at Eylau in 1807, when Austria might have fallen on my rear, between the Elbe and the Oder, have revived the sinking courage of the Prussians, and cut off all hopes of retreat. Now, based on Dantzic, Graudentz, Modlin, and Warsaw, and at the head of the armies of all Europe, how could I anticipate such a result?

With respect to the other objections to the war, I will add that I felt very little apprehension from party spirit in France; that I expected to direct the affairs of the empire from my headquarters, as in my preceding wars; the Empress assisting in my councils; that the whole nation, being organized into three *bans* or classes, would give for the first *ban* one hundred and twenty thousand men in the flower of their age, who, formed into cohorts, and disciplined in the *cadres* or skeletons detached from the line, would supply the places of veterans in guarding our fortifications, our harbors, and the interior of France. I had nothing to fear from Germany, since I took with me the *élite* corps of Austria and Prussia; and I had no apprehensions of another maritime expedition by the English, who were sufficiently occupied in Spain, and not disposed to repeat the disasters of Antwerp. With respect to provisions, I could purchase an abundance of grain of the Poles, and deposit it at Dantzic; and, in return for this money, the Poles would furnish me fifty thousand good soldiers; beef could be procured in Galicia; and I could organize twenty new battalions of the provision train to increase our means of trans-

portation.\* Prussia had owed us several millions since the treaty of Tilsit, and would pay us in the magazines which she had laid up: thus affording me a year's supply of provisions in the rear of my army. I had no desire to imitate Cambyses, or the Emperor Julian, or Crassus; all my measures were adopted with care, and every possible precaution taken to provide against disasters like theirs. It was possible that I might be defeated, and forced to fall back on the Vistula, but I regarded this as the extent of the evil which could happen to me. The chances of the enterprise being decidedly in my favor, I had only to determine whether the proper time had come for its commencement, or whether it could be any longer postponed.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA.—Thus far, our discussions with Russia had been limited to vague complaints and imperfect explanations, while both parties were collecting troops. Causes of complaint were not wanting, but they were rather alluded to than pressed for negotiation, each party fearing to hasten a rupture, which might be so important in its consequences, and which there were so many reasons for postponing. I only knew that Russia complained of the increase of the duchy of Warsaw, of the additions made to my empire, and especially of the annexation of Oldenburg; she desired Dantzic in exchange for that principality, but she did not say positively what were her views with respect to Poland, leaving me to infer that nothing but the literal execution of the treaty of Tilsit would satisfy her. On my side, I complained of the infractions of the Continental System, of new laws calculated to injure French commerce, and of the raising of new troops.

FRUITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM.—If Russia had consented to adhere to the Continental System, I could have asked nothing better than the continuance of our friendly relations; for the fruits of this system were beginning to appear. The distress of the English manufactories was manifesting itself in the rising of the workmen against the use of machinery, and the sufferings of this class of men were becoming matters of serious importance. In the Parliament, even Brougham declared the British Orders in Council to be the cause of the public distress. Notes of the Bank of England had considerably depreciated in value, and the exchange on London had fallen to seventy per cent. It was too much to expect me to renounce this system, just as I was beginning to reap its fruits. If my adherence to this system should produce an alliance between Russia and England, this

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\*Battalions of military equipages were organized after the battle of Eylau, the caissons being arranged and drawn like a train of artillery.

was unavoidable, for war was preferable to its renunciation. By this war I hoped to accomplish two objects at the same time: first, to effect the reëstablishment of Poland; and second, to force the return of Russia to the Continental System. I flattered myself that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, surprised at the numerous forces which I would bring into the field, at a time when it supposed my means were exhausted, would yield to my conditions, and that all our difficulties would be compromised. But matters had gone too far to be easily arranged: I might consent to abstain from any coöperation in the restoration of Poland, but to place things on the footing agreed upon at Tilsit was difficult, after the annexation of Galicia.

OCCUPATION OF SWEDISH POMERANIA.—While we were discussing these causes of mutual complaint, circumstances occurred which were calculated to increase them. The English *dépôt* on the rock of Heligoland had become one of the richest bazaars of the old world—a real political and military arsenal. Colonial merchandise from this place found its way into the North under the neutral flag of America, and on the coast between Holland and Lübeck by the little contraband coasters. The occupation of the Hanseatic cities had closed all the commercial avenues; but the port of Stralsund and Swedish Pomerania, notwithstanding the official declarations of the Cabinet of Stockholm, still carried on a considerable fraudulent traffic. I was not more pleased with the political course of Bernadotte than with this clandestine commerce, and I consequently ordered Davoust to occupy Pomerania in the early part of January. It would have been perfectly absurd for me to induce Russia, Denmark, Prussia, Austria and Spain to close their ports while contraband articles were admitted into the ports of Sweden, a country which was entirely at our discretion. Bernadotte, irritated at this measure, sought the support of Russia, and complained at the Court of St. Petersburg of an aggression which his own conduct had provoked. Considering the existing relations between France and Russia, this step was calculated to produce a sensation. The Emperor Alexander, who, since 1809, had been persuaded that I designed to attack him, regarded this as preliminary to the opening of hostilities. In the unsettled state of our affairs, I had deemed it necessary to increase the garrison of Dantzic to twenty thousand men, and, at the same time, to reinforce those of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. These measures, in the eyes of Russia, were so many additional proofs of hostility, and only tended to aggravate the wound which had already been inflicted by the augmentation of the duchy of Warsaw and the annexation of Oldenburg.



**ALLIANCE WITH PRUSSIA.**—While my propositions and the responses of Russia were being exchanged, and it was announced at St. Petersburg that Count Nesselrode was about to be sent to France with new proposals, I directed my attention to forming the alliance with Prussia which had been offered to me a year before. It has been said by some that, not being able to fully trust this power, I ought to have overthrown the monarchy of the great Frederick, which was already surrounded by my troops. This opinion, though specious, is not entirely correct. Frederick William had always exhibited a character of perfect rectitude; and if the humiliation of the peace of Tilsit had incited him against me, it was, nevertheless, possible to induce him to enter fully into my system, by showing him the possibility of the restoration of his kingdom to what it was in 1806. If he had more to hope from me than from my enemies, he might attach himself sincerely to my cause. The army and people might not have been so easily persuaded; nevertheless, they also would have been attached to my cause by the plan proposed in 1806 by Jomini—that is, by giving to Prussia either the kingdom of Poland or the presidency of the Confederation of the Rhine, with indemnities. The former would probably have been the most wise; for if it had not been so advantageous as the complete reestablishment of the throne of Sobieski, it would, nevertheless, have been preferable to an imperfect restoration of Poland, surrounded by enemies anxious for a new partition. This would have been a strong inducement to Prussia to remain faithful to my cause, and would have afforded to the Poles hopes of a better future. The King of Saxony could have been easily indemnified. If I had followed the advice to destroy Prussia at the beginning of hostilities, it would have required one hundred thousand soldiers to guard the monarchy; moreover, I might have found a German Vendée in the mountains of Silesia and the forests of La Marche. I took a middle course: to attach the King to my cause by hopes of indemnities in Courland, and at the same time to observe his country with a reserve of fifty thousand men, which would supply my army with recruits and guard my magazines. The fear of doing too much for a country which was ill-disposed toward me prevented me from giving ample satisfaction to the Cabinet of Berlin; and the fear of embarrassing myself with new enemies prevented me from acting in a hostile manner toward her. It was, however, no small advantage to obtain from a country ready to join the ranks of the enemy an auxiliary force of twenty thousand men and abundant supplies; and I hoped that my victories would soon attach them firmly to my cause. I therefore directed the Duke of Bassano to negoti-

ate with Krusemarck on the proposals of the Cabinet of Berlin; the affair was soon arranged and the treaty signed on the twenty-sixth of February. Frederick William made numerous efforts to arrange the difficulties between France and Russia, but his efforts produced no effect.

**PACIFIC MISSION OF CZERNITSSCHEFF.**—As soon as I had completed this alliance with the Cabinet of Berlin, I resolved to make a final effort to arrange our difficulties with Russia and thus avoid war. As the discussions of our ambassadors led to no satisfactory result, and the promised mission of Count Nesselrode had been postponed, I called Colonel Czernitscheff, the *aide-de-camp* of the Emperor Alexander, who had resided near my court since the campaign of 1809, and directed him to bear to his master the following proposals for a pacific arrangement of our differences, viz.: “*I am ready to agree to make no further increase to the duchy of Warsaw, and to give an indemnity for Oldenburg; but as I have occupied that country solely for the purpose of cutting off all clandestine communication with England, I can not concede Dantzic, which would soon become an English entrepôt. I offer in exchange Erfurth and its territory. Finally, if the Emperor will adhere to the Continental System, I will give my assent to the system of licenses to Russian merchants, provided the new commercial laws against France are modified by a new treaty.*”

With these propositions Czernitscheff took also the returns of our troops, which he obtained through the treachery of one of the clerks of the war office; this was important information for the Emperor Alexander, but information which he would probably have soon obtained from other sources had it not been procured by Czernitscheff, so difficult is it to conceal such matters from the diplomatic agents of an enemy.

**OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE WITH AUSTRIA.**—In the mean time, Austria signed a treaty of alliance more close than that of our family relations. My political position made me feel the importance of connecting this power more closely to my enterprise, for I was well aware that my marriage would not prevent her from an armed mediation, as soon as I had penetrated into the interior of Russia. The Cabinet of Vienna anticipated my wishes by voluntarily offering to share with me the chances of the war; it proposed even more than I could have ventured to ask, and the treaty was signed on the fourteenth of March.

**RESULT OF THE MISSION OF CZERNITSSCHEFF.**—Czernitscheff had reached St. Petersburg on the tenth of March; but the Emperor Alexander did not find in my proposals anything to induce him to change the course of conduct which he had

marked out for himself.\* A whole month passed without any response being made to these propositions. To the natural distrust of my pacific intentions caused by the affairs of Poland and Oldenburg, and the increase of the garrison of Dantzic, was, at this time, added one of those intrigues to which the Russian court is so often subject. Alexander's most intimate counselor was suddenly arrested and banished to Siberia, on the charge of a connection with me and my ministers. These charges were afterwards found to be utterly false, and the minister was appointed governor of Siberia—a reparation as honorable to the monarch as to his counselor. It is probable that this intrigue of a coterie had some little influence on external politics, but far less than was supposed at the time. The causes which have already been mentioned were sufficient to determine the course of the Emperor Alexander, without attributing it to any influence of petty coteries.

PROPOSALS OF PEACE TO ENGLAND.—While the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was deliberating on my propositions, I opened negotiations with England. Strong in the advantageous position in which I was now placed by my alliances with Austria and Prussia, I nevertheless wished, before throwing down the gauntlet and again drawing the sword, to make a final appeal to England. She was the first cause of my contest in the North, and, if I could treat with her, I might renounce my Continental System, and give up my plan of the restoration of Poland. I therefore directed the Duke of Bassano to dispatch, on the seventeenth of April, a note to Lord Castlereagh with proposals of peace.

Our colonial differences had been swallowed up in the immense naval superiority of England, and in important continental questions. All our present difficulties had reference to Spain, Portugal, and the Two Sicilies. I proposed to proclaim the independence of Spain under the reigning dynasty, to restore Portugal to the House of Braganza, to leave Naples to Murat, and Sicily to Ferdinand. It seemed easy to decide these questions, which were nevertheless as important to England as to us. To propose to the Cabinet of London to recognize Joseph, when Wellington had taken Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajos, and when a war with Russia promised still more important successes, was to risk the chance of a refusal. Castlereagh naturally asked whether I meant, by the *reigning dynasty* in Spain, my brother Joseph or Ferdinand VII.? If it was impossible for the Prince

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\*The author here repeats the causes of the war as given at the beginning of the chapter—a repetition which is omitted in the translation.



Regent to recognize the former, it was equally difficult for me to consent to the restoration of the latter. It has been absurdly said that the peace of the world at this time depended upon the simple question of *Joseph or Ferdinand*, and that my decision was influenced by the interests of my brother. The real question to be decided in the recognition of Ferdinand was, whether Spain should belong to us or to England. To recognize that prince in 1812, after refusing to do so in 1808, and after keeping him captive for some years, would have placed Spain more decidedly than ever in the ranks of my enemies. It was not as the brother of Joseph, but as the chief of the French nation and of its interests, that I opposed the return of Ferdinand. To have *no more Pyrenees*, it was necessary that none of my enemies should occupy the throne of Spain. It is an unjust accusation to charge me with precipitating France into an interminable war, for the sake of my own family interests; and this charge of *nepotism* is the more absurd as Joseph had never given any convincing proofs of his attachment to my interests, and as I knew very well that Philip V. had declared war against the successor of Louis XIV., ten years after the latter had compromised the existence of France in order to place Philip on the Spanish throne.

*ULTIMATUM OF RUSSIA.*—The messenger who brought the response of Castlereagh was preceded only a few hours by the messenger who brought the *ultimatum* of Russia (April 24th). Prince Kourakin, the *chargé*, demanded the evacuation of Prussia and the places of the Oder, the reduction of the garrison of Dantzic, the conclusion of an arrangement with Sweden, and the evacuation of Pomerania. On these conditions Russia would agree to cut off all direct relations with England, but would not discontinue this intercourse through neutrals; commercial licenses would be given to Russian merchants, the same as was given in France; the Russian custom-house duties would be modified for the advantage of French commerce; and pacific negotiations would be entered into to fix upon an indemnity for Oldenburg.

These conditions were in themselves less objectionable than the manner in which they were proposed—that is, as an *ultimatum*. They certainly formed a striking contrast with my political position after the important alliances which I had just formed with Austria and Prussia; but in examining them at this day dispassionately, I must confess that they were the natural result of the position of Russia since 1807. It was a harsh requisition on the part of the Emperor Alexander to ask that I should retract the donation of Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw, and restore to Holland and the mouths of the Weser their independence, although the tenure of our treaties authorized this demand. To

require, for the security of his empire, the evacuation of Prussia was moderate on his part; but to demand this evacuation as a preliminary to any definite arrangement was to draw around me the circle of Popilius and subject me to a gratuitous humiliation.

The evacuation of the Prussian fortresses was a most serious matter: By such a measure I should have thrown Prussia into the ranks of my enemies; Frederick William would have unhesitatingly thrown himself into the arms of Alexander. He had already offered to do so, in 1811, if the Russians would take the offensive and advance upon the Oder. This circumstance was sufficient to prove that the moment I surrendered the Prussian fortresses, she would join the ranks of the enemy. Moreover, I should thereby compromise the duchy of Warsaw, which would have been invaded and destroyed in fifteen days. It may be said that, as Prussia was now my ally, this fear was chimerical; but the motives of this alliance having ceased, of course the policy of the Cabinet of Berlin would have changed. It is possible that Alexander, satisfied with some modifications in his maritime system, would not have taken advantage of the evacuation of Prussia to regain his superiority in the North; it is possible that he would have been satisfied with the restoration of his commerce and the tranquillity of his empire, and the increase of his territories, by Finland and several districts of Poland; while, on the other hand, he could have occupied the Turkish principalities which he so reasonably desired to possess. But what guarantee had I that he would be thus moderate, and that Prussia, with his assistance, would not rekindle the flames of war? Perhaps it was my misfortune on this occasion to have been too thoughtful of the future, and to have been too cautious in the arrangement of existing differences.

With respect to the duchy of Warsaw, it had now become almost impossible for me to restore things to the footing agreed upon at Tilsit; to revoke the annexation of Galicia would have given the death-blow to Poland. Russia did not peremptorily demand this, but it was evident that nothing short of this would entirely satisfy her.

But, as has already been said, it was less the character of the demands of Kourakin than the manner in which they were made that astonished me. If they had proposed a definitive treaty in which the evacuation of Prussia had been stipulated as an indemnity for sacrifices specified in the same treaty, I might have accepted the proposal; but to make this a condition preliminary to any arrangement of our differences was to place me in the condition of a man challenged to a duel and required to beg the pardon of his antagonist before entering into any explanation of the

cause of the quarrel. This course was so contrary to the usual urbanity of the Emperor Alexander that I could not help thinking that some intrigue had caused so complete a change in his character and manner of acting. Anxious to obtain some direct explanation from him, I resolved to dispatch M. de Narbonne on a special mission to Russia. This ancient courtier, reputed for his agreeable and captivating manners, had sufficient *finesse* and penetration to qualify him for so delicate a mission. He received orders to repair to St. Petersburg on the twenty-sixth of April; the pretext of his journey was to communicate to the Emperor the nature of my recent negotiation with England, while its real object was to penetrate the mystery of Alexander's recent conduct, and to ascertain if there were any means of inducing him to adhere to the Continental System.

NAPOLEON REPAIRS TO DRESDEN.—In the meantime my army had been on the march for two months; it had crossed the Prussian territory and was already on the Oder. The time had now come to give the finishing hand to my preparations. I set out for Dresden, where I had appointed to meet my father-in-law, the King of Prussia, and the several German princes who marched under our banners. Never had my superiority been displayed in an assembly so august, and never, since the middle ages, had there been so imposing a meeting of sovereigns. Who could have believed that two years after the same sovereigns, assembled at Vienna, would have put me under the ban of nations? . . . . Nothing was neglected that could increase the splendor of this assembly. The *élite* of the Parisian theaters were there; and *fêtes*, concerts, and plays served as a prelude to the great tragedy which we were preparing to act.

It is the present object to explain my political and military acts, rather than to describe the splendor of courts, or the anecdotes and adventures of the *salons*. I can not, however, omit to mention the interview between Maria Louisa and her father—the first since her marriage. He had sent her to my court as an expiatory victim; he found her radiant with satisfaction and glory, and proud of my power, which had placed her on the first throne in the universe—not an usurped throne as some fools have asserted, but a throne erected by my genius and my sword. Animated by sentiments very different from those of his son-in-law, this proud descendant of the courts of Hapsburg perceived none of that glory with which I illumined the brow of his daughter; but told her with transport, that as I was a descendant of the Princess of Treviso, she need not blush at having given me her hand!!! I left him the petty satisfaction of believing the doubtful genealogies which his courtiers had discovered in old parch-



ments, convinced myself that if there were really any descendants of the Bonaparte who once reigned at Treviso, they would one day pride themselves less in being his descendants than in being mine.\*

I learned at Dresden that the Emperor Alexander had left his capital to repair to Wilna. Fearing that Narbonne might be too late to meet him, I directed to Maret a letter for Lauriston, my ambassador at St. Petersburg, charging him to repair to the Emperor with all possible haste, and to endeavor to revive his former sentiments of friendship for me, and to discover the true cause of his change—a change which I then attributed more to petty intrigues than to considerations of high political policy. Less credit is due to these pacific measures on my part than has been attributed to them by my friends; but they were nevertheless sincere: for, if I could have induced Alexander, by an advantageous treaty of commerce, to maintain the Continental System, and thus avoid a war, I could instantly fly to Spain; and, in case of refusal, I could then pursue the enterprise which I had undertaken, as my troops, which had been collected from the four corners of Europe, were already assembling on the Vistula.

RETURN OF NARBONNE.—I waited with impatience for the return of Narbonne, who at length arrived on the twenty-eighth of May. He had found the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, who exhibited neither a spirit of boasting nor of apprehension, but refused to add to, or to retrench in any respect, the proposals made by Kourakin. War was therefore inevitable.

PRADT'S MISSION TO WARSAW.—The news received from Wilna announced that the Emperor of Russia was seeking to attach to himself the Poles of the Russian provinces by benefits and conciliatory measures. It was therefore more urgent than ever that I should immediately act upon my project of declaring the independence of Poland. Towards the end of 1811, I had designed sending Talleyrand to Warsaw, to arrange with the Polish provinces the necessary measures for the restoration of their country. Since the reprimand which I gave him on my return from Spain, he had had no connection with the affairs of state, but was burning to be again employed. This mission was one of cunning and intrigue, and well suited to his talent. But the vindictive diplomatist, charmed at having an opportunity to thwart my projects, took the first opportunity to divulge them to the Court of Vienna, where, of all places, he ought to have been

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\*Napoleon, in the St. Helena "Memoirs," discusses this reputed genealogy, showing that he did not attach to it the slightest importance. The discussion, however, is interesting to those who attach importance to such investigations, or their results.

the most careful to conceal them. I could hardly restrain my indignation at such a procedure, which was in reality high treason against the interests of France. I was on the point of pronouncing his exile; but as he had been intrusted with the most important secrets of state, it would have been necessary to condemn him to death or to imprisonment for life: this I was unwilling to do. The excitement caused by these developments of Talleyrand forced me to postpone the mission till after the alliance with Austria. I finally charged M. de Pradt, Archbishop of Mechlin, with it. He was a man more ambitious than shrewd, and still more vain than ambitious. He had, however, eloquence and a poetical imagination, and I hoped that he would be able to rouse the enthusiasm of the Polish nation. I unbosomed to him that I hoped to gain two battles, and dictate peace at Moscow; but that, if the war was prolonged, I would leave the Poles an auxiliary force of one hundred thousand men, with which they could themselves complete their work of restoration. It was important to excite their patriotism to the highest degree, and to determine them to make the greatest sacrifices; for it was for their existence that I had taken up arms.\*

MISSION OF LIGNEUL TO SWEDEN.—I left Dresden the twenty-ninth of May, to reach, by Posen, the head-quarters of my army at Thorn. Hardly had I left the capital of Frederick Augustus when M. Ligneul returned there from Stockholm. He was an intimate friend of Bernadotte, whom I had sent to arrange

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\*Dominique Dufour de Pradt, known as Abbé de Pradt, was born in the province of Auvergne, in 1759, and early entered the Church under the patronage of the Archbishop of Rouen. In the early part of the Revolution he took a prominent position in politics, and was elected deputy to the States-General. He opposed the Revolution, and fled from France among the first *émigrés*. He became a strong partisan of the Bourbon cause in Europe, and during his exile published anonymously several books and pamphlets against the government of his own country. Considering the hopes of the Bourbons destroyed by the eighteenth Brumaire, he applied through his relative, General Duroc, for permission to return to France, which, through Duroc's influence, was granted by Napoleon, who afterwards appointed him his First Almoner, and afterwards made him Archbishop of Mechlin.

By his talents as a writer and his great conversational powers he at one time acquired considerable influence with the Emperor, but was much disliked by the generals on account of his sycophancy and character for intrigue. Having successfully filled several unimportant missions, Napoleon selected him in 1812 as his agent or ambassador to Warsaw. Either through incapacity, or, as it was charged, a desire to keep on good terms with Austria and Prussia, he accomplished none of the objects of his mission, and, on Napoleon's return from Moscow, was dismissed and sent back to France.

our difficulties with Sweden. He reported that the Prince Royal was ready to forget all that had passed, and join my banners; but that he required a subsidy to aid him in carrying on the war, and Norway as an indemnity for the sacrifices made by Sweden! I was not in the situation, nor the humor, to purchase a doubtful ally at the expense of one that had always proved itself faithful. A Swedish diversion by Torneo could not have sufficient influence upon the great question at issue to induce me to subscribe to conditions which were calculated only to incite my anger.

PREPARATIONS FOR OPENING THE CAMPAIGN.—Thoroughly persuaded of the immense importance of the contest in which I was about to engage, I had assembled the most numerous army that had ever fought in Europe. The great invasions of the Cimbrians and Huns have never presented a mass of combatants like that of the army of 1812. Reinforced by the troops of Prussia, Austria, and the Princes of the Confederation, I had, in April and May, an army of nearly half a million of men, crossing Prussia and the duchy of Warsaw to their *rendezvous* on the Niemen. I

Napoleon, at St. Helena, thus speaks of him: "The Abbé did not fulfil at Warsaw any of the objects which had been intended. (On the contrary, he did a great deal of mischief.) Reports against him poured in from every quarter. Even the young men, the clerks attached to the embassy, were surprised at his conduct, and went so far as to accuse him of maintaining an understanding with the enemy, which I by no means believed. But he certainly had a long talk with me, which he misrepresents, as might have been expected; and it was at the very moment when he was delivering a long, prosy speech, which appeared to me a mere string of absurdity and impertinence, that I scrawled on the corner of the chimney-piece the order to withdraw him from his embassy, and to send him, as soon as possible, to France; a circumstance which was the cause of a good deal of merriment at the time, which the Abbé seems very desirous of concealing."

On his return to France, the Abbé commenced his intrigues for the restoration of the Bourbons, but so adroitly as to escape prosecution. In 1814, when the Allies reached the vicinity of Paris, he resumed all his activity, and excelled even the ultra-royalists in bitterness against Napoleon.

An anecdote is related of his interview with Caulaincourt at the gate of the court of the allied sovereigns, around which the priest was hovering, and rubbing his hands with delight at the news of the abdication. After vainly seeking to obtain more favorable terms, Caulaincourt was retiring in deep dejection when he encountered the Abbé at the door. The latter made some insulting remarks in regard to the fall of his former patron, when the Duke, losing all self-control, seized the sycophantic and ungrateful priest by the collar, and, after almost shaking the breath out of his body, turned him around upon his heels like a top, and then contemptuously turning his back upon him, walked away. The Abbé did not easily forget this rude pirouette, and it required the balm of many honors from the restored Bourbons to soothe his wounded pride.

He was a voluminous writer, but diffuse and inaccurate, utterly disregarding the facts of history and geography, whenever it suited his purpose to misstate them.



hoped that the Russians would defend Lithuania, and I felt certain of gaining the battle if they would accept one; but those who think that I had previously determined any further than this on my plan of campaign are in error: my operations were to depend upon those of the enemy.

DIVERSION OF THE TURKS.—I had counted on a powerful diversion of the Turks; and as soon as the treaty of alliance with Austria had guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, I directed Andréossi, my ambassador at Vienna, to repair to Constantinople for the purpose of forming an alliance there, and of arranging a common plan of operations. He was retained a long time upon the frontier waiting the *firman* of the Grand Seigneur, and had hardly reached the capital when I crossed the Niemen. It was now too late: the gold of England and the intrigues of the Morouzzi had corrupted the Divan, and even the Vizir; and these ignorant disciples of Mohamet made peace at the very moment when they might have repaired the losses of a century of disastrous wars. This peace was signed on the twenty-fifth of May, at the Russian head-quarters at Bucharest, and was not known when I crossed the Niemen. Some have attempted to justify the course of the Turks at my expense, and have accused me of wishing to sacrifice them. The affairs of Spain forced me to abandon the Mussulman interests at Erfurth, in order to conciliate Russia; but now, when I was about to strike at the heart of this rival empire, I necessarily became the natural ally of the Turks. It required no great genius to comprehend this truth, and to profit by the occasion which I offered them of regaining at a single blow all that they had lost since the reign of Peter the Great. It was not to gratify me that they were to renew the war, but for their own manifest interest. On the contrary, they signed a disgraceful peace, yielding Bessarabia at the most favorable moment ever presented for carrying on the war with certain chances of success. I evidently relied too much on the Turks pursuing their own manifest interest; for, if I had known the influence of their petty intrigues, I might have scattered two or three millions of francs among the counselors of Mahmoud, and have thus obtained a diversion of a hundred thousand Turks on the Dnieper. I at one time thought of sending the Viceroy of Italy with an army by the Illyrian provinces on Servia, in order to act in concert with that of the Turks. By this means I hoped to encourage them, and destroy the impression which had been produced by my temporary alliance with Russia. Sébastiani had negotiated, in 1807, the passage of a corps of twenty-five thousand men; but now I would have sent fifty thousand. Unfortunately, times had changed, and the difficulty of arranging such an oper-

ation with these barbarians induced me to renounce a project which would have secured a powerful diversion for the invasion of Podolia.

**DISPOSITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.**—If I had previously formed a definitive plan of campaign, the present dispositions of the Russians would have forced me to deviate from it, for how could I have supposed it possible that the Russian army would remain divided and scattered along their entire frontier? They had organized their forces into separate armies: The first, commanded by General Barclay, about a hundred and thirty thousand strong (exclusive of Platof's Cossacks), was cantoned behind the Niemen from Rossieny to Lida: Wittgenstein, on the right near Rossieny; Bagawouth, between Wilia and that city; Touczkoff, at Troki; the fourth corps, at Olkeniki on the road to Merez; Doctorof, at Lida; the guards and reserves, about Wilna; with the light troops bordering the Niemen. The second, commanded by Prince Bagration, fifty thousand strong, was cantoned in the environs of Wolkowisk, opposite the gap between the Niemen and the Bug. A third, commanded by General Tormassof, forty thousand combatants, was in rear of the Bug in the environs of Loutsk. Platof with his Cossacks was opposite Grodno. There was a great difference of opinion among the Russian generals. Admiral Tchichagof, who had succeeded Kutusof in Moldavia, had thought to penetrate by Servia and the valley of the Danube into Illyria and Italy; Prince Bagration wished to invade the duchy of Warsaw, dissolve the Polish army, destroy our establishments, and dispute the country between the Vistula and the Niemen; Barclay wished to await the enemy; Fuhl wished to allow us to advance into Lithuania, to fall back upon Drissa, and act on our flanks with the armies of Bagration and Tormassof, one on the Bug and the other on the Pinsk. They were still discussing these projects when my army was collecting from all directions on the Niemen, like a threatening tempest. My forces were crossing old Prussia about the middle of June. I passed successively in review in the environs of Königsberg, Insterburg, and Gumbinnen the splendid troops which were collecting from all directions, and concentrated my principal mass on Wilkowisk and Kowno.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.**—The following was the composition of the Russian armies in this campaign:

I. THE ARMY OF BARCLAY.

		Cossack		
		Bats.	Sqds.	Rgts.
1st corps, commanded by <i>Wittgenstein</i> ;	divisions of <i>Berg</i> , <i>Sazonof</i> , and <i>Kakowskoj</i> .....	28	16	3
2d " "	<i>Bagawouth</i> ; divisions of <i>Olsousief</i> and <i>Prince Eugene of Würtem-</i> <i>berg</i> .....	24	8	
3d " "	<i>Touczkof</i> ; divisions of <i>Kanow-</i> <i>nitzin</i> and <i>Strogonof</i> .....	26	6	
4th " "	<i>Schowwalof</i> and <i>Osterman</i> ; divi-			
	sions of <i>Tschagelokof</i> and <i>Bach-</i> <i>metief</i> .....	22	8	
5th " "	<i>Grand Duke Constantine</i> ; guards and reserves, under <i>Iermolof</i> , <i>Depreradowich</i> and <i>Galitzin</i> .....	26	20	
6th " "	<i>Doctorof</i> ; divisions of <i>Kopsewicz</i> and <i>Lichatschef</i> .....	24	8	
Cavalry, 1st corps under <i>Ouvarof</i> .....			24	
" 2d " "	<i>Korf</i> .....		24	
" 3d " "	<i>Pahlen</i> .....		24	
<i>Platof's</i> Cossacks.....				14
Total.....		150	138	17

Making in all about one hundred and thirty-eight thousand men, of whom eight thousand were Cossacks under *Platof*.

II. ARMY OF BAGRATION.

		Bats.	Sqds.	Rgts.
7th corps under <i>Raefsky</i> ; <i>Paskiewicz</i> , <i>Kolubakin</i> , and <i>Was-</i> <i>siltchikof</i> .....		24	8	
8th " "	<i>Borosdin</i> ; <i>Prince Charles of Mecklenburg</i> , <i>Warrusof</i> , and <i>Newerowski</i> .....	22	20	
Cavalry, 4th corps under <i>Sievers</i> .....			24	
Cossacks.....				9
Total.....		46	52	9

This army numbered from forty-five to fifty thousand men.

III. ARMY OF TORMASSOF.

		Bats.	Sqds.	Rgts.
Corps of <i>Kamensky</i> ; divisions of <i>Scherbalof</i> .....		18	8	
" <i>Markof</i> ; two divisions.....		24	8	
" <i>Saken</i> ; divisions of <i>Sorokin</i> and <i>Laskin</i> .....		12	24	
Cavalry of <i>Lambert</i> .....			36	
Cossacks.....				9
Total.....		54	76	9

Making in all about forty thousand men.



## IV. ARMY OF ADMIRAL TCHICHAGOF.

	Bats.	Sqds.
Division of Langeron . . . . .	12	8
“ Essen . . . . .	12	8
“ Woinof . . . . .	11	12
“ Servia . . . . .	9	8
Corps of Sabaneef, in observation . . . . .	9	8
Total . . . . .	53	44

## V. CORPS OF FINLAND . . . . .16 bats. 63 sqds.

This organization was changed towards the close of the campaign. The army of Wittgenstein united to the corps of Finland was composed of three corps, seventy-five battalions, and thirty-eight squadrons; while Tchichagof's army was composed of six corps, one hundred and two battalions, and one hundred and sixteen squadrons.

**FRENCH AND ALLIED ARMY.**—The following was the organization of the French and allied army in this campaign:

Old Guard under <i>Lefèvre</i>	} divisions of Laborde, Curial, Raquet, and Claparède; cavalry of Walther	40,000
Young Guard under <i>Mortier</i>		
1st corps under <i>Davoust</i> ; divisions of Gudin, Friant, Morand, Dessaix, and Compans; cavalry of Gerardin, Pajol, and Bordesoule . . . . .		70,000
2d “ “ <i>Oudinot</i> ; divisions of Legrand, Verdier, and Merle; cavalry of Doumerc, Castel, and Corbineau . . . . .		42,000
3d “ “ <i>Ney</i> ; divisions of Ledru, Rozant, Marchand, and the Württembergers; cavalry of Wolworth and Mourier		40,000
4th “ “ <i>The Viceroy (Eugene)</i> ; divisions of Broussier, Delzons, Levchi, and Pino; cavalry of Guyon . . . . .		45,000
5th “ (Poles), under <i>Poniatowski</i> ; divisions of Zayouskeck, Dombrowsky, and Kniasewich; cavalry of Kamensky . . . . .		35,000
6th “ (Bavarians), under <i>Saint-Cyr</i> ; divisions of Wrede, Derol, and Sieben . . . . .		22,000
7th “ (Saxons), under <i>Reynier</i> ; divisions of Lecocq and Funk; cavalry of Gablentz . . . . .		16,000
8th “ (Westphallians), under <i>Junot</i> ; divisions of Tharreau and Ochs; cavalry of Wolff . . . . .		16,000
9th “ under <i>Belluno</i> ; divisions of Partonneaux, Daendels, and Girard; cavalry of Delaitre and Fournier . . . . .		32,000
10th “ “ <i>Macdonald</i> ; composed of the troops of Yorck, Moesenbach, and Grandjean . . . . .		32,000
11th “ (Reserve), under <i>Augereau</i> ; divisions of Heudelet, Loison, Durutte, Destres, and Morand; cavalry of Cavaignac		50,000
Cavalry, 1st corps, under <i>Nansouty</i> ; Bruyères, Saint-Germain, and Volence . . . . .		12,000
2d “ “ <i>Montbrun</i> ; Pajol, Wathier, and Defrance		10,000
3d “ “ <i>Grouchy</i> ; Chastel, Doumerc, and Lahaussaye . . . . .		7,700
4th “ “ <i>Latour-Maubourg</i> ; Rosniecky and Lorges . . . . .		8,000

Austrian Contingent under <i>Schwartzenberg</i> ; <i>Frimont</i> , <i>Bianchi</i> , <i>Siegenthal</i> , and <i>Trautenberg</i> .. . . . .	32,000
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Total: . . . . .	509,700
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These numbers exhibit the army organization, rather than the forces which actually made the campaign. About four hundred and eighty thousand crossed Prussia, but not more than three hundred and forty thousand advanced on the Dwina. Changes were also made in some of the corps: Doumerc was detached from Grouchy to Oudinot with a division of cuirassiers.

**NAPOLEON DETERMINES TO PIERCE THE ENEMY'S CENTER.**—Time is all-important in war, as is also the faculty of profiting by the faults of an enemy. The Russians being divided into separate and distant corps, it seemed possible to take them *en flagrant délit*. But as they had never in their former wars followed this fatal system of extended lines of isolated bodies, I was led to believe that the extension had been made merely for the purpose of subsistence, and that they would hasten to concentrate, on the approach of our troops. When, however, I learned that nothing of this kind was done, I deemed it of the greatest importance to anticipate any such movements. I resolved to cross the Niemen at Kowno, a salient point extremely favorable to my project. It was necessary to strike quickly and promptly, without waiting for our magazines, which were coming slowly from Dantzic by the Curish Haff to Königsberg; I therefore directed my troops to take with them provisions for fifteen days in their march across the territories of Prussia. This rigorous but necessary measure led to a multitude of excesses, by which Prussia most severely suffered. This country, rich in horses, was completely stripped of these animals under the pretext of transporting these provisions, the greater part of which, accumulated in immense parks, two or three days' march from the columns, could not keep pace with the troops, and fell a prey to the teamsters.

In order to derive the utmost advantage from my great superiority of forces, I formed the project of attacking the enemy along his entire front, taking care, however, to direct my principal effort upon the decisive point. For this purpose my army was divided into three grand masses. The principal one, two hundred and twenty thousand strong, under my own immediate orders, was to attack the first Russian army and pierce the center of their line; the King of Westphalia, with sixty-five thousand men, forming my right, was to act against the army of Prince Bagration; the Viceroy, with seventy thousand combatants, was to throw himself between these two Russian armies, to prevent their union; while,

on the left, Macdonald, at the head of some thirty thousand men, mostly Prussians, received orders to take the road to Riga.

It was a great operation to concentrate, at the exact time and place, forces so formidable and which had been brought from Pomerania, Mayence, Paris, Boulogne, Valladolid, Milan, and even from Naples; to form such an assemblage in the forests of the Niemen required not a little care and foresight in directing the march of the columns, and in arranging supplies for an army whose horses alone numbered two hundred thousand, and whose carriages numbered not less than twenty thousand. We might here, without exaggeration, use the hyperbole employed to describe the army of Xerxes: *after its passage, they endeavored to find the countries which it had passed over!*

**PASSAGE OF THE NIEMEN.**—On the twenty-fourth of June I passed the Niemen near Kowno on three bridges constructed in a few hours by General Eblé; the Russians did not oppose this passage. It would be difficult to describe my feelings at that moment. My splendid phalanxes now trod the soil of Russia, which no enemy had ventured to touch since the time of Peter the Great, and, if the war should prove successful, all Europe would be irrevocably subject to my power! There was something gigantic in our enterprise which struck us all; it was said that, like the Titans, we were going to scale the walls of Heaven; but we were far from foreseeing that their fate was also to be ours!

I advanced on the road to Wilna and Trocki, at the head of the corps of Davoust, the cavalry of Murat, and my guards. On my right Eugene passed to Piloni and was to direct himself on Roudnicki; on the left Oudinot marched by the left of the Wilia and Janowo; he attacked, at Develtowno, the rear guard of Wittgenstein coming from Keidoni, and took several hundred prisoners.

**RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS ON DRISSA.**—Barclay had collected at Wilna only two corps and the guards; he seemed for a moment to wish to defend the advantageous position of Trocki, in order to concentrate the army about Wilna. But he soon saw the critical nature of his position. If he remained at Wilna, he would, with seventy thousand men, have to contend with the mass of my army; if he joined Bagawouth and Wittgenstein on the right of the Wilia, he might be cut off on his left, which was extended to Lida; if he fell back on the road to Polotsk, his right would be greatly exposed. He had no other course than to pass the Wilia, to burn the bridges, and to destroy the magazines which had been collected at great expense, so as to gain Nementshin and march by Swenziany on Drissa, in order to rally his



army there, under the protection of the intrenched camp. The left, and especially Doctorof, had to make a forced march to gain, from Lida, the road to Michaeliski, and to rejoin him, if the thing was still possible. Bagration was to march from his side on the Dwina from Slonim, by Wileika or Minsk.

I entered Wilna on the twenty-eighth of June, at the head of my guards, the cavalry and the first *corps-d'armée*; my first attention was naturally directed to the military operations resulting from my combinations to pierce the enemy's center, and afterward to fall upon his wings. The King of Westphalia, who had reached Grodno, toward the end of June, followed the traces of Bagration. The Viceroy, who had passed the Niemen at Poloni, being delayed by the bad roads and the difficult nature of the country, sought to gain Roudnicki. Being uncertain whether he would succeed in anticipating the enemy, I thought to make sure of this, by pushing Davoust on Minsk, with two divisions of infantry, and his light cavalry, sustained by Grouchy's corps of cavalry; he reached the road to Smolensko before the enemy. Schwartzberg, who was in the direction of Slonim, would gain the extreme left of Bagration. Murat, with two divisions of Davoust's corps and his reserve of cavalry, put himself on the traces of Barclay on Swenziany, followed by Ney. Morand's division and the corps of Nansouty directed their march on Michaeliski, in order to form a corps intermediate between Murat and Davoust. Finally, Oudinot pursued Wittgenstein on the road to Dunaburg, and Macdonald drove the flying enemy on Mittau and Riga. My army, thus divided, pursued the enemy in every direction.

Doctorof, in seeking to gain Ozmiana, found there the light cavalry of Davoust. Being called by Barclay in the direction of Drissa, he was near falling into the midst of the columns of the King of Naples. The Russian general, however, marched with so much rapidity that he succeeded in gaining Swir before us. The similarity of his name to that of General Dorakof, who commanded a brigade of light cavalry in the army of Bagration, deceived our columns, which had been directed to intercept him. Nevertheless, it must be confessed, that he very skillfully extricated himself from his difficult situation.

When I saw the Russian armies falling back in all directions, I began to have some fears of the possibility of bringing them to a general action; still I hoped to envelope Bagration, and afterward to overthrow Barclay, if he should attempt for an instant to hold out alone. His absurd retreat on the Lower Dwina revived my hopes; he evidently wished to maneuver, like Benningsen in 1807; he threw himself in a false direction where I might readily find him after having destroyed his colleague. If they should

both retreat to the Borysthenese, I would pursue them, and thus disengage Poland; at Smolensko I would determine upon my subsequent operations. I had already announced my intention of halting at that place, if the enemy should escape me unhurt. I had a double motive in giving publicity to this intention—to encourage my own forces, by giving them some fixed point of termination for their severe privations and perpetual marching, and to induce the Russians to risk a battle to prevent my thus forming a permanent establishment in the very heart of their empire.

NAPOLEON'S DELAY AT WILNA.—I remained at Wilna for fifteen days; some have regarded this delay as an error. I had sufficient motives for it. In the first place, I wished to learn the result of the operations directed against the enemy's columns on my right and against the army of Bagration; secondly, to make arrangements for bringing up our magazines from Königsberg; thirdly, to organize a provisional government in Lithuania; and fourthly, to give time to the Viceroy and the Bavarians to join us and put themselves in line on the Dwina.\*

Our entrance into Lithuania had been attended by unfavorable circumstances; our horses could get no other forage than green rye, and were continually exposed to the most terrible rains; our artillery horses perished by entire teams; one hundred pieces of cannon and five hundred caissons were left without draught-animals; the suburbs of Wilna were encumbered with four or five thousand dead horses! The difficulties of procuring provisions, and the disorders of a rapid passage of three hundred thousand men, had occasioned a multitude of stragglers; these already numbered more than thirty thousand. All these circumstances rendered a short delay necessary in order to regulate affairs.

MISSION OF BALASCHOF.—A few days after our entrance into Wilna, the Emperor Alexander sent me General Balaschof, his *aid-de-camp* and minister of police, a man who had been pointed out to me as one of the warmest partisans of the English alliance. He brought the response to the advances of Lauriston. The Emperor announced his disposition to adhere to the Continental System, and to arrange the other points of dispute; but he required, as a preliminary step to any arrangement, that we should first retire behind the Niemen, being resolved to conquer or die, rather than to negotiate so long as a foreign soldier stood upon his territory. There was certainly greatness in this resolution, at a moment when the chances appeared evidently in my favor!

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\*Jomini thinks there may have been other and still more important causes for this delay, which are not known.

**RESPONSE OF NAPOLEON.**—I gave Balaschof to understand that I could not renounce the fruits of my maneuvers and go back, without some positive certainty of peace. Bagratiön was cut off and pursued, and I hoped to destroy him; it was manifestly for my interest to push forward to the Dwina, where I could better discuss our affairs and require guarantees. In fact, I attributed this mission of Balaschof mainly to a desire to gain time in order to unite the scattered Russian forces, and I permitted him to see that I regarded it in that light.

Some have thought that if Balaschof had arrived eight days sooner, he would have negotiated a peace; that the Russians would have retired behind the Dwina while I remained behind the Niemen, making Wilna neutral; that new combinations would here have been formed that would have changed the face of the world. These are mere conjectures. There is little reason to believe that the Russians would have consented to evacuate Lithuania, with four hundred thousand hostile troops on the Niemen, nor is it at all probable that Alexander and myself could have come to an understanding respecting the principal causes of our difference. The treaty of Vienna had so destroyed his confidence that my most sincere promises seemed to him mere lures, and his distrust had been still further augmented by the intrigues which I have already mentioned. Be this as it may, the return of Balaschof to Drissa, instead of tending to a pacific arrangement, became a kind of signal for an unrelenting war. Reports which reached me in my exile have led me to believe that he exaggerated to the Emperor Alexander the expressions which I used on that occasion. I do not know that these reports were well founded, but I suppose that this adventure, and the affair of Speranski, tended to fan, in the mind of Alexander, the hatred against me which influenced all his conduct, and which he was far from exhibiting after our intercourse at Tilsit and Erfurth.

**THE REESTABLISHMENT OF POLAND PROCLAIMED.**  
—I also received at Wilna the deputation of the kingdom of Poland. My ambassador, Pradt, had experienced very little difficulty in inducing them to the decisive step, of themselves proclaiming the restoration of their country. The Diet proclaimed the reestablishment of the Polish Confederation; but they confined themselves to mere declarations; the provinces occupied by the Russians did not act, and they all limited themselves to the tardy levy of some Lithuanian regiments, and the sending to Wilna of an executive commission of the kingdom, for the organization of the province. I could not make a formal and definitive recognition of the kingdom without offending Austria, and with-



out destroying the last hope of a reconciliation with Russia. I, however, promised to interest myself in its fate, when I should make a treaty of peace; it was not prudent, under the circumstances, for me to promise more, although I was determined to do everything in my power to effect this reëstablishment.\*

\*The following is Thiers' account of Napoleon's reply to the Polish deputation at Wilna, and its effect:

"Gentlemen," he said in reply to the address of the deputation, "Gentlemen, deputies of the Confederation of Poland, I have listened with much interest to all that you have just addressed to me! Poles, I should have thought and acted in your place as you have done; I should have acted as you have acted in the assembly at Warsaw. The love of country is the first virtue of civilized humanity.

"In my position I have many interests to conciliate, many duties to fulfill. Had I reigned in the time of the first, the second, or the third division of Poland, I would have armed all my people in your support. As soon as victory enabled me to restore your ancient laws to your capital and a portion of your provinces, I eagerly seized the opportunity.

"I love your nation. During sixteen years I have been accustomed to see its soldiers fighting by my side, on the battle-fields of Italy and Spain.

"I applaud all that you have done; I sanction the efforts which you have made; all that I can do to second them I will do.

"If your efforts be unanimous, you may well hope to succeed in compelling your enemies to recognize your rights; but in these distant and vast countries it is on the unanimous efforts of their peoples alone that such hopes of success can be founded.

"I addressed you in the same terms on my first appearance in Poland. I must add, that I have guaranteed to the Emperor of Austria the integrity of his states, and that I cannot authorize any maneuver or movement tending to disturb him in the peaceable possession of what remains to him of the Polish provinces. But let Lithuania, Samogitia, Witepsk, Polotsk, Mohilew, Volhynia, the Ukraine, and Podolia be animated with the same spirit which I have found to exist in Great Poland, and Providence will crown with success the sanctity of your cause, and will recompense you for that devotion to your country which renders you so interesting and has given you so many claims upon my esteem and protection, upon which, in all circumstances, you may always rely."

This address had no particularly unfavorable effect on the Polish deputies, for they were previously aware that Napoleon entertained the sentiments which it expressed, but its effect at Wilna, in spite of the enthusiasm caused by the presence of the victorious French troops, was most disastrous.

"How can Napoleon," said the Lithuanians, "demand that we should lavish our blood and our resources in his service, when he is unwilling, on his part, to declare the reconstitution of the kingdom of Poland? And what withholds him from this course? Prussia is at his feet; Austria is dependent on his will, and might readily, moreover, be recompensed by Illyria; and Russia is already flying before his armies. Is it the truth, that he is not willing to restore us to existence as a nation? Is it the truth, that he has come here only to gain a victory over the Russians, intending then to retreat without having effected anything with regard to us, save having added half a million of Poles to the grand duchy, and exposed the greater

## WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES.

—Another event of considerable importance occurred during my stay at Wilna—the declaration of war between the United States and Great Britain. Annoyed by the execution of the British Orders in Council, as well as by our system of reprisals, the United State had obtained from me a promise of withdrawing so much of the decrees of Berlin and Milan as affected the Americans; the Cabinet of London refused to modify their system, and continued their hostile acts, till, at last, the Americans became indignant, and, on the nineteenth of June, proclaimed war.\*

If I had not already begun the war with Russia, this new event might have had a most important influence upon the destinies of the world. A ministerial revolution had already occurred in England; Perceval had been assassinated by a man partially insane, on the eleventh of May; his death did not necessarily bring with it any political combinations; but under such circumstances, it was possible that he would have been replaced by a minister less hostile to me. In fact, however, a war with the United States was not deemed of sufficient importance to counterbalance the advantages to be gained from the successes of Wellington and the war with Russia, or to incline the ambitious Cabinet of London to a more pacific policy. The new ministry, at the head of which was Lord Liverpool, with Castlereagh for foreign affairs, Bathurst, Harrowby, etc., pursued the same policy as that which preceded it. Things had now gone too far to expect any change before the close of the campaign.

OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGRATION.—These unfruitful diplomatic discussions, however, produced no influence upon military operations. The army of Barclay having taken refuge in the camp of Drissa, I directed my attention to the army of Bagration. Davoust, who was at Minsk with two divisions, would be ready to attack him in front, while the King of Westphalia, who entered Grodno the thirtieth of June, with the Poles and Westphalians, and the Saxons marching to join, making in all sixty-five

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number of us to exile and sequestration?" To these doubts it was replied, that Napoleon was in a delicate position, that it was absolutely necessary that he should act with caution, but that it was easy to see through his caution that his real intention was to reconstitute Poland, should he be seriously aided; that it was necessary, therefore, for the Polish people to rise *en masse*, and furnish him with the means of accomplishing the undertaking upon which he had entered. But the party which held these latter opinions was by far the least numerous, and the large body of people made Napoleon's caution an excuse for want of energy, avarice, and selfish calculations.

\*The act declaring hostilities passed on the eighteenth, and the proclamation of the President was signed on the nineteenth, of June, 1812.

thousand men, attacked him in rear, seconded by Schwartzberg, who in reality belonged to the center, but was now on the right, marching by Proujani on Slonim. Prince Bagration, hearing at Walkowisk of the passage of the Niemen, and the intention of concentrating the army in the environs of Wilna, at first determined to take the road to that city by Mosty, so as to act in conformity with the plan of operations formed previous to the campaign; but the order to march on the Dwina induced him to take the road to Nowogrodeck and Nicolajeff so as to gain Vileika. Davoust having already preceded him, he was obliged to fall back by Mir, whence he marched again in the direction of Minsk by Kaidanow. This was a faulty movement, for Davoust was ready to enter Minsk before him. When he learned this fact, he fell back again to the southeast, so as to reach Neswije before the Poles; he arrived there on the eighth. Jerome left Grodno on the first of July, and did not reach Bielitz till the seventh. His march was a difficult one, but unnecessarily slow. His advanced guard of Poles having passed the Niemen a second time at Bielitz, advanced on Mir, where their cavalry, on the ninth and tenth, had two engagements with Platof and Wassiltchikof, in which they fought bravely, but experienced considerable loss. Davoust had reached Minsk on the eighth, but, not knowing the position of the enemy, he did not venture to march on Igumen, lest he might open the passage of Minsk, nor upon Kaidanow or Glutzk for fear that Bagration might take him in rear. On the eleventh of July, the latter decided to take the road to Bobrouisk, and Davoust being still at Minsk, that prince found himself relieved from his embarrassment.

Dissatisfied with the slow movements of Jerome, I ordered Davoust to take command of all his army and to march on Mohilew, which he might reach in eight days, whereas the Russians would require at least ten or twelve to arrive at the same place. Jerome received orders to push on more rapidly, while Schwartzberg was to establish himself on the enemy's flank between Bobrouisk and Pinsk. The Saxons were deemed sufficient for observing the enemy's corps remaining at Volhynia.

But, in so vast an empire, the maneuvers of strategy are less certain than in a country hemmed in by seas or neutral territory: practicable roads run in all directions, so that our best founded hopes frequently failed. We committed some faults in this operation, it is true, but then there were a thousand unforeseen obstacles which seemed to spring up to baffle our calculations. From Minsk, Davoust might hope to anticipate Bagration at Bobrouisk or at Glutzk. The first of these cities, being more distant from Bagration, was the most advantageous direction.



But it was a fortress, and although singularly situated, it, on this occasion, played a most important part. The head of Bagration's column reached Glutzk on the fifteenth of July; Davoust could not anticipate him at that place without destroying the efficiency of his troops; if he had moved on without hesitation, he might readily have fallen perpendicularly upon the flank of the long column of the Russians, and it is impossible to say what would have been the result. But, to have gained Glutzk, Davoust should not have remained a single day at Minsk. The marshal, however, on arriving at that city, learned that Bagration had rallied the light corps of Dorokof in the direction of Kaidanow, and did not deem it prudent to leave Minsk unprotected. If he had had his whole five divisions, he would undoubtedly have marched to Glutzk with three, leaving the other two in echelon on Minsk; but the dispersion of our forces, which were sent in all directions in pursuit of the enemy, caused the failure of an operation which was much better planned than executed.

**NAPOLEON ADVANCES ON POLOTSK.**—The fifteen days which I had spent at Wilna, waiting for the result of my operations against Bagration, were, therefore, virtually lost; this delay, however, allowed the Viceroy and the Bavarians to come into line. The former, having crossed the country between Trocki and the Niemen, directed his march on Vileika, whence he took the road to Polotsk. The Bavarians took the road to Gloubokoe. The maneuvers against Bagration no longer requiring my presence at Wilna, I determined to take command myself of the forces which were closing in on the Dwina. I consequently left Wilna on the sixteenth of July, after a sojourn which some, as has already been said, without knowing the cause of this delay, have endeavored to contrast with my activity at Ulm, Abensburg, etc. I left at Wilna the Duke of Bassano, the minister of foreign affairs, with the diplomatic agents who had followed my head-quarters. He was to watch over the relations with our allies and the Polish authorities; he was also to serve as a medium of communication with my lieutenants who were still in rear, and to give to the administration and military operations all the vigor that could be imparted by cabinet orders. If some of my plans had failed to produce the expected results, I now hoped to indemnify myself for the loss of time.

**CAMP OF DRISSA.**—The camp which the first Russian army occupied at Drissa was a manifest proof that their generals did not understand their position, and a still more positive proof that the pretended project of Barclay to draw us into Russia was a mere romance. My sojourn at Wilna had unfortunately prevented me from profiting by the capital fault of their operations.

In limiting themselves to the defense of the single road from Wilna to St. Petersburg, the Russians had left without defense the roads that led to the very heart of their empire. They had so little apprehension of the danger of their eccentric maneuver that at the very moment when they abandoned the center road to Witepsk and Borisof, they directed Prince Bagration to join them by the road from Slonim to Drissa, by a long march which could be executed only through the midst of our columns. Fortunately for him, he saw from the first the impossibility of obeying this order. Not having succeeded in cutting off his forces, I now resolved to profit by the double fault of the enemy, by throwing myself in mass on Polotsk. After having gained the extreme left of their principal army, I would fall back on their line, which had been forced to effect a change of front and to fight with the sea in their rear. By gaining a single battle I would have driven them back on Courland, forcing them to cut their way out, to lay down their arms, or be driven into the sea. I arrived at Gloubokoe on the eighteenth of July. I intended to march immediately on Polotsk, where I had also directed the King of Naples to repair, defiling by his right along the Dwina.

**ALEXANDER RETIRES FROM DRISSA TO MOSCOW AND ST. PETERSBURG.**—There was now no apparent obstacle to the entire success of my projects. It seemed, however, throughout the whole of this war, that all my operations were under the spell of some evil genius, for new obstacles, entirely without the ordinary calculations of probabilities, were continually springing up to destroy my best conceived combinations. Could I foresee that the Russian army would not remain three days in a camp which had cost them several months' work and immense sums of money? Such, however, was the fact. The Emperor Alexander, who had adopted this camp at the instance of a general ignorant of his profession, now perceived the danger of his position. He saw that two armies, so very inferior in numbers to ours, and so divided as to have no hope of a union, would be utterly incompetent to save Russia. It now appeared evident to him that this could only be effected by a general levy of the whole nation. He ordered Barclay to march on Smolensko, and to do everything in his power to effect a junction with Bagration. The Emperor himself first repaired to Polotsk, and afterward went to Moscow and St. Petersburg, to incite the nobility and the people to a general arming in defense of their country. He designated positions for vast intrenched camps, where these levies were to be assembled and organized. Considerable works were ordered for this purpose at Nijni-Novgorod, on the confines of Europe.

**BARCLAY'S OPERATIONS TO GAIN SMOLENSKO.**—In accordance with the plans formed at Drissa, Barclay, having left in the environs of that city a corps of twenty-five thousand men under Count Wittgenstein, in order to cover the direct road to St. Petersburg, began his march to Smolensko, ascending the left bank of the Dwina. He had reached Polotsk when we arrived at Groubokoe. I, nevertheless, still had hopes of being able to turn his left; the least delay in his march would enable us to precede him to Witepsk. I, therefore, directed my march on that city. We reached the Dwina on the twenty-fourth of July, at Bechenkowizi. Finding here that the enemy had already passed on his way to Witepsk, I ascended the river by the left bank. I now saw little chance of interrupting him, and became fully sensible of the losses due to my unfortunate delay at Wilna. Nevertheless, in order to regain Smolensko, Barclay was obliged to pass to the left bank of the Dwina so as to reach Witepsk and the road to Roudnia. This was a hazardous operation, for, if we should arrive in time, he would be obliged to give battle with a river in his rear, as Benningsen did at Friedland. He, in consequence, hastened to direct on Bechenkowizi an advanced guard of about twelve thousand men, in order to retard our march and thus gain time to rally the corps of General Doctorof, who, being the rear guard of his army on the road to Polotsk, was still on the right bank the river.

**COMBATS OF OSTROWNO.**—On the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth, Murat had some sharp engagements with the enemy's rear guard near Ostrowno. Murat was destitute of infantry, while the woody nature of the country favored the corps of Ostermann; some brilliant charges, however, were made to repel the attacks of the Russian columns. On the arrival of the division of Delzons, Ostermann fell back in good order. Night separated the combatants. The next day Murat renewed the attack; being seconded by the Viceroy, he now hoped to be able to defeat the enemy's troops; but Barclay had reinforced them during the night by the fresh corps of Konownitzin. This combat was still more warm than the preceding; the Russians held their ground firmly; in attempting to turn them, our left was assailed by their reserve and driven back; but the right, under Roussel, having turned the enemy, Konownitzin retreated in good order, and, at Komarki, was reinforced by Touczkof, who had been sent to his assistance. These new troops again succeeded in checking the ardor of our advanced guard. Impatient at so many checks, I put myself at the head of the column and threw the fourth corps across the wood. The enemy retreated in echelon and we arrived in sight of Witepsk without further obstacle.



Barclay concentrated his army near Witepsk behind the river Louchetza, and appointed a *rendezvous* with Bagration near Orcha. To reach that city, it was necessary to march to the south by Babinowitchi in a line parallel to my army and with their flank exposed. The Russian general thought that it would be impossible to execute this movement without fighting, and prepared to give us battle so as to dispute the passage of the Louchetza. Fortunately for him, he learned the same evening that Bagration, not being able to pierce his way to Mohilew, had marched by Mestilow on Smolensko. This incident saved Barclay a probable defeat, for he could not oppose more than eighty thousand men to my army of one hundred and twenty thousand. I myself made a reconnoissance of the enemy's position behind the Louchetza, near midday of the twenty-seventh; but, as it was impolitic to risk a partial engagement, the affair was postponed till the next day, in order that our troops might come up. But, in the evening, Barclay received information which rendered it unnecessary for him to give battle, and he decamped during the night on Smolensko, where he was certain of effecting a junction with Bagration. His march was covered by Pahlen with the *élite* of the Russian cavalry. At the break of day on the twenty-eighth of July, the enemy had entirely disappeared and we entered Witepsk, more disgusted than ever that the Russians had again escaped us. If Barclay had injudiciously placed his army on the Niemen, and had imprudently directed his retreat on the Lower Dwina, he had certainly maneuvered with sagacity after leaving Drissa.

OPERATIONS OF BAGRATION.—The second Russian army had also continued its retreat with more good fortune than it had reason to expect. Davoust transmitted the order to my brother, in which he was directed to assume the command; Jerome took offense at being placed under the orders of another, resigned the command of the Westphalians to General Tharreau, directed Poniatowski to obey the orders of Davoust, and left the army on the sixteenth of July. This foolish anger tended for a moment to diminish the vigor of our pursuit. Nevertheless, Davoust, forced to act on Orcha on the left, and to watch the Beresina on the right, marched with twenty thousand men on Mohilew, calling to him the corps of Poniatowski, and directing the Westphalians to follow alone in the trail of the enemy's columns. The Russian general, having reached Nowoy-Bichow, on the Borysthenese, by Bobrouisk, had the choice either to continue his march on Mestilow or to attack Davoust. He had been invited to direct his march on Orcha; but the road to that city passes Mohilew, and if, to avoid the hostile forces, he had deviated

from the direct road, Davoust would have preceded him at Mestilow. He then resolved to open a passage with the sword, and march direct on Mohilew.

**AFFAIR OF MOHILEW.**—Considering the disposition of the forces, it would probably have been more wise for Davoust to move on Orcha; but this marshal determined to give the enemy battle, and bravely establish himself in advance of Mohilew on the road from that city to Staro-Bichow, at the risk of being crushed. Fortunately, Prince Bagration, who attacked him on the twenty-third, brought only one of his *corps d'armée* into action, the other being still in rear. The combat was a warm one. The position of Davoust, very strong in front, was susceptible of being turned by his right. The enemy fearing, probably, to expose his communications, preferred to take the bull by the horns. He was repelled with considerable loss. Discouraged by this check, Bagration fell back on Nowoy-Bichow, where he crossed the Borysthenese on the twenty-sixth, and continued his march by Mestilow on Smolensko. Davoust deemed himself fortunate in being able to sustain his position at Mohilew, and did not venture to throw himself alone on the left of the Borysthenese. The two Russian armies had no further obstacles to prevent their junction, which was effected on the third of August, at Smolensko.

**HALT AT WITEPSK.**—The month of July had been extremely rainy. My troops had suffered much from bad weather during their march from the Niemen to the Dwina and the Borysthenese. Our scanty supplies and coarse food had propagated disease among the soldiers; our magazines were still on their way from Königsberg to Kowno; we were greatly in want of flour and the means of grinding it; the soldiers were obliged to subsist on boiled rye, which produced horrible dysenteries. I ordered portable hand-mills to be forwarded from Paris, but these could not arrive before winter. In the meantime half of our troops were in the same situation as those of the Duke of Brunswick in Champagne. It was important to give them some repose. Having no further hopes of cutting off Barclay, I halted at Witepsk, and my army, reinforced by the junction of the corps of Davoust, Poniatowski, and the Westphalians, was cantoned with its left at Sourage on the Dwina, the right at Mohilew on the Borysthenese, and the advanced guard at Doubrowna.

*6282* **OPERATIONS OF THE WINGS OF THE ARMY.**—In opening the campaign I had supposed that our success in the center would involve the retreat of the enemy's wings. The Russians, however, had persisted in holding firmly their ground on the two extremities of the line. Under the circumstances, this was

natural. Riga and the vicinity of the Baltic on Revel secured the retreat of their right. Their left, superior to us in Volhynia, had its rear free to Odessa, and was expecting to be reinforced by the entire army of Moldavia, which Tchichagof had commanded since the departure of Kutusof. We had not estimated this army at more than half its real strength, which was not less than forty thousand men. I had detached against it only the corps of the Saxons, intending to reinforce them by the Poles as soon as Schwartzenberg rejoined my army. The Poles, after assisting Davoust in the pursuit of Bagration, were to return into Volhynia by Mozyr, and threatening the retreat of Tormassof with an army reinforced by the insurrection of the province, they would easily free our right from all apprehension in that direction. The delay of Schwartzenberg and the operations in the center prevented the execution of this project, which misfortune was not the least fatal one in this campaign.

**TORMASSOF DEFEATS THE SAXONS.**—On the march of the Westphalians and Schwartzenberg, Tormassof took the offensive on the rear of Jerome, by the orders of the Emperor Alexander, and conformably to the plan of operations, in case of the invasion of Lithuania. The Saxons, not being in condition to oppose an efficient resistance, were attacked by Tormassof at the head of thirty-five thousand men, and an entire brigade at Kobrin was taken prisoners on the twenty-third of July. Reynier called loudly for aid, and Schwartzenberg was detached to his assistance. This prince left Nesnije on the first of August, by Slonim, where he met Reynier, who had easily effected his retreat.

**OPERATIONS OF OUDINOT.**—My left wing was not more fortunate: in marching on Witepsk, I had left Oudinot at Polotsk with twenty-seven or twenty-eight thousand men to secure my base against Wittgenstein, whom Barclay had left to cover the road to St. Petersburg with twenty-five thousand Russians. Oudinot advanced, on the thirtieth of July, on the road to Sebeje, with two divisions, leaving the third in echelons on the Drissa. Wittgenstein, not finding himself threatened by Macdonald in the direction of Donaberg, at the same time had taken the offensive against the second corps. The rencounter took place at Kliastitzi. Oudinot was driven back on the Drissa, where he rallied his forces. The Russians ventured to cross this river, on the first of August, and paid for their imprudence with the loss of a thousand men. Oudinot now committed the same error, by pursuing the enemy across the river with the division of Verdier; he was driven back with loss. He returned to Polotsk on the second of August, after two warm engagements, in which his momentary success scarcely compensated for his losses. Deeming this mar-



shal too weak to oppose Wittgenstein, I reinforced him with the corps of Bavarians, which famine and sickness had already reduced to twelve thousand combatants.

**TURKEY, SWEDEN, AND ENGLAND.**—In addition to the ill success of my military projects, I was at this time annoyed by the news of unexpected and most vexatious political events, which were calculated to have no little influence on the results of the war. While I was at Witepsk I learned that the treaty of peace between Russia and the Turks had been ratified. This was a most extraordinary error on the part of the Turks, and one which I might have prevented had I foreseen it. The gold and intrigues which had gained the Vizir at Bucharest also triumphed over the scruples of the Divan, which had at first hesitated to ratify the treaty. The Sultan had decided the question on the fourteenth of July; afterwards, seeing his error, he caused the Vizir and the Moruzzi to be decapitated; but the evil was none the less irreparable for us. I also at this time received a copy of the treaty, which had been signed on the twenty-fourth of March, between Russia and Sweden. This had been kept a profound secret for two months (till the twenty-ninth of May), after it had been signed. Bernadotte was still offering to form an alliance with me to make war against Russia. About the same time (the eighteenth of July), Russia had signed at Orebro a treaty of alliance and subsidy with England; the latter paid a subsidy of eighteen millions, and as the invasion of the French endangered the Russian fleet if it should be frozen up in the Gulf, it was stipulated that it should be placed in *dépôt* in one of the ports of Great Britain.

**COUNCIL OF WAR AT WITEPSK.**—The Emperor Alexander had gone to Abo in Finland to confer with Bernadotte on the conditions of a more close alliance. He then returned to Moscow to incite the people to a *levy en masse*. All these circumstances were of a nature to convince me of the necessity of some more decisive movement. The importance of the crisis induced me to call a kind of council of war, in which the opinions of my generals were consulted. This was the first council of the kind which I had held since the battle of Castiglione. At Essling I had discussed certain questions with Masséna and Davoust, but had not formally consulted them in council. I never repelled the advice of individuals; but I attached very little importance to the debates of councils. Nor did I on this occasion derive much profit from the discussions of my generals. Some wished to halt on the Dwina and the Borysthenese; others deemed it more wise to continue our operations. I was also of this opinion. To take a position between two rivers which would soon be frozen over, and

expose us to the harassing attacks of the enemy's light troops, was not a kind of warfare which suited my army. It was necessary to conquer a peace: this was the only favorable issue which we could hope, and this could be attained only at Moscow. At any rate, the capture of Smolensko was necessary before my ulterior operations could be formed.

**BARCLAY TAKES THE OFFENSIVE.**—The junction of the Russian armies near Smolensko had encouraged Barclay to undertake an offensive movement. The project was not without merit, but was poorly executed. Leaving Smolensko on the seventh of August for Roudnia, their advanced guard of ten thousand men surprised our cavalry near Inkowo. Sebastiani saved himself by a firm stand and a well-ordered retreat. The Russians made no further serious attacks; and it was well for them that they did not, for a partial engagement might have brought on a general battle, as at Friedland, which was of all things what I most desired.

**NAPOLEON MARCHES ON SMOLENSKO.**—On the fourteenth of August I crossed the Borysthenese at Passasna and Khomino, and marched on Krasnoi. The corps which had been cantoned at Orcha and Mohilew crossed the river at those places, and also marched on Krasnoi. I proposed to move rapidly on Smolensko, surprise that place, and take in reverse the enemy's troops which had ventured to threaten me at Roudnia. The Russian armies, being thus turned by their left, would be compromised, cut off from Moscow, and thrown back on the Lower Dwina. This was the third grand maneuver of the campaign, and was the last on our side.

A detachment of eight or nine thousand men, which the Russians had left in observation on the left bank of the Borysthenese, was driven out of Krasnoi by our advanced guard and hotly pursued toward Smolensko by my numerous cavalry. But these brave men succeeded in reaching Smolensko without being seriously cut up, although they had been obliged to leave a part of their cannon, near a thousand killed, and many wounded.

**BATTLES OF SMOLENSKO.**—The city of Smolensko, situated in amphitheater on both banks of the Dnieper, presents a fine appearance. Its *enceinte*, which enclosed twenty thousand inhabitants, was large enough to contain eighty thousand; it was surrounded by a brick wall of extraordinary thickness and flanked by towers. The citadel, which formed a regular pentagon, was the weakest side, for the parapets, which were not revetted, had so fallen down as to form an accessible slope. The *enceinte* of the city, on the contrary, being surrounded by a wall twenty-five feet

high and fifteen feet thick between the towers, was secure from escalade and almost impregnable to field artillery. The weak part of this *enceinte* was secured by these same towers, which were only three or four feet thick and exposed to be battered in breach by twelve-pounders. A few yards from the place were deep ravines, which had been cut out by the rains. The Russians directed their defense to these ravines on the weak side of the town, rather than to the citadel; Generals Rayewski and Paskiewicz defended the place with twenty thousand men.

Ney reached Smolensko on the morning of the sixteenth, at the head of my advanced guard. I followed soon after, and having made a reconnoissance of the weak point, I directed Ney to make the assault. His columns advanced with rare intrepidity; the enemy received them with admirable coolness. Twice Ney's brave soldiers penetrated to the counterscarp of the citadel, and twice were they driven back by the reserves of Rayewski and Paskiewicz. This resistance gave time for two other Russian armies to come to their assistance toward noon; my corps also came up one after another, so that by night we had one hundred and fifty thousand men bivouacked under the walls of Smolensko. Not having succeeded in surprising that city, I now hoped to surround it. I directed General Guilleminot to find a passage above, in order to throw a bridge across and cut the enemy from the road to Moscow. Junot, with the Westphalians, undertook this operation, but lost his way and failed of success. In the meantime the combat was continued under the walls of Smolensko, but, unfortunately, these operations led to no decisive results. Perhaps it would have been difficult to force a passage, on account of the vicinity of Bagration's army, which covered the road to Moscow; but as it was the most feasible plan that presented itself, it was necessary to make the attempt.

The affair of the seventeenth was warmly contested. The Russian generals deployed their forces on the heights to the right of the Borysthenese, and sent into the city a fresh corps of thirty thousand men to relieve Rayewski; I made preparations to receive them; but seeing that they were not disposed to take the offensive, I ordered an attack. Ney directed the attack on our left against the citadel, Poniatowski on our right ascended the Dnieper, while Davoust at the center assailed the *faubourgs* of Roslaw. The attack on the extremities was difficult, exposed as our men were to the hundred pieces of artillery which the enemy placed along the Dnieper. Nevertheless, Poniatowski, under the protection of our counter-batteries, succeeded in reaching the foot of a practicable breach in the walls, and Ney was again on the point of penetrating the citadel. At the center we succeeded, after a



furious combat, in dislodging Doctorof from the *faubourgs*; but all our efforts failed against the body of the place, which the enemy defended with great obstinacy. I directed my reserve to batter in breach the curtain, but it proved a useless attempt, our balls producing no effect upon those immense walls of brick. The only means of effecting a practicable breach was to concentrate our fire upon the two round towers; but we were then ignorant of the difference in the thickness of the walls.

BARCLAY EVACUATES SMOLENSKO.—But as our shells had set fire to a part of the town, and as the enemy had sustained considerable losses in the defense, Barclay determined to evacuate it in the night, leaving Korf to cover the retreat, which he did by increasing the fire which had been kindled by our shells.

GENERAL REVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.—Our entrance into Smolensko was under still more discouraging presages than that into Wilna, notwithstanding the destructive storms with which the latter was accompanied. Our army had expected here to terminate their march, and they now hoped to find a fertile country and enjoy some repose. The vulgar look upon great and hazardous enterprises in different lights. My troops, astonished at the extent and difficulty of their marches, and discouraged by constantly seeing the fruit of their efforts and sacrifices escape them, began to look with disquietude upon the distance that separated them from France. As I had given them to understand that this would be my stopping-place, it was natural that they should be discouraged at seeing no prospect of their efforts terminating here. This city, towards which I had directed all my hopes, and which the Russians had regarded as the palladium of the empire, was now one vast funeral pile strewed with the dead and dying; one-half of the town had been devastated by fire, for which it was difficult to assign a cause. The principal inhabitants had fled to escape the ravages of war, abandoning their effects to the imprudence of our soldiers and the excesses of an exasperated populace. It is said that many of the inhabitants set fire to their own houses during the excitement of the assault. A city carried, as it were, by the point of the sword, and abandoned by its own inhabitants, cannot escape pillage, and the little that was left by the enemy fell a prey to our soldiers, their appetites being sharpened by long privations. A single priest, who had remained behind through his love for his flock, showed by his answers to what a degree the people had been prejudiced against us, painting us in the blackest colors.\* All the religious

\*This venerable man had been taught that Napoleon was a fiend incarnate, recklessly deluging the world in blood and woe. He was brought

and patriotic passions had been excited against us, and it was easily seen that to the privations of Lithuania were to be added all the bitterness and rage of a national war; we were about to find here a new Spain, but a Spain without boundaries, and destitute of cities, provisions, or resources. We were not likely to encounter new Saragossas where all the buildings are constructed of wood, and at the mercy of the torch or the shell; but there were before us obstacles of another kind and not less formidable.

My heart felt oppressed when I reflected upon the interval which separated me from Moscow, and that which was likely to intervene between my magazines and my army, which sickness and want had already diminished one-third. Although I had so often announced my intention of halting here, I soon saw the inconvenience and difficulty of doing so. The harvest of 1811 had been light, and the crops of 1812, still ungathered, had been greatly injured and neglected by the ravages of war and the flight of the inhabitants. Moreover, to subsist two hundred thousand men in a depopulated country, and in the face of a numerous and well-supplied army, is not without difficulty at any time. To retreat was now impossible: my army would have starved in crossing Lithuania, or have been swallowed up in the marshes of Prepecz; or, if directed on Warsaw, my retreat would have been the

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before the Emperor, and in fearless tones he reproached Napoleon with the destruction of the city.

Napoleon listened to him attentively and respectfully.

"But," said he to him at last, "has your church been burned?" "No, sire," the priest replied; "God will be more powerful than you. He will protect it, for I have opened it to all the unfortunate people whom the destruction of the city has deprived of a home." "You are right," rejoined Napoleon, with emotion. "Yes! God will watch over the innocent victims of war. He will reward you for your courage. Go, worthy priest, return to your post. Had all the clergy followed your example, they had not basely betrayed the mission of peace they have received from Heaven. If they had not deserted the temples which their presence alone renders sacred, my soldiers would have spared your holy edifices. We are all Christians. Your God is our God."

Saying this, Napoleon sent the priest back to his church with an escort and some succors. A shriek of terror arose from the inmates of the church when they saw the French soldiers entering. But the priest immediately quieted their alarm.

"Be not afraid," said he; "I have seen Napoleon. I have spoken to him. Oh, how have we been deceived, my children! The Emperor of France is not the man he has been represented to you. He and his soldiers worship the same God that we do. The war that he wages is not religious; it is a political quarrel with our emperor. His soldiers fight only against our soldiers. They do not slaughter, as we have been told, women and children." The priest then commenced a hymn of thanksgiving, in which they all joined with tearful eyes.

signal for the desertion of my allies and the attack of my enemies. Prussia would have risen *en masse*; the north of Germany would have followed her example; my whole edifice would have fallen without my having, as it were, once drawn the sword in its defense. We had not undertaken this war merely to march to Smolensko and then return to canton within the limits of the duchy of Warsaw. To march on Moscow, to force the Russians to a battle, and to dictate peace in the ancient capital of the czars, which was still the heart of the grand arteries of the empire—such was the only means of safety that now remained.

I, however, still encouraged my soldiers with the hope of a near termination to their sufferings, and flattered my marshals with the idea of taking up their winter quarters between Witepsk, Smolensko, and Mohilew; and I ordered the passage of the Dnieper merely to avoid the neighborhood of the enemy's army! But I gave some of my confidential friends to understand that my army was an army of operation, and not an army of position; that its composition (being made up of twenty different peoples) and moral character required that I should maintain an active offense; in a word, that I had no other course than to march upon Moscow. Some ultra critics and detractors have pretended to find in this conduct an unjustifiable deception and falsehood! As if a general was under obligations to make known his real intentions and designs!

My marshals were divided in opinion on this great question. Murat, who had at first accused the Russians of pusillanimity, now trembled at the danger of penetrating so far into the interior of their country. Others contended that we could hope for no repose till we had gained one decisive battle. I was also of this opinion. But how were we to obtain this battle? Certainly not by remaining at Smolensko, without provisions or other resources. There was no third choice; we must march upon Moscow or retreat upon the Niemen.

I was not sufficiently presumptuous to suppose there were no serious difficulties to be surmounted in selecting a new objective point a hundred leagues from my natural base of operations, leaving behind me Riga and Bobrouisk, supported by the armies of Wittgenstein and Volhynia; moreover, the conclusion of peace between Russia and the Porte would enable the army of Moldavia to ascend the Dnieper. But if the enemy still held two threatening points on my flank, I could oppose to them the armies of Macdonald, Saint-Cyr, and Schwartzenberg. Belluno, with a fine reserve of thirty-two thousand combatants, was on the Niemen, ready to sustain my right on the Bug, or my left on the Dwina. Not only were these armies superior to the forces which the



enemy could bring against them, but I had besides fifty thousand men in Prussia, and as many marching from the interior, ready to reinforce my army and replace any losses which I might sustain in battle. Never had I taken more care and foresight in preparing the means of securing the success of a great enterprise; Europe seemed to have placed her whole population in echelons toward the pole. Already the fine divisions of Loison and Durutte were guarding Königsberg and Warsaw; others were forming on the Oder; the cohorts of the first *ban* were collecting on the Elbe; nothing was neglected to secure the success of the expedition.

The experience of ten campaigns had taught me what was the most decisive point; and I did not doubt but a blow struck at the heart of the Russian Empire would instantly destroy the accessory resistance of isolated corps. This blow I hoped to strike as soon as I could force the enemy to give me battle. I had a diminished force, it is true, but what remained under our flags was the very *élite* of our army.

**NEY CROSSES THE DNEIPEP.**—After having reconnoitered the smoking ruins of Smolensko, its extraordinary *enceinte*, and its ill-planned citadel, I pressed forward our preparations for the passage of the Dnieper, the enemy having burnt the bridge. Morand's division crossed over in boats to protect the passage against the rear guard of Barclay. Ney directed this operation, but, notwithstanding all his efforts, it was not completed till the night of the eighteenth and nineteenth. In the meantime Junot, at the head of the eighth corps, received orders to pass at my extreme right near Proudichewo. It would have been better if I had directed the main body of my army on this point, as it was the most direct line for reaching the position of the enemy.

**HAZARDOUS MARCH OF BARCLAY.**—Before the evacuation of the city, the army of Bagration had been detached on Dorogobuje, in order to prevent our gaining the road to Moscow. Barclay himself first took the road to St. Petersburg, and then by a circuitous route regained that leading to Moscow, thus moving upon the arc of a circle of which we held the chord. The alleged motive of this *détour* was, that the direct road along the Dnieper was exposed to our batteries. This, however, was choosing the greater of the two evils, and, to avoid exposure to our cannon, risking the destruction of their entire army. If I had known this in time, they would have paid dearly for their fault, for it exposed them in a worse position than after the retreat on Drissa and the separation of their two armies.

**PURSUIT OF NEY AND MURAT.**—Convinced that the Rus-

sians were not disposed to give us battle, I satisfied myself with sending in pursuit of their rear guard Murat and Ney, seconded by Junot, who crossed the river higher up, so as to maneuver on their left. Ney crossed the Dnieper at four o'clock on the morning of the nineteenth, amid the flames of the *faubourg* of Smolensko. The army of Barclay was first seen encamped on the heights of the road to St. Petersburg, and his rear guard under General Korf was still there. We hoped for a moment to cut him off from the road to Moscow, and drive him back to the north; but some of the enemy's troops were seen in that direction. Ney and Murat were ordered to examine these two roads. Grouchy at first took the direction of Doukowschina. Our columns of the left now observed a division of infantry in an intermediate position near the Stabna. Ney immediately ordered it to be attacked. This was unfortunate; for, if he had marched directly to Loubino on the road to Moscow, we should have reached that place as soon as the enemy, and have engaged the Russians while they were making an extended flank movement.

Barclay now saw the perilous nature of his maneuver, and directed Touczkof to march with a division of infantry in all haste to the assistance of the Cossacks who covered the road to Moscow; he placed Prince Eugene of Würtemberg at Gredeonowo, to flank the march of the nearest column, and to give the rear guard of Korf time to reach Gorbounowo and Loubino. The first column of the army, under Bagawouth, was also directed upon the same point. It was this division of Eugene that Ney first encountered and vigorously attacked. It was about to fall under our blows, when twenty squadrons come to its assistance. Reinforced still further by a part of the column of Korf, it succeeded in reaching Gorbounowo, after having for three hours lost sight of the most important point on the road to Moscow. Ney followed in pursuit, taking five or six hundred prisoners of the rear guard of Korf, and their cannon; it was relieved by Potemkin, who arrived just in time to save the rear of their columns.

**BATTLE OF VALOUTINA.**—In the meantime Touczkof had reached the heights of Valoutina, and formed a junction with the Cossacks of Karpof. Ney, who had been drawn too far to the left by the combats of Staba and Gredeonowo, now received orders to incline further to the right, and soon arrived in presence of the enemy. A furious combat was engaged near Kosina. As soon as I learned the retreat of the Prince of Würtemberg and Korf, I returned to Smolensko, thinking to push forward Davoust to the assistance of Murat and Ney. The latter, though now left alone, nevertheless pressed Touczkof with vigor; but this general defended his ground inch by inch to the rear of the creek of Strachan,

where the *corps-d'armée* of his brother and the cavalry of Orlof-Denisof came to his aid.\* The Russians, feeling that the safety of the army depended upon the defense of this position, fought with desperation. An hour sooner, and with a few divisions more, Ney would have cut the enemy in two and decided the success of the campaign. It was, however, the last time that such an advantage presented itself.

Far from expecting so serious a combat, I had gone back to Smolensko, when Barclay returned with his third and fourth corps of infantry and his first corps of cavalry. Ney did everything which heroism could do under such circumstances, and both parties may well boast of the courage displayed on that occasion. Murat was so embarrassed on the right and left by the wood and marshes that he could not maneuver his cavalry to advantage. Orlof-Denisof showed, on this occasion, as much firmness as the King of Naples displayed activity and bravery. Not being able to penetrate in advance of Latichino against the left of the Russians, Murat hoped to be more successful with the troops of Junot, and moved in that direction. He first charged with his advanced guard, then returned to his reserve; but Junot remained stationary between the woods and the Dnieper only a few hundred yards from the enemy's left; he seemed paralyzed by the delicate nature of his position, or, what is more probable, had partially lost his mind.

The division of Gudin, of Davoust's corps, which had been sent to the assistance of Ney, arrived about five o'clock, and the marshal immediately renewed his efforts to carry the heights of Kosina. The enemy was repulsed, his center pierced, and his whole line on the point of being driven into the muddy stream of Samile, when Konownitzin, arriving with a division of infantry, several battalions of grenadiers, and three thousand horse, restored the equilibrium. Gudin being killed by a cannon-ball, his division was repelled, notwithstanding its prodigies of valor.

At dark the Russian corps of battle was rejoined by the columns of Bagawouth and Korf; ignorant of this circumstance, our people renewed their efforts to carry the position. The division of Gudin crossed the Strachan and crowned the heights; but as it had fallen into the midst of the enemy's columns, it was driven back, notwithstanding the most glorious efforts. Night separated the combatants who disputed the honor of this vast field of carnage, covered with twelve or thirteen thousand killed or wounded, of which each party might claim an equal number. To this deplorable and almost useless loss was to be added the

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\*Major-General Touczkof commanded the rear guard, while his brother, Lieutenant-General Touczkof, commanded the third *corps-d'armée*.



death of the lamented Gudin. This brave and skillful general, who had well deserved a marshal's baton, perished a victim to the fatality which seemed to preside over the fortunes of the day. Although this affair had taken place contrary to my expectations, and contrary to all probabilities, he at least was free from reproach. Notwithstanding the false direction of our first movements, we could have gained important results if Junot had acted with vigor. This conduct was probably a prelude to the mental alienation with which he was affected after the retreat. His character from this time seemed strange and changeable; he never possessed great merit, but heretofore he had displayed an energy almost bordering on rashness. Murat was not entirely free from reproach; his cavalry might have acted with more vigor on the Cossacks of Karpof and the little rear guard of Touczkof; he should also have thrown a part of this cavalry with Junot on Proudichevo, on the night of the eighteenth.

**RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS.**—Learning at midnight, on the return of my *aid-de-camp*, Gourgaud, the state of the battle which my generals were fighting without my knowledge, I immediately mounted my horse, and at three o'clock was on the field of combat. But everything was ours and the enemy in retreat. Seeing the proofs of the efforts of my brave men in the bloody and mangled bodies which covered the field, I lavished on them praises and rewards, and returned to Smolensko, my heart being sad at having allowed so fine an opportunity to escape me. My first impulse was to severely reprimand Junot, and to replace him in the command by Rapp; but feelings of kindness toward this old companion in arms induced me to forgive him.

The King of Naples, on the twentieth of August, pursued the enemy on Dorogobuje; as Ney's corps had greatly suffered in the battle, and as its chief had not been on good terms with my brother-in-law since their quarrel before Ulm in 1805, I caused it to be replaced by the corps of Davoust; unfortunately, Murat was on no better terms with Davoust than with Ney.

**REFLECTIONS OF NAPOLEON ON HIS POSITION.**—On my return to Smolensko from the camp of Ney, on the twentieth, my mind was filled with sadness. The useless results of three bloody battles, the ruins of Smolensko, the reduced and impoverished state of our battalions and our squadrons, were all calculated to produce sad and melancholy reflections. To supply the wants of our men, I ordered administrative establishments to be formed; and directed an intelligent officer with a body of light troops to explore the fertile banks of the Kmora, celebrated for its mills and extensive trade in flour. He was directed to collect

provisions sufficient for the troops on the return of our columns, which had to make but one more effort to cover their asylum.

**BATTLE OF GORODECZNO.**—After my arrival at Smolensko, the affairs on the wings of my army took a more favorable turn. Conformably to my orders, Schwartzenberg had been charged with the general command in the south against Tormassof, whom he encountered on the twelfth of August at Gorodeczno. The Russian general had so scattered his forces that he had not more than twenty-five thousand men in line, while the Austrians and Saxons numbered about forty thousand combatants. But Schwartzenberg failed to profit either by the superiority of his own forces or the bad position of the enemy: yielding to the advice of Reynier, he maneuvered to turn the left wing of the Russians with his Saxons. But he failed to sustain them with sufficient vigor, and the enemy had time to oppose a parallel maneuver, although obliged to give battle with his left completely turned. Tormassof escaped with considerable loss, and continued his retreat by Kobrin and Kowel on Loutsk behind the Styr. Schwartzenberg and Reynier established themselves opposite his position on the other side of that river.

**AFFAIRS OF POLOTSK.**—My left had also been successful, but had derived no advantages from their success. Certain of being soon reinforced by the Bavarians, Oudinot had again marched on Swolna to drive the enemy from the Dwina and prevent him from again troubling Polotsk. This was manifestly imprudent, for Wittgenstein was disposed to pursue the offensive, and would be prepared to meet him before the Bavarians could come to his aid; which was actually the case. The advanced guard of Oudinot, being attacked on the Swolna, the twelfth of August, and receiving a check, the main body fell back on the plain of Polotsk, and formed a junction with the Bavarians. Ignorant of this reinforcement, Wittgenstein continued to advance, and, deploying his twenty-four thousand men, hoped to pierce our center by directing his principal effort along the ravine of the Polota. The combat took place on the seventeenth, but had no other result than the mutual loss of two thousand men. Oudinot being wounded, the command devolved on Saint-Cyr.

The Russian general now saw that he had to contend with a superior force, but fearing to fall back lest his retreat might become disastrous, he thought to impose on us by a firm countenance. Saint-Cyr determined to attack him the next day, and concentrated his principal efforts towards Spass against the Russian left and center. The Bavarians and Legrand's division, concentrated about Spass, overthrew every opposition and penetrated to Pres-

menistza, notwithstanding the strong resistance of the enemy and the destructive fire of the Russian artillery. Wittgenstein's reserve finally arrested their impetuous advance, while the audacious charges of his cavalry drove ours back to the very *faubourg* of Polotsk; Saint-Cyr himself was obliged to take shelter in a ravine. His reserves finally disengaged his cavalry, and the combat ended in the position which the enemy's reserve had occupied in the morning. The Russian general retired during the night on Gomslewo.

Ten pieces of artillery and a thousand prisoners were the only trophies of this battle; our inferiority in cavalry had prevented us from profiting by our success. Saint-Cyr had left Merle's division inactive on the left of the Polota; if he had directed it so as to take Wittgenstein's line in reverse, the victory would have been more easily gained and more complete. Nevertheless it was a success, and the baton of marshal was given to Saint-Cyr, who had already deserved this honor. The brave General Deroi had been slain in battle. I assigned his family, from my private purse, a pension of twenty thousand francs and dotations; thus at the same time repaying a debt of gratitude to a good ally and stimulating the zeal of those who had reluctantly espoused our cause.

NAPOLEON DETERMINES TO ADVANCE.—The successes of Gorodeczno and Polotsk had given temporary security to my wings. My right, however, was still seriously threatened by the army of Moldavia. In an extensive country like Russia, where there is so great a space for the maneuvers of armies, the accessories may become principals, and the operations of lateral corps may seriously endanger the communications of the main army; and especially in this case, as we had but a single line of communication, while the enemy had for his base the whole width of Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

The tranquil state of affairs on my wings and the reports of my lieutenants now determined me to advance; they announced to me that it was not impossible to bring the enemy to a battle. The King of Naples had found the Russians formed behind the Loujea, and had no doubt but they wished to accept battle. Barclay had, in fact, that intention. Informed of this circumstance on the night of the twenty-fourth, I immediately departed at the head of my guards, who marched twelve leagues with the utmost rapidity, in hopes of finally reaching an enemy who was continually escaping us, as if by enchantment. Without attempting to turn the enemy's position, Murat had thrown the cavalry of Montbrun against his left; but Davoust, being weak in infantry; had no desire for a general engagement against an entire army. The disagreement of my generals thus prevented the attack. The



movement of Montbrun, however, had alarmed the Russian generals, who were fearful of being assailed on their left and driven back on the Dnieper, which certainly would have been the case had they remained in position. Barclay, therefore, renounced his perilous plan, and abandoned Dorogobuje just as I was coming up to give him battle.

The Viceroy followed in the direction of St. Petersburg as far as Doukhowschina, then returned into line, leaving one division at Sourage, where General Wintzingerode, with a flying corps, was threatening our communication with Witepsk.

When I reached the head-quarters of Murat, I found that the enemy had disappeared from the banks of the Lougea, and discord reigning in our camp. Murat complained that Davoust had failed to engage his infantry, and the marshal replied that false representations had been made to me. I gave Murat the direct command of Campans' division, which had previously been refused him. As it was supposed that the enemy would make a stand on the Osma, we followed in the pursuit; he evacuated Dorogobuje and reached Wiasma.

We were now so near Moscow that there was no further reason for hesitation. We were still distant eight days' march, it is true, but what was a march of eight days for men who had come from the extremities of Europe? The motives which might have kept us at Witepsk or Smolensko had disappeared, for we had already passed over half of the distance that separated us from Moscow. To diminish the chances of this advance, I had directed Belluno to advance from the Niemen, so as to replace my army at Smolensko. Augereau was to carry half of his divisions on Königsberg and Warsaw. Belluno's reserve of thirty-two thousand men, established between Roslau and Witepsk, might either act on the wings or reinforce the main army, as circumstances should require.

The Russians, however, continued their retreat on Giatz. At Posen their rear guard made a firm stand against the forces of Murat and Davoust. It must, however, be remembered that the generals did not agree, and that our horses were too weak to oppose the cavalry of the enemy. With no other food than coarse rye straw, they had been compelled to perform the most difficult and harassing duty. Always acting in mass on the great roads, and checked at every stream, wood, bridge, or defile, our squadrons, exposed to the fire of the enemy's batteries, were obliged to hold out till the infantry could come to their assistance, when the enemy would retire. Being again pursued by our horse, he would turn upon the heads of columns, till they were disen-

gaged by the infantry. In the pursuit of an enemy, the cavalry is obliged to perform the most incessant and fatiguing duty.

**CHARACTER OF THE COUNTRY.**—But the ordinary difficulties of a pursuit were here greatly augmented by the hostile character of the inhabitants. After leaving Smolensko, we saw alarming symptoms that the war was becoming national. The most formidable army can with difficulty sustain itself when the whole population of the country resolve to conquer or die. We now saw no more Lithuanians, immovable spectators of the great events which were passing around them. The entire population, composed of real Russians, deserted their homes at our approach. Everywhere on our march, we found the villages deserted or burned; the inhabitants formed into bands to cut off our foraging parties; everything seemed quiet, but everywhere our stragglers were cut off or massacred. The city of Wiasma was burned, with its rich magazines; Giatz experienced the same fate; and if anything was left undestroyed, it was due to our vanguards, who frequently fought the enemy with one hand while they extinguished the flames of their burning towns with the other.

**NEW GENERALISSIMO OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.**—At Giatz I learned that the Russian army had changed its chief, and was now preparing to give me battle. Public opinion having attributed the misfortunes of the war to a bad choice of generals, the Emperor Alexander had conferred the supreme command upon General Kutusof, the conqueror of the Turks. The Prussian Pfuhl was accused of being the cause of the first misfortunes of the campaign, and even Barclay was reproached with his foreign origin, and his numerous retreats rendered him an object of suspicion to the pure Muscovites. All seemed agreed that the conqueror of Roudschouck and the negotiator of Bucharest was capable of rescuing them from peril; in their opinion, none but a Russian could now save the country. The new generalissimo thought that to preserve his reputation in the army and with the people it would be necessary to give us battle before we could reach Moscow, and he determined to make a stand in the strong position which he occupied near Borodino in front of Mojaïsk, where he had been joined by ten thousand of the newly organized militia of Moscow.

**PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE.**—The two armies arrived opposite each other the fifth of September. The enemy had constructed a redoubt in front of his left, near the village of Schwar-dino, to defend the access to the most exposed part of his position. As it was important to carry this advanced post before assailing the main position, I directed it to be attacked by the division of Compans, who carried it in the most brilliant manner. The

next day was employed in reconnoitering the enemy's line, and in examining the ground on which we were to operate. On both sides preparations were making for a decisive battle. The Russians mingled with their military preparations the ceremonies of the Greek Church, and invoked divine assistance to save their country. We collected our scattered forces, concentrated our masses, and prepared our arms and parks of artillery. Our numerical forces were nearly equal, being about one hundred and twenty-five or one hundred and thirty thousand on each side. We had about fifteen thousand veterans against an equal number of Cossacks and militia, but they, on the other hand, fought in defense of a city and in a fortified position, and on ground with which they were better acquainted than our forces. Three *fêches* covered their left towards Semenofskoe, a large bastioned redoubt was traced near the center on the height between that village and Borodino, while several redans covered the right towards the river Moskowa; they had not yet had time to palisade these works.

The battle took place on the seventh. I have fought many battles in my life, but I have never seen one as terrible as this. It was an extraordinary contest in several respects—from the nature of the enterprise which it was to terminate, from the greatness of the interests which were involved, and from the singular circumstances which marked the shock of such immense masses in so narrow a space.

**POSITION OF THE RUSSIANS.**—The enemy's position, as I reconnoitered it, was as follows: Barclay, with three corps of infantry and one of cavalry, formed the right from the great bastioned redoubt to the Moskva; it was separated into two parts by the ravine of Gorke. Bagration, with the seventh and eighth corps, formed the left from the great redoubt to the copice-wood between Semenofskoe and Oustiza. This position was defective. The fault was attributed to General Benningsen, who was then acting as chief of staff. He had directed his attention too much to the right, which I had no interest or desire to attack. The left, on the contrary, was not so well placed, although covered by three *fêches*; between them and the old road to Moscow was an interval of five hundred toises secured only by some chasseurs.

**PLAN OF ATTACK.**—If things had remained in this condition, it was not difficult to anticipate the result. But in the evening the Russian generals moved the entire corps of Touczkof to prolong the left to Oustiza, on the old road to Moscow; we, however, saw only its advanced posts. My dispositions were soon arranged. I resolved to gain the old road to Moscow by my extreme right under Poniatowski, to force the enemy's left with



Davoust and Ney, and thus throw their center and right into the Moskva, while the Viceroy held in check that portion of their line. It was nearly the same disposition of our masses as that made at Friedland, except that in that battle the river was in the enemy's rear, while at Borodino the Russians had in their rear a favorable ground for retreat, the obstacle being on their extreme right.

Unfortunately, all my plan could not be executed as I desired; and the enemy made a timely modification in his dispositions. I also changed my intention respecting the destination of the Viceroy, to whom I gave a more active part, directing him to attack the center of the enemy, and at the same time to cover with his left the great road from Giatz to Moscow. For this purpose I reinforced him with two divisions of Davoust's corps. But this marshal wished me to leave him his whole five divisions, and to charge him with a decisive movement by the old road and the coppice-wood; thus turning the position of the Russians before attacking their *flèches*, and beginning the battle by establishing himself perpendicularly on their extremity. The idea was excellent; but it was to be feared that the Russians might take the alarm at seeing themselves thus threatened, and again disappear on the road to Mojaïsk, which would have indefinitely postponed the decisive battle which we so much desired. I, therefore, preferred to attack their line in echelons by the right; this did not promise so easy a success, but it was less likely to cause a postponement of the battle. The corps of Poniatowski was sufficient to maneuver so as to turn the enemy's left and secure our superiority in that direction. Having formed my plan, I disposed my masses so as not to attract too much the enemy's attention. Each one received his special instructions. The artillery was to prepare its fire for an early hour, and the hundred pieces of Davoust, Ney, and the guard were directed to advance at the break of day so as to destroy with their shells and balls the works which were to be attacked by my right.

On the morning of the seventh, I waited with anxiety to learn what the enemy had done during the night. At five o'clock, Ney informed me that the entire army of the Russians was still in position, and the French Achilles, burning with impatience, asked permission to begin the attack. All now flew to arms, and each one took his allotted part in the great contest which was now to decide the fate of Europe. Our batteries advanced into line so as to be within reach of those of the enemy. Compans, who had given so fine a prelude to the battle by taking the redoubt of Schevardino, was now to begin the battle by carrying the *flèche* which formed the extreme right of the Russians; he was to creep

along the coppice-wood, while Dessaix seconded his operation by marching through the woods. Friant's division was to remain in reserve. As soon as Davoust became master of the redoubt, Ney was to advance in echelons on Semenofskoe; his divisions, having suffered much at Valoutina, now numbered scarcely fifteen thousand combatants; ten thousand Westphalians were to reinforce Ney's corps and form his second line. The Young and Old Guards formed the third and fourth lines. Murat divided his cavalry. Montbrun's corps was opposite the enemy's center and at the left of Ney; Nansouty and Latour-Maubourg placed themselves so as to follow the movement of our right; while Grouchy was to assist the Viceroy. The latter, reinforced by the divisions of Morand and Gérard from Davoust's corps, was to attack the village of Borodino on the great road to Moscow, and on the left bank of the Kolocza; the division of Delzons was to establish itself there, while the three others were to cross the Kolocza on the three bridges constructed for that purpose in the morning, and attack the grand redoubt of the center.

The first disposition was the cause of the undecisive turn of the battle. It was necessary to throw Davoust with four of his divisions into the gap between the redoubt of the left and the woods of Oustiza, to follow up his movement by Murat with his cavalry, and support him by Ney and the Westphalians directed on Semenofskoe, while the Young Guard marched in echelons at the center of the two attacks, and Poniatowski, connected with Davoust, turned the right of Touczkof in the woods of Oustiza. In this way we would have broken and turned the enemy's left with an irresistible mass, and forced a change of front parallel to the great road to Moscow, with the river Moskva in the enemy's rear. There were in this gap only four feeble regiments of chasseurs ambushed in the coppice-wood, so that the success of the operation was scarcely doubtful.

**BATTLE OF BORODINO, OR THE MOSKVA.**—At six o'clock the signal of attack is given. The artillery directs its thunders upon the *flèches*. Davoust rushes forward with his two divisions. The brigade of Plausonne on Eugene's left, which was merely to occupy Borodino and remain in observation, carried away by an ill-directed zeal, goes beyond the village and debouches against the entire corps of Doctorof, who drives it back with loss. Plausonne falls a victim to the ardor of his battalions, and Delzons at last succeeds in disputing Borodino with the superior forces which the enemy concentrated on that point.

In attacking with the first echelon Woronzof's division of grenadiers in a post covered by intrenchments, Davoust is assailed in flank by the chasseurs just mentioned, and suffers severely;

Compans' division, however, carries the redan of the extreme left with rare courage. This brave general is wounded; and Davoust himself has his horse killed under him, and receives a severe contusion. Dessaix, who has replaced Compans, is also put *hors-de-combat*. Rapp now takes command of this division, which has three times lost its chief. Nor have the Russians suffered less than the French; Woronzof is wounded and the work carried. But our success is not of long duration. The enemy, under the protection of his batteries, advances the infantry of his second line (Newerowski's division), and our troops are compelled to evacuate the work which they had but just carried. Bagration now sees his danger and calls in all haste Konownitzin's division from the corps of Touczkof. A division of cuirassiers and a brigade of the Young Guard come from the reserve to sustain the threatened flank.

But this momentary *contretemps* is soon repaired; Ney, arriving in echelons, rushes at the head of Ledru's division on the same redoubt, and enters it on the left at the same time that Compans' troops return by the right. The enemy still holds the third *flèche*, which Ney and Murat attack with the division of Razout. These troops are on the point of carrying the work when they are charged upon by the Russian cuirassiers. There is a moment of uncertainty; at length our infantry hold firm, and give the cavalry of Bruyères time to disengage Razout's division, which, animated by Murat, rush again upon the intrenchments and carry them.

More than two hours have been consumed in these attacks. Kutusof, who easily discovered our heavy masses ready to fall upon his left, had time to direct a part of his right to sustain the threatened point. At nine o'clock, the corps of Bagawouth sent by Barclay had already passed the heights of Semenofskoe. One of his divisions marches to Oustiza, and the other throws itself into the coppice-wood.

On our side, Junot had just deployed in rear of Ney, and engaged his first line, when the impetuous marshal throws upon the enemy the right of his own troops. To act still more efficaciously, by turning the position which the Russians disputed with so much obstinacy, the second line of Westphalians receive orders to support the right and penetrate the coppice-wood between Davoust and Poniatowski. If this movement had been executed an hour earlier, it would have been decisive; but now Galitzin's reserve of cavalry had time to dispute with the Westphalians the plain where they were to debouch, and the arrival of Bagawouth's corps enabled Eugene of Würtemberg's division to drive into the woods the column of the Westphalians. Galit-



zin's cavalry profited by this opportunity to make a fine charge against our right. It had even got possession of a battery of the reserve, when a brave infantry regiment of Dessaix's division (the eleventh) debouched from the woods, took these audacious cuirassiers in reverse, and forced them to charge in rear in order to open to themselves a passage by which to escape, thus saving our artillery.

Bagration now felt the necessity of giving the reinforcements drawn from the right time to reach their destination, thinking that the battle depended upon the resistance which he might oppose to us. He threw himself on Ney at the head of a division of grenadiers of the Prince of Mecklenburg, sustained by a brigade of guards and eight regiments of cuirassiers; the remains of the commands of Woronzof and Newerowski, supported by a division of light cavalry, assisted this effort by attacking Davoust. The whole line of the enemy renewed the attack; in the redoubts was retaken, and Murat himself was forced to take refuge in the division of Razout.

Ney now advances at the head of his reserves; Friant's division receives orders to support the left of Razout by marching on the village of Semenofskoe; the lost redoubt is retaken; Friant crosses the ravine of Semenofskoe, and carries the village. Konownitzin's division, which has just arrived from the extreme left, now checks Friant, and obliges him to return to the height of the redoubts, where Ney is still advancing.

Masters of the *flèches*, but threatened by the attitude of Bagration, who continues to receive reinforcements from the right, Ney and Davoust prepare to drive him behind the ravine of Semenofskoe; they are supported by all the disposable artillery, and the Viceroy also prepares to assist them by attacking the center.

Nothing can arrest the impetuosity of Ney; Bagration, fearing to be pierced, throws himself at the head of his lines, who, with the bayonet, hope to regain the offensive. A terrible *mêlée* ensues; Bagration is seriously wounded, and also his chief of staff, St. Priest; the Russian troops, deprived of their chiefs, are on the point of being entirely defeated, when the impassible Konownitzin takes the command, rallies them behind the ravine of Semenofskoe, and, under the protection of a well-placed artillery, succeeds in arresting the advance of our columns.

It is now necessary to render these advantages decisive: Murat throws the corps of Nansouty and Latour-Maubourg beyond the ravine; the first falls upon the extreme left of Konownitzin, where the regiments of the guards of Ismail and Lithuania, formed into squares, receive him with firmness, and give to

the five regiments of Russian cuirassiers time to fall upon our fatigued squadrons, and to drive them back behind the ravine. Latour-Maubourg was equally successful near Semenofskoe, where the infantry of Friant and Ney make a firm stand. The enemy, convinced of the impossibility of retaking these positions, nevertheless remain in heavy masses under the fire of our artillery with an admirable constancy. It was easy to see that these brave men had resolved not to survive the misfortunes of their country.

In the meantime the Viceroy, after having been held in suspense by the attack of Delzons' division on Borodino, by their inconsiderate passage of this defile, and by the obstacles presented by the Kolocza, had crossed that river upon four small bridges constructed by the engineers. Eugene hastened to oblique to the right in order to carry the great bastioned redoubt which had been erected between Borodino and Semenofskoe to cover the enemy's center. Morand's division, having debouched first on the plateau, threw the thirtieth regiment on this redoubt, and advanced with a deep column to second the attack. These brave men marched steadily to their object without noticing the terrible fire of the enemy; they penetrated into the redoubt notwithstanding the efforts of the first line of Paskiewitsch; but, being prepared for this event, that officer now advances at the head of his second line upon the flank of our deep column, and also charges it with his first line faced to the rear. Iermolof seconded this attack with a brigade of the guards.

Exposed at the same time to the artillery of Doctorof, and assailed on the right by Wassiltschikof, Morand is forced to return into the ravine. Bonomi, who is left in the redoubt, is too weak to defend it. He falls pierced with wounds, with a part of the thirtieth regiment which had so bravely taken the place. These two efforts on the left not being properly sustained, and not taking place at the same time, rather tend to encourage the Russians, and to dampen the ardor of our troops. The offensive movement of Iermolof, Paskiewitsch, and Wassiltschikof is near causing the evacuation of Semenofskoe; but this is, fortunately, arrested by the batteries of the reserve being timely placed in rear of that village.

In the meantime the combat was continued with great success on the old road to Moscow. I had expected that Poniatowski would be able to maneuver without great difficulty so as to turn the enemy; he, however, encountered considerable difficulties. Favored by the departure of Konownitzin's division, and by the efforts of the Westphalians, he charged the right and carried the little hill which commanded it; Touczkof with a part of Baga-

wouth's corps soon retook this important post, and paid for this momentary success with his life.

The vigorous attacks of Ney and the admirable charges of our cavalry had now produced the desired effect. Ney and Davoust had solidly established themselves on these intrenched heights which had been occupied by the enemy's left at the beginning of the battle; but apart from these advantages, and the possession of the smoking ruins of Semenofskoe, we had no trophies. It was now eleven o'clock. Ney loudly called for reinforcements to complete his victory. It seemed to him more easy to seek new victories than to remain exposed to the fire of two hundred cannon which were sending death into his ranks. Perhaps the favorable moment had already passed, for the enemy had not only drawn Bagawouth from the banks of the Moskva to the extreme left, but had brought up the fresh corps of Ostermann to sustain the center, which had been so broken by the attack of Eugene.

I, however, was about to order a new effort to be made, with the assistance of two divisions of the guard and three of Eugene's divisions, when a tumultuous cry on the road of Borodino indicated that a grand attack was being made against the Viceroy. I, therefore, suspended the departure of my guard, and rejoiced that had I had done so when I found that Eugene had just re-passed to the left of the Kolocza with the Italian guard. As this movement threatened our line of retreat, I resolved to wait till I could ascertain more definitively the state of affairs, and sent Claparède's division to a position where they might be able to act as occasion should require. I soon learned, however, that it was a mere skirmish of cavalry made by Ouvarof's corps and some of Platof's Cossacks on Ornano's brigade and the division of Delzons, which received the enemy in squares and rendered ineffectual their ill-directed efforts. Nevertheless, this incident kept us more than an hour in suspense, and enabled the enemy in the interval to rectify his position, so that it in reality contributed not a little to the ill success of the battle.

As soon as I was assured of what was passing, everything was disposed for renewing an attack upon the great battery of the center, at the same time that my right debouched in advance of Semenofskoe. The Russians perceive from the dispositions of the Viceroy, Murat, and Ney the storm which is gathering, and relieve the broken corps of Rajefski by that of Ostermann, which enters into the first line, with its left in the direction of Semenofskoe, and its right resting on the great road. My generals mistake this maneuver for an offensive operation; Murat and Sorbier concentrate on these columns an enormous mass of artillery, which causes great havoc in their ranks, but they remain firm and



immovable under this terrible fire. Their whole artillery responds to ours; Doctorof, Barclay, and Iermolof direct their fire upon the divisions of the Viceroy, which shows the same firm attitude. The fire is general from Borodino to Semenofskoe, and even to the woods. Eight hundred pieces of cannon are uttering their thunders within the space of half a league, and scattering death in all directions. Never was there a spectacle at the same time so imposing and so terrible. All the actors in this grand drama proclaim it, with one accord, *the battle of the giants!*

At the moment when everything is ready for a general attack, Montbrun, whose corps was placed directly opposite the enemy's center, is killed by a cannon-ball; I order Caulaincourt\* to fly to his place and charge the great redoubt, which the Viceroy is about to attack with the divisions of Morand, Gérard, and Broussier, reinforced by the legion of Vistula. It is now two o'clock. The enemy has had time to complete the movement of Count Ostermann, whom Miloradowitsch has brought from the right wing, and who is sustained by the second and third corps of cavalry; the shock is terrible.

Caulaincourt, notwithstanding the difficulties encountered, executes his commission with great courage. After having driven off a part of the enemy's infantry, he rushes on the redoubt in spite of the battalions which surround it, and penetrates to the interior with the fifth cuirassiers. But he is killed, and his brave men exposed to the fire of Ostermann's infantry and the old Russian guard in rear of the work, and threatened by Korf and Pahlen's cavalry, are forced to re-form under the protection of the infantry. But a few moments after, the columns of the Viceroy again assailed the twice-conquered redoubt, now occupied by Lichatschef's infantry (of Doctorof's corps), and captured the place for the third time, taking Lichatschef prisoner. He was about to throw Grouchy's corps forward upon the battalions of Doctorof, when the *élite* of the enemy's cavalry advanced against ours and held them in check long enough to allow Korf and Pahlen's corps to return from Caulaincourt to their assistance, and thus caused Grouchy to rejoin his infantry.

It was now three o'clock. We were at last masters of the great redoubt of the center and of the *flèches* of the left; neverthe-

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\*This was Count Augustus Caulaincourt, brother of the Duke of Vicenza. He was the first to surmount the parapet of the redoubt. At that moment a musket-ball struck him dead. He had scarcely left the side of the Emperor with orders to charge the redoubt, when intelligence of his death was brought to head-quarters, where his brother, the Duke, was talking with Napoleon. The scene was most affecting, young Caulaincourt being greatly beloved by all.

less, the Russians formed again behind the two ravines of Goristkskoe and Semenovskoe, and continued an obstinate resistance. Wearied with the carnage, both parties limited themselves to a cannonade without renewing the attack.

During these murderous shocks the Poles were not idle. Encouraged by the success of Ney and Davoust, Poniatowski had again attacked the little hill behind Ouslitz; seeing himself also threatened by the Westphalians, Bagawouth, who now commanded at this point, deemed it prudent to abandon the place and form into line with the remains of Bagration's corps, near the source of the rivulet of Semenovskoe. The battle now degenerated into a cannonade, which continued till dark. Convinced that the Russians would retire during the night and allow me to advance upon Moscow without risking another battle, I preferred to abide by this indecisive victory, rather than to attempt a new attack, which might, in our present situation, lead to disastrous results. Nor was I mistaken in this opinion; for Kutusof retired before day and took the road to Moscow in two columns by Mojaisk and the old road.

REMARKS ON THIS BATTLE.—Such were the principal events of this great battle, upon which so much has been written, and upon which critics are so ill agreed. The truth is, my plan was wisely conceived, but not well executed. There are some battles where success depends upon the first shock; in others the opportune moment for striking the decisive blow does not occur till near the close of the day; this depends upon the respective positions of the contending parties. Thus at Waterloo the decisive moment for Wellington was at the approach of Blücher; at Marengo the decisive moment for me was the return of Dessaix from Rivalta; and for the opposite parties in these two battles it was early in the day. If we apply this general principle to the battle of Borodino, it is not difficult to judge of it understandingly. We ought to have struck the decisive blow in the first attack, without allowing Bagawouth and Ostermann time to reinforce the threatened point.

It has been shown in our recital that we carried the great redoubt of the center and the *flèches* of the left, after a reinforcement of forty thousand men and four hundred pieces of cannon had been carried upon the decisive point. This fact is sufficient in itself to prove that the success would have been more complete if, in the morning, we had thrown Ney and the Westphalians on the *flèches* and the road to Moscow, his right being connected with Poniatowski. We carried these positions when the thing was more difficult and less decisive. The Viceroy, weakened by

the departure of one of Davoust's divisions, might have formed into line to keep the enemy in check and cannonade his center so as to effect a diversion, without making an offensive movement, as that would have been useless after our success on the left.

In reply to the reproach which has sometimes been made against me for not having sent to Ney the Young Guard at eleven o'clock, it may be said that although it would have been better to have done so, nevertheless, under the circumstances, my refusal cannot justly be regarded as a fault; for at that time the enemy still exhibited a firm attitude, and all our battles with the Russians had been long, obstinate, and bloody; I thought they had more fresh troops coming from their right, and was ignorant that their guards were all engaged; it would have been improper in me to have engaged my final reserve before they did theirs. It is not at a distance of eight hundred leagues from the base of operations that one can venture upon such a maneuver. It was for the want of a good reserve that Charles XII. was forced to fly alone into Turkey after the battle of Pultowa. After having reconnoitered the decisive point, I was about to throw upon it Mortier with the Young Guard, when the great noise attending the combat of cavalry on my left caused me to suspend the execution of an attack which would undoubtedly have decided the victory. In judging of this battle from what actually occurred in the two armies, rather than from what was known to me at the time, it may be said that there was an evident fault in attacking the redoubt of the center at ten o'clock, with the single division of Morand. If the Viceroy had then assailed it, as he did at two o'clock; with all his forces united, and I had at the same moment thrown the Young Guard to the support of Ney on Semenofskoe, the victory would have been certain and complete by eleven o'clock in the morning. As, for the reasons already given, this opportunity was allowed to pass, the next favorable moment was at three o'clock, after the taking of the great central redoubt. At that time the troops of Bagration were almost destroyed, and those of Doctorof greatly broken in the contest with the Viceroy and Grouchy, so that Ostermann's corps and two regiments of the guard were the only ones which had not severely suffered.

Bagawouth and the remains of Touczkof were scarcely able to oppose the Westphalians and Poniatowski. If I had presented my guards to the right of Semenofskoe between the village and the source of the brook, the Russians would certainly have been beaten and forced to fight in retreat. But I was ignorant of the state of things in the enemy's army; my own troops were dislodged; my cavalry had severely suffered; and I supposed the enemy's reserve still untouched; whereas all were engaged except



the militia of Moscow. All this was known after the battle, and it is very easy to find fault after the thing has taken place and all the circumstances are known.

It is in this way that critics have reproached Frederick with not having destroyed the army of Soltikof at Kunersdorf, a battle which very much resembles that of Borodino. Surprised on the left by the King of Prussia, the Russians held so firm in the ravine of Kuhgrund that the right wing and Laudon had time to come up and gain the victory. I had, over Frederick, the advantage of a strong reserve and a numerical superiority, and therefore I gained the battle, while that great king suffered a total defeat.

Always ready to do homage to truth, I confess that there is not to be found in this battle the same vigor that marked our victories at Austerlitz, Friedland, Abensburg, Rivoli, and Jena. Writers who did not understand the reasons of my circumspection have attributed it to a malady with which I was several times attacked. If it is true that I was suffering from illness, I nevertheless had all my faculties and knew very well what I had to do. My plan was a simple one—to turn the left of the Russians, and all my orders were directed to that object; and it certainly required no great exertion of mind to tell the Viceroy when to attack, and Mortier when to assist Ney.

My great circumspection in this battle was very natural, and caused by the peculiar circumstances of our situation. On the one side was an army which had marched eight hundred leagues, suffering every privation, composed of twenty different nations, and exposed to all the unfavorable chances of a reverse; on the other side, an army homogeneous, disciplined, animated by religious enthusiasm, and resolved to conquer or die, showing in their long and difficult retreat proofs of their devotion and of the excellent spirit which animated them. All the battles which I had fought with it, for the last ten years, had been strongly disputed; and could we expect a weaker effort in their own territory and almost under the walls of that city to which they attached the destinies of their empire? If we found here the same Russians as at Eylau and Heilsberg, but more deeply interested than there, and more than ever resolved on victory; what was to become of my army in case of the slightest reverse? Such were the motives which here influenced my mind, which compelled me to avoid every hazardous maneuver, and which diminished the vigor of my operations. A victory, however incomplete, would lead me to Moscow; it was there that I hoped to reap the results of the war. As soon as we were masters of the enemy's positions on the left, I was certain that the enemy would retreat during the night;

why, then, should I willingly expose myself to the consequences of the defeat of Pultowa?

This memorable and bloody battle, which we had so ardently desired, was far from accomplishing my object. I had hoped to fight it in Lithuania, and to make it decisive; but I had found it two hundred leagues in the interior, and gained no other trophies than a field covered with the dead and wounded.

The losses on both sides had amounted to eighty thousand men *hors-de-combat*; from twelve to fifteen thousand wounded Russians regained Moscow, where the most part became a prey to the flames. The wounded French were also carried there; and almost all perished in the hospitals or during the retreat. The generals wounded on the side of the French were Nansouty, Grouchy, Latour-Maubourg, Rapp, Compans, Friant, Bonamy, Morand, Lahoussaye; and of the Russians, Galitzin, Charles of Mecklenburg, Gortschakof, Woronzof, St. Priest, Kretof, Bachmetof, Iermolof, and Lichacschef.

Shades of the brave men who fell on this memorable day, posterity will erect for you immortal monuments! Montbrun, Caulaincourt, Plausonne, Romenof, Bonamy, Marion, Compère, Huart, more fortunate than your associates, you have fallen when your glory was at its apogee, and when your country was mistress of half of Europe! Less favored by fortune, the Russian generals Bagration, Kaisarof, Touczkof fell carrying with them the grief of seeing their country invaded and threatened with impending ruin! But their regrets were of short duration, for the empire of the czars soon emerged from this contest with glory.\*

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\*In speaking of the battle of Borodino, Napoleon said, at St. Helena: "The Russian soldiers are brave, and their whole army was assembled at the Moskva. They reckoned one hundred and seventy thousand men, including those in Moscow. Kutusof had an excellent position, and occupied it to the best advantage.

"Everything was in his favor—superiority of infantry, of cavalry, and of artillery, a first-rate position, and a great number of redoubts—and yet he was beaten.

"Ye intrepid heroes, Murat, Ney, Poniatowski, to you belongs the glory. What noble and brilliant actions will History have to record! She will tell how our intrepid cuirassiers forced the redoubts and sabered the cannoners at their pieces.

"She will recount the heroic devotion of Montbrun and of Caulaincourt, who expired in the midst of their glory. She will tell what was done by our cannoners, exposed upon the open plain, against batteries more numerous and covered by good parapets; and she will make mention also of those brave foot soldiers, who, at the most critical moment, instead of requiring encouragement from their general, exclaimed, 'Have no fear; your soldiers have all sworn to conquer to-day and they will conquer!'

"What parallels to such glorious deeds can future ages produce? Or will falsehood and calumny prevail?"

**NAPOLEON ENTERS MOSCOW.**—On the retreat of the enemy from Borodino, he was pursued by my advanced guard on the road to Moscow. A warm engagement near Mojaisk made me think it possible that we might have another battle before we reached Moscow; the enemy, in fact, had some intention of making a stand at Fili in advance of their capital, but changed their minds, and General Miloradowitsch merely went through the forms of a negotiation. I entered the capital on the fourteenth of September.

Built, like Rome, on seven hills, Moscow presents a most picturesque appearance. It is necessary to have seen this great city, half Oriental and half European, with its two hundred churches and its thousand steeples of different colors, to form any idea of our feelings on first discovering it from the heights of Fili. I had placed great hopes on the occupation of this city, whose nobility had been represented to me as dissatisfied with their government and disposed to join our party. I hoped to incite this nobility against the throne, or, if they were still hostile, to create a democratic interest against the oligarchy. In this I was doubly deceived, for both the middle class and the nobility were still more exasperated against me than against their own court, and rallied to the support of the throne. From the representation which I had received, I expected, on reaching Moscow, to meet some deputation from a city so influential in the interior of the empire, and was proportionately astonished when I learned that my advanced guard had found the place almost entirely deserted, and that even the municipal authorities had disappeared.

✓ I entered the city with great pomp, but amid an ominous silence. Alighting at the Kremlin, the antique palace of the czars, so celebrated for its historical associations, and so extraordinary for its architecture, half Oriental and half Slavonic, I felt no less emotions on seeing the throne of Peter the Great than in visiting, in 1806, the cabinet of Frederick at Potsdam. The delightful view from the fine balcony of this palace added to these emotions; but my attention was called from the reflections to which these scenes naturally gave rise, to the pressing cares of our present situation.

My first care was the maintenance of order by assigning quarters to the several *corps-d'armée*, where they might establish themselves and supply their most pressing wants. Commandants were appointed for each of these quarters. Order has always been maintained in all the capitals which we have conquered, so long as there remained any municipal authorities or inhabitants to guard their effects. Even at Madrid my entry was marked by



no excesses. But here a half-famished soldiery, finding everything abandoned, regarded Moscow rather as a vast camp deserted by the enemy, and every one felt entitled to appropriate to himself what he pleased. Every precaution was taken to guard the public *dépôts* and great establishments; but there were a thousand private shops which had been stripped by their owners of their most valuable contents and abandoned; and our soldiers, as they could not expect their regular supplies until we could organize the commissariat, regarded these houses and cellars as subject only to their mercy.

THE RUSSIANS BURN THE CITY.—To these scenes of violence succeeded burnings, which soon increased in number. I at first attributed it to the imprudence of our soldiers in kindling fires in the middle of the houses, and directed severe punishments to be inflicted. But the ravages of the fire continually increased; and it was soon found that the project had been premeditated by our enemies, and was the result of a resolution at the same time heroic and cruel. On the third day Moscow was an ocean of flame, and the spectacle from the balcony of the Kremlin was worthy of Nero burning Rome. But for me, who could not share the feelings of that monster, it was a sad and sorrowful sight and filled my heart with grief.

My troops were ordered to use their best endeavors to check the flames; but all their efforts were in vain; the engines had been removed by the governor, Rostopschin, who was the principal author of the burning, and the houses, three-quarters of which were of wood, were actually fired by disguised soldiers of the city police. In two days between seven and eight thousand houses became a prey to the flames. The Kremlin, surrounded by high walls, for a time seemed safe, but the burning brands which were flying about in every direction caused fears for the arsenal and our parks; at length the whirlwinds of smoke and fire rendered a longer sojourn in this place impossible, and it was with the greatest difficulty that I effected my escape from this fiery furnace, and took refuge in the castle of Petrowski.\*

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\*Thiers thus describes the burning of Moscow:

"The French army hoped, therefore, to enjoy comfort in Moscow; to obtain, probably, peace by means of its possession, and at least good winter cantonments, in case the war should be prolonged. But on the afternoon they had entered, columns of flames arose from a vast building containing vast quantities of spirits, and just as our soldiers had almost succeeded in mastering the fire in this spot, a violent conflagration suddenly burst forth in a collection of buildings called the Bazaar, situated to the northeast of the Kremlin, and containing the richest magazines, abounding in stores of the exquisite tissues of India and Persia, the rarities of Europe, colonial produce, and precious wines. The troops of the guard immediately

This catastrophe entirely changed the face of affairs; but it was not, as some have supposed, a certain cause of my ruin and the salvation of Russia. On the contrary, if I had been less tenacious in my projects, I should have regarded so desperate a resolution as a proof that the Russian government and nation would not treat, and as a happy warning to retreat before winter. In not doing so I committed the greatest error of my whole life. If the Russians had not destroyed their city till the end of October, the effect might have been decisive; but executed about the middle of September, it was calculated to save me and might have become a useless sacrifice. What would have been the result if, taking warning by this barbarous act, I had the next day taken the road to Kalouga? Although the fire had destroyed two-thirds of our resources, we still had a good deal left; but we were mostly destitute of forage for our animals. We attempted to reorganize the Russian authorities, but the employees failed to perform their duties, and the subaltern agents, instead of render-

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hastened up and attempted to subdue the flames, but their energetic efforts were unfortunately unsuccessful, and the immense riches of the establishment fell a prey to the fire, with the exception of some portions which our men were able to snatch from the devouring element. This fresh accident was again attributed to natural causes, and considered as easily explicable in the tumult of an evacuation.

"During the night of the fifteenth of September, however, a sudden change came over the scene; for then, as though every species of misfortune were to fall at the same moment on the ancient Muscovite capital, the equinoctial gales suddenly arose with the extreme violence usual to the season and in countries where widespread plains offer no resistance to the storm. This wind, blowing first from the east, carried the fire to the west, into the streets comprised between the Iver and Smolensko routes, which were the most beautiful and the richest in all Moscow. Within some hours the fire, spreading with frightful rapidity, and throwing out long arrows of flame, spread to the other westward quarters. And soon rockets were observed in the air, and wretches were seized in the act of spreading the conflagration. Interrogated under threat of instant death, they revealed the frightful secret, the order given by Count Rostopschin for the burning of the city of Moscow, as though it had been a simple village on the Moscow route. This information filled the whole army with consternation. Napoleon ordered that military commissions should be formed in each quarter of the city for the purpose of judging, shooting, and hanging incendiaries taken in the act; and that all the available troops should be employed in extinguishing the flames. Immediate recourse was had to the pumps, but it was found they had been removed; and this latter circumstance would have proved, if, indeed, any doubt on the matter had remained, the terrible determination with which Moscow had been given to the flames.

"In the meantime, the wind, increasing in violence every moment, rendered the efforts of the whole army ineffectual, and suddenly changing, with the abruptness peculiar to equinoctial gales, from the east to the northwest, it carried the torrent of flame into quarters which the hands of the incendiaries had not yet been able to fire. And after having blown during



ing us any assistance, required us to furnish them with supplies. Here war could not support war!

NAPOLEON PROJECTS A MARCH ON ST. PETERSBURG. —I carefully weighed all the consequences of this great catastrophe; and I saw that peace alone could rescue us from the gulf into which a fatal destiny had plunged us. Four different projects presented themselves to my choice; to pass the winter at Moscow; to retire to the south on Volhynia; or by Kalouga on Smolensko and Wilna; or finally, to march to the north on St. Petersburg. It was possible that, threatened in his last capital, the Emperor Alexander would treat for peace. If not, we would take Wittgenstein in reverse and force him to fall back on the Ingria, thus enabling Belluno, Saint-Cyr, and Macdonald to advance on Pskow and form a junction with the main army. After more mature consideration, and after weighing the chances of being attacked in rear by the Russian army and thrown into the

some hours from the northwest, the wind once more changed its direction and blew from the southwest, as though it had a cruel pleasure in spreading ruin and death over the unhappy city, or rather, over our army.

"By this change of the wind to the southwest the Kremlin was placed in extreme peril.

"More than four hundred ammunition-wagons were in the court of the Kremlin, and the arsenal contained some four hundred thousand pounds of powder. There was imminent danger, therefore, that Napoleon with his guard, and the palace of the czars, might be blown up into the air.

"The officers who surrounded him, and the artillerymen who knew that his death would be their own, thronged about him with entreaties that he would retire from so dangerous a position.

"The peril was most threatening; and even the old artillerymen of the guard, although accustomed to such cannonades as that of Borodino, almost lost their *sang-froid*.

"General Lariboisière at length approached Napoleon, and with the authority he had by virtue of his age and his devotion, entreated that the troops might be permitted to save themselves without having their embarrassment increased by the excitement caused by the presence of their emperor. Several officers, moreover, who had been sent into the adjacent quarters to make inquiries, reported that it was scarcely possible to traverse the burning streets, and that to depart immediately was the only means of escaping from being buried under the ruins of the doomed city.

"Napoleon, therefore, followed by some of his lieutenants, descended from the Kremlin to the quay of the Moskva, where he found his horses ready for him, and had much difficulty in threading the streets, which, toward the northwest, in which direction he proceeded, were already in flames. The terrified army set out from Moscow; the divisions of Prince Eugene and Marshal Ney fell back upon the Twenigorod and St. Petersburg roads. Those of Marshal Davoust fell back upon the Somlensko route, and with the exception of the guard, which was left around the Kremlin, to dispute its possession with the flames, our troops drew back in horror from before the fire, which, after flaming up to Heaven, darted back toward them as



marshes of the Ingria, I determined only to make a demonstration on St. Petersburg, and if the Emperor would not treat, to retire upon the plateaus of Waldai and Novgorod on the Dwina by Sebeje. But my generals so strongly opposed this project, as being exceedingly dangerous, that I determined to remain where I was till I could learn the effect produced by the battle of Borodino and the burning of Moscow on the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The fire having subsided, I returned to the smoking ruins of Moscow on the nineteenth, to wait for news from Kutusof and Alexander.

It would now be difficult to say what would have been the consequences of the adoption of my project of marching on St. Petersburg. If it had been executed immediately, the movement might have conducted us to Novgorod by the middle of October; and Belluno and Saint-Cyr might have effected their junction. But by following in our rear and harassing us with partial combats, Kutusof, after effecting a junction with Wittgenstein and

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though it wished to devour them. The few inhabitants who had remained in Moscow, and had hitherto lain concealed in their dwellings, now fled, carrying away such of their possessions as they valued most highly, uttering lamentable cries of distress, and in many instances falling victims to the brigands whom Rostopchin had let loose, and who now exulted in the midst of the conflagration, as the Genius of Evil in the midst of Chaos.

"Napoleon took up his quarters at the château of Petrowskoie, a league's distance from Moscow on the St. Petersburg route, in the center of the cantonments of the troops under Prince Eugene, awaiting there the subsidence of the conflagration, which had now reached such a height that it was beyond human power either to increase or extinguish it.

"As a final misfortune, the wind changed on the following day, from southwest to direct west, and the torrents of flame were carried toward the eastern quarters of the city, the streets Messnitskaia and Bassmanala, and the Summer Palace. As the conflagration reached its terrible height, frightful crashes were heard every moment; roofs crashing inwards, and stately façades crumbling headlong into the streets, as their supports became consumed in the flames.

"The sky was scarcely visible through the thick cloud of smoke which overshadowed it, and the sun was only apparent as a blood-red globe. For three successive days, the sixteenth, the seventeenth, and the eighteenth of September, this terrific scene continued, and in unabated intensity.

"At length, after having devoured four-fifths of the city, the fire ceased, gradually quenched by the rain, which, as is usually the case, succeeded the violence of the equinoctial gales. As the flames subsided, only the specter, as it were, of what had once been a magnificent city, was visible; and, indeed, the Kremlin and about a fifth part of the city were alone saved; their preservation being chiefly due to the exertions of the Imperial Guard.

"As the inhabitants of Moscow themselves entered the ruins seeking what property still remained in them undestroyed, it was scarcely possible to prevent our soldiers from acting in the same manner, and accordingly searching among the crumbling edifices, they speedily penetrated to the

the corps of Riga, and being reinforced by new levies, might have forced us to retreat by Witepsk on Wilna, and by taking a parallel route he would have rendered our retreat no less disastrous than that by Smolensko.

The only wise course now to be pursued was to march without delay on Volokolamsk and Toropets, and to take the direct road to Witepsk, or to march immediately against Kutusof, give him battle, destroy the manufactory of arms at Toula, and return by Kalouga and Roslaw on Smolensko. No other operation could save us from ruin.

Upon cool reflection and a full knowledge of the condition of affairs in Russia, I am convinced that a movement to the south was preferable to one on St. Petersburg. The Emperor Alexander had resolved not to treat so long as an enemy was on the Russian soil; and from the important change which, after the camp of Drissa, he had effected in the *personnel* of his staff, and the supe-

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cellars, and found there quantities of provisions still in great part uninjured by the fire, and in an abundance, which was due to the custom prevailing in the country, on account of the length of the winters, of storing up provisions for many months.

"In many of the houses, also, which the fire had injured sufficiently to render their pillage excusable without actually destroying them, were found the most exquisite articles of luxury, furs, and plate, which latter spoil the troops, in their improvidence, preferred to either food or clothing, and superb porcelain, which in their ignorance they despised or idly destroyed.

"It was a lamentable and grotesque spectacle which was now presented, as the crowd of our troops and the inhabitants of the city thronged the smoking embers of the splendid city, laughing at the singular costumes in which they had robed themselves, bearing in their hands articles of the utmost value, selling them for the most insignificant prices to those capable of appreciating their value, or dashing them to pieces in pure wantonness. And this wild and melancholy scene, in which intoxication was also a great element, for quantities of liquors had been discovered in the cellars, was rendered still more sad by the return of the unfortunate inhabitants who had fled at the moment of the evacuation or the breaking out of the fire, and who now returned, for the most part, to weep over the ruins of their dwellings, or to dispute with an unbridled mob the fragments still remaining of their possessions. Their only shelter the huts they could construct of the ruins which lay around them, their only beds the cinders of their former dwellings, they had no other food but what they might be able to beg from our troops.

"Thus gradually and mournfully, the population of Moscow returned; and with them came back, equally in search of their former habitations, and uttering the most dismal croakings, the clouds of crows and ravens whom the flames had driven away. And of this horrible scene, the chiefest horror of all remains to be told: the Russians had left fifteen thousand wounded in Moscow, and, incapable of escaping, they had perished, victims of Rostopschin's barbarous patriotism."

rior military knowledge which was thus introduced into that body, I now have reason to believe that they would have abundantly profited by any movement of ours into so difficult and dangerous a country as that in the direction of St. Petersburg. It is probable, therefore, that the project would have proved exceedingly disastrous, had I persisted in its execution.

#### MOVEMENT OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY ON TAROUTINA.

—But let us leave these discussions and return to the ashes of Moscow. As has already been said, I again took up my quarters amidst the ruins of that city on the nineteenth. Although the destruction of this capital was calculated to absorb all my attention, I did not entirely lose sight of the Russian army, the rear guard of which Murat had pursued on the road to Razan. The fatigue which the remainder of my troops had sustained rendered it necessary to give them a little repose. Our situation was becoming complicated. Moscow, like all large capitals, was the center from which twenty different roads diverged like the radii of a circle; detachments of the enemy's cavalry showed themselves toward Klin on the road to St. Petersburg. Others guarded the roads to Jaroslav, Wladimir, Podolsk, and Toula. This rendered it difficult to obtain any correct information of the enemy's movements; especially as our own cavalry was greatly broken down, while that of the Russians was much better supplied with forage. Eight entire days passed before I could learn anything positive. Murat then announced to me that the Russian army had deceived us, and after having followed for a time the road from Razan to the east, it had returned on the Pakra to reach Toula or Kalouga. I immediately dispatched Bessières in that direction. I was preparing to march, on the twenty-eighth of September, by Podolsk, to turn the right of the Russians and throw them back upon the Dnieper, when Murat announced that they had again retired. Our troops received a counter-order, and I resolved to wait till I could see more clearly into the state of our affairs and the projects of the enemy; fifteen days were thus unfortunately lost.

Kutusof thus gained time to establish himself in the position which he had taken at Taroutina behind the Nara, a point between Toula and Kalouga, on the old road leading to the latter city. He thus covered the fine armories of Toula and the fertile and populous provinces of the south, and at the same time was near enough to the road to Smolensko to threaten our only line of communication. I was impatient to learn the effect of the battle of Borodino and the burning of Moscow on the Emperor Alexander and the Court of St. Petersburg. I still retained some hopes



of effecting an arrangement. The circumstances attending these two events were not, in truth, very encouraging; but as the Russian army had suffered such terrible losses, I thought it not improbable that the Emperor would be glad to terminate the war upon honorable terms. The Russian army is excellent, but if once broken, it would be no easy matter to immediately build it up again.

A conversation which I had with a Russian gentleman, employed in the civil government, induced me to intrust to him a letter to the Emperor Alexander. M. Jacoblef left on the twenty-fourth of September, with this confidential overture. It required eight days for an answer; but as ten days had already elapsed, I determined, on the fourth of October, to send my *aid-de-camp*, Lauriston, to the head-quarters of Kutusof; he was the bearer of a letter for the Emperor, in which I proposed to enter into negotiations, and, as a prelude, to form an armistice. The same proposition was sent to Kutusof, who replied that he had no power to negotiate, but had forwarded my letter by Prince Volkonski. In the meantime, the greater part of my army was cantoned at Moscow and in its environs, while a strong vanguard, under the orders of the King of Naples, was established opposite the Russians near Winkowo.

EMBARRASSMENTS OF NAPOLEON'S POSITION.—We had already been twenty days at Moscow, and still no propositions for an accommodation; I, however, still flattered myself that we should receive them, although I must now confess that there was little or no ground for such hopes. The fact is, I disliked to look behind me and to submit to the idea of a retreat.

The retreat on Smolensko was difficult; the roads were bad, and we were in want of provisions, of which the country was destitute. Nevertheless, it was possible, if undertaken before winter set in and before the enemy received his reinforcements.

The retreat on Kiev was apparently more advantageous; it led through a rich country, where our army could obtain supplies, and would enable us to effect a junction with Schwartzenberg; I might then base myself on Tomosa, Lublin, and Warsaw. But to do this I must rely on Austria; and God only knew whether or not she would then have done what she did, with less security, in 1813, by attacking me at Dresden. Besides, the road by Kiev was then occupied by Tormassof, Tchichagof. and Sacken, while our great *dépôts* were at Kowno, Wilna, and Minsk.

I have already spoken of a third alternative—that of operating at the north on the borders of Twer and Pskow, and thence moving on the road from Nevel to Polotsk, so as to join Belluno and Oudinot. This course would save me the danger of a retreat

parallel to the enemy, and of being anticipated at Smolensko, and would take me to the Lower Niemen, where were my *dépôts* of provisions; but this line took me too far towards the Baltic, and, moreover, exposed me to the chances of being anticipated by the enemy at Witepsk or Gloubokoie.

But I could not bear to think of retreating at all. Since the battle of Castiglione, I had but twice retired before the enemy—after Essling and Eylau—but then it was merely to gather strength for a new advance. At Moscow, however, the circumstances were totally different, and I felt that the least retrograde movement might endanger the very existence of my empire. Although Austria had given me one of her archduchesses in marriage, I knew very well that that bond of connection, although good under ordinary circumstances, would be of no avail in a case like the present. I understood the public spirit of Prussia and Vienna, for I myself had given it birth.

If my army had half melted away during the long days and fine weather of July and August and during a triumphal march, what would become of it in retreating over the same road in the muds of autumn and the frosts of winter, and during the long nights and tempestuous weather which rendered bivouacs fatal even to the most robust? Where could I repose my suffering troops, and where find a refuge for the sick and stragglers? Where were the horses to transport our provisions and artillery, and to oppose the cavalry of the enemy? This enemy could collect in the country, where we could find nothing, sufficient flour for the supply of men who, even in time of peace, are accustomed to little else; and his horses, raised in the *steppes* and accustomed to pass half of their lives in bivouac, both in summer and winter, subsist on the bark and branches of trees. The fatigues and privations which killed our horses were only the ordinary regimen of these wild coursers. What could I do on the Borysthenese, or the Niemen, with a broken army, with my artillery scattered, and my cavalry half dismounted, with a million of enemies on my rear and the whole Russian army before me?

I should not have hesitated what to do if my army had been composed entirely of Frenchmen; but these formed scarcely one-half of my forces. The remainder were Prussians, Austrians, etc., whose attachment to my cause was more than suspected. Many times, in reflecting upon these things, did I regret not having followed the judicious advice of the officer who told me at Berlin that I would lose my army if I ever engaged in a great war at the North without basing myself on Prussia and without attaching her to our cause by advantageous concessions.

But as it is necessary in such cases to choose the least objec-

tionable of the projects presented, and as the retreat on Kiev offered more favorable chances than any other, I was inclined to adopt it; but a fatal confidence in my fortune induced me to defer its execution until the return of the courier from St. Petersburg. As any one easily persuades himself into believing what he most desires, I still hoped that the Emperor Alexander would take advantage of the present occasion to enter into negotiations. But I had mistaken his character.

Time passed on; yet no response came from St. Petersburg. To the inquietude of my situation was added the unfavorable news which I received from Spain and from the wings of my army. Wellington, after his victory of Salamanca, had entered Madrid, and the flames of war had burst forth with more vigor than ever. The army of Moldavia had been directed against Schwartzberg; Admiral Tchichagof had replaced Tormassof in the general command, and now sought laurels on land which he could not find in the ungrateful service of the sea. Not being able to oppose a force of one hundred and two battalions and one hundred and twenty squadrons, in all not less than seventy thousand men, Prince Schwartzberg had fallen back behind the Bug. Warsaw was again alarmed and Wilna seriously threatened. On the other side, Steingle's corps, returning from Finland, had embarked in Livonia and thus given the enemy a superiority over Macdonald. If Steingle should join Wittgenstein (whose army had already been reinforced by the cohorts of the militia of St. Petersburg), it would increase his force to seventy-five battalions and thirty-eight squadrons, whereas, with one-half of that number he had maintained a threatening attitude during the whole campaign. To dispel this double storm, Belluno and Baraguay d'Hilliers were at Smolensko; Duruth's fine division at Warsaw; and I had solicited the Emperor of Austria to send reinforcements to Schwartzberg, and had asked Prussia to send another division to Macdonald.

In the meantime I was waiting, with apparent calmness, for an answer from St. Petersburg. I affected the intention of passing the winter at Moscow, and even joked with one of my generals about his fears of the cold, asking him, "Where now is the cold weather from which you have anticipated so many difficulties?" In fact, until the thirteenth of October, we had the finest weather possible; it seemed expressly designed to lull us into a fatal security. But I must confess, now that I look upon things with a vision not distorted by surrounding objects, that the position of the enemy at Taroutina ought to have more fully opened my eyes to the impending danger. This position not only covered the best provinces of the empire and secured to the army



numerous reinforcements, but it was actually offensive, threatening our communications. Our victorious position and the calm which reigned around me contributed to the illusion. We were at Moscow as if at the gates of France: estafettes succeeded each other daily, and the mails arrived with the utmost regularity; the dispatches of my ministers and Council of State were laid before me as usual; from the Kremlin I directed the minutest affairs of my empire, and no Frenchmen suffered in his interests from an absence which seemed calculated to completely stop the ordinary course of events. It is true that some of the enemy's partisans had appeared on the road to Mojaisk, but strong columns of the cavalry of the guard soon swept them away. The boldest of these partisans were Davidof, Seslavin, and Fiquener; the first was a poet, witty and amiable, and an intelligent officer; the second, active and audacious; the third, a German by birth, but a true Tartar in character. Seconded by the inhabitants of the country, they attacked our lines of communication and carried away our outposts; but they were yet too circumspect to approach near our cantonments around Moscow. But they gradually became more bold. Every day our foraging parties lost some of their men in engagements with the armed peasants, militia, or Cossacks, and sometimes even large detachments were captured by the enemy's light cavalry.

**NAPOLEON FINALLY DETERMINES TO RETREAT.**—The time necessary for a reply from St. Petersburg to my overtures having passed, it was evident that the enemy did not desire peace. As our occupation of the salient point of Moscow had not produced the desired effect, and as the winter season was rapidly advancing, it was now absolutely necessary to regain the line of the Borysthenese, in order to cover our communications. It was impossible to pass the winter amid the ruins of Moscow. On the thirteenth of October there was a light fall of snow. This was a powerful spur in hastening our departure. I hoped to be in motion by the twentieth of October. On the fifteenth the hospitals were evacuated, the sick being sent to Smolensko. The snow of the thirteenth was followed by fine weather.

**ATTACK ON MURAT.**—On the eighteenth of October, Ney's corps entered Moscow preparatory to beginning the retreat, and while I was passing it in review, the news came that Murat was exposed to a total defeat: a heavy cannonade had been heard all the morning, and the alarm had already reached Moscow. In fact, the Russians, certain that Murat was not in sufficient force to resist their entire army, had conceived a project to destroy him. It had been verbally agreed to avoid a war of outposts, until an

answer to my proposition could be received; but Kutusof had rejected every proposal for an armistice, saying that he had no authority to make one. Murat was overconfident and off his guard, and our soldiers, unaccustomed to a repose which they regarded as a forerunner of peace, did not think there was any danger of their being troubled. Benningsen, at the head of two-thirds of the Russian army, thought to carry away our vanguard at Winkowo. The false direction of one of his columns accelerated his attack, and prevented the success of his plan. Nevertheless, Murat was compelled to yield to superior forces, and, although he escaped a total defeat, we lost considerable baggage, several cannon, and many brave men.

DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW.—I left Moscow on the nineteenth of October, while Lauriston went to seek the expected reply from St. Petersburg. Murat, at the same time, defiled by the left to disengage himself from the presence of the enemy. I, at first, took the road to Taroutina, but, at Troitzkoje, I inclined to the right by the road to Kalouga in order to reach Borousk and Malojaroslawetz before Kutusof could be informed of my intention. If we should gain this last city before him, nothing could prevent our reaching, if not Kalouga, at least Joucknow, to take the road to Elnia.

We left Moscow with a train equal to the army of Darius. My forces numbered about eighty thousand combatants and some fifteen thousand convalescents; we had some six hundred pieces of cannon and two thousand carriages for the artillery. To diminish my train as much as possible, I had preserved only such of my lighter bridge-equipages as might be necessary in urgent cases. As we could not rely upon regular distributions, each company formed an equipage of two or three carts for the transportation of such provisions as it had collected from the ruins of Moscow and from the surrounding villages. To these equipages were added those in which, under the pretext of carrying provisions, they concealed the illicit booty which the soldiers, and even the officers, had found in the deserted cellars and stores of Moscow. In order the better to conceal this booty, they pretended that these carts contained clothing, etc., to protect them from the cold. The officers not serving with troops had also each their cart or *britscha* for the same purposes, and under the same pretext. There were almost as many wagons as combatants: never did a modern army present such a spectacle; and it was with such *impedimenta* that we were about to make the most delicate and difficult retreat ever undertaken by an army.\*

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\*The people who accompanied the army in its retreat from Moscow were mainly Jews, Germans, and Italians who had remained there, not-

I was forced to tolerate these abuses, as they were almost our only resource. Our train diminished daily, and the wagons emptied of their provisions served for the transportation of our sick and wounded, or for barricades against the enemy's light troops. Our numerous body of horses consumed all the forage on the way, and gradually diminished for the want of food. The traces which we left behind us attested that *great enterprises perish from the very greatness of the preparations required for their success.*

Mortier remained at Moscow with seven or eight thousand men. He was to cover our communications till our march was well begun, and then to blow up the Kremlin, destroy the public buildings, and evacuate the place.\* He was to rally the remains of Junot's troops at Mojaisk, and follow my army on the first favorable opportunity.

RETREAT ON BOROWSK.—Although I had determined to follow the route to Borowsk; I first marched on the old road to Kalouga, in order to deceive the Russians and enable the King of Naples to collect his scattered troops. On the twentieth, the Viceroy, who formed my vanguard, turned to the right in order to reach, at Bykassowo, the road from Borowsk on Malojaroslawetz, which, on the twenty-third, was occupied by our troops. I was exceedingly impatient to reach Borowsk, where I could learn

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withstanding the orders of the Russian authorities for its entire abandonment on the approach of the French. Knowing that, for this disobedience, they would be given up to the barbarity of the Cossacks on the return of the Russians, they were obliged to join the French in order to save their own lives. A large portion of these families, however, were murdered by the Cossacks, or perished from cold and hunger, during the retreat. It is estimated that sixty thousand perished in this way.

\*The task assigned to Mortier was a most difficult one, and few of his friends ever expected to see him again. Napoleon embraced him in taking leave, and said to him frankly, yet sadly: "I rely on your good fortune. Still, in war we must sometimes make part of a sacrifice." In addition to his danger from hosts of the enemy who surrounded him, he had to destroy an immense amount of military munitions left behind. Thousands of barrels of powder were collected in the vaults and halls and apartments of the Kremlin. On abandoning the place a slow match was attached to this mine. "The Cossacks, eager for plunder, rushed within the deserted halls. Suddenly the majestic fabric was raised into the air. The earth shook under the feet of Mortier. The explosion, in most appalling thunder peal, startled the army in its midnight bivouac. From the darkened and sulphurous skies there was rained down upon the city a horrible shower of fragments of timber, rocks, shattered weapons, heavy pieces of artillery, and mangled bodies." It should be remarked that while preparing to destroy these magazines, Mortier and his division was hotly pressed by the enemy around the Kremlin, and a single spark from his own or the enemy's fire must have destroyed him and all his men. His success was complete, but almost miraculous.



whether Kutusof had got wind of our departure, and had taken any measures to intercept our march on Kalouga. Here also I was to be joined by Murat, and from here I proposed to push forward Eugene in the direction of Malojaroslawetz. Our future safety depended upon our reaching this point before Kutusof, which, if he had not heard of our departure, was still possible, although three days had been spent in insignificant movements by which we had gained only ten leagues on our line of march. The twenty-third I departed on a gallop for Borowsk, which place Eugene had occupied the night before, and where Murat had already arrived. Nothing being perceived of the enemy except reconnoitering parties on the left, Eugene received orders to march on Malojaroslawetz, and to occupy that city with his advanced guard, as soon as possible. We now had every reason to think that we should reach, without obstacle, the new road from Smolensko by Elnia (Jelnia).

Belluno had been ordered to occupy that place by the division of Baraguay d'Hilliers, which consisted of about ten thousand men of the provisional regiments, or recruits, destined for the different regiments of the army. I also directed the governor of Wiasma to send a movable column of three or four thousand men with estafettes in the direction of this new road.

The numerous parties of the enemy on the left denoted some important movement. At Borowsk I learned that Mortier, with powder found in the mines of the Kremlin, had blown up a part of its buildings, and especially its arsenal, and on the twenty-third had taken the road to Mojaisk, carrying with him General Wintzingerode, who had ventured alone with his *aid-de-camp* into the streets of Moscow. I hardly thought that Kutusof could debouch in time on Borowsk: but Eugene, who did not understand my projects, and who was occupied with the enemy on his left, advanced too slowly; he did not fear an engagement, but thought that I might be attacked, and if so, that it would be necessary for him to return to take part in the engagement.

But one of those fortuitous events which seemed connected with this fatal campaign now defeated my designs. Kutusof, hearing of Eugene's march on Borowsk, but not supposing that we were retreating, had projected a plan to strike the fourth *corps-d'armée*, as he had Murat. Doctorof, with twenty-five thousand men, was directed to accomplish this object. On approaching Borowsk he encountered our army, but supposed it nothing more than Eugene's corps. The partisan Seslavin, getting wind of our approach, informed Doctorof of it, but that general was incredulous. The bold Cossack, piqued at his report not being believed, advanced even to the gates of Borowsk, and captured

an officer of the Young Guard, who confirmed his story. Doctorof's chief of staff hastened to Taroutina, to announce to Kutusof that I had left Moscow, and that all my army was on the road to Kalouga; at the same time, the corps which had been sent to surprise Borowsk directed its march on Malojaroslawetz. This fortuitous incident produced the most grave consequences; for the Russian army, which would have remained quiet at Taroutina had it not been for this accidental receipt of the important news of my retreat, raised their camp on the twenty-fourth, and also directed their march on Malojaroslawetz. On the morning of the twenty-fifth Doctorof reached that city and expelled our detachment; but the Viceroy soon arrived with his whole corps, and retook the place. An obstinate combat followed, and continued all day. The Viceroy sustained himself with glory against a superior force. The Russian corps which successively arrived continually reinforced the engaged troops. Seven times was the burning city taken and retaken; but its ruins finally remained in the hands of the Viceroy. We lost the brave Delzons, and Pino and two of Eugene's aids were wounded. Toward night my army also reached Malojaroslawetz. Davoust sustained Eugene with two divisions, which established themselves on the flanks of the fourth corps, so as to enable it to maintain its position.

We were now masters of this city, or rather of a funeral pile covered with dead; but we were none the further advanced towards the accomplishment of our object. Kutusof had taken position at some distance and still barred our passage. To force this barrier it would have been necessary to give battle to an army which had already established itself on the very communication which we wished to open; or to give battle for the purpose of effecting a lateral retreat. But such a course seemed to me the less prudent, as it was not indispensable, the road to Wereya being still open in our rear. The chance appearing to me too hazardous, I renounced the project of piercing my way to Kalouga, and decided to regain the road to Wiasma, the only way which was now open to me. During the twenty-fifth, the two armies remained in position, almost within cannon range of each other. But, on the twenty-sixth, I took the road to Borowsk.

Everything in this retreat seemed to be at the caprice of Fortune; for, at the very moment that I renounced the intention of piercing the enemy's lines, Kutusof, on his side, fearing to risk a general battle, ordered a retrograde movement. I was soon informed of this, but persisted in my resolution, which was certainly a fault. I had a consultation with my officers, and all, even to the stoic Mouton, were of the opinion that it was neces-

sary to regain the Niemen by the shortest and least difficult route. Thus, instead of taking the direct road to Medyn and Joucknow on Elnia, driving before us the cavalry which still barred the way, I returned by Wereya on Mojaisk.

**RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF THE TWO ARMIES.**—Our chances of a retreat were now most unfavorable, as may readily be seen by examining the respective positions of the parties. The Russian army reached Taroutina with sixty thousand old soldiers and twenty thousand irregular troops; but while there, it had been reinforced to ninety thousand regular soldiers and thirty thousand militia and Cossacks. The Cossack cavalry, though unfit for battles, is intelligent, enterprising, and indefatigable. There are no European horses, nor even Russian, that can rival those of the Don in enduring fatigue and privations; and, in our present situation, this militia was even more useful to the enemy than the *élite* regiments of the guard.

Our line of retreat now lay on a single isolated road; while the enemy's army had a road, even shorter than ours, that led obliquely on Wiasma, Smolensko, Krasnoi, and Kopy. We had now not more than fifteen thousand horse, and at the end of two weeks not over five thousand, with which to make reconnoissances in front, and to protect our flanks and immense parks. My infantry numbered from sixty to sixty-five thousand brave men; but what could they do against an enemy who, by the lateral direction of his line of operations, could select his time and attack us in the most critical position, either in front or rear? If we had taken the road to Elnia, the enemy would have followed us only in rear, and we should not have been exposed to parallel attacks on our line of retreat, thus daily compromising our safety.

Having regained the great road to Smolensko, I continued to follow it. Our only object now was to escape as soon as possible across this desolated country. To avoid inconvenience in the march, I divided my army into four corps, which followed each other at about half a day's distance. I began the march with my guards; then came successively the corps of Ney, the Viceroy, and Davoust. The latter formed the rear guard.

Kutusof sent in pursuit of us his Cossacks and an advanced guard of twenty-five thousand men, under the orders of General Miloradowitsch, who overtook our rear guard on the first of November, near Gjath. The main body of the Russian army marched directly on Wiasma, with the intention of cutting off our retreat. We, however, reached that city before the Russians. I passed through the city, directing Ney to await there the arrival of the Viceroy and Davoust, who might otherwise be cut off. The event justified the necessity of this precaution.



**BATTLE OF WIASMA.**—On the third day of November Miloradowitsch executed very skillfully a forced march parallel to the great roads, and debouched on that road between Wiasma and Federowskoe. The Viceroy had already reached Wiasma, but Davoust had not yet passed Federowskoe. The circumstance was critical; but the Viceroy accomplished everything by the vigor of his resolution. He immediately turned back and assailed the Russians, who, hemmed in on the other side by the troops of Davoust, were obliged to decamp in haste, and open a passage to those in rear. My two corps now fell back on Wiasma, closely followed by the Russians, who had received a reinforcement.

Seeing us in retreat, the enemy redoubled his energy, and drove our rear guard from Wiasma and across the river of that name. This affair, which we might regard as a victory, since we repelled and defeated the enemy, cost us about five thousand men *hors-de-combat*. It might, however, have had disastrous consequences for us if the main body of the Russian army, which had already reached the road from Wiasma to Joucknow, had acted with decision; but Kutusof, who feared to engage in a general battle, had stopped at Bykowo, three leagues from Wiasma, and sent forward only a heavy detachment of cavalry. This was held in check during the battle by the corps of Ney. The operations of Kutusof on this occasion have been criticised.

— In a tactical point of view, they were certainly faulty, for if his sixty thousand men encamped at Bykowo had driven Ney from Wiasma, he would have destroyed the half of my army; but, on the other hand, as he was certain of our retreat to the Niemen, he deemed it more safe not to risk a battle, but rather to build for us a *bridge of gold!*

**APPROACH OF WINTER.**—Having escaped this imminent danger, my army continued its retreat on Smolensko. Our march was becoming every day more difficult. The provisions which we brought from Moscow were exhausted; our horses were dying from starvation; this forced us to leave much of our artillery. Winter now succeeded to an extraordinarily fine autumn. Ney, who now commanded the rear guard, complained of the disorder which was daily increasing among our men. My eagles, formerly the emblem of triumph, had now become to our faithful soldiers only a talisman for privation and suffering. Death seemed the inevitable fate of those who still pressed around them with courageous resignation.

**CONSPIRACY OF MALLET AND LAHORIE.**—Fate seemed resolved now to heap upon me every misfortune. As if those which had arrayed themselves before our eyes here were not

sufficient, it prepared in France the overthrow of my throne by a simple state's prisoner! On the sixth of November, within a day's march of Smolensko, I heard of the conspiracy of Generals Mallet and Lahorie—the most singular, perhaps, in the history of the world.

General Mallet, more renowned for his exploits of gallantry than for his feats of arms, was an ardent demagogue, but not a partisan of the Bourbons, as some have since pretended. His conduct had compelled me (for the last four years) to shut him up in prison. He had afterwards been transferred, on account of ill health, to a *maison de santé*, where he was on parole. Here this ardent adventurer conceived the bold project of overthrowing my government. He had heard of our arrival in Moscow, and of the burning of that city. Foreseeing the result of the campaign, or thinking that I would be so much occupied at eight hundred leagues from Paris as not to be able to check his designs, he escaped on the night of the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of October, presented himself at the barracks, announced my death, and, supplied with a forged order from the staff of the place, he demanded a detachment in the name of the provisional government which had just assumed the reins of state. At the head of this troop he flew to the Conciergerie, and released General Lahorie, former *aid-de-camp* of Moreau; this officer, with a detachment of a hundred men, marched to the house of the minister Savary, arrested him and sent him to prison in his own place, while he installed himself as minister in the place of Savary. Mallet had gone to the residence of General Hullin, commandant of Paris, whom he hoped also to replace. Finding him more disposed to resistance, Mallet fired a pistol at him and wounded him, but Colonel Laborde, having recognized Mallet as an escaped prisoner, seized hold of him, and struggled with him till the guard could secure his person. The troops now saw that they had been deceived, and, returning to the office of police, they seized Lahorie just as he was being measured for a minister's coat, and carried him back to the Conciergerie.

The Senate, called together by the archchancellor, met just in time to learn the arrest of these insane conspirators, who, on being tried by a military commission, received the reward due their rash attempt.

If this movement had been delayed till the news of our disastrous retreat had reached Paris, the result might have been different. We should not have escaped so cheaply if, taking example from Prince Edward, a Bourbon prince had landed at Havre at the same time they had installed a provisional government at Paris. I communicated this news only to a small num-

ber of my officers, and I was convinced, from the effect which it produced on them, that the fragile nature of my power astonished them more than the misfortunes that were hanging over us.

**RENEWED DISASTERS IN THE RETREAT.**—On the seventh of November, the cold began to be more serious, and developed with frightful rapidity the germs of dissolution which had already appeared at Wiasma. We had left Moscow with more than ninety thousand men, but not half this number was under arms at Dorogobuje. We now had only two marches to make before reaching Smolensko. We were about to receive the hand-mills which had been sent from Paris, and for the want of which our soldiers had been obliged to live on boiled rye. I hoped to find here provisions and a sufficient shelter to enable us to reestablish order. The division of Baraguay d'Hilliers, coming from France with reinforcements for the regiments, had been cantoned on the road to Elnia, which we were about to reach. The sight of these soldiers, in order and in discipline, would be calculated to produce a beneficial influence upon our veterans. I moreover trusted to the firmness of Ney to have time to effect the reorganization of the army. But a crowd of circumstances combined to destroy these frail combinations and deceitful hopes.

**FLANK MARCH OF KUTUSOF ON ELNIA.**—Kutusof had left to his Cossacks the care of pursuing us, while he himself, with the main body of his army, marched parallel to the great road by Elnia. This plan was the more advisable on his part, as it took his army over a more fertile country, while at the same time it threatened my line of retreat and forced me to hasten my march without giving my troops any repose. His vanguard thus fell upon Liakowo in the midst of the division of Baraguay d'Hilliers, and carried off Augereau's brigade, after an insignificant combat.

I arrived at Smolensko on the ninth, and the remainder of my army on the thirteenth. We had looked upon this place as the Land of Promise, and as the termination of all our misfortunes. But how greatly were we deceived. This city, which in the summer had appeared to us so charming, and whose environs, especially on the south side, seemed so rich and prolific in grain, now presented only deserted houses filled with the sick and dying, and destitute of magazines! The presence of Belluno's corps for two months in the vicinity, the garrison of the place, the fifteen thousand sick and wounded, and the passing troops had consumed sixty thousand rations per day—an immense supply, sufficient for my whole army of Italy, but which had here been consumed as fast as it arrived. Thus, instead of the supplies which I had expected, I found at Smolensko only scenes of



desolation. My army arrived in disorganized bands; three days of severe cold weather, though in no way extraordinary, had sufficed to break up, in a great degree, our organization, and to cause us to abandon nearly two hundred pieces of artillery.

On leaving Dorogobuje, the Viceroy's corps took the road to Doukowchina, which he had followed in our advance, but in a very different attitude. Closely pursued by the five thousand horse of Platof, he found himself hemmed in on the Vop, a stream scarcely perceptible in summer, but now so swollen by the rains as to be fordable only in certain places. The bridges had been destroyed, and the steep banks of the river were now covered with snow and ice. After numerous efforts, Eugene succeeded in crossing with a few pieces and his infantry, who were obliged to ford the stream with the water up to their shoulders; but the artillery and baggage were lost. The half famished remains of this corps reached Smolensko at the same time with the rear guard of Ney.

**PLAN OF THE RUSSIANS TO CUT OFF NAPOLEON'S RETREAT.**—I was greatly relieved by the arrival of these two corps, but still there was the most urgent necessity for an immediate march. The enemy now exhibited as much activity as audacity, and almost everywhere gained an ascendancy over my lieutenants.

Wittgenstein, coöperating with the corps of Steinheil to cut off Saint-Cyr's retreat on the Dwina, had attacked him at Polotsk; Saint-Cyr and Wrede had repelled his attack, it is true, but not finding themselves in condition to sustain a second assault, they abandoned Polotsk and fell back on Czereya. Wittgenstein had followed in pursuit as far as Zcasnicki on the Oula. This circumstance had forced Victor to leave Smolensko in order to rally the wrecks of Oudinot; the two marshals had established themselves at Czereya, in order to hold Wittgenstein in check; his army, reinforced by the militia of St. Petersburg and the troops of Finland, now numbered not less than seventy-five battalions and thirty-eight squadrons, without including the Cossacks. Tchichagof had also taken the offensive on Minsk and the Bug, with one hundred and two battalions and one hundred and sixteen squadrons.

The corps of Schwartzenberg and Reynier, seeing themselves opposed by superior numbers, after the junction of Tormassof and the army of Moldavia, instead of adopting Minsk as the pivot of their operations, recrossed the Bug and based themselves on Warsaw, thus renouncing all coöperation with my army. In consequence of this grave error, Admiral Tchichagof left Sacken to observe the Austrians, and prepared to advance with the rest

of the army of Moldavia on Minsk, where he could coöperate with Wittgenstein so as to establish a formidable mass on our rear. On the other side the grand Russian army, already established on the road to Poslaw, was ready to intercept the route to Mistislaw and menace that to Krasnoi.

**NAPOLEON RETREATS ON KRASNOI.**—It was now necessary to hasten our retreat before this last hope should be closed against us. I left Smolensko with my guards on the fourteenth. The Viceroy, Davoust, and Ney followed at the distance of a day's march. The latter, reinforced by the fresh troops of the garrison of Smolensko, blew up the walls of that city; and departed, as my rear guard, on the seventeenth. This march, with columns in echelons, at a considerable distance, and across a desolate country, where no subsistence could be procured, has been the subject of criticism; and I must confess that a retreat by wings, in three columns, by parallel roads, would have been more advantageous. If I had foreseen the event of Krasnoi, I should have descended the Dnieper by the right bank by Katana as far as Doubrowna or Orza, thus placing that river between my army and the enemy. It is certain that this resolution would have saved us many cruel losses. But, as our maps of the country were defective, and we had no knowledge of the existence of practicable roads in that direction, I could not venture upon such an uncertainty.

We had already sustained immense losses; our artillery was reduced one half, and our cavalry entirely ruined. Even the horses which had survived the effects of hunger and fatigue were not properly shod for the ice, and there was no iron in the country to supply this deficiency. From Wiasma to Orza there are numerous little hills, and the streams had cut for themselves deep beds. These steep slopes of the road were so covered with ice that our horses could not draw our pieces and caissons; our men were continually obliged to assist in moving these loads, and every day a large number of carriages were abandoned in the road. The pen of history can never fully describe the misfortunes of this retreat; the horrors suffered by our army exceed the most exaggerated stories of fiction.

**BATTLE OF KRASNOI.**—It was now scarcely possible that we could reach Krasnoi without encountering the enemy. In fact, the advanced guard of Miloradowitsch appeared, on the fifteenth, between that city and Korytnia. I reached Krasnoi with the main body of my guards; but the rear of the column had to sustain an unequal combat. The next day the Viceroy found Miloradowitsch in a position commanding the great road, and closing the passage. He attempted to cut his way, sword in hand, but failed. The enemy, thinking him lost beyond hope, sum-

moned him to surrender. But the Viceroy was not a man to be easily discouraged: while his rear guard amused the Russians with demonstrations of an attack on the great road, he escaped with the main body between that road and the Borysthenese. He reached Krasnoi in the night, if not without loss, at least with glory, for he had saved the greater part of his corps. On the same day, the sixteenth, Kutusof also arrived before Krasnoi, and established himself within a short distance of the city on the road to Roslaw.

My situation was now critical. Davoust and Ney were still in rear, and if I suspended my retreat till they came up, the enemy might prolong himself by the left, and easily intercept our only line of communication. But it seemed a hard extremity to abandon the half of my army to the Russians. I therefore determined to brave the danger, and wait at Krasnoi, at least till the arrival of Davoust. But to remain here inactive would only embolden the enemy; I therefore resolved to act on the offensive. On the morning of the seventeenth I caused the village of Ouvarowo to be assailed by Mortier, and marched there myself at the head of the Old Guard. The combat was continued with varied success until the arrival of the first corps. Kutusof, fearing the result of a general battle, and trusting to cold and hunger to effect the destruction of my army, had directed Miloradowitsch not to compromise himself for the sake of opposing the march of Davoust. This general, menaced with an attack, fell back on the right of the army, and did not again reach the great road till the troops of the marshal had entirely passed. The Russian vanguard now made a vigorous attack upon our left, while Kutusof detached the greater part of his army to turn Krasnoi, to debouch on the road between that city and Liady, to turn our right, and thus entirely cut us off. On learning the march of this column, I felt that I had not a moment to lose, and ordered an instant retreat. Our rear guard experienced a considerable loss, but the main body of the army was saved. We passed the night at Liady, and the next day continued our retreat on Doubrowna and Oreza.

I think I acquired some glory in this affair of Krasnoi. Perhaps my march in echelons on a single road may be criticised; but the impartial historian will say with what resolution I disengaged successively the corps of Davoust and Eugene. Marching on foot through the snow, and supporting myself with a cane while crawling up the slippery slopes of the road, I myself directed the columns which drove back the enemy.

Happy would I have been if, like the Emperor Julian, I had here encountered death, which I desired! But since the invention of gunpowder there are no combats hand to hand, as in

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antiquity, with the sword and buckler of the Romans; and I found no Parthian to terminate my career.

**DESPERATE EFFORTS OF NEY.**—I had taken the road to Orcza, with the deepest regret at the necessity of abandoning Ney in order to save the rest of the army; he seemed lost beyond hope. But, to our utter astonishment, this brave general succeeded in saving his eagles and the *élite* of his corps. On reaching Krasnoi on the evening of the eighteenth, he found the Russian army established in a position commanding the great road; after admirable but unsuccessful efforts to dislodge the enemy, he found himself completely cut off. But, taking counsel from his own courage alone, he put himself in march with about three thousand men on Gousinoe, where he crossed the Borysthenese on recently formed ice. The first battalion succeeded in reaching the right bank, but the ice broke with those in rear, and many were drowned. The remainder of this corps and the stragglers from the rest of the army, finding no chance of retreat, were compelled to surrender. Ney had succeeded in crossing the river only to fall into the midst of the Cossacks of Platof. The enemy had a good battery of artillery, while Ney had not a single cannon, nor a single cavalry soldier. His soldiers were destitute of munitions and could scarcely discharge their firearms; but having recourse only to their own valor and their bayonets, they finally succeeded, after some severe combats, in joining us at Orcza, on the night of the twentieth and twenty-first. My joy was so much the greater, as I had regarded them as lost. Ney was saluted by the whole army, as the most intrepid of its chiefs.

**NEW DIFFICULTIES TO BE ENCOUNTERED.**—The affairs of Krasnoi had cost me one-half my combatants, and I now had to devise means for saving the remainder, which was no easy matter. The first thing to be done was to renounce the system of echelons on single roads, for a march by parallel columns; but how could we expect to do this with two-thirds of our soldiers reduced to a disorderly mob? Moreover, the roads from Orcza to Wilna were intercepted by Wittgenstein, and Admiral Tchichagof might advance on the line of the Beresina, so as to close the roads from Orcza to Minsk. On leaving Smolensko, I had ordered Oudinot to place himself at Bohr, so as to reconnoiter the road to Minsk, and at the same time had directed Victor to try what resistance Wittgenstein was likely to oppose to our march on Wilna. On the fourteenth, Victor attacked the Russians at Czasniki, but, finding them solidly based in the Oula, he returned to Czereya.

At Doubrowna I learned that Tchichagof had advanced on Minsk, while the garrison of that place had fallen back on

Barisof; and it was to be feared that Dombrowsky, who was blockading Bobrouisk, had not been able to gain the *tête-de-pont* of the Beresina. I hesitated at Orca what course to pursue. Should I advance against Tchichagof with all my remaining forces, or direct my march against Wittgenstein so as to form a junction with Belluno? If I advanced in the direction of Polotsk, might not Kutusof unite with the army of Moldavia and anticipate me at Wilna?

Hoping still, by forced marches, to anticipate the admiral on the Beresina, I gave my troops but a single day's repose at Orca, and, on the twenty-first, I resumed our march on Kochanov. Oudinot's corps was now to form the vanguard, and that of Victor the rear guard. I reached Tolocsin on the twenty-second, and Bohr the next day. I here found it was necessary to open a passage, sword in hand, as the Russians had anticipated us on the Beresina. The admiral had entered Minsk on the seventeenth, and on the twenty-first his advanced guard attacked and carried the intrenchments of the *tête-de-pont* of Borissov before Dombrowsky, who had just arrived from Boronisk, had been able to establish himself. The next day the admiral passed the Beresina. His advanced guard at Bohr was defeated and completely routed on the twenty-third by Oudinot's corps. The admiral had merely time to repass the Beresina and destroy the bridge of Borissov.

This success was therefore useless, and my position more critical than ever. I called to me a general officer who had indicated the existence of a direct road from Zembin to Molodetzno: I imparted to him my embarrassment and my projects. Reasoning on the principles of war, I thought to fall, as at Castiglione and Ratisbon, on the armies that annoyed me the most. I thought to unite my guard and remaining forces to Belluno's corps, and, with these fifty thousand men, to attack Wittgenstein, drive him back on the Dwina, form a junction with Macdonald, and retake the road to Wilna. This general objected that this maneuver, perfectly correct under any other circumstances, would now be accompanied with numerous inconveniences. It was objected:

1st. That the country of Lepel and the upper Beresina was covered with marshes, the dikes of which Wittgenstein, with his one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, could defend till Kutusof came to his assistance;

2d. That the destitute condition of our army would not permit us to delay the retreat;

3d. That, by taking the direction of the Dwina, we should expose ourselves to be attacked in rear by the united forces of Kutusof and the admiral, before we could finish with Wittgenstein;

4th. That, as the road to Minsk was occupied by the enemy, it would be more prudent to take the road from Zembin on Molodetzno, for, if we found that closed, we could then take the passage of Vileika. Both of these roads, and especially that from Zembin, passed through a fertile country which had not yet been laid waste.

But these peremptory reasons were not sufficient to deter me from my plan; I still adhered to a maneuver which might procure us glorious results, and rescue us from the hands of the enemy. I called another general, who had been sent the day before by Belluno, and who might have more positive information respecting the positions of Wittgenstein. His opinions only tended to confirm those of the other officer, and, urged by the advice of Murat and Eugene, I finally relinquished my project. I, therefore, left on the twenty-fourth, for Lochnitsa, and, on the twenty-fifth, collected all my forces at Borissov, except Victor's corps. This last, pursued by Wittgenstein, also moved on Lochnitsa, instead of taking the road to Baran so as to cover our march.

**PASSAGE OF THE BERESINA.**—Never had my situation been so desperate as now. Hemmed in on the right and left and in rear by superior forces, I found myself arrested in front by a river difficult to cross and defended by an entire army. And it was with soldiers half dead with hunger and cold that I now had to overcome obstacles that would have frightened the best organized army in the world. Fortune seemed resolved to heap upon us every possible calamity during this fatal retreat. The cold, so severe on our arrival at Smolensko as to close the Dnieper, suddenly moderated after my arrival at Krasnoi; a thaw of two days broke the ice, and the Beresina was much swollen. This was a double misfortune. If the river had been frozen sufficiently to enable us to pass with cannon, we should have crossed in twenty-four hours in sufficient force to crush Tchichagof, without even the trouble of building a bridge.

This river, on the contrary, was now greatly swollen and filled with large masses of floating ice, so as to render the construction of our bridges not only difficult, but almost impossible. But, as I could not command the elements, it was necessary to take my part and redouble my efforts to overcome the immense obstacles which both Nature and the enemy opposed to my passage.

The forces which I had brought from Moscow did not exceed fifteen thousand combatants, including the guards, and the corps of Belluno and Oudinot amounted only to about the same number. In our front, disputing this difficult passage, was Tchicha-



gof with twenty-eight thousand men; on our right, Wittgenstein and Steinheil with twenty-five thousand men; and on our left, Kutusof with fifty thousand. I felt that I could effect this passage only by a surprise; and to do this it was important to make demonstrations on several points in order to deceive the vigilance of the enemy. Oudinot displayed the heads of his columns in the direction of Oucholoda, toward the Lower Beresina, while the other detachments in silence ascended the river toward Wesselowo. These demonstrations produced the desired result; the admiral prolonged himself by his right toward the road to Igoumen. We profited without delay by the false movement to effect the passage above Borissov. On the night of the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth, we moved from Borissov to Studienka, where we arrived on the morning of the twenty-sixth. General Aubry had constructed a bridge of poor materials for infantry, while General Eblé, with the sappers and pontoniers, erected a trestle-bridge, for the passage of all arms. This bridge, eighty toises in length, was constructed with admirable rapidity by our brave sappers, who precipitated themselves into the water up to their shoulders, notwithstanding the severe cold and the enormous masses of ice that floated in the Beresina. One-half of these intrepid men perished in their devoted efforts to save the army. Nothing could diminish their ardor. The vanguard of General Tschaplitz hastened to oppose itself to our projects; as this might prevent the construction of the bridge, the cavalry of Corbineau swam the river with their horses, and were supported by a battalion of sharpshooters, who crossed on a raft. The enemy was repelled, but he soon succeeded in reëstablishing himself so as to command the debouch. As soon as the bridge of plank was finished, Oudinot's infantry crossed over and drove Tschaplitz to Strakow, a league from Borissov; being reinforced by Pahlen at this place, he resumed the offensive. But Oudinot, taking advantage of a piece of woods, succeeded in maintaining his position. Our brave soldiers seemed convinced of the importance of this combat, and every one redoubled his energy; Frenchmen, Poles, Swiss, Croats covered themselves with glory, and the enemy was held in check the whole evening. Thus far everything had gone for the best; but it was still necessary to secure the road from Zemin, which crossed a marsh, over which was a kind of dyke with three bridges of one hundred toises each. If the enemy should destroy these, the ice not being sufficiently strong to supply their place, all would be lost. Oudinot was ordered to send in haste a detachment, which fortunately arrived there in time to secure the road. In the meantime the remainder of our broken troops and the corps of Belluno approached Studienka. Néy

crossed in the night with the Poles and a division of the Young Guard, amounting in all to not more than twenty-five hundred men; he was to unite with Oudinot, and he put himself at the head of the few forces which we could oppose to Tchichagof. I crossed with my head-quarters after noon, and the passage continued a part of the night and all day of the twenty-seventh. It could only be effected slowly, the trestle-bridges having broken twice, on account of the muddy bed of the stream and the masses of floating ice. Tchichagof thus gained time to return to Borissov with the two divisions which he had taken in the direction of Ouscha; but, instead of marching directly against Oudinot, he remained opposite Borissov, and sought to communicate with Wittgenstein. Belluno's corps had left that city in the night of the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh, to march to Studienka, leaving Partonneaux's division to guard Borissov until noon, as much to draw the attention of Tchichagof as to afford a momentary check to Wittgenstein.

This detachment was unfortunate; hardly had the division returned to Borissov when it was announced that it was cut off. As soon as Partonneaux learned that Wittgenstein had established himself at Staro-Borissov between him and Belluno, he attempted to effect his escape. There are two roads leading from Borissov to Studienka, one of which was closed by Wittgenstein, while the other was still open. Unfortunately, Partonneaux took the one occupied by the enemy. Ignorant of the enemy's force, he attacked him with bravery; but, after useless efforts, he fell into the hands of the Cossacks and was taken prisoner. The next morning his division, numbering about three thousand men, besides some four thousand stragglers from other corps, surrendered to the enemy. A battalion, which at the same time took the other road, succeeded in effecting its escape. The taking of Borissov enabled Tchichagof to establish a bateau-bridge so as to communicate with Wittgenstein; he was now reinforced by Iermolof and Platof.

The enemy combined, for the twenty-eighth, a simultaneous effort on the two banks of the river, and the result was calculated to decide the fate of our army. Wittgenstein prepared to attack Belluno by the left bank, while the admiral marched at the head of his divisions on Stakhov. We anticipated him by attacking his advanced guard, which we drove back on Stakhov, notwithstanding a glorious resistance. Ney threw a division of Doumerc's cuirassiers into the woods which were occupied by the Russian chasseurs; they made great havoc in the enemy's ranks and captured between twelve and fifteen hundred prisoners. The enemy was driven back, but, after a bloody combat, which



continued till after ten o'clock at night, they succeeded in holding Stakhov. The brave generals Zayouskeck and Legrand were wounded and the remains of the second corps fell, covered with the laurels which they had won within the last two days.

In the meantime Victor had made a no less glorious resistance against the attack of Wittgenstein. He first bravely disputed, with only seven or eight thousand men, the heights which border the avenues of Studienka, but, finding that he was likely to be surrounded, he concentrated his forces near the bridges. The Russians now crown the heights with their batteries and pour in a heavy fire upon the multitude of sick and wounded and stragglers and the innumerable quantity of carriages which had collected here for the purpose of crossing the river. This confused mass of men, horses, and wagons rush with such impetuosity to the bridges that three-quarters of them are either trampled under foot or precipitated into the river.

The piercing cries of these wretched beings, as they are thrust forward to inevitable death by their own countrymen, in their haste to escape the murderous fire of the enemy's batteries; the horrible aspect of the thousand women who have followed in the train of the army, as they are trampled under foot by the flying columns, or driven into the river, or mutilated by the enemy's artillery; caissons and shells exploding in the midst of this struggling mass; the bed of the Beresina covered with the wrecks of broken carriages and the bodies of the dead; all together formed a scene of desolation without parallel in the annals of history!

The firmness of Belluno saved the remains of this multitude, by affording them time to escape by the bridges; but they had the greatest possible difficulty in opening a passage through the broken carriages and the dead bodies of men and horses. The cannonade continued till night, and it was not till the morning of the twenty-ninth that Belluno passed the Beresina with three thousand men, who remained to burn the bridges.

REMARKS ON THIS PASSAGE.—Had it not been for the misfortune of Partonneaux, we might have prided ourselves on this famous passage. It was a fine spectacle to see eight or nine thousand men, under Ney and Oudinot, repelling the three divisions of Tchichagof, while, on the other side, Belluno's eight thousand men were gloriously contending against the efforts of Wittgenstein. And in what a situation did our soldiers sustain this desperate combat? A prey to famine and cold, surrounded by the enemy, six hundred leagues from their country, without hope of escape from destruction, destitute of munitions, and seeing nothing but disorder around them, they nevertheless fought



and died like heroes! The Russians, on the contrary, inured to the climate, well furnished with supplies, fighting for their own firesides, encouraged by success far surpassing their hopes, with a large army ready to sustain them, having a numerous cavalry and well-served artillery—in a word, certain that success would secure for them rich trophies, fought under advantages immensely superior to ours.

But it must be confessed that these advantages were in some degree counterbalanced by several fortuitous circumstances. In the first place, through a misunderstanding, one-half of Wittgenstein's corps remained in rear, so that that general could not act upon Belluno with the desired vigor. Again, the numerous stragglers in the train of our army, though useless as combatants, deceived the enemy respecting our numbers, and made him more cautions in his operations. Moreover, Tchichagof, being a sailor by profession, was not accustomed to military operations on land, and his cavalry could not act with advantage in the woods, while the same obstacle assisted in covering our infantry and concealing their numbers. But it must not be supposed from these remarks that I wish in the slightest degree to depreciate the glory won on that memorable occasion. I merely wish to present a true picture of the relative circumstances, in order that posterity may do justice to all. With respect to the circumspection of Kutusof, which has been so much criticised, it is certain that if he had acted with more celerity and audacity, he would have overtaken us. But it must be remembered that, like most of the Russian generals, he overestimated our numbers, and was compelled by political considerations to spare the remains of his army. It was important that Russia should be able, on her return to the Niemen, to exhibit a considerable force, in order to detach Prussia and Austria from our alliance.

CONTINUATION OF THE RETREAT.—But let us return to the remains of my army. The sad victory which we had just gained was glorious, but it did not ameliorate our situation; it did not avert, but merely retarded, our ruin. It was necessary to continue our retreat, although the exhausted condition of our troops rendered them incapable of any longer enduring the fatigues and privations to which they were exposed. To crown our misfortunes, the cold, which had moderated for some days before, now set in with redoubled severity; and the enemy, piqued at having allowed us to escape at the Beresina, pursued us with renewed energy. Our march from Zembin to Smorgoni completed the dissolution of our army.

NAPOLEON DEPARTS FOR PARIS.—I was deeply affected by the disasters of my troops; but I felt that, as a sovereign, I

was bound to act for the salvation of the entire nation, rather than for the few. I could do nothing more for this army; but the interest and destinies of a great people reposed on me; my duty to this people now required that I should return to France, and organize the means of repairing this great disaster. I, therefore, at Molodetzno, on the fifth of December, gave the command of the remains of my army to the King of Naples, and set out for Paris.

**MOTIVES OF THIS MEASURE.**—My detractors have loudly declaimed against this departure. If I had been the grandson of Louis XIV., and my natural successor had been in France, ready to mount the throne, I should not have hesitated to share the fortunes of my companions in arms; for my presence in France would not have been necessary to save the empire. But what could I do with thirty thousand half-starved and half-frozen men, six hundred leagues from their own country, fighting against all Germany, and with a Russian army in their rear? Ought I to augment the trophies of the enemy by my own capture, merely for the purpose of remaining with an army which must necessarily pass beneath the Caudine forks? I left with only two officers, and returned three months after with three hundred thousand men, of which there existed only the skeleton when I first put foot on the French territory. This fact alone should forever silence the critics who make war only in the *salons* of the capital. Who besides myself could have raised this army, and organized a new train of six hundred pieces of artillery, which appeared triumphant in the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen?

**GENERAL CAUSES OF THE DISASTERS OF THIS CAMPAIGN.**—But before passing to the discussion of this memorable resurrection, let us review the principal causes of the failure of my expedition into Russia. Some of my partisans have attributed the ill-success of the campaign entirely to the premature and excessively cold weather; this is not true. The cold weather did not begin till the seventh of November, and was not excessive. For, until our arrival at Krasnoi, it varied from 3° to 8°, and after the twentieth, it continued to thaw till our arrival on the Beresina. There was no time when the ice on the Dnieper would bear infantry. This cold did not exceed that of the Eylau campaign, but then we were in a country abundantly supplied with resources, whereas, in 1812, there were no means of supplying our most pressing wants. Our numerous columns became disorganized, and it required a week's halt in some intrenched camp well stored with magazines to enable us to recruit our men and reorganize our regiments. We expected to find such a camp at Smolensko; but, failing in this, our only other asylum was on the

Vistula, and our army was destroyed before it could reach it. The cold was quite supportable previous to our arrival on the Beresina, and then we had left only fifty thousand combatants out of the three hundred thousand which I had led to the banks of the Dwina and to Moscow. The true causes of this catastrophe were:

1st. I did not intend, in commencing the war, to advance further than Smolensko, the first campaign; but the difficulty of procuring supplies for two hundred and fifty thousand men in that devastated and sparsely populated country, and more especially the erroneous statements of Murat that he had cut up the Russian army on the Louja, induced me to advance too far into the interior.

2d. I hoped to fight a decisive battle between Wilna and the Dwina, but was unable to bring the enemy to a general action. If I could have found another Austerlitz or Friedland in the plains of Lithuania, all Europe would have been subject to my power.

3d. Jerome neglected to profit by a favorable opportunity to destroy Bagration.

4th. The Poles of Wolhynia and Podolia, did not second my projects with the ardor I expected. If the corps of Poniatowski had been sent into these provinces instead of the Austrians, a better result would probably have been produced.

5th. Lithuania, from the failure of the crops the previous year and the requisitions of the Russians, did not afford us the resources I anticipated. I neglected no means to repair the evil, and ordered hand-mills from Paris to grind the rye which we found in the country; but they arrived too late to be of any great use.

6th. The cattle which I had purchased in Poland and Galicia did not reach us in time, and, moreover, were insufficient to supply our wants. And the immense magazines which I had collected at Dantzic could not be transported to Smolensko in sufficient quantities for the support of such an immense army. I had organized thirty-four battalions of the train, each battalion conducting one hundred and fifty four-horse wagons. Twenty of these battalions followed my army, making a provision train of twelve thousand horses, carrying four millions of rations. But this was merely sufficient for fifteen days; whereas it required four times this number for regular distributions, inasmuch as my dépôts were twenty-five days' march in rear of the army. The convoys required fifty days to go and return. To obviate this difficulty, I ordered boats from France to transport my magazines up the Niemen and the Wilia; and where the water was too shallow in the latter stream for navigation, I directed rafts to be



constructed. What more could I do? "*Great enterprises into distant countries,*" says Montesquieu, "*perish from the very extent of the preparation required to secure their success.*"

7th. I remained two weeks at Wilna, whereas I ought, by the first of July, to have pushed on against the main army to Gloubokoe and Polotsk, or to have directed my march on Minsk against Bagration. Had I profited by the false direction of the principal army of the enemy toward Drissa, to turn their left and throw them back upon the Baltic, the destruction of their army would have been certain. But the difficulty of obtaining provisions, and the fear that Bagration might defile on my rear in order to regain Drissa, induced me to make the halt at Wilna, which eventually cost us dearly.

8th. Murat failed to do anything with his thirty thousand horse to harass and cut up the enemy in his retreat.

9th. At Borodino we were ignorant of the existence of Touczkof's corps toward Oustitza, which modified the effect of the first plan of attack. We failed to throw a sufficient mass against the enemy's left, by the old road to Smolensko, and, for reasons already given, my reserve did not come into action at the most opportune moment.

10th. It was unfortunate that I did not pursue the enemy still further than Moscow; it was a choice of evils, it is true, but perhaps he would have accepted battle at Taroutina, and, if victorious, I would have been master of the rich provinces of Kalouga; if the enemy had continued his retreat to the Volga, I should have had a more favorable line of retreat by Roslaw. But the fear of penetrating further into the enemy's country induced me to halt at Moscow.

11th. We had no good maps of the country, and knew not the position of the practicable roads; while the enemy profited by his superior knowledge in this respect. *Of course - on home ground*

12th. Turkey signed the treaty of peace at the moment when I expected her to renew the war with vigor; and Bernadotte at the same time deserted my cause, and allied himself with the Russians. This double incident changed the chances of the war. Sébastiani or Andréossi should have been sent to Constantinople, six months sooner, with money, to induce the Divan to continue the war with Russia.

13th. The enemy had greatly improved in the art of war. After the camp of Drissa, his operations were conducted with skill; and the concentration of his forces on the Beresina, ordered by the Emperor Alexander, was one of the finest military movements of the age.

14th. I committed a capital fault in not uniting the corps

of Macdonald, Oudinot, Saint-Cyr, and Victor under a single chief, possessing vigor and skill. These hundred thousand men united might have destroyed Wittgenstein and secured my line of retreat.

15th. Finally, I was deceived in the military character of the Emperor Alexander, as well as in the efforts of the Russian nation to sustain him. my - mm  
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Some writers, instead of looking at the natural causes of our disasters, have preferred to attribute them to supernatural means, like the manna of the desert, and the closing of the waters of the Red Sea. These writers can see no fault in my operations, and no merit in those of our adversaries. Never have they rendered me a worse service than in depreciating the actions of my opponents; they thus tarnish my own glory and that of the French army, for that glory consists in having surmounted unforeseen obstacles. The Russians certainly effected a retreat of three hundred leagues without having their army cut to pieces, and without leaving us any trophies. Barclay and Bagration, after being separated by a hostile force of three hundred thousand men, again effected their junction in spite of all our efforts: Wittgenstein, though opposed by three marshals with a force twice his own, maintained a threatening attitude during the whole campaign; and the army, defeated at Borodino, was again in condition to dispute our passage at Krasnoi. How could all this have happened if my enemies did nothing but commit faults? Again, how could men possessing no talents or merit collect their scattered forces, and concentrate them with troops from Finland and the Pruth, late in the autumn, on the Beresina, to dispute the passage of that river? Undoubtedly they were favored by a thousand advantageous circumstances, but it would be unjust to refuse them the praise which they deserve. de m - de m - de m - how m  
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Undoubtedly the Russians committed some great errors, especially in the first period of the campaign; their primitive position, their direction on Drissa, and their retreat from Smolensko are the most prominent. It is true also that Kutusof might have done more, for, in his place, I certainly should not have failed to destroy the army that left Moscow; but his circumspection did not prevent his making skillful maneuvers; these maneuvers were the result of the instructions of Alexander or of his staff, and it would be unjust to say that they were without merit. It is ridiculous to say that our disasters were in no way due to the Russians: it is true that they were not the result of any great victories gained; but in the second period of this campaign, the generals, the army, the government, and the nation all did their duty.

But if my admirers have been unjust towards my rivals, my personal enemies have not been less so towards me. My conduct in this campaign was not below the renown which I had previously gained. (I did not venture into an inhospitable country without due preparation.) But the immense distance to be passed over, and the enormous preparations required to support so large an army, all turned against me. My forces were prudently disposed of in echelons, and no point was needlessly exposed; if I ventured much, it was only after having taken every precaution which human foresight could suggest to secure the success of my operations. But let us return from this digression, and conclude the operations of my lieutenants after my return to Paris.

#### CONTINUATION OF THE RETREAT UNDER MURAT.—

In leaving Molodetzno I resigned the command of my army to Murat, giving him Berthier as his chief of staff (major-general). The former, of a rash and chivalric character, had not any more than the other the will of iron suited to such difficult circumstances. My departure became the signal of new disasters, still more terrible than any which preceded them. The cold increased to thirty degrees, and even the birds fell dead to the earth! In the three marches from Smorgoni to Wilna more than twenty thousand men fell by the wayside; and the remainder, half dead with cold and hunger, threw themselves into Wilna like a troop of madmen. This flourishing city contained immense resources; a part of our magazines had been brought here from Königsberg, and the Duke of Bassano had collected here supplies from all Lithuania; but the disorder was so great that it was impossible to make regular issues; a part was given up to pillage, and the remainder left, untouched, to the enemy. Wittgenstein and Tchichagof pressed close on our rear while Kutusof followed within two days' march. The division of Loison, which had opened the passage and was echeloned on the road, now formed the rear guard. The intrepid Ney, who had successively commanded the whole army, was still charged with sustaining here the shock of the enemy. Although composed of fresh and robust soldiers, Loison's division lost, in these three days, two-thirds of the men present, and there were scarcely five thousand men left before Wilna to oppose the Russians. Ney fought with resignation and courage, but his feeble force could not prevent the enemy's partisans from penetrating into the suburbs of the city. Sixty thousand half-famished men had quartered themselves in the hospitals, magazines, and private dwellings; by feeding on heavy half-baked bread they had contracted diseases not less fatal than the severe cold. In two days Wilna was but one vast



lazaretto. Those who could drag themselves along left at the sound of the enemy's cannon.

Two leagues from Wilna is the mountain of Ponary, whose steep and icy slope became, for our horses and the remains of our artillery and baggage-train, a true barrier of iron. All our remaining carriages were here abandoned; our treasure was divided among our soldiers, who, loaded down with gold, half-famished with hunger and half-dead with cold, took, in mournful despair, the road to Kowno. The Emperor Alexander, having returned to his army in order to gather the fruits of his plan of campaign, entered Wilna amid scenes of desolation exceeding even the romantic description of fiction. He halted here to afford succor to the twenty thousand dying men who filled the city, and to provide for the wants of his own army, which now began to suffer as much as ours. His columns continued the pursuit on Kowno.

The severe cold had closed the Niemen so that it could be readily crossed with artillery. This circumstance, which would have been so favorable to us on the Beresina, now became fatal to our army, which had scarcely six thousand men capable of firing a gun. The Cossacks reached the Niemen at the same time with the wreck of our forces, and threatened the debouches of the bridge. Each one sought for himself an issue; some took to the woods of Wilkowisk, and the road to Warsaw, while the greater number, with Murat and his head-quarters, took the road to Königsberg; Ney, who had been left in the city with a rear guard of only five hundred combatants, found on evacuating the town, that the enemy were in possession of the bridge across the Niemen. Valiant as Achilles, and strong as Ajax and Diomede, this hero seized a musket, and throwing himself upon the enemy with forty brave men, cut his way through the ranks of his astonished foes.\*

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\*Abbott thus describes Ney's final retreat and crossing of the Niemen:

"On the twelfth of December the French arrived at Kowno, upon the banks of the Niemen. On the thirteenth they crossed the bridge, but about thirty thousand in number. The 'Old Guard' was now reduced to three hundred men. They still marched proudly, preserving, even unto death, their martial and indomitable air. The heroic Ney, through miracles of suffering and valor, had covered the rear through this awful retreat. The march from Viasma to the Niemen had occupied thirty-seven days and nights. During this time, four rear guards had melted away under his command.

"Receiving four or five thousand men, the number would soon be reduced to two thousand, then to one thousand, then to five hundred, and finally to fifty or sixty. He would then obtain a fresh supply to be strewn in death along the road. Even more perished from fatigue and the cold than from the bullets of the enemy.

Murat has been reproached for having taken the road to old Prussia and thus exposing himself to be thrown into the sea; but the hope of being reinforced by the garrison of Königsberg, and of getting supplies in that rich country, and the idea of basing himself on Dantzic, are the excuses which he gave in justification of his resolution.

Including the Prussian contingent, Macdonald had still twenty-four thousand men. In my march on the Beresina I had employed every means in my power to send him orders to move on Wilna and Kowno; but Wittgenstein, after the passage of the Beresina, had forced him to take the road to Königsberg.

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"In the following way he conducted the retreat: Each afternoon, at about five o'clock, he selected some commanding position, and stopped the advance of the Russians. His soldiers then, for a few hours, obtained such food and rest as was possible under such circumstances.

"At ten o'clock he again resumed, under cover of night, his retreat. At daybreak, which was about seven o'clock, he again took position, and rested until ten o'clock. By this time the enemy usually made his appearance. Cautiously retiring, Ney fought them back all day long, making as much progress as he could, until five o'clock in the evening, when he again took position.

"In order to retard the advance of the Cossacks, powder and shells were placed in the wagons which it was found necessary to abandon, and a long lighted fuse attached. The Cossacks, observing the smoke, dared not approach until after the explosion. Thus, for more than a month, by night and by day, Ney struggled along against blinding storms of snow and freezing gales, with his ranks ploughed by the shot and shells of the enemy.

"At Kowno, Marshal Ney collected seven hundred fresh troops, and planting a battery of twenty-four pieces of cannon, beat back the enemy during the whole day, while the army was defiling across the bridge. As these troops melted away before the fire of the foe, he seized a musket, and with difficulty rallied thirty men to stand by his side. At last, having seen every man safely across the river, he slowly retired, proudly facing the foe.

"The bullets flew thickly around him; still, he disdained to turn his back upon the foe or to quicken his pace. Deliberately walking backward, he fired the last bullet at the advancing Russians, and threw his gun into the stream. He was the last of the 'Grand Army' who left the Russian territory.

"General Dumas was seated in the house of a French physician, on the German side of the river, when a man entered, enveloped in a large cloak. His beard was long and matted, his emaciated visage was blackened with gunpowder, his whiskers were singed by fire, but his eyes beamed with the lustre of an indomitable mind.

"'At last I am here,' said he, as he threw himself into a chair. 'What, General Dumas, do you not know me?'

"'No,' was the reply; 'who are you?'

"'I am the rear guard of the Grand Army, Marshal Ney. I have fired the last musket-shot on the bridge of Kowno, I have thrown into the Niemen the last of our arms, and I have waked hither, as you see me, across the forest.'"

Being abandoned on his march by the Prussian corps of York, and his right wing being turned, Macdonald was fortunate in gaining Königsberg with the Polish division, which he afterwards directed on Dantzic to reinforce the garrison.

Murat, after having also directed the division of Heudelet on Dantzic, cantoned twenty thousand men behind the Vistula, his right on Thorn, and his left in the direction of Elbing. But the defection of the Prussians rendered the position untenable, and exposed our communications. The enemy had only to present himself on our right flank, in order to throw these wrecks on Dantzic. In fact, the Russians attacked Eugene's headquarters at Marienwerder, and, through the negligence of the outposts, succeeded in penetrating into the place. The alarm was given, and Eugene, at the head of a few brave men, opened a passage, but more than a thousand prisoners fell into the hands of the enemy. The extreme left of our cantonments retired into Dantzic, while the right, composed of Bavarians, entered Thorn; fifteen thousand men directed their march on Posen, forming echelons on the road. The Russians satisfied themselves with Bromberg and Elbing.

#### CONTINUATION OF THE RETREAT UNDER EUGENE.

—Seeing that there was no further hope of effecting the reorganization of the army, and convinced of the defection of Prussia, Murat resolved to return to his kingdom, without waiting for my permission. He left Posen on the seventeenth of January, in spite of the remonstrances of the Viceroy, who represented to him the irregularity of his conduct both as a marshal of France and as my lieutenant. Blinded by the hope of preserving his throne, he departed under the name of one of his *aids-de-camp*, and left to Eugene the care of continuing the retreat.

The Viceroy remained ten days at Posen to restore more order to his columns; and the Russians, arrested by the fortifications of Thorn and Dantzic, also halted behind the Vistula. Rapp, who commanded at Dantzic, had collected an army of more than thirty thousand men, but at least ten thousand of these were invalids. Nevertheless, it was a considerable army, and I hoped that, under the protection of these formidable ramparts, it would afford occupation for the enemy. But it was unable to take the field, and did not equal my expectations.

The Russians waited for the opening of navigation to besiege the place, causing it to be observed, first by General Lewis, and afterwards by the Duke of Würtemberg. General Barclay was left before Thorn, with two divisions of grenadiers, and a siege-park, afterwards organized by the Prussians, enabled them to form a regular attack.



The defection of General York was soon followed by a convention which neutralized the Austrian corps of Schwartzberg. This marshal, in leaving to Tchichagof the field free to march on the Beresina, had entitled himself to the gratitude of our enemies. He had fallen back on Warsaw, and stipulated with the Russian generals an armistice, which, it is true, enabled Reynier to retire, but which, at the same time, neutralized the Austrian army, and permitted the enemy to pursue us to the last extremity.

Kutusof, not trusting to the continuance of this neutrality, left Sacken to observe him; but he had sufficient troops besides this to destroy the wrecks of the forces of the Viceroy, who redoubled his efforts to find some place of refuge.

Twenty thousand French and their allies, mutilated by the frost, and fifteen or sixteen thousand men still capable of bearing arms, pursued by an army of sixty thousand active men, inured to the climate, thus dragged themselves along from Wilna to the Oder, through a hostile population.

**HIS ARMY FINALLY TAKES REFUGE BEHIND THE ELBE.**—This sad but glorious retreat is a phenomenon in history; and one hardly knows at which to be most astonished,—the great disasters which befell our army, or the final return of the Viceroy to the Elbe. Except a warm engagement near Kalisch between Reynier's corps and the Russians, there were no further military events worthy of notice. The arrival on the Oder of fifteen thousand fresh troops from Italy, under General Grenier, enabled Eugene to retire in good order behind the Elbe. A new campaign was now about to open.

But diplomatists were in the meantime coolly discussing the best means of profiting by my disasters in the North; and, as if to give them additional hopes, Fortune had been but little less fatal to my armies in Spain than on the banks of the Beresina.\* We will give a brief summary of our affairs in the peninsula.

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\* "Many attempts," says Thiers, "have been made to reckon up the losses suffered by France and her allies in this Russian expedition, and although such a calculation is as impossible as terrible, some idea of the truth may, nevertheless, be attained. The total force of the army, intended to act from the Rhine to the Niemen, consisted of six hundred and twelve thousand men (with the Austrians, six hundred and forty-eight thousand) and one hundred and fifty thousand horses. Of these, five hundred and thirty-three thousand had passed the Niemen, of whom there remained, under the Prince Schwartzberg and Reynier, about forty thousand Austrians and Saxons, fifteen thousand Prussians and Poles under Marshal Macdonald, and some isolated troops, numbering about thirty or forty thousand.

"Of the remaining four hundred and thirty-eight thousand, about one hundred thousand had fallen into the hands of the Russians; and, accord-

SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN.—While my troops were triumphant at Tarragona and Valencia, the Cortes of Cadiz were planning the basis of their constitutional edifice. The liberals or *comuneros* were in the majority, and they excelled even the extravagance of our constituent assembly. Their intentions were no doubt pure, for they imitated revolutionary France even to excluding the members of their constituent assembly from the first elections to the legislative body. Nevertheless, their principles were not pleasing either to the *grandees* or the high clergy; and the opposition of the latter was the more decided as the Cortes, following my example, had ventured to strike at the abuses of the Church. Joseph had made pacific overtures to the Cortes, and the disasters of Tarragona and Valencia had somewhat shaken their courage; the more reasonable of the Spaniards began to reflect that, if England should deliver their country, they would become still more dependent on the Cabinet of London than Godoy had ever been on that of France. They, therefore, thought that they might obtain a preferable result by treating with my brother, and thus become the arbiters of their own future. Joseph offered to recognize their constitution with certain indicated modifications, and they decided to send deputies to Madrid to treat on these bases; and these deputies were actually on their way when the disastrous battle of Salamanca entirely changed the face of affairs.

The English had redoubled their efforts during this campaign, the retreat of Masséna and the success of Wellington and Beresford serving as a stimulus to incite them.

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ing to this calculation, therefore, about three hundred and forty thousand would have perished; but this happily was not the case, for a certain number of men, who had deserted their ranks at the commencement of the campaign, had gradually rejoined their country across Poland and Germany. Nevertheless it can be no exaggeration to say that in the course of the campaign about three hundred thousand men fell beneath the enemy's fire and the severity of cold and want."

M. Laurent de l'Ardèche, Vol. II., p. 166, estimates the loss of the French army during the Russian campaign at three hundred and fifty thousand men, more than sixty thousand horses, a thousand cannon, and nearly twenty thousand wagons and carriages. He also says that, including the population of the abandoned cities, who perished for want of food and shelter, the loss of the Russians must have far exceeded that of the invaders.

Large numbers of women and children, when driven from their homes by their own countrymen or the Cossacks, in pursuance of the orders of the government to lay waste the country as fast as the French advanced, perished, in the fields and forests, from hunger, fatigue, and exposure. In some places the road-sides and plains were covered with the unburied dead of the Russian inhabitants. Had their own government permitted these people to remain in their homes, very few of them would have been molested by the French.

They recruited in Germany from the prisoners of war, and even from the malefactors; anything seemed good enough to oppose us.

In making this statement I must not be accused of undervaluing their army, for their own parliamentary debates prove that they sought criminals in the interior of the prisons to incorporate them in the regiments employed in the peninsula.

The taking of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajos, as glorious for Wellington as discreditable to the two generals who permitted these disasters to take place, began to show the extent of our danger. It was thought that the English general, able in a war of positions, but wanting enterprise in an open country, had taken these posts only the better to secure his line of defense in Portugal. They expected that he would now trouble our two armies in Estremadura, but they did not attach to these events the importance which they deserved.

On the approach of the war in Russia, I had recalled all my guard from Spain, as well as the legions of the Vistula and several skeletons of dragoon regiments, destined to form lancers; I had, moreover, withdrawn many men of the *élite* to complete the Old Guard, and dissolved what had been called the "Army of the North." Nevertheless, our forces in the west and south amounted to one hundred and thirty thousand men; Soult had forty-five thousand in Andalusia; and Marmont nearly as many toward Salamanca. Souham guarded old Castile with twelve thousand men; Joseph, with his guard and the army of the center, held La Mancha, the banks of the Tagus, and Madrid. Independently of these forces, divisions of occupation were stationed in Navarre, in the Asturias, in Leon, and in Biscay. On deciding to march against Russia, I at first had the intention of concentrating all my forces behind the Ebro; but the important successes of Suchet in the kingdom of Valencia and the destruction of Blake's army, animating our hopes in the peninsula, caused me to change my plan and to persist in guarding Andalusia.

Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese army had been increased to more than seventy-five thousand men, and the Cortes had finally given him the general command of the Spanish army of sixty thousand men. Moreover, the natural advantages of his position were very great. Our line of operations, extending from Bayonne to Cadiz, was more than two hundred leagues in depth. Portugal was like an impenetrable fortress, placed on the flank and center of this line, while the fortifications of Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajos served as advanced works to the main bulwark. Wellington, departing from such a base, was certain to act with advantage against an enemy who was obliged to occupy a whole kingdom



and to secure himself against a multitude of Spaniards, little formidable in line, but continually harassing our posts with indefatigable activity. As it was impossible, on account of the guerrillas, to form any system of regular magazines, the French could not remain long together in large masses, and, their positions being greatly extended in order to cover their supplies and their line of retreat, they were exposed to attack on every side.

Wellington saw the advantage of his position, and at last took the offensive. He had three plans from which to choose: first, to move to the right on Soult; second, to debouch at the center on Madrid; third, to operate at the left on Marmont. By operating at the south Wellington would draw there the principal masses of the French, and only the more completely effect the invasion of Spain. But in going to the north he would draw Soult in that direction, and thus deliver over the south of Spain to the junta of Cadiz. If the French should commit the error of attempting to guard Seville instead of going to the support of Marmont, then the latter would be defeated, and, as the line of retreat on Bayonne lay in that direction, a victory on the Douro would be certain to cause the evacuation of half of the peninsula, and even of the capital. This was too evident to escape my penetration; but, deceived in the character of their chief, I hoped that the English would not venture to commit their troops far from Portugal. I, however, gave a *carte-blanche* to Joseph and Jourdan, who thought, like myself, that they could face the danger.

THE ENGLISH DESTROY THE BRIDGE OF THE TAGUS AT ALMARAZ.—Conformably to his plan of operations, Wellington debouched from Portugal in the month of May. In order to retain Suchet in the east, and prevent reinforcements from being sent to Joseph, Wellington requested the landing of ten thousand English and six thousand auxiliaries from Minorca on the coast of Catalonia. The general wisely commenced his operations by destroying the great bridge of Almaraz across the Tagus, in order to cut off all communication between the armies of Soult and Marmont. This bridge was not only secured by a well-constructed *tête-de-pont*, but also by the little fort of Mirvales, which closed the gorges through which passes the road to Truxillo. Hill succeeded in turning this fort by ascending the rocks of Manaderos with all the necessary implements for an escalade. The officer who commanded the foreign battalion in the *tête-de-pont* allowed himself to be surprised on the eighteenth of May, and the detachment which guarded a part of the works on the right bank basely fled; its chief was condemned to death, but the evil was without remedy. After this important *coup-de-main*, Hill returned to Badajoz. Soult and Marmont each sent divisions to

*Sudden attack*

sustain the place, but the bridge and great *dépôt* of munitions had been destroyed, and, as the enemy had also disappeared, our troops returned to their respective quarters.

THE TAKING OF SALAMANCA.—Wellington, having completed his preparations, crossed the Tormes at a ford, on the seventeenth of June, invested Salamanca, and established himself in observation at San Christoval. Marmont, having collected his forces, presented himself there on the twentieth, but, not venturing to attack the enemy, he retired again after two days' maneuvering, and asked for reinforcements from Joseph, and from General Caffarelli, who was commanding in Castile. The three small forts constructed to cover Salamanca, being warmly battered, surrendered on the twenty-fourth. Marmont then fell back on the Douro between Toro and Tordesillas, where he was joined by Bonnet's division from the Asturias; his force now numbered between forty-two and forty-five thousand. Wellington followed him with at least an equal army. Joseph, indecisive, like all mediocre men, first declared that he could not detach any reinforcement from Madrid, and that the marshal must do all he could to sustain himself. Caffarelli also replied that he was hard pressed by the insurgents of Navarre and the Asturias. The marshal, judging that it was necessary, at whatsoever cost, to drive the enemy back into Portugal, resolved to take the offensive as soon as he was joined by Bonnet's division. After making new demonstrations on Toro, he fell back to the left on Tordesillas, passed the Douro, and advanced against the extreme right of the English.

After some maneuvers intended to deceive his adversary, Marmont collected the mass of his forces behind the hills of the Arapiles, and resolved to drive the English from these heights, from which place he hoped to operate with advantage on their right, if they remained in position, or to cut them up if they attempted to retreat.

General Maucune had orders to carry this post with the advanced guard. This valiant soldier executed his task with audacity, but afterward advanced with too much precipitancy into the plain beyond. Marmont ascended the eminence to ascertain the state of affairs, and just as he saw the enemy, instead of retreating, making preparations to assail with advantage, his arm was broken by the bursting of a shell. It was now necessary to sustain this division, and to attack the second hill opposite the enemy's center. The battle was thus begun in a disadvantageous situation. The wounded marshal resigned the command to Clausel, but all the experience of this brave general could not remedy an affair so improperly begun. Maucune was

separated from the rest of the line by half a league, and Wellington moved one Spanish and four English divisions and all his cavalry on the point where we were most exposed to his attacks. Imitating the example of Frederick at Rosbach, or rather mine at Austerlitz, he waited till our left was well separated, then ordered Beresford to attack the heights of Arapiles, and directed, by an oblique march, the half of his army on the extreme left. Taken in front and flank, this wing was thrown on the center, which evacuated the Arapiles in pretty good order, but was finally involved in the defeat of the left.

Foy, who commanded our right, thought to assist the center by a lateral movement, but was assailed by the enemy's left and reserve, and succeeded with difficulty in covering the retreat. This defeat, which cost us eight or nine thousand men *hors-de-combat*, was calculated to decide the fate of Spain. The consequences were the more to be deplored as they destroyed the hope of effecting an arrangement with the Cortes, or of securing the pacification of the peninsula. I was the more displeased with this result, as Joseph had changed his mind in relation to reinforcing Marmont, and marched with his guard, his reserve, and part of Caffarelli's troops on Segovia to rejoin the army of Portugal.

This circumstance prejudiced me against this imprudent marshal, as it seemed that he had compromised our safety on account of his jealousy and the desire to decide the question before the approach of my brother. But as it was not absolutely certain that he knew of the vicinity of the King, I only replaced him in the command, and directed that he should not even be informed of this until the recovery of his wounds. I had an old affection for my companion in arms; he and Junot had been the first of my *aids-de-camp*. The loss of Spain is, however, to be dated from this catastrophe, and posterity will decide whether it was the fault of Joseph or of Marmont.

WELLINGTON ENTERS MADRID.—The military results of this campaign were, for us, as unfortunate as its political consequences. The broken army of Marmont retired to Burgos; Clausel did not even deem it prudent to hold Valladolid, for fear of being obliged to accept a new battle. Wellington, getting possession of that city on the thirtieth of July, caused the army of Portugal to be observed by two divisions, and on the fifth of August marched on Madrid by Segovia. Joseph, on hearing the loss of the battle of Salamanca, and not being able to unite with Clausel without danger, retired by Guadarama on Madrid, evacuated that capital after having thrown his baggage in the Retiro, and fell back with the army of the Center behind the Tagus, and



urged Soult to send him twenty thousand men from Andalusia. This unfortunate army of the South caused all our embarrassments, and, nevertheless, was the resource to which it was always necessary to resort. As Soult could not, without compromising his army, send half of it to the King, he proposed to Joseph to fall back on him, to hold Andalusia, and give me time to send reinforcements into the north of Spain to drive out the English. This project would have been good if I had been tranquil at Paris; but as I was then in Moscow, it was therefore exceedingly objectionable.

Joseph, listening to better advice than that of Soult, ordered him to abandon Andalusia, and join him at Valencia, where he retired with the troops of Count d'Erlon. Hardly had he left his capital when the English general entered there in triumph (August 12th). The intoxication with which he was received soon gave place to very different feelings, when it was known that he had levied a contribution on that city of ten millions!

The Retiro had been fortified for the last two years, to serve as a *dépôt*: its *enceinte* was a double line; the first line was too extended, and required too many forces for its defense; the second was too confined, and its garrison was exposed to the fire of the besiegers. The garrison being too weak to defend the first line, Wellington carried it at the first onset; he then bombarded the second, which was surrendered by the commandant a few hours after, with censurable precipitation. They captured here one hundred and eighty pieces of cannon and rich stores.

Wellington has been blamed for going to Madrid for a triumph instead of pursuing the wrecks of Marmont's corps. It is very certain that a second victory over Clausel would have driven his army to the Pyrenees, and have greatly embarrassed Soult and Joseph in the south. But the English general relied much upon the moral effect which the taking of the capital would produce upon the already flagging courage of the Spaniards.

On the reiterated orders of the King, Soult determined to sacrifice the immense works which his army had erected around Cadiz, and, on the twenty-fifth of August, took the road to Grenada and Lorca on Yecla, after having effected, at Huesca, his junction with the corps of Count d'Erlon; he conferred with Joseph and Suchet at Almanza, and then immediately directed himself on the Tagus by the road from Alicante to Madrid. Ballesteros, who had fought against him with so much constancy during the whole summer, did not trouble his retreat, which he might have done, either by operating on the flanks or by the direct road from the Sierra Morena to Madrid. It appears that he had been ordered into La Mancha to act under the orders of

Wellington; but his pride revolted at serving under another, and he preferred to let our columns escape unmolested. The Cortes broke him of his command, and banished him to Ceuta.

#### WELLINGTON'S UNSUCCESSFUL SIEGE OF BURGOS.

—In the meantime Wellington had left Madrid to return to the north against Clausel, who had just resumed the offensive against the divisions left in observation near Burgos, and had already advanced on the Douro to disengage Toro and Zamora. Wellington left General Hill, with three Anglo-Portuguese divisions, to guard Madrid, and marched anew against Burgos at the head of four divisions and the Spanish army of Galicia. General Souham (to whom Clausel, who was sick with his wound, had given the command) fell back on Briviesca, a formidable position on the principal spur of the Pyrenees which covers the left bank of the Ebro. The English general, though destitute of his park of heavy artillery, determined to attack the castle of Burgos, hoping that what could not be effected by his large field-pieces and howitzers could be accomplished by subterranean warfare, and sapping the foot of the walls with his miners.

General Dubreton, who commanded the garrison, was a man of head and heart. He executed many sorties with success, on the trenches; nevertheless the breaches were finally made practicable, and the assault given, but it completely failed. Our great *dépôts* were in a kind of intrenched camp between the castle and the old donjon. Wellington now redoubled his efforts, giving a new assault on the eighth of October, but with the same ill-success as before; and finally, on the twenty-second, he raised the siege, after a loss of thirty days and three thousand men.

**HE RETIRES INTO PORTUGAL.**—Two circumstances decided Wellington to retreat. First, the approach of Souham to El Olmo, his army being reinforced by General Caffarelli with two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry. The second was the march of Soult on Aranjuez and Madrid, threatening to cut off his line of retreat by Portugal. The English army immediately retired behind the Douro, but not without considerable losses in the combats which its rear guard had to sustain against our light cavalry and the divisions of Foy and Maucune, especially at Celada, Villadriego, and Villa-Muriel. Wellington, after blowing up the fine bridges of Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas, regained Salamanca.

Joseph and Soult, after driving Hill from Madrid, also took the road to Salamanca, and on the tenth of November our three armies united on the Tormes. They still numbered eighty thousand foot-soldiers and ten thousand horse. Although worn out with a fatiguing and ill-directed war, the idea of avenging the

defeat of Salamanca had revived their enthusiasm; and the soldiers loudly demanded to be led against the enemy. Soult, to whom the King had given the command, wished to profit by this feeling to act on Wellington's line of retreat; but he was delayed by the difficulty of crossing the Alba, and the English general, taking advantage of a terrible rain and fog, effected his retreat towards Ciudad-Rodrigo.

Wellington was now driven back to the position from which he had started; but his operations had resulted in the deliverance of all the south of Spain—Grenada, Seville, Andalusia, Cadiz, and Alicante; and he had acquired a marked ascendancy over my generals. This campaign, although slow and measured, did honor to Wellington. The choice of his strategic direction was wise, and his tactical dispositions skillful. Nevertheless it must be confessed that, with an army of seventy-five thousand men, assisted by ten millions of Spaniards and Portuguese, full of fervor for their cause, and with only a fraction of our own force to oppose him, he was bound to accomplish some important results. The thirty days lost at Burgos certainly militate against him; and he has been justly blamed for giving Clausel time to reform the army which had been defeated at Salamanca.

SECONDARY OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA, ETC.—In the east the war does not offer the same interest as in the former campaigns. General Suchet, satisfied with the taking of Valencia and Peniscola, and annoyed by the unfortunate expedition of Montbrun, rested on his laurels. General Decaen, with Lamarque and Maurice Mathieu, kept up an active contest with the Catalonians, who, under Lascy, threatened at the same time Tarragona, Barcelona, Gerona, and Tortosa. The distance of Suchet's troops had revived the warlike ardor of the intrepid mountaineers of Monserrat, Manresa, Reuss, and Vicque. Maurice Mathieu encountered Lascy, on the twenty-third of January, on the heights of Alta-Fulla, routed his army, captured all his artillery, and took near two thousand prisoners. Decaen carried the mountain of Olot, drove Sarsfield on Centelles, and explored the whole country to Barcelona.

But these successes did not destroy the activity of the insurgent parties in Catalonia, and it was only with the greatest care on our side that we could maintain Barcelona and keep its garrison supplied with provisions. After completing the organization of Valencia, Suchet made a reconnoissance of Alicante. Joseph O'Donnel had organized a corps of eight or nine thousand men to cover the environs of the city, and Suchet was soon convinced that the place was too strong to be taken without a regular attack. At this epoch the English made known



their intention of landing ten or twelve thousand Anglo-Sicilians, under General Maitland, on the eastern coast of Spain. On hearing this, I united the corps of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia under the orders of Suchet. While the English squadron was making demonstrations at the mouth of the Xucar, O'Donnel thought to surprise and destroy General Delort at Castella (July 22d). This intrepid officer, without fearing the enemy's numbers, and taking advantage of an injudicious movement of the Spanish cavalry, threw himself on his adversaries with the twenty-fourth dragoons and his cuirassiers, captured their artillery, sabered and dispersed their infantry, and returned with more prisoners than he himself had soldiers. This brilliant exploit of eighteen hundred Frenchmen against nine thousand Spaniards crowned the expedition of Suchet. The Irish General Elliot succeeded O'Donnel in the command, but was not more fortunate than his predecessor. Not venturing to land in the midst of our troops, Maitland debarked near Alicante, and again threatened Castella.

Suchet was at this time obliged to shelter the columns of Joseph, who returned from Madrid with the burlesque *cortège* of a fugitive court. The contrast between the army of Aragon, well-clothed and equipped, and the army of the Center, undisciplined, destitute of everything, and serving as a mere escort to the thousand carriages of the *grandees* of Spain who shared the fortunes of the King, formed a picture worthy the pencil of Calot. As soon as he could get rid of this embarrassment, Suchet resolved to again menace Alicante. Maitland, on his side, sought to get possession of Denia; but Duncan's brigade was repulsed, and Suchet, to threaten the enemy in his position, pushed forward Harispe's division, even under the cannon of Alicante.

In the meantime the war in Catalonia continued without material change. The bands of Eroles, Milans, Rovira, and Sarsfield distinguished themselves by their boldness and activity, and our convoys had great difficulty in getting supplies into Barcelona. It required all the talents of Decaen, Lamarque, and Maurice Mathieu, and all the constancy, bravery, and resignation of their soldiers, to drive Lasey from Vicque. The bands of Aragonese, although less enterprising than the Catalonians, continued to harass the division which had been left to guard that province.

CONCLUSION.—The news of the retreat from Moscow, and the terrible bulletin that announced my return to Paris, was calculated to precipitate the ruin of our affairs in Spain, and revive the confidence and enthusiasm of our enemies. In fact, the disasters of the Russian expedition destroyed the *morale* of

our army, which was more fatigued by the character of the war than discouraged by the chances and perils of battle.

But it is time to close this brief outline of the campaign of 1812 in Spain, and return to the dispositions which I made to save France from the dangers that threatened her on all sides.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## SPRING CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

General State of Europe—Mission of Bubna—Amicable Protestations of Austria—Napoleon's Preparations for a new Campaign—Eugene behind the Elbe—Prussia declares against Napoleon—March of the Allies on the Elbe—They enter Saxony—Negotiations with Austria—She declares an armed Mediation—Napoleon rejoins his Army—He advances on the Saale—Organization of his Army—Levy in Mass in Prussia—Movements of the Allies—Position of their Armies—Napoleon effects his Junction with Eugene—He directs his March on Leipsic—Project of the Allies—Battle of Lutzen—Remarks on this Battle—Pursuit of the Allies on Dresden—Eugene sent to organize an Army in Italy—New Negotiations—Another Mission of Bubna—Napoleon accepts the Proposition of a Congress—Caulaincourt's Proposition to Russia—Napoleon repairs to Bautzen—Fortified Position of the Allies—Ney's March to turn this Position—Combats of Weissig and Königswartha—Ney debouches on Klix—Battle of Bautzen—Remarks on this Battle—Nesselrode's Reply to the Overtures of Caulaincourt—Combats of Reichenbach and Haynau—The Allies throw themselves on Schweidnitz—Armistice of Neumark—Combat of Luckau—Treaty with Denmark—Third Mission of Bubna—Negotiations of the Allies at Reichenbach—Metternich at Dresden—His Interview with Napoleon—Envoys to the Congress of Prague—Napoleon meets his Empress at Mayence—Military Projects of the Allies—Negotiations at Prague—Summary of Operations in Spain—Battle of Victoria—Suchet's Operations in the East of Spain.

GENERAL STATE OF EUROPE.—Europe was not less astonished at my reverses than it had been at my successes. I had just lost that army which had been the terror of the world; and my enemies might now hope to conquer the remainder, for the relative proportion of forces was changed. I was not to be deceived respecting the sentiments which now agitated Europe, for I foresaw that, the first moment of surprise being passed, I should find against me a formidable league, of which I now only heard the smothered cries of joy.

MISSION OF BUBNA.—The moment of defeat is certainly an unfavorable time for concluding a treaty of peace. Austria,



however, hoping to derive greater advantages from her alliance with me than from any which she could form with my enemies, interposed to mediate a peace.

General Bubna was sent to me, on the part of that court, to assure me of its benevolent dispositions. In his official language Bubna spoke only of the good offices of the Cabinet of Vienna for the reëstablishment of peace, and was most prodigal in his protestations and assurances of the wish of his government for the maintenance of our alliance. But in the *salons*, and in private conversations, he let it be understood that, as a return for these dispositions, his government expected the retrocession of some of its provinces, and particularly of Illyria. This desire was perfectly natural, and I should not have hesitated to gratify it if I had known precisely what my father-in-law wished; that is, what he was disposed to do for me, and what price he set upon this assistance. We were reciprocally distrusting each other for want of a frank and open explanation. It was evident that Austria would profit by her situation to recover a part of her lost power, but to attain this object by honorable means, it was essential that she should not hesitate to declare herself. Her situation, however, was somewhat embarrassing, for she had only a single alternative: she had either to maintain our alliance and seek to obtain from me concessions sufficiently important to reëstablish the equilibrium between us, or to break the alliance and declare herself in favor of my enemies.

The first of these seemed the most advisable course to pursue, although it was no easy matter to dictate conditions to one of my character; and, moreover, my father-in-law could not, with very good grace, say to me: "*I am your ally, and you must give me your provinces.*" Austria, therefore, preferred to show how necessary she was to me, and thus induce me to explain what I would be disposed to do for her. I, on the contrary, wished to gain time, being persuaded that under any circumstances I could make better terms after gaining a battle. I formed a just estimate of my resources, and felt confident that in two or three months I could beat the enemy and drive him behind the Vistula, thus regaining my European preponderance.

The second plan was not less embarrassing for Austria than the other, for, if my preponderance had appeared excessive and threatening, there were also equal reasons for fear if that preponderance should pass entirely into the hands of Russia. Moreover, an ally is not to be instantly converted into a public enemy; time and the formalities of negotiations are required to accomplish this.

Under all the circumstances, I determined not to voluntarily offer myself to be despoiled, but to wait till I could ascertain the

exact intentions of the Cabinet of Vienna; in the meantime seeking to obtain from Austria some formal declaration respecting the continuance of our alliance. As Bubna only spoke of the desire of his master to intercede for peace, I reiterated to him all the assurances which he could desire, and confirmed them by my direct correspondence with my father-in-law. The reports which reached me from Vienna were, however, daily becoming more alarming. Lord Walpole, the secret envoy of England, promised, it was said, to Austria ten millions of pounds sterling, Illyria, and even the kingdom of Italy, if she would declare against me. Thus a power which had not a single battalion to dispose of was generously offering to give away vast provinces on the continent, to which not the shadow of a title had yet been acquired.

AMICABLE PROTESTATIONS OF THE CABINET OF VIENNA.—Nevertheless, the protestations of Metternich were so positive that I was for a time deceived. I saw in his proffer of good offices only a sincere desire on the part of Austria to interpose between the contending parties, and thus increase her own importance. How could I fail to believe a minister who said to me, on the fourteenth of February, “that my alliance with Russia was an alliance of war, imposed by victory, and ought from its nature to be dissolved, but, on the contrary, that the alliance with Austria reposed on the most permanent interests; that Austria had herself voluntarily sought this alliance, and that if she now had it to make over again, she would make it upon precisely the same basis; that if it did not already exist, she herself would now solicit it, for a half-century had demonstrated the advantages of the one precisely similar which had been negotiated by Prince Kaunitz in 1756”?

Nor did the Cabinet of Vienna confine itself to these protestations: it announced, the middle of March, that Prince Schwartzenberg, as chief of the auxiliary corps, was coming to Paris to receive my orders; and Metternich spoke of bringing one hundred thousand, instead of thirty thousand men, into the field, if the enemy should still refuse to make peace. The letter announcing the return of Schwartzenberg was certainly remarkable:

“His presence at Paris has, under the circumstances, been deemed necessary by the Emperor of Austria for the reciprocal interests of the two courts. As an ambassador and chief of the auxiliary corps he will be of service to Napoleon, in the negotiations, if they are commenced, or in receiving his orders for the coming campaign, if, contrary to the dearest wishes of the Emperor of Austria it becomes necessary to continue the war.”

At the same time M. de Floret communicated, by the orders of his court, the overtures of the Cabinet of Vienna to England

and Russia, and also the views of the Emperor of Austria on the events that were transpiring in Prussia. "The personal sentiments," said to be, "of the Emperor of Austria are most strongly opposed to measures like those resorted to by Prussia." He blamed, in the strongest terms, such defection; his sentiments were most unequivocally in favor of continuing the alliance; and his zeal was both strongly and truly in favor of peace—a peace less necessary for France than for Austria herself. Such were the declarations of the agents of the Cabinet of Vienna. It had explained its views in the same way, it was said, at Berlin, at Wilna, and at London. "Their course of conduct was *purely Austrian*, and they wished to *place France in her true attitude*, which was not to fear the continuance of the war, nor to oppose the negotiation of peace."

My minister of foreign affairs, however, distrusted these fine protestations, and proposed to me to restore Ferdinand to Spain, and the Pope to Rome.

It was thought that by this means I might voluntarily accomplish what Europe would perhaps sooner or later impose by force, and, moreover, that I might in this way obtain an additional force of one hundred thousand men to assist me in Germany, and thus show to Europe that I renounced both Spain and Rome, the better to maintain my ascendancy in the North. I consented to the restoration of the Pope, and went myself to Fontainebleau, under the pretext of a hunting party. I saw the Pontiff, and frankly proposed to him to forget our spiritual and temporal quarrels, offering him the restoration of Rome, provided he would maintain the independence of the Gallican Church. A new concordat was signed to this effect on the twenty-fifth of January. But the restoration of Ferdinand was a different matter. The new retreat of Wellington into Portugal, notwithstanding the victory of Salamanca, gave me hopes of still maintaining our power in the peninsula. I preferred to risk my throne, rather than to surrender the maritime interests of France. They could not regard the restoration of the Pope as the result of fear, for I could have nothing to apprehend from that quarter, but the return of Ferdinand might give my enemies an exaggerated idea of our embarrassments.

#### ENERGETIC PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW CAMPAIGN.

—During the interval of these negotiations, I was making every preparation to resume an imposing attitude on the Oder. The disasters of Moscow, instead of discouraging me, had animated me with new ardor; I felt equal to the exigency of the occasion, and France shared my confidence and my energy. Never did a people present a more noble and lofty character. Instead of



mourning over our losses, we thought only of the means of repairing them; in three months I accomplished my object. This fact alone is sufficient to confound the declamations of those intriguers who triumph only in the disasters of their country. France, it is true, showed herself great in misfortune; but if there was in the whole of my career a single moment which merits the admiration of posterity, it was this, beyond all doubt.

In less than three months, more than six hundred pieces of cannon and two thousand caissons were on the road to the Elbe; the cohorts of the first *ban* were formed into regiments of the line; the number of these regiments was increased to one hundred and fifty by the creation of twenty new *cadres*; the newly levied conscripts filled up the old *cadres*. The *dépôts* of the regiments in Spain were completed and organized as provisional; the *cadres* of one hundred battalions were drawn, for this purpose, from the army in Spain, their soldiers being all transferred to the battalions which remained with that army. I increased the number of the regiments of the Young Guard to sixteen, so as to incite among the conscripts a rivalry to get into these corps, which then passed as the *élite* of my army, but which in reality were inferior to the ordinary regiments of the camp at Boulogne. They were not wanting in courage, but in the habit of enduring fatigues, privations, and dangers; in a word, they wanted the force of discipline and experience.

The *personnel* of the artillery was reorganized by means of the companies of cannoneers, which had been attached to each cohort of the *bans*; seventy of these companies were sent into Germany. I had six fine regiments of well-disciplined marine-artillerists; these were withdrawn from the ports, and also sent into Germany. These brave men did not object to the loss of their prerogatives, while I directed them to act as infantry.

A small number of these companies, however, were required to complete the artillery of the guard. The reorganization of cavalry was more difficult. I, however, remounted, in Hanover, the squadrons which had lost their horses in Russia; I levied a part of the postillions and the sons of postmasters, and of the mounted guards of the forests; I also formed guards of honor in order to stimulate the proud and warlike youth of the country. The *gensdarmierie* also offered me a resource; two thousand officers and non-commissioned officers of this *corps-d'élite* left their residences to aid me in forming the *cadres* of our young cavalry. The order, regularity, and activity which marked the fusion of all these heterogeneous elements constitute, perhaps, the most remarkable trait of my administration.

I thus reappeared, at the opening of the campaign, as formidable as ever, at least in numbers. The enemy was surprised at

the sudden return of our eagles. The army which I commanded, and especially the cavalry, was less warlike than that of Boulogne; but the heritage of glory gave it confidence, and I led it to the field against the enemy without hesitation.

I had a great task before me: it was necessary to reëstablish our military ascendancy, and to resume a contest which had been so near its termination. I still held Italy, Holland, and most of the fortified places of Germany. The army of Spain, though defeated at Salamanca, had soon regained its supremacy by the concentration of its forces; it had again confined Wellington to Portugal, and, with the exception of Andalusia and Galicia, still occupied nearly all the peninsula. A reinforcement of thirty thousand conscripts ought to enable it to maintain its position. I had, therefore, lost but little ground; it was only the prestige of my invincibility that was gone: it still required well-combined efforts on the part of my enemies to overthrow me, and these efforts might fail for want of union. England, however, redoubled her activity, and Prussia was preparing to make war *en masse*. The levies ordered by Russia in 1812 were collecting from all quarters into Poland to complete the organization of her army. Austria, convinced that the moment for pronouncing was approaching, armed herself with all possible activity. The princes of the Confederation, compelled by their own weakness to follow the strongest party, marched with hesitation under my flag. But my declared enemies and doubtful allies caused me less inquietude than the secret societies which were formed for the overthrow of my power. These societies were organized in Bavaria, Saxony, and Westphalia, while agents of the coalition were preaching a crusade against me in every part of Germany.

**EUGENE BEHIND THE ELBE.**—While I was preparing my forces for a new contest, Eugene completed his long and difficult march from the Vistula to the banks of the Elbe. Prince Schwartzemberg in consequence of the convention with the Russian generals, had left General Frimont to march back his corps into Austrian Galicia. Poniatowski, by a subsequent convention, had retired without arms across the Austrian territory to rejoin me on the Elbe. Eugene, although reinforced by Grenier, had been obliged to garrison the places of the Oder, and brought for the defense of the Elbe only twenty thousand men, exclusive of the Saxons who were destined for the garrison of Torgau.

**PRUSSIA DECLARES AGAINST NAPOLEON.**—Prussia, after having disapproved the defection of York, sent to me, first, Prince Hatzfeld, and then General Krusemarck, to claim the reimbursement of the ninety millions of francs which she said we owed her for supplies furnished to our army. If I had had to deal

only with Frederick William, I should have retained him in my alliance by restoring a part of his lost provinces, and by paying him the money which he claimed; but I knew that he would be induced by the feelings of the army and of the nation to declare against me: in fact, his cabinet was even then negotiating with Russia. I thought it useless to deceive Krusemarck, and told him plainly that I was not disposed to supply arms to my enemies. The Prussian government now no longer concealed its hostility: a treaty of alliance was signed with Russia, on the twenty-seventh of February, at Kalisch, and the two sovereigns soon after met at Breslau to concert their political and military operations. Russia promised to bring one hundred and fifty thousand men into the field, and Prussia eighty thousand as a *minimum*, and double that number if circumstances permitted. It was agreed to make an appeal to the people and princes of Germany, and to strip of their territories all those who did not join in the coalition. A committee was formed, first, under the presidency of Kotschubey, and afterward of Stein, for inciting and directing the *levée en masse*. It is also said that a secret convention was signed, near the close of March, stipulating for the assistance of Austria.

MARCH OF THE ALLIES ON THE ELBE.—The Russian army, having passed the Oder and the Rohr, moved its headquarters to Bunzlau, where Kutusof, already aged and broken down by the fatigues of the campaign, died of an epidemic fever which prevailed in the army, and also in the countries through which they passed. Count Wittgenstein succeeded him in the command, and directed a part of his army with Blücher on Dresden, and the remainder, with the corps of Bülow, Kleist, and York, by Frankfort on Berlin. Eugene, finding himself unable to defend the Spree against the united armies of Prussia and Russia, fell back from Copenick on Wittenberg, and Augereau, who had at Berlin only a few conscripts, evacuated that capital on the approach of the Allies, and followed the retreat of the army behind the Elbe.

Eugene, informed of the reinforcements which were approaching, thought to defend the line of that river; Belluno, with two new divisions which afterward formed the second *corps-d'armée* on the Saale, covered the space between Magdeburg and the confluence of that river. Davoust, with a part of the eleventh corps, defended the interval between Torgau and Dessau; while Reynier was to secure Dresden with Durutte's division and the wrecks of the Saxons and Bavarians. As it was less important to guard this line than to assemble the scattered forces, I directed him to concentrate toward Magdeburg. Davoust and Reynier, after some difficulty with the citizens, who opposed the blowing up of some of the arches of the bridge of



Dresden, left the Saxons at Torgau, and descended the river with their few remaining troops. I had also directed on Magdeburg the regiments of infantry formed by the cohorts of the first *ban*. This reinforcement of twenty-four thousand men, under the orders of Lauriston, increased the number of combatants in the vicinity of the city to fifty thousand. Vandamme went to command a *corps-d'armées* formed of the cohorts in the departments of the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser.

THE ALLIES ENTER SAXONY.—The enemy continued to advance with excessive confidence; Count Wittgenstein and the Prussians, under Bülow, entered Berlin: the first, leaving Count Woronzof to mask Magdeburg, passed the Elbe in the environs of Dessau; and Blücher, with the corps of Silesia and that of Miloradowitsch, debouched by Dresden. At the approach of the enemy's columns, the King of Saxony left for Ratisbon; but afterwards, on the invitation of Austria, returned to Prague, where he was at the same time more secure and nearer to his states. The Cabinet of Vienna was making every effort to enclose this prince in her toils: it sought to induce him to unite his destinies with those of Austria, with the hope of acting the mediator. Such a step was directly opposed to our treaties, and to the statutes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and consequently could not be approved by the principles of morality. A model of virtue and loyalty, this prince at first resisted all these insinuations; but finally, drawn on by the hope of contributing to the general pacification, and of saving his country from the disasters of war, he declared that he would follow in every respect the course which Austria might pursue. Such was the condition of affairs in Germany when I was prepared to resume the contest and to take the initiative in the new campaign.

#### CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA.

—In the meantime Austria continued to speak of peace, reproving the defection of others, and protesting her fidelity to the alliance of 1812.

If she negotiated with Russia and England, it was, she said, only for us and with us; and she communicated to me all her correspondence. Nevertheless, the news from Vienna was very different from these fine official protestations. Public opinion at Vienna was the same as at Berlin. All official notes were of the most pacific character; but confidential overtures indicated other and different intentions. They manifested the wish that I should renounce the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, and also my projects respecting the duchy of Warsaw. But the cabinet did not present these as its own conditions, but as those expected by the Allies. It protested its own disinterestedness,

but let me understand that it expected the restitution of Illyria. I determined a little late, and perhaps too indirectly, to sound the views of the Austrian cabinet, by authorizing the Duke of Bassano to hold out the offer of Silesia; so as to see whether Austria placed her hopes elsewhere than in the results of a co-operation with France. Silesia had been taken from Austria by Frederick the Great; it was a valuable province; and as Prussia had declared against me, it would be necessary to punish her severely. But instead of being satisfied with this acquisition, the Cabinet of Vienna manifested the most opposite views by laying down as a principle that Prussia was to be reconstructed in proportions even greater than in 1806.

As the correspondence of my ambassador at Vienna, Count Otto, seemed too much in the views of Austria, I thought it prudent to replace him with M. Narbonne, a shrewd courtier, capable of penetrating the mysteries of that cabinet. His reports soon confirmed my fears. The Prince of Schwartzberg, announced for more than a month, did not arrive; and it was evident that Austria merely wished to gain time to increase her forces. She expended her paper-money, regardless of the depreciation produced by large issues, provided it furnished her with battalions.

As I was about to join my army, I took leave of Bubna, charging him with a letter to my father-in-law, in which I repeated what I desired to do for peace, and the means which seemed best calculated to lead to negotiations. My position was so delicate that I could not do anything abruptly. If I provoked Austria to formal declarations which proved unfavorable, I would thus accelerate the crisis which I wished to avoid. I was preparing to strike decisive blows in Germany, blows calculated to secure her fidelity, and procure me an honorable peace, independent of her arbitration.

Schwartzberg finally reached Paris just as I was leaving to join my army. I merely asked him if the Austrian contingent was still at my disposal. On receiving his affirmative answer, I left him to complete his negotiations with the Duke of Bassano. My minister used all his diplomacy to draw the Austrian negotiator further towards an alliance than the other desired. But the object on both sides was to gain time, and all the negotiations of Bubna, Floret, and Schwartzberg tended only to that object. And so long as Austria remained in her present line of conduct, it was not good policy for us to push matters, for I felt assured that a victory in Saxony would retain her under my flag.

**AUSTRIA DECLARES AN ARMED MEDIATION.**—The negotiations of Narbonne at Vienna finally drew from Austria the avowal that she intended to offer an armed mediation—that



is, to make herself the arbiter of peace. Schwartzenberg soon received new instructions. In a note as long as it was obscure, in which he spoke with affectation of the *Jacobin ferment which threatened the stability of thrones, of the disinterestedness of the Emperor for his monarchy, and of his solicitude for the general repose*, he let it be understood that, in order to obtain new sacrifices from the Austrian people, his master could not announce a formal intention of uniting his forces to those of France, but that he wished merely to show himself in arms in order to obtain peace. But, notwithstanding its general ambiguity, this note contained some protestations very amicable for France; for it *avowed the partiality of Austria for us, as we sincerely desired peace.* Quieted by these new assurances, we thought that Austria really intended to act the part of a friend, when the fit occasion should arrive. However, Metternich, and even the Emperor himself, in their conferences with Narbonne, advanced a little farther. They spoke already of the independence of the Confederation of the Rhine, the dissolution of the duchy of Warsaw, the restitution of Illyria, the reconstruction of the Prussian monarchy, as conditions which would be demanded by our enemies, and which it would be difficult for a mediator to refuse. This new state of things gave rise to two questions: Would Austria break our alliance, by declaring herself the mediating power? Would she leave me her contingent? On the first point Metternich did not fail to make the most positive assurances: "The alliance," he said, "continued; Austria would instantly contract it, if it did not already exist; she would persist in it; and would change in no respect its conditions. This alliance was based on interests too identical, too inherent in the nature of things, and too invariable in their character to be influenced by either reverses or successes." With respect to the contingent, he said that, in order to preserve the appearance of impartiality, the Cabinet of Vienna could take no active part in the war; it was enough for her to be secretly inclined in our favor, without having its mediation rejected by my enemies on account of her furnishing me with troops.

NAPOLEON RETURNS TO HIS ARMY.—During these discussions, I left Paris to rejoin my army. As my enemies were not yet prepared, I wished to profit by the occasion to resume the offensive and recover our glory. The Russian army which had pursued us to the Elbe was broken by the winter campaign. Having left some corps before Dantzic, Thorn, Modlin, Zamosc, and Custrin, and another to occupy Poland and follow Poniatowski, it now scarcely numbered sixty thousand combatants. For the moment, Prussia could not unite with it more than fifty thousand combatants. By uniting the cohorts of the first *ban*,

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which I had very fortunately organized in 1812 and amalgamating a levy of one hundred and twenty thousand conscripts with the remains of my army which had returned from Russia, we could count on two hundred and fifty thousand men, and concentrate them on the enemy before he could collect an equal number. I resolved to profit by this circumstance. My enemies have not failed to attribute this to personal ambition, and to accuse me of having lost this opportunity to restore the peace of the continent! Was it more proper for me to now submit to the yoke and implore the good-will and support of the Cabinet of Vienna, or to first beat the enemy while still inferior in numbers, to finish my armaments, and then subscribe to an honorable and advantageous peace?

**HE ADVANCES ON THE SAALE.**—On the twenty-fifth of April, I arrived at Erfurth, where I found my guard reorganized. Ney's corps assembled at Weimar numbered forty-eight thousand; Marmont's corps at Gotha numbered not less than twenty-five thousand; Bertrand, who commanded about the same number from Italy and Würtemberg, was already at Saalfeld, and Oudinot with as many at Coburg. I was thus again at the head of one hundred and forty thousand men, exclusive of the Viceroy, who, with forty thousand combatants, was under the cannon of Magdeburg, and of Belluno and Davoust on the Lower Elbe. Independently of these forces, Augereau was directed to organize at Würzburg a small army for the three-fold purpose of imposing on Austria, observing Bohemia, and maintaining Bavaria. I had as yet only eight or ten thousand cavalry; those who had escaped on foot from Russia were waiting in different parts of Germany for their horses. But this arm is far less important in gaining a victory than in deriving the full advantage from success. I had sufficient means for opening the campaign, especially as the chances were in our favor, and as the enemy exposed himself to our blows. I, therefore, did not hesitate.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.**—My army was at this time organized into twelve corps:

1st corps,	<i>Vandamme</i> .....	3 divisions.
2d "	<i>Belluno</i> .....	2 "
3d "	<i>Ney</i> .....	5 "
4th "	<i>Bertrand</i> .....	3 "
5th "	<i>Lauriston</i> .....	3 "
6th "	<i>Marmont</i> .....	3 "
7th "	<i>The Saxons, at Torgau.</i>	
8th "	<i>Poniatowski.</i>	
9th "	<i>The Bavarians.</i>	
10th "	<i>Rapp, at Dantzic.</i>	
11th "	<i>Macdonald</i> .....	3 divisions.
12th "	<i>Oudinot</i> .....	3 "

Augereau's army at Würzburg was composed of five divisions of infantry; its battalions arrived in June and July.

LEVY IN MASS IN PRUSSIA.—No sooner had the King of Prussia pronounced for the enemy than his council took every measure in their power to incite the people of Germany against us. The ordinances of April 21st, directing a *levée en masse*, promised to make every city a Saragossa, and every village a funeral pile. The good Saxons, Silesians, and Westphalians were to transform themselves into ferocious Aragonese: liberty could not be too dearly purchased! They go still farther, and proclaim *equality*! Old honors have been effaced by the disgrace of bearing a foreign yoke! The new genealogical trees are to date from 1812, and no one is to hold public office who has not served one year in the War of Independence! It must be confessed that these measures were not calculated to favor the permanent interests of sovereigns, however advantageously they might assist the accomplishment of their temporary objects. A civilized people is not easily satisfied with the mere hopes of an ideal liberty. The desire to crush my power made the sovereigns forget the danger of exciting popular passions.

MOVEMENTS OF THE ALLIES.—But as these proclamations produced little effect, without the support of the bayonet, the Allies resolved to pass the Elbe, and spread, with impetuosity, over the country between that river and the Rhine. Tattenborn entered Hamburg at the head of a few hundred Cossacks, without opposition; Westphalia and Hanover, more exasperated than in 1809, were only waiting for the signal to rise; and Denmark, on being summoned, declared against us. It was important to prevent the fatal consequences of these <sup>ir</sup>ruptions. Pushing rapidly on Hamburg the corps of Vandamme, formed of the garisons and *dépôts* of the Lower Rhine, I sent Marshal Davoust to command in that important part of the theater of war.

POSITION OF THEIR ARMIES.—On the other side, the army of Wittgenstein marched on the Saale with the same assurance which had proved so fatal to the Prussians in 1806. This general had just been placed, by the sovereigns, at the head of the combined forces. He was with thirty thousand men between Dessau and Halle. Blücher had collected twenty-five thousand men at Altenburg; and Miloradovitsch was at Chemnitz, with fifteen thousand Russians. The Russo-Prussian reserves were advancing from Dresden on Leipsic; the corps of Bülow and Woronzof were masking Magdeburg, and covering Berlin against the Viceroy. The divergent direction of all these corps showed that the enemy arranged his operations more with reference to giving force to his proclamations than to opposing a formidable army.

**NAPOLEON EFFECTS HIS JUNCTION WITH THE VICEROY.**—As it was important to effect a junction with the Viceroy, with the least possible delay, I resolved to advance immediately. I arrived at Naumburg on the twenty-eighth of April, and the next day Ney entered Weissenfels, after driving back the Russian vanguard of cavalry; Marmont reached Kösen, and Bertrand, Dornburg; Oudinot had not yet passed Saalfeld; but the Viceroy, after having ascended the left bank of the Saale, arrived at Merseburg. Count Wittgenstein marched parallel with Eugene on the right of the Saale and the Elster, and concentrated his forces on Leipsic; Blücher filed by his right, and marched on Borna; while Miloradowitsch and the reserves advanced in the direction of Altenburg.

**NAPOLEON DIRECTS HIS FORCES ON LEIPSIC.**—Having secured my junction with the Viceroy, I resolved to march on Leipsic, with the intention of attacking the enemy wherever I should meet him. My affairs required a victory, and my superiority in numbers now gave me promise of success. On the first of May the Russian advance guard, which we encountered at the defile at Ripach between Weissenfels and Lutzen, was thrown on Pégau, after an engagement which, except for the death of Marshal Bessières, was unimportant. This veteran and faithful general was here killed by a musket-ball: a sad end for an old warrior who had survived so many battles, to die in a petty skirmish of a rear guard.\*

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\*Thiers thus describes Bessières' death:

"At daybreak Marshal Ney's troops advanced upon the vast Lutzen plain, formed in squares, which were accompanied by artillery, and preceded by numerous tirailleurs. Arriving at the brink of a long and deep ravine, called the Ripach Ravine, from the name of a village which it traversed, the squares broke for the purpose of passing it, and when it had been crossed, re-formed and continued their advance. The division Souham held the foremost place, marching with an excellent bearing, and had just deployed, when Marshal Bessières, who usually commanded the cavalry of the guard, and should not consequently have been where he now was, advanced a little to the right, for the purpose of being better able to observe the enemy's movements, and suddenly fell dead, struck by a bullet in the breast.

"It was the second time, alas! that this brave man had been hit on the battle-field by Napoleon's side, the first time being at Wagram, where a bullet had struck him, but only caused a contusion. His death on the present occasion caused, in spite of the general confidence, a painful foreboding in more than one heart.

"He was a valiant man, of a lively Gascon temperament, but possessed of a fine intellect, and of a courage which frequently led him to express to Napoleon useful truths both impressively and opportunely. Napoleon loved and esteemed him, and felt a sincere pang of sorrow at his loss; but then exclaiming, 'Death comes nigh us!' pushed forward to watch the march



My army was now in echelons from Naumburg to Leipsic. Lauriston's corps and the army of the Viceroy formed the head, between Leipsic and Marckranstädt; Eugene and the corps of Macdonald occupied the latter of these towns; my guards and head-quarters were established at Lutzen, which was covered on the side towards Pegau by Ney's corps; Marmont arrived at Poserna, and Berthier was in march for the same point; Oudinot, still further in rear, marched from Jena to Naumburg. On the morning of the second of May the Viceroy continued his movement on Leipsic. I wished to follow at his right on Marckranstädt. Impatient to learn whether the enemy would abandon to us the important strategic point of Leipsic, the center of all the great communications of northern Germany, I set out with my guard to ascertain whether any opposition would be made: the enemy, however, was preparing to surprise me on another side.

PROJECT OF THE ALLIES.—The Allies, recovering from the excessive confidence inspired by the reports of their couriers, now saw that mere demonstrations by the head of their columns were not sufficient to drive us from Germany. They heard with astonishment of my return on the Saale with a powerful army, but, considering the reports of my strength to be exaggerated, they still hoped, by concentrating their own masses, to beat in detail our hastily levied conscripts, who were now assembling by twenty different routes; it was not supposed that these forces could contend with the old bands of Russia and the troops of the *élite* which Prussia had reorganized within the last six years. Supposing the corps of Ney, Marmont, and Mortier much less than they really were, the Allies resolved to attack them on the march, so as to prevent their junction. This project seemed the more admissible for the Allies, as they hoped by it to draw over to their side Saxony, which was disposed to abandon our cause. The King, it is true, retired at the approach of the Allies, but the people, acted on by the emissaries of the Tugendbund, were uncertain, and might carry over their sovereign in spite of himself. Already a tacit convention had neutralized the Saxon corps of

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of his young soldiers, and experienced in the spectacle a satisfaction equal to that felt by Ney two days before; beholding his conscripts repelling again and again the repeated charges of the enemy's cavalry, and strewing the ground before them with three or four hundred killed and wounded foemen.

"The troops halted at Lutzen, and Napoleon went to visit the monument of Gustavus Adolphus, who had been struck down on this plain, as Epaminondas, in the bosom of victory, and gave orders that a monument should also be raised to the memory of the Duke of Istria, killed on the same ground."

General Thielmann under the cannon of Torgau, and the enemy was negotiating with Prague to obtain its adhesion to the coalition.

Stimulated by these powerful motives, and deceived respecting the numbers of our troops, the allied sovereigns resolved to take the offensive and maneuver against my extreme right. With this object Wittgenstein had left only a corps of five thousand men to defend Leipsic, and had united between Zwenkau and Pegau a mass of seventy thousand men, composed of his own army, the corps of Blücher, and the allied reserves. With this mass he resolved to pass the Elster and march on Lutzen, so as to assail in rear my army, which he supposed to have filed on Leipsic. Miloradowitsch directed himself on Zeitz to cover the flank and communications of the Allies during their operations beyond the Elster.

**BATTLE OF LUTZEN.**—It was extremely important for us to sustain ourselves at Lutzen, as the possession of that place by the enemy would enable him to cut my army in two. Wittgenstein debouched on that city on the morning of the second, but instead of finding here my extreme right, he encountered the center of my army. This maneuver of the enemy, although it failed in its object, was certainly worthy of praise; so little was I expecting to be assailed on this side that I had taken with me Marshal Ney, leaving his corps without its chief. It would be difficult to say what would have been the result if the enemy had made good use of his twelve thousand superb cavalry, for Ney had not six hundred horse with which to oppose them. While Wintzingerode paraded his squadrons before Tournau, and the Prussians were losing time in forming, Ney's troops ran to arms; the four French divisions were in échelons in the villages which covered Lutzen on the side toward Pegau and Zwenkau. The fifth, composed of German troops, covered their left. The first division, composed entirely of conscripts, eighteen years of age, was attacked at eleven o'clock, and, seconded by the division of Girard, sustained the combat with glory. The troops being arranged in echelons, the attacks were successive and partial, which was favorable for our new troops. The Prussian brigades of Klux and Ziethen advanced on Görschen; that of Röder served as a reserve; Dolfs' cavalry was directed on Starsiedel, with the hope of turning the columns of Ney. York's corps and the Russian division of Berg formed the second line. The Russian corps of Prince Eugene of Würtemberg was in column of march to the left, where the cavalry of Wintzingerode deployed. There was no unity of action in this first effort; Souham and Girard, after having disputed Gross-Görschen and Rahna, were forced to fall back on Klein-Görschen, which Souham also abandoned.

At the sound of this violent attack, Ney left me to fly to the head of his troops; I also returned to Lutzen with my guard, and directed Eugene to renounce his march on Leipsic and join the contest. Officers were also sent to Marmont, directing him to hasten into line on the right of Ney, and to Bertrand, directing him to fall upon the enemy's flank.

Ney, having reached his corps about noon, assembled his divisions, and threw those of Souham, Girard, and Brenier on Klein-Görschen, thus dislodging the Prussians. This vigorous blow retards the operations of the Allies and gives time for the corps of the right and left to come to the assistance of the center. Marmont, having reached the field during this interval, prolongs the right of the army which the enemy sought to gain, and debouches toward Starsiedel, without troubling himself with the numerous cavalry which Wintzingerode deployed in the fields of Kobson, or that of the Prussians which afterward formed between this first village and Rahna. These squadrons finally advanced to the charge; the divisions of Compans and Bonnet, formed in squares, repel them; they several times renew the attack, but our brave regiments oppose an impenetrable front; a single battalion is broken by the Russian cavalry.

But this first reinforcement has not yet restored the equilibrium in our favor; for Blücher has at the same time ordered York's corps and the Russian division of Berg to enter into the first line and retake the villages of Rahna and Klein-Görschen, which Ney had just gained. The shock now becomes more general and more serious. Ney is forced to fall back behind Kaya, which he defends with all the vigor of which he is capable. The enemy throws himself with impetuosity on this village; twice is Ney driven out; and a final effort of Berg's division secures its momentary possession to the Allies. Our young soldiers surpass my hopes in this obstinate contest; but, more brave than experienced, they suffer severe losses. I arrive at this point at the moment when Ney is preparing a final effort to regain Kaya with the division of Ricard. I order Count Lobau to put himself at the head of this troop, while the marshal conducted his other divisions to assist him. This movement is executed with the rapidity of lightning; Count Lobau penetrates into Kaya with that steadiness for which he is so distinguished; he is warmly supported by the divisions of Brenier, Girard, and the remains of Souham, which Ney leads back to victory. A terrible combat then takes place between this village and Klein-Görschen, where the enemy debouched with all his united means. Girard and Brenier fall like heroes at the head of their young soldiers, whom they persist in leading to the fight, although severely wounded.



Girard cries to his men: "*Soldiers, this is the day for France; let us avenge the defeat of Moscow or die!*"

The enemy now felt that victory would escape him unless Blücher was more effectively sustained. For this purpose Wittgenstein moved, from the left to the right, the corps of Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, which had at first marched in the opposite direction. One of these divisions debouched from Eisdorf beyond the Flosgraben, and pushed the division of Marchand; the other reinforced Berg at Klein-Görschen; this village was again carried and Ney for a third time driven behind Kaya. The arrival of the grenadier corps and the Russian guard, which the allied sovereigns were awaiting with impatience, might decide the battle against us. The moment was decisive; I threw on Kaya the two divisions of the Young Guard, which returned and debouched from Lutzen, followed by the Old Guard and all my cavalry. The enemy was driven back to Klein-Görschen.

Here a new scene is developed. Seeing the inutility of his efforts against the center, Wittgenstein prepared to strike on the left of Ney; the corps of grenadiers under the orders of Konownitzin had just arrived on the field of battle; its two divisions debouched by Eisdorf and Gross-Görschen. This movement, which might have been decisive if all my troops had been engaged, did not have the success which the Allies expected; I had taken measures to provide for this event. Eugene had received the orders of which I have already spoken; but seeing Lauriston's columns engaged in the *faubourgs* of Leipsic, and thinking he ought to leave them to occupy that city, he hastened to Macdonald's corps and directed it on Kitzen. The arrival of these three fresh divisions decided everything; the victory was no longer doubtful. Konownitzin and the Prince of Würtemberg vainly sought to defend the village of Eisdorf; being attacked on all sides, they were forced to abandon it. The Allies now saw their right turned, while Ney and Marmont pressed them in front towards Görschen, and Lauriston, master of Leipsic, prepared to push Kleist in the direction of Connewitz, and Bertrand, debouching at the opposite extremity at the head of Morand's division, turned the left of the Allies by Gosserau and Pobles. Seeing the danger of their position, they now abandoned the four burnt villages and fell back behind Gross-Görschen, where the arrival of the Russian guards enabled them to maintain their position.

Darkness even did not terminate the battle. The scouts of Marmont advanced in the dusk beyond Starsiedel, and gave the alarm to the Prussians. A night combat ensued, in which the enemy was at first repulsed. Blücher then put himself at the

head of his reserve of cavalry and executed a rash charge. Some squadrons penetrated between our lines, and our troops, being unprepared for the attack, fell into disorder; this was still further increased by a *hourra* of the Cossacks on the ambulances in rear of our line. But this attack was attended by no serious consequences; our troops soon recovered from their surprise and made Blücher pay dearly for his isolated and ill-conceived enterprise; his squadrons did not regain their line without considerable loss.

REMARKS ON THIS BATTLE.—The day had been bloody without being decisive. Ney's corps alone had lost twelve thousand men and five hundred officers *hors-de-combat*, and we had gained neither trophies nor results. The number of men wounded in the hand was so great that our young conscripts were accused of self-mutilation in order to avoid the fatigues of the war. Perhaps this resulted from their being unaccustomed to the use of weapons. The accusation was, nevertheless, of sufficient importance to merit an examination.

This battle, having been unforeseen, had produced no important results. I therefore determined to renew it the next day in order to complete the defeat of the enemy, if he committed the fault of remaining on the left of the Elster. To obtain still greater results, I ordered Lauriston, who had entered Leipsic during the battle and driven Kleist on Wurtzen, to leave only a detachment in the city, and with the mass of his corps to march along the left bank of the Elster, so as to threaten the enemy's bridges.

But Wittgenstein, having already perceived the danger of his position, profited by the night to recross the river. The following day the allied army continued its retreat in two columns on Dresden and Meissen; Wittgenstein, with the Russians, took the road to Altenburg and Chemnitz; I caused him to be pursued by Bertrand and Oudinot. Blücher took the direct road to Colditz; I myself followed him with Marmont, the guard, and the corps of Macdonald, commanded by the Viceroy. Ney, with the third and fifth corps, took the road to Leipsic on Torgau, from which place he was to act in concert with the Duke of Belluno, who was leading the second corps from Magdeburg on Wittenberg. Davoust and Vandamme, at the head of the first corps, again entered Hamburg.

PURSUIT OF THE ALLIES ON DRESDEN.—Although the pursuit was made with activity, yet, for want of cavalry, we obtained no results. We overtook the rear guard of Blücher on the Mulde, where it was much cut up; but the fresh corps of Miloradowitsch appeared to cover the retreat, and conducted itself with that cool bravery and steadiness so characteristic of the



Russian army, and which results from their fine military institutions and severe discipline. The Viceroy engaged in three successive combats, at Elsdorf, Nossen, and Wilsdruf; he pushed the enemy, but did not succeed in cutting him up. The Russians recrossed the Elbe on the seventh, at Dresden, and the Prussians at Meissen. Finally, on the eighth of May, we arrived before the capital of Saxony. Miloradowitsch blew up the bridges, burned the magazines, and prepared to defend the new town, which is situated on the right of the Elbe. I made a reconnoissance of the advantageous heights of Priesnitz; a bridge of boats was thrown across here under the protection of eighty pieces of the guard, and two battalions of voltigeurs crossed on rafts. As at Essling, a sudden rise of the Elbe threatened the security of our bridges; but the army had not yet passed; and even if they had commenced the passage, the enemy would not have been prepared to attack us. Our troops, in their impatience, used long beams to build over the two arches of the stone bridge which had been blown up by the enemy; finally, the approach of night decided the Russian general to begin his retreat. Dresden was now in our possession, and its magistrates came out to meet me. I reproached them for the conduct of the inhabitants in Eugene's retreat, and on the approach of the enemies of their sovereign, and pardoned them only on condition of their sending a deputation to their king to solicit his return.

The information which reached me after I entered this capital was far from agreeable. On the one hand, I learned that General Thielmann, the governor of Torgau, had been several times at the head-quarters of the Allies, and Ney informed me that he refused to open the gates of the place to my troops. This revelation indicated the use which Austria expected to make of her influence and her mediation; this state of uncertainty could not continue. I therefore immediately detached my *aid-de-camp*, Montesquiou, to Prague; he was the bearer of dispatches demanding to know of the King of Saxony if he was still a member of the Confederation of the Rhine, and what treaty had released him from the engagements which he had contracted. This brave and loyal prince answered by coming himself to Dresden on the twelfth of May, having previously forwarded a formal order to receive us at Torgau. Thielmann, being enraged against us, abandoned his sovereign and passed into the service of Russia. The Saxon troops, again placed under the orders of Reynier, formed, with Durette's division, the seventh *corps-d'armée*. Nevertheless, this difficulty lost us five days in the pursuit, and Ney did not cross the Elbe at Torgau till the thirteenth.

EUGENE SENT TO ORGANIZE AN ARMY IN ITALY.—  
The political horizon began to lower in the direction of Austria.



I therefore resolved to send Eugene into Italy, where he might be more useful to me in case of a rupture. The most pressing orders had been sent there to replace the French troops which had been withdrawn, and to form again the Italian army, which the cruel losses in Catalonia and Russia had almost destroyed.

THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BASSANO AND SCHWARTZENBERG.—While I was thus marching to new victories, I had left the Duke of Bassano and Schwartzberg at Paris to discuss our reciprocal interests. Although my minister had the same confidence as myself in the success of our military operations, and although he would have preferred to discuss directly the question of peace, yet, under the circumstances, his mission was naturally limited to ascertaining the intentions of Schwartzberg, without making any offers himself, at least not until after the first events of the campaign. It was important to ascertain what were the intentions of my enemies, and what the limits assigned by Austria to the sacrifices required of me; and at the same time to avoid any formal declaration which might be immediately changed by the results of a victory. As Bassano and Schwartzberg had been negotiators of my family alliance, an intimacy had sprung up between them favorable for a frank explanation. In one of their conferences, in which Bassano sought to ascertain the influence which my marriage might exercise on Austria, Schwartzberg replied that *policy had concluded that marriage, and that policy might break it again*. It was evident from this that the considerations of kindred were, in Austria, to be made subordinate to the interests of the cabinet. Bassano pretended not to notice the remark, and turned the conversation to matters of less importance. He immediately informed me of the fears which this conference had excited in his mind, concealing, however, the threatening words, lest the anger excited in me by them might interfere with the negotiations. "It is necessary," he wrote to me, "to hasten the treaty with Austria, and to profit by her present hesitation to draw more closely the ties of blood and policy which now connect the two powers." A few days afterwards, Prince Schwartzberg communicated dispatches from London, in which Baron Weissenberg announced the ill-success of his overtures. "Austria," said he, "is very far from submitting the peace of the cabinet to the caprices of England. The zeal of the Cabinet of Vienna will not diminish, and she will soon take a very peremptory step towards the allied powers to bring them to final explanations." The mission of Prince Schwartzberg closed with these new assurances. He had just left Paris when the renewal of hostilities was followed by the battle of Lutzen.

NEW MISSION OF BUBNA.—On arriving at Dresden, I learned the departure of Schwartzemberg, and the opinions formed from these conferences by my minister respecting the question of a general peace. Great events were now to be decided: it was natural to hope that my victory at Lutzen would reestablish my relations with Austria. Unfortunately, the results of this victory were not sufficiently decisive to influence Austria as was desired. Metternich, informed at the same time of the too frank explanations of Schwartzemberg and of my victory at Lutzen, felt that he was about to be compromised; he trembled lest I might profit by the occasion to have a reconciliation with Russia. The consequences might thus become still more important than the battle itself. It was not impossible but that I might have a frank understanding with the Emperor Alexander, as at Tilsit; I flattered myself that I would have found him disposed to a reconciliation, if I sacrificed to him the duchy of Warsaw. The wily diplomat hastened to send to him Count Stadion, and to dispatch to me by Bubna a letter from my father-in-law. The same protestations as before were here renewed, in nearly the same terms. "*The mediator,*" wrote the Emperor, "*is your sincere friend; it is important to place on an immovable basis your dynasty, whose existence is now inseparably connected with that of his own.*"

In the absence of the Duke of Bassano, I directed Caulaincourt to confer with this envoy, whose language differed a little from that of his sovereign. Bubna confessed that the alliance was suspended, at least in some of its articles, but when pressed to specify what these were, he pretended that on this point he had no precise instructions. There was every reason to believe that the first of the articles referred to was that of the guarantee of the territories. In that case it was important to know what changes were expected in the state of things guaranteed in March, 1812. Although Bubna had no instructions on this subject, it was understood from him that Austria hoped for Illyria, a part of Galicia, and the Innviertel; and that the Allies required the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine and of the duchy of Warsaw. These were rather given to be understood than positively asserted; they, however, were only a repetition of what had already been said to M. de Narbonne at Vienna. Austria proposed a congress for explaining herself more categorically. Coming to me, as they did, immediately after my brilliant victory, these ambiguous and exacting propositions wounded my feelings, and in a moment of displeasure I remarked that "*if Bubna annoyed me with such pretensions, I would treat at any price with Russia, and then have an explanation with these Austrians!*" These words were foolishly repeated by my imprudent admirers, and, coming



to the ears of my father-in-law, were calculated to prejudice him against me, and to favor the inclinations of his cabinet in favor of my enemies.

**PROPOSITION FOR A CONGRESS ACCEPTED.**—The reports which reached me from all directions were of a nature to destroy my last illusions. With an extraordinary refinement of address, Austria sought to paralyze my Allies. “She appeared in Denmark, in Saxony, in Bavaria, in Würtemberg, and even at Naples, as a friend of France, who only wished for peace; *she negotiated with them to discontinue their military preparations, as being both ruinous and useless, for, if I consented to treat, she was ready to put one hundred and fifty thousand men in the scales in my favor!*”

During the few days which had just passed, events were pressing beyond the Elbe, where the enemy were concentrating at two days’ march from my head-quarters; I left for Bautzen to cut the knot so artistically formed by Austria. However, without rejecting anything, I answered Bubna: “Austria can, if she pleases, renounce the alliance; I shall not be wounded by it; I fear nothing so much as half-way measures, the common resource of irresolution and weakness; I accept the proposition to assemble a congress at Prague, and if the other powers accept it, I am willing to facilitate a treaty of peace by concluding an armistice.”

Bubna transmitted my proposition directly to Stadion at the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns, and, in his letter, *he did justice to the pacific dispositions which I manifested, notwithstanding my victorious attitude.* On my part, I wrote to my father-in-law to renew the sentiments which I felt towards him; but I declared *that, as a good Frenchman, I would rather die, arms in hand, than to subscribe to conditions presented at the point of the sword. I was ready to negotiate, but not to receive the law.*

**CAULAINCOURT’S PROPOSITIONS TO RUSSIA.**—Bubna left for Vienna with these assurances. On my side, I wished to profit by the occasion which the proposition of an armistice presented, to send Caulaincourt to the Emperor Alexander; he received the order on the eighteenth of May. I preferred to give the advantages of peace to a noble and chivalric enemy, rather than to these traders in mediation, who subjected everything to selfish calculation, and coolly counted the price of defection. The instructions which I gave to Caulaincourt, dated at Hartha, May 19th, sufficiently attest the sentiment which animated me. They contain these words:

“His Majesty does not reject the possibility that new circumstances and new combinations may induce him to return to his system with Austria; but in the present situation of affairs, such is not his thought. His intention is to negotiate with Russia



a peace which may be glorious for that power, and which may pay Austria the price of her bad faith and the political fault she has committed against the alliance of 1812, by drawing together Russia and France. If the convention made for Poland, after the peace of Vienna, had been accepted, with some changes in the terms, there would have been no bitterness and no war. The Emperor Alexander will readily reply to these arguments by referring to the radical vice of the existence of the duchy of Warsaw in respect to Russia; which will naturally lead, after much mystery and reserve, to the following proposition, of which the secret will be previously asked of him, in case he should not accept it:

“To limit the existence of the Confederation of the Rhine to the Oder, drawing a line from Glogau to Bohemia: this will give to Westphalia an increase of one million five hundred thousand souls. Prussia will have in compensation the duchy of Warsaw with the territory of Dantzic, except a small *arrondissement* for Oldenburg; Prussia will then acquire four or five millions of inhabitants, Dantzic, Thorn, Modlin, and all the Vistula. She will become complete, and will form, for Russia, a new frontier, which will cover her and form for her a great security, inasmuch as Prussia, having her capital near to her, will be in her system. France and Russia will be separated by three hundred leagues, with a respectable power between them. The King of Prussia, having his capital at Warsaw, Königsberg, or Dantzic, will be in the Russian system. Thus France and Russia, having nothing more to fear from each other, will easily place themselves in such relations as naturally to produce a close alliance.”

It was also stated in these instructions:

“It is useless to revert to the stipulations of Tilsit, which were directed against England only; whereas now the question is for a general peace, and the Emperor Alexander will sooner or later feel the necessity of adopting a proper system for causing his flag to be respected.”

NAPOLEON GOES TO BAUTZEN.—Caulaincourt repaired to the advanced posts and waited, the nineteenth, for an answer to his request for a safeguard to the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns. In the meantime I did not sleep on vague hopes; military operations were continued; the moment of an inevitable and decisive shock was approaching. My masses were in motion; it was necessary that the armistice should be agreed upon on the twentieth, or that the arena should be left open for new combats;

to give more weight to my propositions, I flew to the point where my glory and interest called me.

After the passage of the Elbe, there was some uncertainty about the enemy's movements: the public rumor announced that the Prussian army had descended the river to join Bülow's corps, which covered Berlin, thus separating from the Russians, who were said to be fortifying themselves at Bautzen. The fact was that the whole allied army was occupying the superb positions around that city, when the arrival of some reinforcements, among which were two divisions of grenadiers which returned from the siege of Thorn, under the orders of Barclay de Tolly, seemed to encourage them to receive a new battle. I caused them to be observed by the corps of Bertrand, Marmont, Macdonald, and Oudinot. I was expecting, on my side, some fine divisions of cuirassiers and light cavalry, reorganized by Latour-Maubourg, and two divisions of the Young Guard. When these troops had joined me, I went, on the twentieth, before Bautzen. No reply to Caulaincourt's application for a safeguard had reached the out-posts; it was therefore necessary to resort to the chance of arms, which of all others I feared the least.

**FORTIFIED POSITION OF THE ALLIES.**—The Allies had profited by the ten days' repose to surround their camp with field-works. Their principal position was located on the famous mountains of Klein-Bautzen and Kreckwitz, which had served as a refuge for Frederick the Great after the surprise of Hochkirch, and where, by the strength of his position, he had braved the superior army of the victorious Daun. It is true that the Austrian marshal came from the direction of Görlitz, and we came from the opposite direction by Dresden. The left, supported on the great chain of the mountains of Bohemia, was but little exposed to an attack; the right, established behind the lakes of Malchwitz, was difficult of access; but by turning it at a greater distance toward Bergern, it might be taken in reverse. However strong it might be on the front and flanks, this position offered two grave inconveniences: it had only one line of retreat by Würschen and Hochkirch, on Reichenbach; and as its line of battle rested on the neutral frontier toward its extreme left, it was clear that we should cut off the enemy's retreat, if we could gain the least success at the opposite wing. The army of Wittgenstein was charged with the defense of the left, from Baschutz and Nieder-Kayna to the mountains near Kunitz; that of Blücher held the right, from Malchwitz to Kreckwitz; the center and reserves were between Litten and Baschutz.

**NEY'S MARCH TO TURN THEIR POSITION.**—It will be remembered that Ney had debouched from Torgau with the ten infantry divisions of the third, fifth, and seventh corps. If the report of the separation of the enemy's armies were confirmed,

I should have left him in the interval between them, and should have assisted him by a movement to the left, throwing myself on the right of the Russians. In every state of the case, I thought it best to place under the orders of this marshal the second corps commanded by Belluno, and to prescribe to him a demonstration on Berlin, causing him to be sustained by the corps of Reynier, who would advance toward Dahme (Sayda). The marshal was to remain with the third corps on the great road from Luckau to Lubben, and to detach only Lauriston from his right on Hoyerswerda, in order to reinforce me toward Bautzen. Ney, attaching too much importance to the movement on Berlin, was about to go there in person; he was, fortunately, prevented from doing so by the news received from Lubben, which announced the arrival of Barclay in the direction of Bautzen. As soon as I learned the concentration of the enemy's forces on this last point, I wished to prolong Ney toward Kalhau and Spremberg. This movement was good to force the enemy from his position without battle, but it was not sufficiently concentric to gain great results. Ney fell back, on the seventeenth, from Kalhau on Senftenberg; he was advised to direct Belluno and Sébastiani on Spremberg, to complete the maneuver for seizing the only line of retreat of the Allies. This movement was not executed, either because Ney feared to isolate this corps too much or that Belluno would march too slowly to arrive in time.

The conqueror of Elchingen then advanced in procession, from the eighteenth, with the third corps in the woods of Senftenberg, preceded by Lauriston, and followed by Reynier and Belluno. Our communications had been troubled by the partisans of Lutzow; many of my orders had been intercepted. Duplicates were sent by messengers, to direct a movement which he had been making for two days.

COMBATS OF WEISSIG AND KÖNIGSWARTHA.—The ground between the Spree and the Schwarz-Elster is cut up by great marshy forests; it is a turf-bog, where it is not possible to travel in the autumn or spring except by two narrow roads. Lauriston, detached after the passage of Torgau, had marched, with slow and measured steps, by Dobrilugk; his baggage obstructed the roads. Ney arrived, on the nineteenth, at the middle of his columns at Hoyerswerda, and directed them on Weissig to flank his march, and open the road of Königswartha, which he had followed with the third and seventh corps. At the report of his approach, the Allies, ignorant of his force and thinking, undoubtedly, that they had to deal only with the corps of Lauriston, conceived the project of fighting him separately, and for that



purpose detached against him General Barclay with his corps and that of York.

Informed, on my side, of the arrival of Ney at the environs of Hoyerswerda, I pushed, on the nineteenth, an Italian division of Bertrand's corps on Königswartha, in order to secure the junction. This incident gave place to a double engagement. Barclay, marching to Königswartha, fell upon the Italian division, which was not on its guard, although bivouacked in the middle of the woods; it was surprised and dispersed with the loss of all its cannon and two thousand prisoners. This took place within a league of Ney's advanced guard; Kellerman, who commanded this vanguard, hastened to save the wrecks of the Italians, and Barclay fell back at his approach. York had not been so fortunate; his column encountered the center corps of Lauriston, and was defeated with a loss of near five thousand Prussians. Maison's division gained the honors of the victory.

**NEY DEBOUCHES ON KLIX.**—These incidents had no influence on the great question; the loss was nearly equal on both sides, and the Allies rejoined their army. On the twentieth, Ney debouched at Königswartha on Leichnam and Klix. In order to give the Allies no opportunity to molest him, and at the same time to drive them from all the advanced positions which covered their camp, I ordered an attack upon the city of Bautzen and the heights occupied by the left of the Russians. Oudinot and Macdonald carried Dobershau and Strehla, then advanced to Binewitz and Auritz. My right and center passed the Spree, carried the city of Bautzen, and dislodged the enemy from the heights of Nieder-Kayna and Nadelwitz, which covered the front of the intrenched camp. My maneuver accomplished its object; the Allies reinforced Miloradowitsch in the mountains, and Ney concentrated the third and fifth corps behind Klix, ready to strike, the next day, a blow not inferior to either Ratisbon or Friedland in the importance of its results.

**BATTLE OF BAUTZEN.**—On the twenty-first of May, at the break of day, the battle was commenced throughout the whole line. We renewed against the left of the Allies the demonstration of the previous day. Oudinot wished to pierce by Kunitz on Rachlau; but Miloradowitsch drove him beyond Binowitz; I ordered Macdonald to sustain him; my center is deployed to impose on the enemy, but not to engage him. Ney crosses the Spree at Klix, places Maison's division as flankers behind the lake of Malschwitz, pushes the two other divisions of Lauriston on Gottamelde, and conducts the entire third corps on the wind-mill of Glein: *these forces afterwards direct their march on*

the spires of Hochkirch,\* and the seventh corps, which was expected about one o'clock, was to act as their reserve. Lauriston was to march by Baruth and Belgern in the same direction.

This maneuver was perfect and ought to have produced incalculable results; but several unfortunate circumstances marred its success. I had expected, rather late, to give Ney instructions as to the part which he was to play in this battle. But these instructions did not reach him in time, and were of rather too general a character. At eight o'clock in the morning I had written him a pencil note, giving him only a laconic order to be, by eleven o'clock, at the village of Preititz, and to attack the enemy's right. The officer who carried this note made a long *détour* by Klix in the hopes of finding the marshal there; at ten o'clock he arrived on the heights of Glein, which Ney had just taken possession of, much sooner than I had expected.

Thus far all was well; for the directions assigned to the columns of our left on the spires of Hochkirch accomplished the same object as my order to march on Preititz. It was now only ten o'clock: Preititz being only eight or nine hundred toises from the heights of Glein, Ney was unwilling to accelerate the attack by an hour. He waited for Reynier's corps, and lost three-quarters of an hour in forming his troops: he then only advanced Souham on Preititz, leaving his three other divisions at the distance of half a league, and the third at the distance of a league. Souham, penetrating the village without support at the moment when Blücher detached Kleist to reinforce Barclay, fell into the midst of these two corps, and suffered severely without producing any result: his division fell back in disorder. Ney caused him to be sustained by his batteries of reserve and the division of Delmas. Finally, near one o'clock, hearing the approach of Reynier's columns, which appeared in rear of Klix, the marshal sent three of his divisions on Preititz. Lauriston, who had been engaged towards Gottamelde at the head of two divisions of infantry against a feeble detachment of three thousand men under General Tschaplitz, affirmed that he was opposed by superior forces, and advanced with great caution over the ploughed ground that separated him from the village of Baruth. Men and precious time were thus lost by unreasonable delay. If Ney had operated with decision as at Friedland, he would have arrived about noon in rear of the enemy's line on the road to Wurschen, between Belgern and Purschwitz; and no one can calculate the immense results of a movement like that which Blücher executed against us at Waterloo.

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\*The credit of this maneuver is claimed by Jomini, who was at this time acting as Ney's chief of staff.



Success, however, was only postponed, for there was still time at one o'clock to obtain great results. But, unfortunately, Ney did not appreciate his position. As he penetrated Preititz, Blücher, who found himself assailed in rear, caused some battalions to descend from the heights of Klein-Bautzen with twenty pieces of artillery. These cannon, firing against the flank of the marshal's columns, made him forget the direction of Hochkirch, which he had indicated in the morning; and instead of debouching in front on the road to Würschen, he directed the head of his column to the right, and climbed the hills in rear of Klein-Bautzen, a position which, it is true, commanded the whole field of battle, but which deviated entirely from the maneuver which had been directed in order to get possession of the enemy's line of retreat. The appearance of twenty of the enemy's squadrons in the plain between Preititz and Purschwitz contributed to induce Ney to adopt this unfortunate movement. He had only six feeble squadrons of cavalry, and feared to expose himself in the plain while Blücher occupied the heights in his rear.

While this was passing at the decisive point of the battle, I brought into action the corps which were to assail the enemy's front. Oudinot, at the extreme right, continued to fight with ardor at the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, against Miloradowitsch and Prince Eugene of Würtemberg; Macdonald seconded him and maintained the combat toward Binowitz and Rabitz. Marmont and the Duke of Treviso held in check the enemy's center and reserves on the heights between Kreckwitz, Baschutz, and Jenkwitz. At twelve o'clock Ney's cannon announced that the moment had come for striking at the center. Soult, at the head of the corps of Bertrand, threw himself from Baschutz on the heights of Kreckwitz, where he assailed Blücher in front, at the moment when the latter had weakened his forces in order to defend Preititz. The Duke of Ragusa, placed before the Russian intrenchments of Baschutz, first battered them with his artillery and then prepared for an assault. My Young Guard and eight thousand horse of Latour-Maubourg waited in the ravine of Nadelwitz for me to give them the signal for victory. Blücher, reinforced by York, was threatening to repel Bertrand, when I threw this reserve of the *élite* on Litten. Blücher being thus turned on the left by Treviso and Latour-Maubourg, threatened in reverse by Ney, and assailed in front by Soult, saw the impossibility of resisting these concentric attacks and retired beyond Purschwitz, like a lion pursued by audacious hunters. Marmont then penetrated toward Baschutz, which the Russians could no longer defend without exposing themselves to be cut off.

Ney, advancing at the same instant from Preititz on the hills of Klein-Bautzen, found not a single enemy to oppose, but



saw them defile by a road to which he had been much nearer than they were only two hours before. This marshal had begun the battle in rear of the Allies' camp, and ended it almost in rear of the columns of our center!

The retreat of the Prussians was protected by Barclay, who, defeated on the heights of Glein, instead of changing front to form a crotchet *en potence*, prepared to place himself in echelons more distant on the heights of Belgern, and thus covered the avenue of Würschen against Lauriston and Reynier. The latter had not reached the field of battle till near three o'clock; he formed himself in the plain of Cannewitz, and at four o'clock engaged in a warm cannonade against Barclay. Ney supported him with the third corps; Lauriston joined his left, by forming opposite Rackel. At dark Barclay put himself in retreat, and the Saxons entered pell-mell with his rear guard into Würschen.

In the meantime the Russian left had fought bravely at the foot of the mountains against the corps of Oudinot and Macdonald; as soon as we were masters of Purschwitz and Litten, I ordered Marmont to move from the center to the right, so as to take that wing in reverse and cut it off from the road to Hochkirch. But it was too late; the enemy had begun his retreat, and for want of cavalry our troops could not reach the road in time. Night terminated the combat here as at Wurschen.

REMARKS ON THIS BATTLE.—In tracing out the movements of the different masses on the field of battle, we see that Ney and Lauriston, with eight divisions, contended with Kleist and Barclay, who had only twenty thousand men; they ought to have destroyed them, whereas they allowed them to destroy the division of Souham.

If Ney had executed the precise order which had been given to him at eight o'clock in the morning, and had displayed one-half the energy which he exhibited at Friedland, Elchingen, Moskva, and numerous other occasions, the enemy would have lost the greater part of his army and all his *matériel*; the Allies could never have saved their left wing and their cavalry. Austria after such a victory would have ranged herself under my banners, which I would have again carried victorious to the Niemen.

The fate of my empire thus depended upon the faulty movement of the most valiant of my generals; it is just, however, that I should take my own share of the blame. After the left wing under Ney was on the decisive point of the battle, I should have moved there myself with a part of the Old Guard and my reserve of cavalry, or at least have sent to the marshal a more detailed order than the brief pencil note simply directing him to march on Preititz. I should also have instructed him to oblique to the

left in the direction of Drescha, which was the same as that of the spire of Hochkirch. It is true that I had indicated to him this point of Drescha in my dispatch of the eighteenth, but then he was too far from the field of battle.

If Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, debouching in the morning from Nieder-Gurch by Malschwitz, had been directed to second Ney at Preititz, no doubt we would have captured Blücher's infantry, and I should now be on the throne. But as it was, we took no prisoners and found on the field only a few dismounted cannon; we had again sacrificed twenty thousand men without any important result.

REPLY TO THE OVERTURES OF CAULAINCOURT.—The next day after the battle we received Nesselrode's reply to the overtures of Caulaincourt; the letter was dated the twentieth and accompanied by a note dated the twenty-first. The Emperor Alexander, already allied with Austria, refused to receive any proposals not coming through that power. It was natural to infer from this that these powers were already intimately connected. This refusal of the Emperor of Russia was dictated by a praiseworthy but exaggerated loyalty; he refused to become the arbiter of the peace of Europe for allies who were far from grateful.

COMBATS OF REICHENBACH AND HAYNAU.—The next day I pursued the Allies, and rudely assailed their rear guard, which had taken position near Reichenbach. The enemy stood firm: impatient at the opposition, I myself repaired to the vanguard to animate it with my presence: the enemy fled; but I paid dearly for the advantage. A spent ball killed both Marshal Duroc and General Kirgener of the engineers, who were in my rear; Bruyère, one of my old soldiers of Italy, had fallen only a few hours before. Duroc was a man dear to my heart, and his loss greatly affected me.\*

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\*The following is Thiers' account of Duroc's death:

"After the cavalry engagement which had thus taken place on the plain, General Reynier with the Saxon infantry occupied the Reichenbach heights, and Napoleon, considering that sufficient had been now effected for this day, gave orders that his tent should be pitched on the ground the troops then occupied.

"As he was alighting from his horse there arose a cry, 'Kirgener is dead!' On hearing these words, Napoleon exclaimed, '*Fortune nous en veut bien aujourd'hui!*' But to the first cry immediately succeeded a second, 'Duroc is dead!' 'Impossible!' said Napoleon, 'I have just been speaking to him.' It was, however, not only possible, but the actual fact. A bullet, which had struck a tree close to Napoleon, had, in its rebound, slain successively General Kirgener, an excellent engineer officer, and then Duroc himself, the grand marshal of the palace.



A few hours after, a still warmer combat took place at Haynau. Profiting by my want of cavalry to reconnoiter our line of march, Blücher laid an ambuscade for Ney, who advanced with haste at the head of the fifth corps, and crossed the valley of Weisse, without exploring the heights beyond. The infantry of Lauriston, while about to establish their bivouacs, were suddenly assailed by three thousand horse; Maison and Puthod formed squares; but the cavalry had time to saber a battalion which was in advance of the others, and to capture several pieces of artillery. Lauriston drew upon himself this loss by placing his cavalry (twelve hundred horse) on his left flank, instead of pushing it in advance of his position to reconnoiter the roads.

**THE ALLIES THROW THEMSELVES ON SCHWEID-NITZ.**—The Allies had continued their retreat by Lauban,

“Duroc, a few minutes before his death, overcome by a singular feeling of sadness, had said to M. de Caulaincourt, ‘My friend, do you observe the Emperor? After a series of misfortunes he is now victorious, and should profit by the teachings of misfortune. . . . But see! he is still the same, still as insatiable as ever for war. . . . The end of all this cannot possibly be a happy one.’ He had received a cruel wound in his entrails, and there could be no hope that he could survive it. Napoleon hastened to him, took him by the hand, called him his friend, and spoke to him of a future life, where at length they might find rest; uttering these words with a feeling of remorse which he did not acknowledge, but which thrilled the inmost recesses of his heart.

“Duroc thanked him with emotion for these testimonies of regard, confided to his care his only daughter, and expressed a hope that his master might live to vanquish the enemies of France, and then to enjoy repose in the midst of that peace of which the world had so much need. ‘As for myself,’ he continued, ‘I have lived as an honorable man should live; I die as a soldier should die. I have nothing to reproach myself with. Let me again recommend my daughter to your care.’ And then, as Napoleon remained beside him, holding his hands, and seeming overwhelmed with serious reflections, he added, ‘Go, sire, go; this spectacle is too painful for you.’ And Napoleon left him, saying, ‘Adieu, my friend. We shall meet again, and perhaps soon!’

“It has been asserted that these words uttered by Duroc, ‘I have nothing to reproach myself with,’ were an allusion to some unjust reproaches made against him by Napoleon, who in his moments of excitement did not spare even the men whom he esteemed the most. But he rendered full justice to his grand marshal, who was the second sincere and truly devoted friend whom he had lost during the space of twenty days.

“Napoleon was, indeed, profoundly moved by his loss.

“Leaving the cottage in which the dying Duroc had been placed, he went to sit down upon some fascines near the advanced posts; and there remained, overpowered with grief, his hands lying listlessly on his knees, his eyes wet with tears, deaf to the fire of the tirailleurs, unconscious of the caresses of a dog belonging to one of the regiments of the guard, which frequently ran beside his horse, and now stood before him licking his hands. Such, and so changeable, is human nature! So contradictory in its various aspects; so incapable of being judged by any but God alone.”



Löwenberg, and Goldberg; I supposed they would repass the Oder, but they left the road to Breslau at Goldberg, and directed themselves by Jauer and Striegau on Schweidnitz. This change of their line of operations gave me some uneasiness: to allow themselves to be cut off from the Oder and Poland, and to throw themselves against the mountains of Glatz, was, on the part of the enemy, a fault so manifest in a military point of view that it could only be accounted for on grounds of political policy, by supposing that the Allies were already certain of the accesssion of Austria to the coalition; but I did not believe that the affair was as yet so far advanced.

**ARMISTICE OF NEUMARK.**—The Allies now proposed an armistice, which I accepted for the three-fold purpose of not offending the Cabinet of Vienna by a refusal, of enabling myself to ascertain more clearly the intrigues of Austria, and of seeking to effect a new understanding with the Emperor Alexander.

This armistice is perhaps the greatest fault of my life. By consenting to it, I probably lost the only remaining opportunity to restore my former power. By thus yielding to the intercession of Austria, I had inspired her with confidence in her own strength, and thus hastened her decision against me. If, on the contrary, I had continued hostilities, my firmness would have imposed on her; the Russo-Prussian army, turned by its right, overpowered by my superiority, and thrown back into the mountains of Glatz, would there have found its Caudine forks, while Austria, intimidated by my success, would not have ventured to offer the Allies a free passage through her states. I would have become again master of Europe, dictating peace as a conqueror. Even admitting that Austria had resolved to permit the entrance of the allied troops into her territory, my position would not have been worse than it was in the month of September; for, if my army recruited one hundred thousand men during the armistice, that of the enemy received more than double that number, exclusive of those which Austria organized during the interval.

**COMBAT OF LUCKAU.**—At the moment of signing this armistice Marshal Oudinot sustained a slight check at Luckau. I had directed him on that city, after the battle of Bautzen, to attack Bülow's corps, which had followed the march of Belluno when he left Wittenberg to join Ney, and thus threatened our line of operations. Bülow was stronger than we supposed, and the Duke of Reggio did not succeed in his mission, which, however, was rendered useless by the armistice.

**TREATY WITH DENMARK.**—On returning to Dresden, on the tenth of June, I found there an envoy from the King of Denmark, who had left Copenhagen after the battle of Lutzen to

form a still closer alliance. Never was a treaty more easily concluded: we had the same interests and the same enemies. An English squadron was before his capital, and had summoned the King to cede Norway to Bernadotte; what other part could Denmark take than to throw herself into our arms? The Duke of Bassano soon concluded with that power an offensive and defensive alliance.

**THIRD MISSION OF BUBNA.**—The course pursued by Austria was very different: Bubna also returned to Dresden, but bringing neither the powers nor the instructions which he had sought at Vienna. He announced that England had rejected all the insinuations of Weissenberg; that she had found even the conditions of Lunéville too favorable to France. Austria then announced that she had proposed at London the basis of the treaty of Lunéville! Bubna seemed to forget the proposition of a congress; he affirmed that Austria, having a schedule of the pretensions of Russia and Prussia, now wished to know what concessions I would make. Thus showing that the negotiations in a congress were to be carried on through the intermediation of Austria, who would then have at her mercy all the other continental powers. Astonished at this new pretension, I directed the Duke of Bassano to address a note directly to Metternich, to ask for formal explanations.

#### NEGOTIATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT REICHENBACH.

—The Emperor of Austria had just established his court at Gitschin. The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia were at Reichenbach and Peterswalde: they had assigned a *rendezvous* for Bernadotte at Trachenberg, for forming a plan of operations. This Prince Royal of Sweden, although allied for a year past to Russia and England, had not deemed it proper to take an active part in the war of 1812. But as they now promised him Norway in exchange for Finland, which had been ceded to Russia in 1809, and as the English had undertaken to put him in possession of that kingdom, he had agreed to bring twenty-five thousand Swedes on the Elbe, and had just landed at Stralsund.

It was at the head-quarters of Reichenbach that the allied powers bound themselves by new engagements through the intervention of England. Russia promised to bring into the field one hundred and sixty thousand soldiers, exclusive of her garrisons; Prussia, one-half that number; while England was to furnish subsidies: neither of the contracting powers was to treat separately.

Count Stadion transmitted these negotiations to the Cabinet of Vienna, which authorized him to accede to them, if I should reject the *ultimatum* which would be proposed to me. By a



formal convention of the twenty-seventh of June the Allies agreed to the mediation of the Cabinet of Vienna, having previously stipulated the conditions which should be imposed on me. Thus Austria, who was boasting of her partiality for me, had actually acceded to the coalition against me previous to the opening of the negotiations!

**METTERNICH REPAIRS TO DRESDEN.**—Under these circumstances, Metternich deemed it best to come himself to Dresden to try his diplomatic talent in making the formal explanations which I had demanded: he protested his moderation and his love of peace. I well knew what his interests were in carrying on the war; but even if there had been any means left for attaching him to our alliance, I must confess that I did not adopt those most likely to accomplish that object. Supposing myself in the place of the Cabinet of Vienna, would I have neglected to profit by the only opportunity which had occurred during the last fifteen years for recovering, by a single stroke of the pen, what had been lost in ten unsuccessful campaigns? Under such circumstances, would it not have been politic in me to offer Austria advantages sufficient to retain her in my alliance?

The question is difficult to decide. To offer her great concessions on my part might seem a pusillanimous act, and inspire her with contempt for my weakness. The demands which the cabinet afterwards addressed to me through Bubna were transmitted as the conditions of Russia and Prussia; they seemed to me exaggerated. I exhibited anger, and my threats were repeated; and it is probable that these influenced her ulterior conduct.

The exact epoch at which Austria entered into formal engagements with the Allies is not yet known. There, however, is good reason to believe that it was even previous to the battle of Lutzen; for the King of Prussia gives this to be understood in his proclamation to his people on the eighth of May. Upon this date will depend the judgment of posterity respecting her conduct and mine. It was plain that I sought to leave her in the position agreed upon by our reciprocal treaties; and even admitting that it would have been more skillful on my part to have offered her great advantages in the month of January, it must, at least, be confessed that I did not fail in any of my engagements by seeking to conquer and to make peace without recurring to her mediation. My object and my means were equally legitimate.

**HIS INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON.**—My interview with Metternich at Dresden completed the breach with the Cabinet of Vienna. After some discussion on the interest of different parties and on that of Austria to remain in my alliance, this



cunning diplomatist enumerated the concessions which the Allies required, and to which I must subscribe if I wished Austria to declare in my favor. He required not only the surrender of Illyria, but also that of Poland, of a part of Germany and Italy, the restoration of the Pope to Rome, the independence of Spain, Holland, and the Confederation of the Rhine!

What impression ought it to make upon a victorious soldier to require him to surrender, without drawing his sword, all the territory which he had won in ten campaigns and a hundred battles? I must, indeed, have fallen in the estimation of those who could propose to me to abandon countries which the Allies could not even threaten; countries which were separated from them by a powerful and victorious army and by numerous formidable fortresses! To make such propositions to me, they must have supposed me more base than the senate of Carthage! My feelings of insulted honor, as a man, got the better of my cooler calculations as a statesman, and I replied to Metternich in terms well calculated to make him my mortal enemy. In this I was wrong. I should have sought to separate the Austrian interest from those of Russia and Prussia, and instead of asking Metternich *how much England had given him for making such propositions to me*, I should have told him that Austria had two interests to consult, and that I was ready to satisfy both; that it was for her interest that we should remain the arbiters of the continent, and that he had only to enumerate the measures which he deemed best calculated to secure this object. Perhaps the moment for doing this had already passed; nevertheless, by making the attempt, I should have performed my duty to my throne and to France. On the contrary, by this exhibition of my indignation, I destroyed the only remaining hope of a pacific arrangement. Metternich retired, *convinced that war, though only partially successful, would restore to Austria her lost power, and that this was his only means of saving his honor and serving his master*. But, although war was now fully decided on, Austria still wished to gain time, either to complete her preparations or to determine the bases of her arrangement with the coalition. A congress at Prague was, therefore, agreed upon, and the armistice extended to the tenth of August.

At the moment that Metternich was leaving Dresden, I received the news of Joseph's defeat at Vittoria. This increased the embarrassment of my position, and if England had been included in the proposed treaty, I might have accepted the conditions offered; but to close this war with all the difficulties of my maritime quarrel still on my hands was too important a step to be hastily taken.

It will be remembered that my threat to make peace with Russia had been reported to Austria. This inconsiderate but laudable frankness, joined to my angry remarks to Metternich, embroiled me with Austria, and perhaps cost me my crown. In 1803 my warmth to Wentworth contributed to involve me in the war with England. The head of a state should treat all foreign ministers with cool reserve, and negotiate with them only through the medium of adroit and skillful agents. They should never be admitted to his intimacy. The abrupt frankness of a soldier is not well suited to affairs of diplomacy.

NAPOLEON'S ENVOYS TO THE CONGRESS OF PRAGUE.—Hoping that the Congress of Prague might afford me means of explaining myself at the same time to Russia, Prussia, and Austria, I sent there the Duke of Vicenza and Narbonne. In taking leave of the former I explained my feelings at the equivocal conduct of Austria; I announced to him that I regarded it as an indignity to reward her by giving her all the advantages of the peace; that I should prefer to see Russia profit by it, as she had purchased these advantages by her heroic devotion, the ravage of her provinces, and the loss of Moscow; in a word, I repeated the instructions which I had given to him when intrusted with a mission to the Emperor Alexander, previous to the battle of Bautzen.

ARRIVAL OF THE EMPRESS MARIA LOUISA AT MAYENCE.—The Court of Austria had returned from Gitschin to the château of Frewald near Prague; I had left for Mayence, where the Empress then was, and where I had called together some of my ministers to consult upon the measures to be taken for the interior of France on the probable resumption of hostilities. The minister of finance had come to receive the keys to my treasury of reserve in the vaults of Marsan, forty millions of which were now appropriated to the most urgent expenses required in preparation for another campaign.

Some have thought that this interview with the Empress was had for the purpose of dictating to her measures calculated to influence the resolutions of the Emperor of Austria. This is erroneous. It is true that I dictated to her a letter to her father, for I saw no wrong in inciting in him favorable sentiments toward us; but to imagine that I reposed the destinies of my empire on such means is too absurd. The Empress took no part in state affairs, and I knew too well the character of the Austrian cabinet to suppose that such a measure could be decisive.

MILITARY PROJECTS OF THE ALLIES.—Before going to Mayence, I was informed of the military and diplomatic council at Trachenberg, where, since the ninth of July, the Allies

had been discussing a plan of operations. Austria had designated General Waquant as her commissioner in this council of sovereigns; and young Count Latour was to assist in arranging the plan of campaign in the name of that power. Some wished to form three armies of one hundred and fifty thousand each; the first, under Bernadotte and composed of Russians, Prussians, and Swedes, was to operate at the north with Berlin as a center, and to attack Hamburg; the second, under Blücher in Silesia, to advance by Lusace on Dresden; while the Austrians, reinforced by fifty thousand Russians and Prussians, were to operate on Dresden by Bohemia. The Emperor Alexander and his generals were in favor of drawing Blücher's army into Bohemia, in order to cover Prague and the line of operations, while the grand army acted by the left bank of the Elbe. This course was more wise, more skillful, and more in accordance with military principles. But it was opposed by Austria, because she was unwilling to see two hundred and twenty thousand foreigners in Bohemia, and by Prussia, who wished to cover Silesia and to have the means of sustaining Bernadotte in case Berlin should be threatened. The plan of three armies was adopted, leaving that of Blücher's on the Oder; but the Emperor Alexander insisted on the necessity of reinforcing the grand army at the expense of those of a secondary character, and it was agreed that one hundred thousand Russo-Prussians should move from Silesia into Bohemia under the orders of Barclay de Tolly, to act in concert with the same number of Austrians by Freyburg and Töplitz on Dresden.

*In order to avoid reverses on secondary points, they decided that Blücher and Bernadotte should never accept battle when I moved against them, but that they should resume the offensive as soon as I moved to other points.* This well-conceived plan failed to accomplish its object, on account of its faulty execution and the vigor of my first operations. If I had then known the tenor of their plan, I should not have exhausted myself in vain pursuits of Blücher, but have taken, from the opening of the campaign, the most certain means of striking decisive blows wherever it suited me.

➤ **NEGOTIATIONS AT PRAGUE.**—In the meantime the negotiations made very little progress at Prague. The choice of ministers to treat with the Duke of Vicenza was unfortunate. Russia had sent M. Anstett, a Frenchman by birth, and my personal enemy; the laws of the empire prohibited any treaty with him. The commissioners appointed to sign the armistice of Neumark had no power to extend it. All the month of July was thus consumed in preliminary discussion. The armistice was finally extended to the tenth of August, which left hardly two weeks in which to arrange the most complicated interests of all Europe.



Moreover, difficulties arose about conducting the negotiations, whether in open council, or through a mediator, or by written notes. Each one sought to show his diplomatic knowledge by discussing the forms followed by the Congress of Teschen and of Utrecht, and no progress was made. Austria wished everything to be done by written notes, through her, as the mediator. This made her the arbiter of peace, and prevented all arrangement between France and the other powers. Nothing could justify such a pretension; moreover, Metternich had said at Dresden that Austria had no intention of making herself the arbiter. My negotiator could not yield to such unexpected demands; and Metternich well knew that I was at Mayence, and that no new instructions could be received from me much before the expiration of the armistice. I had supposed that the negotiations would commence by the twenty-sixth of July, and that five or six days would be required for the discussion of the conditions of peace. That time was sufficient for my journey to Mayence. What was my surprise to learn on my return that my plenipotentiaries had not exchanged a single word with MM. Anstett and Humboldt, the plenipotentiaries of Russia and Prussia! A blind man could have seen that no negotiations were possible under such circumstances. I now had but one course to pursue, and I adopted it without hesitation. This was, not to open these negotiations at all, as they had not been commenced, but to demand directly of the mediator what were the conditions necessary for concluding peace. As Caulaincourt was no longer a plenipotentiary in the congress, I directed him, on the sixth of August, to address that question to Metternich, who replied on the seventh. He demanded the restitution of Illyria, the reconstruction of Prussia with her frontier on the Elbe; the surrender of the duchy of Warsaw, to be partitioned out to Russia, Prussia, and Austria; the renunciation of the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine; the guarantee of all the powers, great and small, and that none should be changed without a general consent; the independence of Holland, and the independence of Spain under Ferdinand VII.; the publicity and execution of the last article were to be postponed till the conclusion of a maritime peace, provided that this should be calculated to facilitate that object.

There was nothing new in these sacrifices, except that they were now put in the shape of positive demands. I could not persuade myself that the Allies did not wish to trace around me the circle of Popilius, and that all their negotiations consisted in dictating positive conditions to be signed by me without modification; in a word, that it was proposed to force me to comply with the exaggerated pretensions of Metternich. From these

harsh conditions I turned my thoughts to the fine field between the Elbe and the Oder, all the keys of which I now held in my power, and was daily augmenting their value by constructing vast intrenched camps at Dresden and Pirna, and a *tête-de-pont* at Königstein. My confidence was increased by the success of the new levies in France and the assurances of attachment sent through the Prince of Neufchâtel by the King of Bavaria. Although desirous of peace, which was much needed by his people, the brave and loyal Maximilian swore *that he would lose his life rather than desert my alliance.*

There were a thousand other circumstances which seemed to ensure me a victory, and which inclined me to reject conditions so harshly imposed.

At Presburg, Tilsit, and Schönbrunn, time was allowed for negotiation, although interests less general were discussed and sacrifices less important were required. When Austria yielded me the Tyrol, I was master of her capital and victorious at Austerlitz. When she ceded me Illyria, I was master of Vienna and victorious at Wagram. When I imposed on Prussia the cession of her provinces, I was not only master of Berlin, but also of Königsberg and Prussia. In making these treaties with defeated Austria, two whole months were allowed for negotiation; but now this power wished to impose, without discussion, conditions much more harsh upon a general who had just gained two glorious victories! It is customary for a state which has lost ten provinces in a war to sacrifice one-half of these in order to obtain peace and save the remainder, but it would be a new thing for a state which had lost only Poland, to sacrifice Germany, Holland, and the half of Italy, and her own dignity! I had before declared to my father-in-law that I never would submit to conditions dictated by the sword, and I now could not, without dishonor, subscribe to these propositions. I therefore spent the ninth in weighing these conditions and the consequences of rejecting them. If they could be modified, I might agree to them without dishonor, for they would no longer have the appearance of an imposed *ultimatum*. This desire might have sprung from self-love, but the feeling was natural and laudable, springing as it did from a sense of honor. I therefore wrote to the Duke of Vicenza, on the night of the ninth and tenth, that I would accept the *ultimatum*, with the reservation of Trieste and the guarantee of the integrity of Denmark. The reservation of Trieste may seem a small affair to be weighed against a question of peace, but on account of its maritime importance, and for the reasons above given, I determined to make it. The article concerning Denmark was an act of loyalty, but should have been sooner mentioned, if intended to be insisted on.

Perhaps, however, the delay was of little importance; for if they wished peace, the treaty could be signed as well during the ten days' notice of the renewal of hostilities as before the denunciation of the armistice. The Allies thought differently, and as my reply did not reach them till the eleventh, Austria declared the negotiation broken; the Russian and Prussian ministers decamped in the greatest haste, and notice was immediately given of the cessation of the armistice. These facts prove incontestably that the Allies preferred war to peace. It must be confessed that in this, as the events prove, they consulted their own interest; but it would be unjust to charge me with the consequences of the rupture.

I, however, was still ignorant of the formal decision of the Allies, and their departure from Prague, when Bubna left Dresden to join his court at Gitschin. My minister advised me not to compromise peace by any concealments. Yielding to his solicitations, I authorized him to see Bubna, and to give him the formal assurance that I would accept all which was desired by the Cabinet of Vienna. Vain hope! The demon of discord had prevailed. The Allies had already entered Bohemia, and their numerous columns were approaching Dresden.

Narbonne, being forced to leave Bohemia, returned to Dresden to render an account of the sad result of his negotiation. Caulaincourt, who had a private mission, remained some days for my final orders. He received these orders to accept all the conditions of Austria. But the Cabinet of Vienna now replied that it was too late, the commissioners having left. This was a mere pretext, for if Austria, as the arbiter, considered these conditions just and suitable for the general interest of Europe, she could easily transmit them to the other parties who were interested in them. The Emperor Francis had a *rendezvous* with the Emperor Alexander at Gitschin, on the fourteenth, and did not hesitate to declare that he was resolved to run all the chances of the war—a profession which left nothing to be added, for no one could misinterpret it.

In thus waiting till the last moment before subscribing to the harsh conditions of the Allies, I had supposed that, if the armistice should be denounced, the congress would continue till the resumption of hostilities, if not during the war. Those of Westphalia and Utrecht had lasted several years, during which the military operations were continued. The dissolution of the congress and the sudden departure of the plenipotentiaries characterized, better than I could, the resolution of my enemies. I have been reproached for this measure, but it is perfectly evident that



this rupture was less my work than that of a coalition, who were anxious to divide my spoils.

Such are the true points from which we must view this important epoch, which decided the fate of my empire and of Europe. A Mazarin or a Ximenes, remembering the fable of the oak and the reed, would have bent before the storm in the hope of rising again, more strong than ever, when it had passed. But self-respect, or rather the honor of the victorious captain, prevailed over the cool deliberations of the statesman. What general in my place would have taken a different course?

But we must render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and the event proved that, if the conduct of Austria was base, it was nevertheless conformable to her temporary interests. Afterwards, at Frankfort and Châtillon, the same cannot be said for her. Before that time, it was for me to parry the blow; and if I did not, it would be unjust to impute it either to an excess of presumption or a want of sagacity; I was deceived by the promises of Bubna and Schwartzenberg, and by the insignificant results of my first victories. The world will never agree respecting this negotiation; some will accuse Metternich of felony, while those whom he benefited will praise him to the skies. By an impartial writer, the matter may be summed up as follows:

In the month of January, Austria wished to profit by her advantageous situation to regain her lost territories; but she feared to ask these openly. As it was sufficient for my purposes that this power remain neutral in the early part of the campaign, I did not hasten to retain her in my alliance, by restitutions which could only be made at my own expense. As her indirect overtures through her ministers at Paris and Vienna had not accomplished what she desired previous to the battle of Lutzen, she now sought to obtain it by concert with my enemies. But still preferring to acquire provinces by treaty rather than by incurring the chances of war, she hoped to enrich herself with my spoils through her character of mediator. When she distrusted the results of this calculation, she determined to risk the chance of arms; for she had much to gain and nothing to lose.

The difference in the language of the Austrian cabinet at the two epochs will be regarded by some as a violation of good faith; it must be confessed, however, that the first declarations of Austria may have been honorable, and made to see what effect her insinuations might produce; she may be reproached for not explaining herself more openly, but she may say in excuse that she was deterred from doing so by the fear of irritating me. Some writers, in their desire to enhance my glory and good faith, have overlooked the correspondence of the Cabinet of Vienna, or have

given it only in a mutilated state. In this it is plainly shown that, after the month of April, Metternich and the Emperor gave M. Narbonne to understand that it would be necessary to restore Illyria, renounce the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the duchy of Warsaw, and, finally, the restoration of the Prussian monarchy. Nor should it be forgotten that Austria did not dissemble that she would go to war, if I should not accept her conditions as the mediating power. I am far from excusing the conduct of the Austrian cabinet, especially in her attempts to seduce my allies, and, while pretending friendship, to hedge me about with difficulties.

This conduct on her part is the more inexcusable as she had every reason to pursue a course of policy frank and open, and at the same time loyal and strong. Instead of sounding me by the mission of Bubna, Schwartzberg, and Metternich, she had only to say: "The alliance of 1756 was calculated to make France and Austria the arbiters of the continent; the alliance of 1810 and of 1812 had the same object. This also is what now is desired. But you have reduced us to a secondary part by destroying our influence abroad, and by taking from us our finest provinces and our only port. It is just that we should profit by the present occasion to regain them; unless we do so, our alliance will be odious to our people. Therefore restore to us the frontiers of 1805 and the Tyrol and renounce the Confederation of the Rhine. Holland may remain in your possession until a maritime peace is made. You can retain Italy, and settle the question of Spain and of England without our interference. Join us in treating, without delay, with Russia and Prussia, on just and moderate terms; let us amicably arrange the question of the duchy of Warsaw; since the disaster of Moscow, this can only be an apple of discord, without the slightest advantage to you. Austria will then bring two hundred thousand men into the field to sustain your cause, and dictate these conditions to your enemies; then we will always be your allies."

I should have immediately subscribed to such conditions, for I should have seen in them the good faith and real interest of Austria; and even if I had not consented to these sacrifices, Austria could then have attacked me openly and honorably, proving to Europe that my ambition had forced her into the war. My position in this affair was less complicated than hers, and my conduct was indisputably more frank. To maintain our treaties, and thus paralyze the action of that power, while I planted my victorious eagles on the Niemen—such was my object. I should have accomplished it, without violating any of my engagements, if the victory of Bautzen had equaled my expectations. But I failed by gaining only a half victory, and my conduct seemed

rash and even audacious. If the movement of the left wing had been conducted conformably to the order given by Ney's chief of staff in the morning, I would still have been master of Europe. Thus the destinies of nations often depend upon the most insignificant incidents. But it is time to quit the diplomatic arena, and return to military events. Before, however, we continue our relation of the operations of the armies in Saxony, we will hastily review the condition of affairs in Spain.

**SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS IN SPAIN.**—Wellington, after having obtained, in 1812, the liberation of Andalusia by his maneuvers on the Douro, and the bold occupation of Madrid, had been forced to raise the siege of Burgos, before the united arms of Soult and Joseph. He had taken up his winter quarters about Ciudad-Rodrigo, and profited by it to reinforce his corps. His army, in the spring of 1813, was composed of seventy-five thousand Anglo-Hanoverians and Portuguese. The Cortes of Spain conferred on him the command of all their forces, and took measures to place a corps of fifty thousand Spaniards at his immediate disposition, in the west and north. The evacuation of Andalusia, Grenada, Galicia, Estremadura, La Mancha, and the Asturias enabled the Cortes to double their levies, and they neglected nothing to incite ardor and patriotism in the hearts of the Spaniards.

Our forces in this part of the theater of war amounted to about ninety thousand men. Besides these, Suchet had from thirty-five to forty thousand men in the east. Two divisions of dragoons and twelve thousand of the best troops had been drawn from the peninsula to the army in Saxony. Soult also had rejoined me just before the battle of Bautzen. The regiments in Spain were very weak; climate, battles, guerrilla bands, assassination, etc., had cost us many men, and my immediate wants in Saxony had compelled me to draw there, in provisional regiments, the recruits intended for the army in Spain. To disguise our real weakness, we preserved the names of the army of Portugal, the army of the South, the army of the Center, and the army of the North, for skeleton corps not numbering more than fifteen or sixteen thousand men. Reille commanded the army of Portugal, Drouet that of the Center, Gazan that of the South, and Clausel that of the North. Joseph's guard, which was reduced to three thousand Frenchmen and a thousand Spaniards, with a feeble Spanish division, formed the reserve.

It will be remembered that after the union of our three armies on the Tormes, Joseph had returned to Madrid, where he hoped to maintain himself by supporting his right on the Douro, and his left on the Tagus towards Toledo. In a military point of



view, such a position was not defensible; but such is the unfortunate alternative of an army which has, at the same time, to resist organized masses and to keep in subjection an insurgent population. To subsist their forces in a country which is destitute of the means of transportation or of navigation, *extension* was necessary; whereas, to fight the opposing forces, *concentration* was equally essential. The Anglo-Portuguese army had greatly the advantage in this respect, as they could receive provisions from Lisbon and Oporto by the Douro, which was navigable to near Miranda, and by numerous brigades of mules, which carried provisions for a distance of three hundred miles. This enabled them to act against us with united forces whenever they pleased.

Having completed his preparations for resuming the offensive by the end of May, Wellington deemed the decisive point to be the right of the French on the Douro. By obtaining a success here, he threatened our only line of retreat, and a victory like that of Salamanca would throw us back on the Pyrenees. The evacuation of the south had enabled the junta to raise troops, and assemble a considerable Spanish corps on the Tagus, which threatened our left and the capital. The army of Galicia and the Asturias might take the right in reverse, and advance by Bilboa to the defiles of Tolosa. Wellington, favored by these two demonstrations, resolved to pass the Douro, the middle of May, near Lamega, to fall on Zamora, and thus turn all Joseph's system of defense. After having succeeded in this first operation, the English general concentrated his forces at Toro, and continued his march towards Palencia.

Joseph now, for the first time, renounced the defense of Madrid and collected his forces at Burgos. The increasing efforts of the Anglo-Spaniards, the sad effects of our disasters in Russia, and the necessity of seeking the security of the army rather than the preservation of a useless capital, justified this resolution; but it was now necessary to instantly take the initiative against the enemy, or to retire. Joseph preferred to remain on the defensive. But the new demonstrations of the enemy soon forced him to blow up the fort of Burgos and to retire into the plains of Vittoria.

It would be difficult to find a worse place for a battle, under the circumstances in which Joseph was situated. The Gulf of Biscay closes the frontier of France and Spain into a kind of gorge between Bayonne and St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port. There is but a single road on the west of the Pyrenees, which runs from Madrid to Bayonne. There is another road, practicable for cannon, from Vittoria to Pampeluna; whence it runs on one side to the Col-de-Maya, and on the other to St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port, by the valley of Roncevaux, celebrated under Charlemagne by the

famous retreat of Roland. To take a position parallel to a road would enable the enemy to occupy a corresponding line, and by the least effort of his left against our right, to intercept our communications. If we add to this that the basin of Vittoria is surrounded by commanding mountains, precisely in the prolongation of the English left, and in the direction of their approach, it will be seen how ill-suited it was for our army. It was necessary either to take the initiative and to attack the enemy wherever he might be found or to retire upon the Pyrenees. The latter was certainly the wisest plan; for a victory which, before 1812, would have been decisive, would now be of little importance.

BATTLE OF VITTORIA.—Joseph's left, under Clausel, remained at Logrono to cover the important road to Pampeluna. A flying corps was sent to Bilboa under Foy, to cover the debouch from that city on San Sebastian. These two detachments were the necessary consequence of giving battle in a defensive position. In any other country than Spain, it would have been preferable to renounce the road to Bayonne, to retire parallel to the Ebro to Saragossa, so as to join Suchet and fall on Wellington when separated some one hundred and fifty leagues from his vessels and his *dépôts*. The national guards of the south and some battalions of the line would have been sufficient to watch the Bidassoa and guard the place of Bayonne; and the English general would not have ventured to enter the Pyrenees with one hundred thousand Frenchmen in his rear. This maneuver had the assent of the best generals in the army; but Joseph and Marshal Jourdan thought that the spirit of the Catalonians and Aragonese rendered this strategic line unsafe. If it was necessary to base themselves on Bayonne, they ought to have avoided a battle, or at least to have received it on the heights of Salinas. Jourdan, it is said, formed this project, but was overruled by the others, who feared the embarrassment of Joseph's *impedimenta*, and who wished to dispute the possession of Castile. Joseph's camp resembled that of Darius; he was encumbered with the families and baggage of the unfortunate Spaniards who had taken office under him. A part was sent away the evening before the battle to Tolosa, under the escort of Maucune's division of the army of Portugal; nevertheless, there still remained much more than the situation of our affairs justified.

The Allies passed the Ebro on the fifteenth of June. On the twenty-first they presented themselves before Joseph's *corps-de-bataille*, which was posted parallel to Zadorra and the road. There was sufficient time during these five days to adopt a course suited to the circumstances, but they did nothing. The battle which decided the fate of the peninsula took place on the twenty-

first of June. It was more disastrous than bloody. The left and center were driven back on Vittoria by Hill and Beresford, who attacked them concentrically toward Ariniz and the bridge of Mamorio, penetrated the interval between them, and thus forced them into a precipitate retreat. The right wing, after having sustained a vigorous combat against General Graham at Gomarra Mayor, near the great road to Bayonne, suffered themselves to be defeated after hearing the loss of Vittoria. An English division, turning the right wing, succeeded in gaining the road before our troops; the alarm immediately spread, and each one hastened to gain, in disorder, the road to Pampeluna, the only one remaining by which they could reach the Pyrenees. The entire column of equipages fell into the hands of the conqueror; cannon, baggage, caissons—in a word, everything was abandoned, and Joseph arrived at Bayonne in a worse plight than I reached the Beresina. A most scandalous disorder blasted all the laurels of the army of Spain, caused only by a panic terror, like that of the Austrians at Marengo.

Joseph merited many reproaches for his military conduct in this affair; but not those which have been made by his detractors. The fault was not so much in the disposal of his troops, as in his giving battle at all in this position. He should have taken the offensive; or if not, have received battle in the defensive position of Salinas.

The news of this disaster made me regret that I did not evacuate Spain on my return from Moscow. This would have enabled me to assemble one hundred thousand veteran troops behind the Rhine. The Spaniards would never have crossed the Pyrenees, had I abandoned the country to Ferdinand; and Wellington would not, with his English forces alone, have attempted the invasion of France. His theater of operations would probably have been transferred to Holland or elsewhere.

OPERATIONS OF SUCHET.—In the east of Spain fortune was more favorable. Dissatisfied with the conduct of General Maitland, the English had replaced him with Murray, a chief of staff of much merit. He arrived at Alicante with orders to take the offensive so as to favor the projects of Wellington against the line of the Douro. During the winter the Allies had reorganized and reinforced the Spanish army of Elliot. In the month of April, 1813, Murray took position at Castalla, with twenty thousand Anglo-Sicilians and Spaniards, and detached some corps to Villena. Between the twentieth and twenty-second of April, Suchet, by a rapid march, enveloped a battalion at Villena, defeated Elliot's corps at Yecla, and the English vanguard in the defile of Biar. This success brought him before Murray's posi-



tion at Castalla, which he immediately resolved to attack. But as he failed to carry it, Murray made an attack in his turn, but was arrested by our artillery in the defile. Our army returned to Valencia with its prisoners, but did not long remain inactive. Not venturing an attack on our intrenchments, Murray decided to evacuate the east and seek to operate on our communications.

He reëmbarked his troops, and his fleet passed Valencia on the first of June. He again debarked his troops at Salo, where he got possession of Fort San Félipe de Balaguer, and began an attack on Tarragona. Twenty-eight heavy cannon were landed for this purpose.

Hearing of this danger, Marshal Suchet immediately moved by Perdillo, and in three forced marches with his infantry arrived in sight of Fort Balaguer; the English fleet defended the shore and commanded with their guns the high road. Making a *détour* through the mountains to avoid their fire, Suchet carried a column of infantry in sight of Tarragona, at the moment when General Maurice Mathieu, from Barcelona, approached on the other side. Seeing his danger, Murray now blew up Fort Balaguer, abandoned his heavy artillery, reëmbarked his troops, and resigned the command to Lord Bentinck, who returned to Alicante. In the meantime the Spanish army of Alicante, under the Duke del Parque, attacked Generals Harispe and Habert on the Xucar, but was defeated. Suchet returned to Valencia in triumph.

But hardly had he arrived there, when he received news of the battle of Vittoria, and orders to approach the frontiers of France. The evacuation of Valencia commenced on the fifth of July. The retreat of this army was accompanied by the sincere regrets of a large number of the inhabitants. Good officers with well provisioned garrisons were left at Denia, Peniscola, and Saguntum; the last of these places contained six months' supplies for the whole army. Tortosa, Tarragona, Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon were also provided for. More than twenty thousand men were thus sacrificed to the vain hope of still holding the peninsula, when their presence on the Rhine and in Champagne, a few months later, might have saved France. Suchet was not to blame for this disposition; he had received positive orders. Our victory at Bautzen was known to him; as also the meeting of the Congress of Prague; but he knew nothing of the defection of Austria, and hoped soon to receive orders to return to Valencia.

On reaching Barcelona, Suchet united with his own the army of Catalonia under General Decaen. Together they occupied the line of the Llobregat, which they retain for several months. In the early part of August General Bentinck threatened Tarragona. The French army crossed the Col de Santa Christiana and

offered him battle, which he refused and retired toward Cambrils and the Col de Balaguer. Suchet now blew up the fortifications of Tarragona and removed the garrison to Barcelona. The enemy afterward established himself at Villa-Franca and the Col de Ordal. The latter place was attacked by the marshal on the night of the thirteenth of September, and carried, after an obstinate defense. We captured three field-pieces and three or four hundred men. The twenty-seventh English regiment of the line perished almost to a man. The next day our army reached Villa-Franca. General Bentinck prepared to retire on Tarragona, but our cavalry greatly harassed his retreat.

This victory secured us quiet cantonments between the Llobregat and Barcelona, and the winter passed away without any remarkable event, or anything to disturb our forces, except the sad news of our disasters in Saxony. Our skirmishes with the Catalonians were regarded only as an every-day affair; they had become a matter of habit, and a daily routine.

## CHAPTER XX.

## AUTUMN CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

Renewal of Hostilities—Immense Efforts of the Coalition—Organization of the Allied Forces—Organization of the French Army—Relative Position of the opposing Forces—Different Combinations of the Theater of War—Preliminary Movements—Plan of Operations—Napoleon marches against Blücher—His Instructions to Macdonald—The Command of the Allied Forces—March of the Allies on Dresden—Their singular Dispositions for Attack—Napoleon's Project to cut them off at Königstein—Battle of Dresden—The Allies retreat—Operations of Vandamme near Königstein—His Disaster at Culm—Oudinot defeated at Gros-Beeren—Macdonald's Disaster at the Katzbach—Napoleon marches to his Assistance—Ney's defeat at Dennewitz—Remarks on this Battle—Remarks on Napoleon's Plan of Campaign—His Demonstrations on Bohemia—Third Attempt against Blücher—New Plans of the Allies—They assume the Offensive—Napoleon marches against Blücher and Bernadotte—Napoleon's Project of Maneuvering against Berlin—It is defeated by the Defection of Bavaria—The Allies concentrate on Leipsic—Singular Project of Schwartzemberg—First Day of Leipsic—Napoleon proposes an Armistice, which is refused—The Allies receive Reinforcements—Second Day of Leipsic—Third Day of Leipsic—Remarks on this Battle—Napoleon retreats on Erfurth—Pursuit of the Allies—Departure of Murat—Threatening March of the Bavarians—Their Defeat at Hanau—The French retire behind the Rhine—Capitulation of Dresden—Operations before Hamburg—Capitulation of Dantzic—Siege and Blockade of the other Fortresses—Operations of Eugene in Italy—Soult's Operations in Spain.

**RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES.**—Although the overthrow of my brother's throne had no immediate influence on the military operations in Germany, nevertheless, it greatly complicated my affairs. I had always supposed that I could at any time draw fifty thousand men from beyond the Pyrenees to the Elbe; but the unfortunate defeat of Vittoria not only destroyed these hopes, but, on the contrary, caused me alarm for the safety of my own territory. These events probably had their influence in the negotiations of Prague, and contributed to their unfortunate issue.



Some future statesman may think that this failure, by destroying all further hopes of success in the peninsula and drawing all my efforts to the continent, should have been an additional inducement for Austria to unite with me; but the Cabinet of Vienna thought differently, and only rejoiced at the increase of my embarrassment and the probability of my fall. The Congress of Prague having been dissolved on the tenth of August, as has already been said, the armistice expired on the fifteenth and hostilities recommenced the next day.

**IMMENSE EFFORTS OF THE COALITION.**—The efforts of the coalition were almost incredible; I regarded the accounts of them which reached me as ridiculously exaggerated. Prussia alone had put in the line two hundred and forty thousand men, of which thirty-two thousand were cavalry. I had never thought her forcés one-half that number. The Russians, besides the corps of Sacken and Langeron, received near one hundred thousand veterans from the hospitals and recruits from the *dépôts*; they were the remainder of the levies of 1812, who, on account of their distance from the theater of war, had not been able to arrive in time to take part in the campaign of 1812. The whole number of the troops of the first line put in motion against me amounted to six hundred and fifty thousand men, with eighteen hundred pieces of cannon, all included. The reserves and garrisons amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand, making a grand total of eight hundred and ten thousand\* men against me, in the North and in Italy, exclusive of the English, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Sicilians in the peninsula. It is true that some of these were militia and irregular troops; but if they did not serve in the line, they did us still more injury by their partisan warfare.

The English aided these efforts by subsidies and supplies of arms and artillery; they sent to Prussia and to the Prince of Sweden field batteries and men to manage them, several companies of Congreve-rocketeers, and a siege-equipage which served in the attack of Glogau. They also carried four hundred thousand muskets and one hundred thousand sabers to the continent, to assist in the armament of Germany.

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\*This number must be intended to represent the strength of the allied forces at the renewal of hostilities, for in September, as is stated immediately after, they numbered eight hundred and eighty-nine thousand three hundred and twenty men, and one thousand nine hundred and sixty-six pieces of artillery, and in December their force was increased to one million one hundred thousand men.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIED FORCES.—The following table exhibits the detailed organization of the allied armies in September, 1813:

ARMIES AND SIEGE-CORPS.	NATIONS.	CORPS.	BATTALIONS.	SQUADRONS.	COSACKS.	MEN.	ARTILLERY.	
Barclay .....	Russians...	Wittgenstein .....	39	36	4	23,000	60	
	Prussians...	Kleist.....	41	44	—	43,500	128	
	Russians...	Platoff.....	—	—	12	6,000	—	
	"	Constantine.....	53	80	—	36,000	250	
			133	160	16	108,500	438	
Schwarzenberg...	Austrians...	Lichtenstein .....	4	18	—	—	12	
	"	Bubna .....	7	18	—	—	12	
	"	Collredo .....	24	12	—	—	48	
	"	Murfield .....	21	12	—	—	48	
	"	Giulay .....	21	12	—	—	48	
	"	Klenau .....	24	18	—	—	48	
"	"	Hesse-Homburg...	20	36	—	—	42	
			121*	126	—	130,860	258	
Blücher .....	Russians...	Sacken.....	24	20	11	16,200	60	
	"	Langeron .....	48	14	8	29,000	156	
	"	St. Priest.....	20	26	4	13,800	36	
	Prussians...	York.....	40	44	—	37,700	104	
			132	104	23	96,700	356	
Bernadotte.....	Russians...	Wintzingerode .....	11	8	8	9,100	56	
	"	Woronzoj .....	8	24	13	12,250	56	
	Swedes .....	—	35	32	—	24,010	62	
	Allies†.....	Walmoden.....	37	33	4	28,600	53	
	Prussians...	Bülow.....	40	45	4	41,300	104	
"	Tauernzien.....	55	52	—	38,900	56		
			186	194	29	154,060	387	
Benningesen.....	Russians...	Markoff.....	14	25	9	16,500	38	
	"	Doctoroff.....	29	25	—	26,500	120	
	"	Paskiewitz.....	30	17	2	17,000	40	
	"	Tolstoy .....	30	17	2	17,000	40	
			73	67	11	60,000	198	
Corps before the places of	Dantzic .....	Russ. and Pruss.	Duke of Würtemberg .....	70	17	8	35,000	80
	Stettin .....	" "	Plotz .....	19	4	—	35,000	25
	Custrin .....	" "	Hinricks .....	10	2	—	14,600	8
	Glogau .....	" "	Rosen .....	44	4	—	8,600	30
	Zamosa.....	Russians...	—	21	5	3	29,000	36
			164	32	11	122,200	179	

\*Previous to the battle of Dresden the Austrians had but one hundred and twelve battalions; they here lost ten, which were replaced by nineteen others, making one hundred and twenty-one battalions. In addition to this number, they had thirty-four battalions in garrison at Prague, Theresien-Stadt, and Joseph-Stadt.

†Walmoden's corps was composed of Russians, Germans, Swedes, and English.

The Russians employed in these sieges were militia, except at Dantzic, where there were four battalions of the old regiments, and the militia of St. Petersburg, who had fought gloriously during the war.

*Recapitulation of these Forces.*

	Men.	Artillery
Grand army in Bohemia (Barclay and Schwartzberg)	239,360	696
Army of Blücher . . . . .	96,700	356
Army of Bernadotte . . . . .	154,060	387
Army of Benningsen . . . . .	60,000	108
Austrians and Bavarians under General Wrede . . . . .	55,000	120
Army of General Hill in Italy . . . . .	50,000	120
Siege-corps . . . . .	102,200	179
Reserve of Landwehr in the interior of Austria . . . . .	60,000	...
Prussian reserve and garrisons . . . . .	32,000	...
Reserve under Prince Labanof . . . . .	40,000	...
Total . . . . .	889,320	1,966

If we add to this number one hundred and forty-five thousand regulars, and one hundred and forty-five thousand Landwehr raised by the Germanic Confederation in the month of December, we have a grand total of more than *one million one hundred thousand men*, armed against France, exclusive of the forces in the peninsula.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.—I also had profited by the armistice to reinforce my army in Germany, and, by almost inconceivable activity on my own part and that of my officers, we had increased its numbers to near four hundred thousand, and the artillery to one thousand two hundred and fifty pieces. It was organized as follows:

Infantry.	1st corps under Vandamme . . . . .	3 divisions.
	2d " " Victor . . . . .	3 "
	3d " " Ney (afterwards Souham) . . . . .	5 "
	4th " " Bertrand . . . . .	3 "
	5th " " Lauriston . . . . .	3 "
	6th " " Marmont . . . . .	3 "
	7th " " Reynier . . . . .	3 "
	8th " " Poniatowski . . . . .	2 "
	9th " " Augereau . . . . .	2 "
	10th " " Rapp, at Dantzic.	
	11th " " Macdonald . . . . .	3 "
	12th " " Oudinot . . . . .	3 "
	13th " " Davoust . . . . .	3 "
	14th " " Saint-Cyr . . . . .	3 "
	Cavalry.	1st " " Latour-Maubourg . . . . .
2d " " Sébastiani . . . . .		3 "
3d " " Arrighi . . . . .		4 "
4th " " Kellerman, Jr. . . . .		3 "



## RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.—

The respective forces were distributed as follows: on my right, twenty-five thousand Bavarians, assembled at Munich, were in observation before an army of nearly equal force, which Austria had collected in the environs of Lintz. They were sustained, or rather restrained, by a corps of twenty thousand men which Augereau had assembled in the environs of Würzburg and Bamberg. On my left, Davoust occupied Hamburg and Lübeck with thirty thousand French and Danes, forming the thirteenth corps. He had before him the corps of Walmoden, of equal force. Bernadotte, Prince Royal of Sweden, commanded, in the environs of Berlin, an army of some hundred and twenty thousand Russians, Swedes, and Prussians; I opposed to him Oudinot, who, with seventy thousand men, placed himself at Dahme on the road from Torgau to Berlin. My grand army of two hundred and thirty thousand men were cantoned from Dresden to Liegnitz; it was composed of eleven corps of infantry and four of cavalry, including the forces under Oudinot. Murat, having returned from Naples after my victory at Bautzen, in order to obtain, by his devotion, pardon for his conduct in the retreat from Russia, was charged with the command of the reserve. The Russo-Prussian army of two hundred thousand combatants was in the environs of Schweidnitz, and one hundred and thirty thousand Austrians had united in Bohemia.

I have been reproached for having employed Davoust with thirty thousand men at Hamburg. This position, they say, had no connection with the great question to be decided on the Elbe; the strength of my position depended upon the right, and not the left, and the enemy could not throw himself upon Hamburg, so long as I was victorious between Magdeburg and Dresden. All this is true; but then the English might have thrown ten thousand men, arms, and money into the north of Germany, have raised Hanover and Westphalia, and, by uniting with Walmoden, have brought sixty thousand men on my rear, and even drawn Denmark after them. The position of Davoust freed me from this apprehension, and, moreover, gave occupation to an equal number of the enemy. If ever a detachment was indispensable and useful, this one was.

DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS OF THE THEATER OF WAR.—The new theater upon which we were about to wage so terrible a war was different from those which preceded it. In examining its various combinations I found four systems from which to choose.

The first was to make the Elbe the pivot of all my movements; I held all the fortified points, Königstein, Dresden, Tor-

gau; Wittenberg and Magdeburg made me master of the course of this river, as Stettin, Glogau, and Custrin commanded the Oder. I was certain of having bridges for maneuvering at my pleasure between the two rivers, with great advantage against the enemy, who did not possess a single fortified passage. My position, it is true, was taken in reverse by Bohemia; but if the enemy wished to maneuver by the left bank of the Elbe against Saxony, I could paralyze all who remained on the right bank, and throw myself in mass on those debouching from Bohemia. Thanks to the situation of the little fort of Königstein, I could even operate in my turn against the communications of the enemy, if he should descend the Elbe to Dresden. I might even allow the mass of the allied forces to break their heads against my barrier of the Elbe, while I threw myself alternately on the armies of the North and of Silesia. In either case, the tactical advantage was on my side.

The second system was to profit by the places of Magdeburg, Torgau, and Görlitz on Yung-Bunzlau or Prague, to take in reverse the grand army of the sovereigns, which was moving on the Eger. This would have entirely changed my line of operations and have based me on the Danube and Bavaria. The success of this plan would have produced immense results; but, in case of reverse, all my defenses on the Elbe and my *dépôts* would have been abandoned to themselves; it is true that they were well provided and might have held out for some months. In order to execute this grand operation, it would have been necessary to draw my army of Silesia into Bohemia, and leave to Oudinot the care of throwing good garrisons in Torgau and Dresden to form my rear guard on Zittau. The union of three hundred thousand Frenchmen in Bohemia in the plains of Yung-Bunzlau would have greatly embarrassed the sovereigns, for, by beating their principal army near Laun, it would have been thrown back near Egra on the Böhmerwald or on the Voigtland, and been cut off from its base, from Blücher, and from Bernadotte; finally, its magazines, collected at great expense, would have amply provided us with provisions. It cannot be denied that this plan was manifestly superior to either of the others. It may be said, perhaps, that its execution required a knowledge of the march decided on by the sovereigns at Trachenberg, and which I did not know till the sixteenth; but that was of little importance. Whether I found Schwartzemberg with one hundred thousand Austrians, or encountered the grand allied army, I would become master of the southern side of the theater of war and drive the enemy to the other side, where the advantages were already in my favor. Nevertheless, this maneuver had the inconvenience of requiring, at its commencement, a retrograde movement of the army of Mac-

donald before the army of Silesia, which would have pursued and perhaps have cut up the French marshal. However, Macdonald had the advantage of disputing in his retreat the defile from Lauban to Reichenberg, ground favorable for defense. The want of practicable roads was the greatest obstacle to the adoption of this system; for we had, in order to execute it, only the road from Rumburg and Gabel, and that from Lauban on Reichenberg.

The third system was to face toward the western frontiers of Bohemia, by placing my left near Dresden and extending my line in the direction of Zwickau and Plauen, abandoning all the right bank of the Elbe. Although the advocate of defensive war would give this the preference, it did not at all suit me. I should have been destitute of common sense to abandon voluntarily all the advantages of the Elbe and enable three allied armies to unite, when I could divide their efforts. My left, abandoned at Dresden, would have had to contend alone against these three armies; or, if I had wished to bring the rest of my forces to its assistance, I should necessarily have been obliged to change my front in order to place myself in battle on the Elbe. This would have been war without reason and without results.

The fourth system was to evacuate Germany and establish myself behind the Rhine; several of my generals, who did not comprehend my position, were inclined to adopt this plan. It was an absurd idea. There was no necessity for such a measure; it would have been better to subscribe at once to all the sacrifices imposed by the coalition. Such a course would have been more honorable and more advantageous than to retire of my own accord, and draw upon the frontiers of France all Europe in arms, without putting an end to the war. To retire behind the Rhine would have been to surrender the Confederation, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland. Moreover, what could we have done with only four hundred thousand men to defend the whole line from Amsterdam to Bâle? It would have required half of this force to garrison the fortifications, and we would have had only two hundred thousand men in the field to fight six hundred thousand Allies, who assailed us in Saxony and Franconia. Here we might at least oppose to them all our forces and preserve our own territory untouched. Instead of throwing one hundred and fifty thousand men into our fortresses and ruining the soil of France, we could here keep these forces active, augment their numbers still further by the contingents of the Confederation, and carry on the war at the expense of others.

**PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.**—Every thing being arranged for the new campaign, I left Dresden on the fifteenth, and



went to Zittau.\* The hostilities were not to begin till the sixteenth, but the Allies put themselves in motion on the twelfth, to execute the plan which had been agreed upon at Trachenberg.

\*The following note, put by Jomini in the mouth of Napoleon, contains the substance of Napoleon's own dictations at St. Helena, as given in his "Memoirs" by Montholon and Gourgaud:

"On arriving at Bautzen, I learned that General Jomini, chief of Marshal Ney's staff, had gone over to the Russian army. Although this event has been generally misjudged by the historians of the campaign, it was, nevertheless, of a nature to greatly annoy me. Jomini was a susceptible man, violent, self-willed, but too frank to conduct any premeditated intrigue. Many circumstances contributed to induce him to take this step. He was a Swiss. Constantly maltreated by the Prince of Neufchâtel, he had already, in 1810, wished to enter the Russian service, where he had been, in fact, offered the rank of general in the suite of the Emperor Alexander. He had asked for his discharge, but I had refused it. After having recently distinguished himself at Bautzen, as has been shown in the preceding chapter, he was arrested on the charge of not having sent, in time, certain returns and information which he could not obtain, and under this futile pretext he was published to the army in an order of the day as guilty of neglect of duty. Twice during the armistice Ney had proposed him for the grade of general of division, to which he had just claims for recent and important services. Numerous promotions had been made in his *corps-d'armée*; he alone was excepted, and instead of being recompensed, was subjected to unmerited punishment. Exasperated at such injustice, and certain, from what had occurred in 1810, that I would not accept his resignation, he determined to join a prince who promised him a distinguished reception, and whose magnanimity has been greatly extolled.

"However violent this step, the attenuating circumstances which accompanied it render it excusable. It was the result of a very natural feeling—that of submitting to no humiliation. This officer was not a Frenchman, and was bound to our flag by no feelings of patriotism, the only feelings which can enable one to submit to ill-treatment.

"Some ill-informed writers have attributed to this event the retreat of our troops behind the Bober, by accusing Jomini of having communicated my plans to the enemy. He was incapable of such an act; moreover, he did not know my plan, for it could not have been communicated to him till after the renewal of hostilities. Others have attributed Blücher's attack to information given him by Jomini; this is equally false; Blücher entered the neutral territory on the twelfth of August, whereas Jomini did not leave for Prague till the fourteenth, and had previously had no communication with the Prussian general. He proved, besides, that so far from compromising Ney, he himself had taken, in spite of the marshal, every precaution to cover his camps, ordering, on his own authority, the light cavalry of General Beurmann to Leignitz to place it in advance of the Katzbach. This fact alone attests that Jomini was a slave to his duty, and that in taking this desperate step he had obeyed his head, rather than his heart. His loss was a serious one; for, of all my officers, he best understood my system of war, and had rendered me important services at Ulm, at Jena, in Poland, at Eylau, in Spain, at the Beresina, and at Bautzen."

The different views taken of Jomini's conduct by his friends and his enemies are briefly stated in the biographical sketch of the author at the beginning of the first volume of this translation.

Barclay, with more than one hundred thousand men, fling by his left, crossed Bohemia. His junction with the Austrians formed a mass of two hundred and twenty thousand men, destined to march on Dresden by the left bank of the Elbe. Blücher, left in Silesia with about one hundred thousand men, inundated the neutral territory, took possession of Breslau, and advanced on the Katzbach. My corps in Silesia were obliged to raise their cantonments in haste, and retire behind the Bober. Until now, I had believed that the Russian and Prussian masses, forming the general center of the Allies in Silesia, would advance on the Bober, and that the Austrians would attack me in flank with one hundred thousand men. All my dispositions were made to observe, with eighty thousand men each of the masses of the enemy, and to throw myself with a suitable reinforcement upon either, as occasion required.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—I had pushed Poniatowski, the seventeenth of August, on Gabel, to ascertain what was passing in Bohemia; we there learned at the same time the march of the sovereigns and the grand army on Bohemia, and the retreat of my army of Silesia. These two events left me no further doubt as to the part I was to take. As Blücher was coming against the mass of my forces, it was necessary to begin by getting rid of him. It has been thought that I would have done better to push forward on Yung-Bunzlau, so as to fall on the grand army of the sovereigns. Perhaps I should have done so, if there had been time; but as the armies of Oudinot and Macdonald had not been prepared for such an enterprise, I thought it more safe to fall at once on Blücher, leaving the grand question to be afterward decided. Although my information announced that the sovereigns were advancing on Bohemia, yet there was nothing to indicate whether they would cross the Elbe, or place themselves at Gabel, Leypa, and Reichenberg; in the last supposition, the attack on Prague would be only a front attack.

NAPOLEON MARCHES AGAINST BLÜCHER.—Having resolved to march into Silesia, I left Saint-Cyr to guard Dresden; Vandamme and Poniatowski remained in echelons on the road to Gabel; Belluno remained at Zittau to sustain them; these last three corps were to mask my rear and cover my communications with the Elbe. I advanced into Silesia at the head of one hundred and forty thousand men. Mortier, Marmont, the guards, and Murat's cavalry followed the corps of Ney, Lauriston, and Macdonald. We passed the Bober on the twenty-first. Unfortunately for us, Blücher refused battle, as had been agreed upon at Trachenberg. If I had known this intention, I should have changed my plan, and not have hesitated to march on Prague.

Blücher fell back on Jauer. I could not follow him without compromising the safety of Dresden, threatened as it was by the grand army of the Allies; this point was the more important as it was to serve as the pivot of all my operations, and to enable me to act at pleasure upon either side of the Elbe.

INSTRUCTIONS TO MACDONALD.—I left Macdonald in Silesia with eighty thousand men, and with the remaining sixty thousand took the road to Lusace; and, after marching one hundred and twenty leagues with my best troops, returned to the place from which I started, without having accomplished any object. I had given Macdonald detailed instructions, which should have avoided the disasters which he experienced. On the twenty-third of August, at my departure from Löwenberg, I directed Berthier to write to him: "That in the present state of our troops we could do nothing better than to march against the enemy, as soon as he should take the offensive; in that case, the Allies would undoubtedly move on several points at the same time; that Macdonald, on the contrary, should concentrate his force on a single point, so as to debouch against them and immediately take the initiative. He was informed of my project of debouching from Zittau on Prague, in case the enemy did not seriously threaten the intrenched camp of Dresden, or of debouching by that camp, if the enemy presented himself before it with the mass of his forces. In case he should be attacked by superior numbers, to fall back behind the Queis, hold Görlitz, and keep open his communications with me, so as to form a junction in case of need. If he should be pressed, and I in full operation, he would, at the worst, retire on the intrenched camp of Dresden, while my first care would be to keep up our communications with him."

Never did I take more wise precautions, and never were they worse understood or worse executed. Having returned to my army, on the twenty-fourth of August, between Görlitz and Zittau, I hesitated whether or not I should debouch on Prague; but the fears manifested by Saint-Cyr for the fate of Dresden decided me: I directed myself on Stolpe, the twenty-fifth, and very soon had cause to applaud this resolution, when I learned that Oudinot had been beaten, on the twenty-third, in a partial engagement at Gross-Beeren near Berlin. Having decided to operate on the communications of the grand allied army, I left Poniatowski alone to guard the defiles of Gabel, and assembled my masses between Stolpe and Lohman; but, before relating these operations, let us look for a moment at what the enemy was doing.



THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED FORCES.—The allied sovereigns, at the head of their grand army, had, on the twenty-first, crossed the mountains which separate Bohemia from Saxony, and advanced on Dresden. This movement, very well conceived, was very badly executed. The information which I had received proved to me the advantage which I possessed over my adversaries in the unity of command and combinations. Never had an army so many chiefs. Louis XIV. had conducted war with his ministers, his courtiers, and the envoys of his allies; but, in fact, Louvois and Turenne had directed everything. The Emperor Alexander seemed the natural chief of the new league; being more distant from France than the others, he seemed the most disinterested of the monarchs. It is said that the chief command was offered to him, but that, distrusting his own abilities, he had modestly declined it, and that it was then decided to confer the command on one of the secondary generals, directed by the council of sovereigns. Alexander had even the generosity to divide his own army, and to distribute his troops among those of Bernadotte, Blücher, and Schwartzberg.

It is said that afterwards, stimulated by Moreau and Jomini, the Emperor of Russia offered to charge himself with the responsibility which he had at first declined, but that the Emperor of Austria, appreciating the advantage which that command would give him, refused his assent. The Prince of Schwartzberg was, therefore, invested with the title of generalissimo. This brave soldier was not a man capable of directing so complicated a machine; on the other hand, he was of a modest, yielding character—in a word, more fitted to obey than to command. Thus the appointment would not have been so objectionable if they had given him a skillful major-general (chief of staff) and a couple of aids-major-generals (subordinate officers of staff) capable of forming under him good plans of operation; but this they neglected to do. General Radetski was a good lieutenant-general, and young Count Latour an officer of great promise; but neither had the experience necessary for such a command. To these were added General Languenau, a Saxon officer who owed to me his advancement, and who, at the epoch of the battle of Lutzen, had rejoined the Austrian army. He had never done anything to justify my confidence. He had more talent for intrigue than military ability; some verbose memoirs secured for him the favor of Prince Metternich.

It must not be inferred, however, from this whimsical selection of officers, that Austria had no good ones, or that her army was bad because it had been often defeated. That her troops should be imperfect, after twenty years of reverses, was

natural, and that her generals should lose their confidence was still more natural; however, both exhibited great firmness in their reverses, and the good qualities of Wurmser's soldiers proved what was to be expected of an Austrian army when ably commanded. The staff was well instructed in all the accessory branches, as topography, fortification, tactics of detail, etc. But the habit of the Aulic Council of directing everything themselves, and of selecting court favorites for commands, caused many misfortunes. Why was it that in a country that produced Prince Charles, Kray, Laudon, and Lichtenstein, more competent persons could not be found to direct their military operations than those charged with those important duties in 1813? Why was it that Metternich could not find some more skillful person to direct his armies, or at least more able staff-officers as advisers to the Prince of Schwartzberg?

As it was, the Aulic committee of the campaign had the important task of preparing and issuing all orders, after first submitting them to the sovereigns, who formed a kind of council of revision. The Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, Lord Cathcart (the English ambassador), Lowenhelm (the Swedish ambassador), Prince Wolkonsky, Generals Moreau, Barclay, Diebitsch, Toll, Jomini, and Knessebeck discussed the projected operations. As they had to give their opinions on the crude plans of the others, this council led to interminable debates. Either because Schwartzberg wished to free himself from such leading-strings, or because he found it impossible to wait for these long discussions before combining his operations, his orders were often sent to the different corps without being first submitted to the sovereigns for their approval; and it was soon found that the formation of plans of operation for the army was left to men who were utterly ignorant of the duty. Several generals, who were capable of appreciating the sad results of such a state of things, now urged the league to choose an Agamemnon, and intrust to him their destinies. There being no monarch suited for this office, they proposed the Archduke Charles, who had given proof of his capacity: but private interests defeated this object. It was therefore necessary that the Emperor Alexander should act as a kind of mediator, and by his moderation and address have the indirect control of affairs, and, at least, avoid great evils, if he could not accomplish great objects.

**MARCH OF THE ALLIES ON DRESDEN.**—My march on Silesia had been made almost in musket-shot of the Austrian frontier, which was well guarded by custom-house officers, game-keepers, forest-guards, etc.; yet strange to say, Schwartzberg knew nothing of it. He descended on Marienberg and Pirna by a

slow march, supposing me still at Dresden, when I was at the distance of sixty leagues. Saint-Cyr threw himself into that city with the resolution to defend it to the uttermost, so that I might have time to come to his assistance. The Allies seconded his plans admirably by the slowness of their march. They passed the mountains on the twenty-first of August, but it was not till the evening of the twenty-fifth that their right under Barclay appeared before Dresden, after beating Claparède at Pirna, and leaving Ostermann in observation near Königstein. The Austrians, who were amusing themselves at a grand review in the plains of Laun, and pushing their left to the environs of Egra, combined their movements so badly that they could not arrive till two days after the Russo-Prussian army, which had debouched from the mountains of Glatz.

On learning at Gabel, on the seventeenth, this movement of the Allies on the Elbe, I foresaw this attempt against Dresden, but was not at all embarrassed by it, for I knew that the place could not well be carried by an assault, and that I was more advantageously situated than they were, for maneuvering on their communications. Their first plan had been to march on Leipsic, where Bernadotte would join them, by passing the Elbe at Dessau. If they had followed this project, and I had gained a great battle, their destruction would have been almost certain. By drawing to me the army of Oudinot, I should have had two hundred thousand men; and by passing the Elbe at Dresden on their rear, I should have got possession of their magazines, and their line of operations on Bohemia; I would have attacked them at Leipsic with the advantage of having in my power all the fortified debouches of the Elbe; I would also have held the issues of that river, of the Oder, and of Bohemia, so that the Allies, if beaten, would have been thrown back on the Baltic, without the ability of regaining Austria.

The King of Saxony, under an exaggerated idea of the inconvenience of living in a fortified capital, had, since 1810, begun to demolish the defenses of the old city. But during the armistice I had employed numerous workmen in rebuilding them: the dismantled fronts had been made sufficiently strong to resist an assault, and the rich exterior *faubourgs* were covered by an *enceinte* of thirteen redoubts, of which eight were on the right and five on the left bank of the Elbe. These were not strong enough to resist a siege, nor even an assault, if defended by only an ordinary garrison; but defended by an entire army, the post was impregnable.

The Allies had two courses to pursue: 1st, to debouch by Peterswalde, Altenberg, and Marienberg; to occupy the heights



of Dippodiswalde with their right reinforced towards Gieshubel, and to there await my attack; 2d, to march rapidly against Dresden with several thousand fascines and scaling-ladders, and, if I was not found there with the mass of my forces, to attempt against the *faubourgs* and old town what Bernadotte and Soult had done at Lübeck: they might have been repelled with the loss of several thousand men; but as the result of the campaign depended upon the success of this operation, it was well worth the attempt. As soon as my presence at Dresden announced that the mass of my forces was opposed to them, the question was changed, and the Allies ought then to have held themselves in the imposing position between Gieshubel and Dippodiswalde. This place would have been to me what Taroutina was in 1812. Placed on my line of operation, they might have continually inundated it with partisans, and nothing but a decisive battle could have rid me of such troublesome neighbors. If beaten, the Allies could have escaped behind the Eger; if conquerors, they would have driven me back into Dresden, where, under such circumstances, my position would have been far from secure. I should have been obliged to adopt the course which I pursued in October—to defile on Leipsic. But the Austrians, who were ignorant of my being on the Katzbach, the twenty-first of August, did not yet know, on the twenty-fifth, that I had returned to Stolpe. In fact, they had received only a few hours before the dispatches of Blücher, saying that I was hotly pressing him near Goldberg. How then was it possible that I could be on the Elbe the next day with the same troops?

At ten o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fifth the allied sovereigns had assembled on the heights of Röknitz before Dresden, to decide upon the disposition of their forces. Two divisions of Saint-Cyr were in advance of the city, deployed between the Gross-Garten and the road to Dippodiswalde, with their rear supported on the intrenched camp. A Russian general proposed to attack, citing in support of this opinion our operation against Blücher at Lübeck. A vigorous *coup-de-main* might have decided the campaign, by rendering the Allies masters of my base of operations.

All the Allies who had passed through Dresden some months before knew that this old town had been partly dismantled, and that I had only been able to secure the place by field-works. On the supposition that I was still in Silesia, there was no reason to hesitate: they must either risk an attack or form in battle-array between Gieshubel and Dippodiswalde. They determined upon the former: the attempt could cost nothing, and never was there a project with more powerful motives for its adoption. But

Schwartzenberg wished to wait for the arrival of his Austrians, who were marching from Marienberg by horrible roads, instead of taking the great road, or at least that which runs directly from Sayda to Dresden. He therefore postponed the attack till four o'clock p. m. on the twenty-sixth. This was a great error, because the hundred thousand Russians and Prussians under Barclay were sufficient for a *coup-de-main* against three divisions. Numbers here were of no consequence, but time was everything. It was not in contending with me that they could lose thirty hours with impunity.

THEIR SINGULAR DISPOSITIONS FOR ATTACK.—To this mistake they added another still greater in their manner of attack. The plan prepared by Schwartzenberg fell into my hands among the baggage which was captured. It was a *chef-d'oeuvre* of its kind; it ran thus: "A general reconnoissance will be attempted on the place of Dresden; the army will advance in five columns, which will endeavor to carry the works and to penetrate into the city!" . . . . Can anything more incoherent be imagined? He either wished to reconnoiter or to make an assault; in the first case, why place one hundred and eighty thousand men in mass around a place, and make them fight? If, instead of a simple reconnoissance, he designed an assault, why not prescribe the precautions and preparations for such an attempt? Mack has been greatly decried, but he never imagined anything like this!

PROJECT TO CUT OFF THE ALLIES AT KÖNIGSTEIN.—As has already been said, I had returned to Stolpe, on the twenty-fifth, by a remarkable forced march. My project was at first to debouch with one hundred thousand men by Königstein and Pirna on the enemy's rear; I informed the Duke of Bassano of this at Dresden, by the following letter, which I addressed to him from Görlitz, on the twenty-fourth of August:

"It is my intention to march to Stolpe. My army will be assembled there to-morrow; I shall pass the twenty-sixth there, in making preparations, and in rallying my columns. On the night of the twenty-sixth I shall move my columns by Königstein, and at daybreak on the twenty-seventh I will establish myself in the camp of Pirna with one hundred thousand men. By seven o'clock in the morning I will commence an attack on Hollendorf, and by noon will be master of the place. I will then put myself in a commanding position on that communication. I will make myself master of Pirna, and have pontons ready to establish two bridges at that place, if necessary. If the enemy has taken for his line of operation the road from Peterswalde to Dresden, I will be found on his rear with all my army united

against his, which he cannot rally in less than four or five hours. If he has taken his line of operations by the road to Komotaw, Dresden will be relieved; I shall then be in Bohemia, nearer Prague than the enemy, and will march there. Marshal Saint-Cyr will follow the enemy as soon as he appears disconcerted.

"I will mask my movement by covering the bank of the Elbe with thirty thousand cavalry and light artillery, so that the enemy, seeing all the shore occupied, will think my army about Dresden! Such is my project. It may, however, be modified by the operations of the enemy. I suppose that when I shall undertake my attack, Dresden will not be so assailed that she cannot hold out for twenty-four hours.

"You may impart to the King of Saxony alone my projects, and say to him that if the enemy press Dresden, it may be more convenient for him to take a country-house on the right bank. Send none but very vague news to Paris, giving it to be understood that they will hear at the same time my victory over the army of Silesia, the capture of Berlin, and of other events still more important. Write to Erfurth, Munich, and Würzburg in cipher. The letter to Würzburg will be imparted to the Duke of Castiglione. Write to General Margaron that if he is pressed at Leipsic, he ought to retire on Torgau. See the director of the estafette, and have it pass through Leipsic and Torgau.

"If Marshal Saint-Cyr has sufficient force to defend Dresden, and should not be pressed, let him send out to meet General Vandamme, so that the latter may take position with his divisions at Neustadt, seeing that any retrograde movement may be disadvantageous."

The success of this enterprise would have produced immense results. I should have cut off the Allies' line of retreat; and, in case of reverse, I could have taken refuge under the fort of Königstein and the camp of Pirna, where I could recross the Elbe in security; these *lîtes-de-pont* were of incalculable importance to me. But information which I received from Saint-Cyr made me fear that a strong attempt might be made to carry Dresden, and as the force of the enemy was rumored to be two hundred thousand men, I sent Gourgaud to reconnoiter Saint-Cyr's position; he returned in haste, and assured me that the enemy were strong enough to carry the city, if they attacked it with vigor. I therefore concluded my projected maneuver would be too adventurous, and preferred to march directly on Dresden so as to debouch from there, throwing Vandamme on the decisive point of the road to Peterswalde. Under the circumstances, I did not repent having formed this resolution; but God alone knows what would have been the result if I had executed the plan



which I dictated at Stolpe on the twenty-fifth. I could have drawn Poniatowski toward me, and have placed one hundred and thirty thousand men on the only communication of the Allies! On the other hand, my troops were young and without experience, and I had but few old cavalry. The Allies had a more numerous force, were better organized, and numbered at least forty thousand experienced cavalry. Moreover, time was wanting to rally the armies of Macdonald and Oudinot, from which I would have been separated, had I been defeated. The last of these two marshals had just experienced a check at Gross-Beeren, of little importance in itself, but calculated to effect the *morale* of the contending forces. All these motives combined to induce me to change my project, and to march on Dresden the morning of the twenty-seventh.

BATTLE OF DRESDEN, AUGUST 26 AND 27.—I thought that at the sight of my columns which descended the Elbe and commanded the right of Wittgenstein, the Allies would renounce their project of attacking the city. The head of my columns entered the town at two o'clock, and to my great astonishment, at precisely four o'clock one hundred and twenty thousand men assailed the works. I have since learned that this assault was made through an inconceivable misunderstanding. The Emperor Alexander, learning my return from the reports of my cannon, now pronounced it ridiculous to make the projected attack; all agreed in this opinion, and Schwartzberg started to revoke the orders. It was now one o'clock, and there was plenty of time to give the counter-order. It required no new dispositions, merely a verbal direction to the principal officers, countermanding the attack; but no direction was given. It is not pretended that it was forgotten, but that the objections of Radetzki and Languenau prevented its being sent. The responsibility of this neglect is to be divided between the generalissimo and those who composed his staff.

The enemy's columns assaulted the works with great impetuosity; those of Colloredo and Lichtenstein penetrated into the city. The Russians and Prussians formed a lodgment in Gross-Garten and Striese; at the left, Bianchi got possession of Lobeda and the houses near the gate of Freyburg; Giulay and Metzko pushed on nearly to Friedrichstadt. Saint-Cyr had taken care to draw in the divisions which had been deployed on the twenty-fifth; so that columns of attack were ready to debouch as soon as the fire of the intrenchments had staggered the enemy. He was everywhere repulsed. Ney debouched at the head of two divisions of the Young Guard and drove back the left of the Austrians on Lobeda; two other divisions made a sortie by the

gate of Pirna and repulsed Kleist; Saint-Cyr, at the center, drove back Chasteller and Colloredo. During the night I was rejoined by the remainder of my troops from Silesia, and now found myself at the head of one hundred and ten thousand men, independent of the corps of Vandamme; but the Allies had one hundred and eighty thousand men besides those against Vandamme. Nevertheless, I did not hesitate to attack them; I required a complete victory to clear my communications.

On the morning of the twenty-seventh, we debouched from Dresden, while Vandamme took the enemy in reverse by Königstein. The allied army, drawn up in a semi-circle before Dresden, supported its right on the Elbe, its center on the heights of Räcknitz; but its left was paralyzed by being placed beyond the defile of Tharandt, which it could not cross. Under the pretext of facilitating its junction, Schwartzenberg had insisted, against all advice, in placing three Austrian divisions beyond this precipice. This exposed them without necessity. It is true that it was advantageous to seize it; but Klenau was there already; there was no objection to his remaining at a distance, and it would even have been better if he had been left at Freyburg, instead of drawing him to Dresden, since the first of these points was two days' march nearer my base of operations, and from it he could have anticipated me if I had decided to regain the Saal.

In profiting by this error, I accomplished the double project of overthrowing their isolated divisions and opening my own communication. I therefore threw the King of Naples against them with the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg and the corps of Belluno. A very warm combat was engaged in between Lobeda and Corbitz. The weather was frightful, torrents of rain had been falling since midnight; the few Austrian cavalry could not resist our cuirassiers; and the infantry, soaked with rain and not being able to fire their pieces, were broken at the center near Corbitz. Giulay having been driven into the defile of Tharandt near Potschapel, Murat attacked the three brigades of the extreme right under Metzko, which, being isolated, turned, and defeated, laid down their arms, after useless efforts to escape. More than ten thousand prisoners were the fruit of this brilliant feat of arms. In the meantime the left of Belluno established itself in the village of Plauen, which constitutes the key of the defile of Tharandt, and the only point by which it was possible to succor the three compromised divisions.

Marmont and Saint-Cyr, supporting themselves on the entrenched camp, had limited their operations to cannonading the enemy and repelling the charges of the Austrians and Prussians; the latter had made a lodgment in the Gross-Garten and rested on the village of Strehlen, which Kleist had at first been ordered to

evacuate, and which he had afterward vainly attempted to recapture. The enormous masses of the Allies at the center on the heights of Räcknitz did not allow us to undertake anything on that point. I, however, caused it to be cannonaded by the artillery of the guard and that of the Duke of Ragusa. It was here that Moreau had his legs carried away by a French ball. This general, who had been deemed, by my enemies, capable of balancing my fortune, had returned from America to enter the Russian service. He soon perceived his error; for the Austrians allowed him no part in the command. He died the next day at Laun, worthy, perhaps, of a better fate.\*

On our left, Ney, having united four divisions of the Young Guard between Gross-Garten and the Elbe, debouched from Gruna against Wittgenstein. It was now the more easy to push on to Reich, as the Allies had determined during the night to concentrate on the heights of Leubnitz, and to abandon the valley of the Elbe so as to fall on our flank if we ventured to engage ourselves there. The Russian general, Roth, nevertheless, made a glorious defense of the villages of Seidnitz and Gross-Dobritz, and regained in good order the right of Wittgenstein behind Reich.

In the meantime Kleist, Miloradowitsch, the reserve of the Grand Duke Constantine, Colloredo, and the reserve of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, had scarcely been engaged. The half of their masses accumulated on the center might have attacked Ney by Strehlen, and have defeated him while extended too much to the left so as to form a line parallel to the Elbe. The project was approved by the Emperor Alexander, and the masses of Kleist and Miloradowitsch were actually disposed for the purpose of striking this blow. Barclay was at the same time to descend from Leubnitz with the reserve and Gortschakof's corps; but he failed to give the signal for the others to act, and the thing was not attempted. If the movement had been executed with vigor and *ensemble*, it might have balanced the defeat of Giulay on the left.

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\*The following remarks are copied from Thiers:

"Whilst these events were taking place on the Allies' left, a strange accident occurred at the center, where Napoleon was exchanging a vigorous cannonade with the Austrians, and where he himself directed the operations of his batteries in the very thickest of the fire. At the same time, the Emperor was at a point exactly opposite, at Rackwitz, accompanied by General Moreau, who, seeing the danger of his position, advised him to withdraw somewhat further back. This advice had barely been given, and was on the very point of being executed, when a bullet from the batteries of which Napoleon was personally directing the fire struck the general on his legs, and hurled him and his horse to the ground. A strange stroke of fortune, this! which made the instrument of his death a ball from a French cannon, fired, as it were, by Napoleon's own hand."



The Austrians have only to attribute to their own chiefs this bloody defeat. Not satisfied with recommending to their left to hold all the space between Plauen and Priesnitz even to the Elbe, which was absurd, they attached to it only one division of cavalry, while the reserve of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg was concentrated on the center and uselessly exposed to the fire of our artillery, from which it suffered as great losses as if it had been engaged. The ground here was unfavorable for the maneuvering of cavalry, and the Russian and Prussian horse would have been abundantly sufficient for the object in view, whereas three divisions of the Austrian cuirassiers on the left flank might have decided the battle and saved their infantry.

THE ALLIES DETERMINE TO RETREAT.—It was now five o'clock, and beginning to grow dark; the rain was increasing, and the troops on both sides were drenched. The Allies, or rather a majority of them, informed at the same time of the disaster of their left and of the passage of Vandamme at Königstein, were inclined to retreat. The Emperor of Russia was not pleased with the plan, and the King of Prussia was unwilling to hear it spoken of; but the Austrians declared that they had brought with them only half-supplies for their artillery, and had but a few more rounds to fire; that their parks of provisions had been unable to follow them through the narrow roads of the mountains; in a word, that it was necessary to regain Bohemia in order to prevent the dissolution of their army. Notwithstanding the constant opposition of the King of Prussia, they decided upon a retreat; two generals, charged with drawing up the order of it, soon returned with a burlesque disposition for a retreat behind the Eger in five columns, each of which had its daily march marked out in regular stages as in time of peace and without any reference to what might occur to the other columns! Such combinations excited the ire of the enlightened critics, but time was pressing, and if they were to retire that night, not a moment was to be lost. The plan was, therefore, assented to through disgust rather than conviction. As a *chef-d'oeuvre* of absurdity in this disposition, they feared to take, at the right, the good road to Pirna, because Vandamme occupied it with twenty-five thousand men, although there was no river or other obstacle to cross; Barclay, Kleist, and the Russian reserve might have taken this road without any great inconvenience. Vandamme, hemmed in between them and Ostermann's corps, would have been happy to effect his own escape. They directed Barclay and Kleist by Dohna on Gieshubel; Klenau by Freyburg and Marienberg; the Austrians by Altenberg and Zinwald. The ill-planned order was still farther aggravated by Barclay, who, fearing to find the passage barred at

Peterswalde or Dohna, threw himself with the Russians on the road to Dippodiswalde and Altenberg, where they became frightfully jammed in with the Austrians. This resolution was the more to be regretted as Ostermann, although left alone, succeeded in effecting a passage; and Barclay with fifty thousand men more could have found very little difficulty in doing the same thing.

The enemy lost much of their artillery and thirty thousand men *hors-de-combat*, including the ten thousand Austrians of the left wing who were taken prisoners. The trophies gained in the pursuit were scarcely less: we captured in the defiles two hundred pieces of artillery and caissons, a thousand wagons, and a multitude of wounded and stragglers. This was one of the most glorious victories I ever gained. We were but one to their two, nevertheless the victory was not for a moment doubtful at the points where I struck. It was the only battle where I operated at the same time on both wings; the position of Dresden at the center enabled me to do so without danger. This circumstance was the more fortunate for me, as the principal communications of the Allies were on the wings, and by getting possession of these I forced them to retreat in disorder through the defiles of the mountains.

#### OPERATIONS OF VANDAMME NEAR KÖNIGSTEIN.

—The same day on which we gained these important successes, Vandamme, crossing the Elbe at Königstein with thirty thousand men, forced Count Ostermann, who masked this fort with the division of the old Russian guards and the corps of Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, to retire, which he did by taking the road to Pirna, either because his right was turned or because he had been ordered to fall back in that direction. On the twenty-eighth of August he was forced, by the retrograde movement of the Allies, to take the road to Peterswalde. Vandamme, having already turned him, cut the road, first at Gieshubel, and then at Hollendorf. The Russian general was compelled to cut his way out, and our young soldiers, being obliged to defend too long a line, and assailed by veterans of the Old Guard, were driven back. Ostermann bivouacked at Peterswalde, where he rallied his forces, and the next day defended the ground, foot by foot, with exemplary firmness as far as Culm: even one of his brigades which had been cut off succeeded in rejoining him. I had foreseen the advantage which was to be derived from Vandamme's position in case we were victorious at Dresden. I had ordered him to descend from the mountains and push rapidly on Töplitz, with the promise of his being sustained. If this movement had succeeded, it would have destroyed the greater part of the Allies who were still engaged in retreat in the defiles of Altenberg. But Fortune decided otherwise.

DISASTER OF VANDAMME AT CULM.—Ostermann and his troops, also seeing the importance of the point of Töplitz, fought on the twenty-ninth with an intrepidity above all praise, and finally succeeded in maintaining themselves behind Culm, notwithstanding the reiterated efforts of our troops. Towards evening they began to receive reinforcements which restored the equilibrium of the contending forces: the Grand Duke Constantine carried there a part of the Russian reserve. This first contrariety was followed by a circumstance much more deplorable, which caused the ruin of Vandamme. No sooner was victory declared in our favor in the plains of Colditz and Dresden than I devised the means of profiting by it. The King of Naples and Beluno followed the enemy on Sayda; Ragusa had taken the road to Altenberg; Saint-Cyr debouched on Dohna, Maxen, and Liebenau; Mortier, with the Young Guard, took the road to Pirna; and, on the morning of the twenty-eighth, I started with my headquarters for that city. I was to leave there on the twenty-ninth to follow Vandamme, but a fatality which seemed to attach itself to all my enterprises did not permit me to complete the movement. Having been exposed for fifteen hours on the twenty-seventh to a violent rain, I was seized the next day, during my march to Pirna, with so violent a fever as to compel me to return abruptly to Dresden. I had the project of joining the army of Oudinot with fifty thousand men, and taking possession of Berlin; this motive caused me to renounce the movement on Bohemia. I, at first, had reason to applaud this resolution; for, on returning to Dresden, I heard of Macdonald's bloody defeat on the Katzbach. The reinforcements intended to sustain Vandamme were then stopped at Pirna: but, unfortunately, he was not informed of this. Berthier probably neglected to take the proper means to communicate the information to him. The circumstances have never been explained.\*

The Allies descended with one hundred thousand men into the valley on the morning of the thirtieth, convinced that their safety depended upon the overthrow of Vandamme. A man less audacious would not have waited the attack, but would have effected his escape during the night or at break of day. But, expecting my arrival, he resolved to maintain his position. Although turned on the right and left, and assailed in front,

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\*Jomini, in a long note, contradicts the assertion of Fain that Vandamme descended from the mountains without orders. It appears that this order was given, and that Napoleon at first made his dispositions to sustain him; but when his illness forced him to return to Dresden, he either forgot to give counter-directions to Vandamme, or Berthier neglected to send the order.



he still refused to retreat, it being announced that a column was finally seen debouching on the mountains towards Hollendorf. But the joy caused by this news was of short duration; it was soon found that this column, instead of being one of mine, was the Prussian corps of Kleist, which the Emperor Alexander had ordered to descend on the flank of the French towards Kraupen, and which had taken the main road, instead of the path by the old castle, then encumbered with equipages. The cavalry of Vandamme threw itself on the first troops of Kleist and cut their way through: twelve thousand infantry had the good fortune to follow them, and to regain the army through the woods. All the others, and Vandamme himself, being surrounded, fought with desperation, but were taken in arms. This combat cost us at least fifteen thousand men and sixty pieces of artillery.

This defeat, so unexpected, was a double misfortune, for it might be imputed to a manifest forgetfulness of the principles of war. These principles required a hot pursuit of a beaten and broken army. On this depended the success of the war; all else was only accessory. If I had left Pirna to succor Macdonald, the resolution would have been excusable; but I did not then know of his defeat. If I had returned to Dresden for no other object than to prepare to march on Berlin, it would undoubtedly have been one of the gravest faults of my life. It is true that the consequences would have been less serious if Berthier had recalled Vandamme. Although this accident was not the result of my own intended dispositions, nevertheless, it not only prevented me from profiting by my victory, but also became the first cause of the defeat of my lieutenant.\*

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\*The following is Thiers' account of this battle:

"Such was the unfortunate affair at Culm, which cost us five or six thousand men killed or wounded, seven thousand prisoners, forty-eight pieces of cannon, and two generals, and which, whilst costing the Allies some six thousand men, relieved them from their position of defeat, re-inspired them with the hope of victory, and effaced from their minds the remembrance of the disasters they had suffered on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh of August.

"Where can we look for the cause of this singular catastrophe? Shall we attribute it to Vandamme, saying that he ventured too much? Or to Mortier and Saint-Cyr, complaining that they failed to afford him timely succor? or to Napoleon, on the ground that he trusted too much to the favorable progress of affairs? or shall we rather regard it as the legitimate consequence of the military skill displayed by the generals of the allied armies?

"The facts above narrated almost of themselves sufficiently answer these questions, and account for one of the greatest reverses of fortune of which the pages of history retain any record.

"Vandamme, whose many faults were counterbalanced by many fine qualities, is certainly not blamable for the unfortunate results of these

**LOUDINOT DEFEATED AT GROSS-BEEREN.**—It was the more to be regretted as it tended to encourage the allied army at the moment of our misfortunes in Silesia and Brandenburg. I have already said that Oudinot was left to fight at Gross-Beeren; this marshal, who commanded about sixty-five thousand men, had received orders to take the initiative against Bernadotte, to seek to beat him, and get possession of Berlin. In order to second him in this enterprise, General Gérard had organized a flying corps of the best troops from the garrisons of Magdeburg and Wittenberg. He was to debouch from the first of these places with six thousand men under General Lanusse, to act, in concert

days; for it, after having wisely established himself at Culm, it was General Kleist instead of Marshal Mortier who appeared in his rear, this was an extraordinary accident, to hold him responsible for which would be a crying injustice. During the catastrophe which followed, Vandamme preserved all his presence of mind, and took the only resolution which offered a chance of escape—namely, that of retracing his steps, and passing through the midst of the Prussian troops.

“He is not fairly open to reproach, and the supposition that he lost himself in a too eager pursuit of that marshal’s baton which, far more than others, he deserved for military services already performed, is a calumny upon a man whose misfortunes render him an object for pity rather than blame.

“If it be admitted, however, that Vandamme is not to be blamed, having been unfortunate only in the fact that a Prussian corps appeared in his rear instead of the French one which he expected, what are we to say of the French generals who might have supported him, and more particularly of Marshals Mortier and Saint-Cyr, the only ones posted within reach of Culm? Marshal Mortier, established at Pirna, liable to be dispatched thence either to Dresden, on the one hand, or to Töplitz, on the other, might certainly, had he acted with more self-reliance and vigilance, have hastened up to Vandamme’s aid; but it was, at the same time, perfectly natural that, in the strict fulfillment of the orders he had received, he should await in complete immobility the expression of Napoleon’s will; and with respect to the precise order given to him to aid Vandamme with two divisions, it is sufficient to state that this order did not reach him until the catastrophe had already taken place.

“It would be well if we could say as much with respect to Marshal Saint-Cyr; but the fact is that, directed as he was to keep constantly on the track of Kleist’s corps, he should never have lost sight of him for an instant; and had he fulfilled this positive duty, the necessary result would have been that when Kleist’s corps fell upon Vandamme, it would itself have been attacked by a French corps in the rear, and would probably have been itself broken and routed instead of helping to break and rout the army of Vandamme.

“But, unfortunately, Marshal Saint-Cyr, never zealous for the success of any operations but those with the execution of which he was himself directly charged, and ever inclined rather to seek difficulties than to seek to overcome them, employed the twenty-eighth in moving to Maxen, and on the following day, the twenty-ninth, only advanced to Reinhard’s Grimme, thus making a movement of no more than a league and a half on the very

with Dombrowsky's division from Wittenberg, on the right flank of the Allies. Davoust, on his side, had received orders to ascend the Elbe and the Havel. This union of one hundred thousand men in the environs of Berlin seemed well calculated to secure to us immense results, both in a military and political point of view. I supposed that Bernadotte had but eighty thousand men, including Walmoden's corps, which was opposed to Davoust towards Hamberg. There remained, therefore, according to my calculation, only about fifty thousand combatants with Bernadotte; and Oudinot, superior in numbers, had only to gain one battle to accomplish his task. Unfortunately, the enemy was much stronger than we supposed. Oudinot, after making some de-

day when it was important that the enemy should be pursued with the utmost vigor, and allowed Kleist to disappear from before him, and fall upon Vandamme's rear, whilst he employed himself in inquiring of the staff whether he should not follow Marmont on the Altenberg route.

"On the following day, the thirtieth, when he received the order directing him to endeavor to effect a junction with Vandamme by the lateral route, he at length aroused himself, and by the road which led Kleist upon Vandamme's rear, and which should have conducted himself upon Kleist's rear, arrived just in time to hear the cannon which announced our disaster. As for Marshal Marmont, he pushed the enemy as vigorously as he could, and engaged in several skirmishes which resulted to his advantage, but he was too far from Vandamme to be able to move up to his support. Posted decidedly on the right, he could not attempt to cross the mountains in advance of Saint-Cyr without exposing himself to falling alone amidst a crowd of enemies; and the catastrophe is not, therefore, to be attributed to any error of his.

"With respect to Murat, it is sufficient to say that it was impossible that he should have had any share in the deplorable event which took place at Culm, since he and his squadrons were traversing at the time the great Freyburg route.

"Of the persons who may be considered the responsible actors in this catastrophe, it remains, finally, to speak of Napoleon himself, who, by sedulously following his lieutenants, might have made them converge towards a common point, and by his presence would certainly have obtained what he hoped and expected. But he was turned aside, on the twenty-eighth, from this duty, by the news which reached him from the neighborhood of Löwenberg and Berlin, and also, it must be added, by the confidence he felt that the orders he had given were of themselves sufficient to secure the results he desired. Ever recurring to past experiences, Napoleon believed that he had done sufficient to render him certain of obtaining the most splendid triumphs.

"But, unfortunately, times were changed, and to have accomplished the destruction of the grand army of Bohemia would have required, at least, Napoleon's incessant superintendence of the execution of his designs. But now, distracted as he was by the passionate desire of obtaining all results at once, Berlin and Dantzic were as much means of leading him into error as Moscow had been during the previous year. Indeed, that he might strike a serious blow at Prussia and Germany, at Berlin, and be able to boast that his power extended from the Gulf of Tarentum to the Vistula, he had enter-



tachment of flankers and escorts, advanced with sixty thousand men on Trebbin and Berlin. Bernadotte, after making a feint of maneuvering against his left flank, took the position of Ruhlsdorf with ninety thousand men (of which twenty thousand were good cavalry), without counting the light corps of Generals Hirschfeld near Bradenburg, and that of Wobeser near Baruth. The left of the army, under Tauenzien, was supported on the lake of Rangsdorf; the center, under Bülow, held the road to Berlin; the Russians and Swedes were on the right.

On the twenty-second of August, Oudinot passed the defile of Thyrow, after a warm combat against the advanced guard of Bülow. On the twenty-third our army advanced in three col-

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tained the idea, from the very commencement of this campaign, of sending one of his corps to the Prussian capital, and keeping a garrison at Dantzic; and for the sake of these objects he had, as we have seen, allowed an error to creep into the finely conceived plan he had formed for the conduct of the campaign, giving an excessive extent to the circle of operations, the central point of which was to be at Dresden, placing Macdonald at Löwenberg, instead of at Bautzen, and sending Oudinot against Berlin instead of establishing him at Wittenberg. And as the same cause continued to produce the same effects, he was anxious, on learning the misfortune which had happened to Macdonald, to succor him as soon as possible; and being also anxious to lead in person Oudinot's army to Berlin, he turned from Pirna and Culm, where he ought to have been with his guard, and neglected to achieve victories, the consequences of which would have been of the utmost advantage to him, for the purpose of running after others, and thus exposed himself to the danger of losing everything from an over-anxiety to obtain everything at once.

"But for this catastrophe at Culm alone must he be blamed, for in the details of the several maneuvers he had committed no fault. And at the same time it must be observed that the actual results were but little due to the merits of his enemies; a sentiment of despair rather than calculation having led them to carry into execution a combination which had the most unexpected and important consequences, and which was certainly due, not to the skill of the Emperor Alexander, to whom its merit has been attributed, but to the determination of the Prussian troops either to cut their way out of their perilous position or perish in the attempt.

"We must look, then, not so much to the military skill of the Allies, although they were far from being deficient in this, as to the passionate spirit of patriotism which inspired them, and which rendered them comparatively indifferent to defeat, for the cause of their seizing with such promptitude the opportunity offered them at Culm.

"Another important moral lesson to be drawn from these great events is, that care should ever be taken not to drive men to despair, since to do this is to endow them with a supernatural strength, which may enable them to overthrow the best calculations and to frustrate the plans of the most consummate skill. The Allies, who, when they abandoned the battle-field of Dresden, regarded themselves as completely vanquished, and sadly questioned whether, in attempting to vanquish Napoleon, they had not undertaken an enterprise against destiny itself, suddenly, at the spectacle of the defeat and capture of Vandamme, regarded themselves as being once more

umns; Bertrand and the fourth corps at the right on Johnsdorf; Reynier, with the Saxons, at the center, by the great road; Oudinot and the twelfth corps by the road to Trebbin on Ahrensdorf. It would be difficult to say what the marshal intended by thus engaging his forces on ground cut up by woods and marshes, and without a single cross-road by which he could unite his columns; he himself marching in rear of his left. No preparations were made for a battle, and undoubtedly Oudinot did not expect one. Bertrand, at six o'clock in the morning, first encountered near Blankenfelde the corps of Tauenzien, who made a good defense of the debouch from the woods by means of that village. The combat was an obstinate one, and without result. It was already terminated when Reynier, at three o'clock in the afternoon, attacked, near Gross-Beeren, the advanced guard of Bülow, which he dislodged. He was preparing to establish his bivouacs there, without thinking of the possibility of an attack, when Bülow fell upon him at the head of thirty-five thousand Prussians with one hundred pieces of artillery. Notwithstanding all that could be done by the Saxons and Durutte's division, they were forced to yield to so great a superiority; they effected their escape by favor of the woods, with the loss of three thousand men *hors-de-combat*. At the sound of the cannon, Generals Guilleminot and Fournier, who formed the head of the column of the twelfth corps, marched in all haste toward Neu-Beeren; they arrived at nightfall in time to protect the retreat, but too late to reestablish the battle. The cavalry of General Fournier, in deploying at the left of this hamlet, was charged in flank by the enemy, whom they had hardly perceived. A part of our squadrons, driving before them the Prussian platoons, advanced into the plain in sight of Hennersdorf, when the enemy pursued them and drove them back more rapidly than they had advanced; they were very fortunate in effecting their escape.

Oudinot, on arriving at Wittskof, learned the defeat of his center and ordered a retreat on Wittenberg. Bernadotte com-

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in an excellent position, and believed that the balance of fortune between themselves and Napoleon was at least in equilibrium.

"It is true that the two days' fighting at Dresden, and the pursuit during the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth, had cost them in killed, wounded, or prisoners some forty thousand men, whilst the defeat of Vandamme had, at the most, cost us no more than twelve thousand.

"But, nevertheless, the result was, that a feeling of confidence had reentered their hearts, and they resolved to close with Napoleon at every opportunity, and leave him not a moment in repose. For the Allies, not to be vanquished was almost to be victorious; whilst for Napoleon, on the contrary, to have failed to annihilate his adversaries was to have done nothing. On such extreme and almost impossible conditions had he based his hopes of safety."

mitted the fault of allowing him to quietly take up his position, when his own vast superiority in number and his formidable cavalry gave him an opportunity to seriously cut him up during his retreat.

The first consequence of this check was the loss of Gérard's division, which made a sortie from Magdeburg, and, while advancing alone in the midst of an army of one hundred thousand men, fell a certain prey to the enemy. General Hirschfeld, with the Cossacks of Czermischef, attacked him in front of Belzig, and forced him to retire again into Magdeburg with a loss of one thousand two hundred prisoners; it was fortunate that his whole command was not taken. Gérard himself was seriously wounded.

Although these two checks were unfortunate, there was nothing in them alarming; their worst result was to encourage the newly levied Prussian militia. But to the faults committed in the battle, Oudinot added that of falling back on Wittenberg, and thus increased his distance from Luckau and Bautzen, which was the only suitable direction for acting in concert with me. I therefore sent Marshal Ney to take command of this army, informing him that I would immediately follow him at the head of my guard, two *corps-d'armée*, and my reserve of cavalry. I hoped, by means of these powerful reinforcements, to push Bernadotte hard, and to get possession of Berlin, which would have produced a powerful influence on the public opinion of Germany and of all Europe. As I hoped that Macdonald would, on his side, push Blücher on Breslau, my two secondary armies would thus find themselves in a good situation, my base would be enlarged, and I might return to strike a mortal blow at the grand allied army in Bohemia. But the sad disaster to my army in Silesia three days after decided it otherwise.

MACDONALD'S DISASTER AT THE KATZBACH.—It will be remembered that I gave minute instructions to Macdonald on leaving Löwenberg. He was to profit by our joint superiority over Blücher, but it was recommended to him to allow the latter to come to him, then to take the initiative and fall on Blücher with all his corps united on a single point. Instead of waiting for the Prussian general to manifest his projects, Macdonald imagined, from false reports which he had received, that he had only to present himself to induce the enemy to retreat, and to gather the laurels of victory. He was severely punished for his excess of confidence. As the first of a series of unfortunate events, I had ordered Ney to follow me to Dresden, and the marshal, supposing that he was to march with the third corps, had conducted it to Bunzlau; but learning here that I only wanted him personally, and not his troops, he sent them back to the Katzbach, fatigued



and worn out by this long and harassing march. Macdonald, still persuaded that he had only to advance to make Blücher fly before him, ordered, for the twenty-sixth of August, the passage of the Katzbach and the Wuthende-Neisse, then directed his three *corps-d'armée* in five columns from Schönau to Liegnitz, on a front of from eight to ten leagues; a strange manner of applying the principles which I had marked out for him in my instructions: In vain did Sébastiani represent to him the imprudence of engaging himself in the *coupe-gorge* of Crain, without first reconnoitering the enemy, who was reported to be concentrated on the opposite plateau. The marshal obstinately persisted in believing that Blücher was in full retreat on Breslau; Lauriston directed by his order, one division by Schönau in the mountains, while the other two moved to the right against Langeron toward Hennersdorf. Macdonald himself advanced toward the mouth of the Wuthende-Neisse, and debouched on Weinberg at the head of the eleventh corps, while that of Sébastiani was to arrive by Crain on the same point. Souham, on the contrary, had instructions to direct himself on the left by Liegnitz at the distance of three leagues, to pass the Katzbach and fall on the enemy's right; a movement too extended, and which was to deprive him, during the whole battle, of the coöperation of that corps; it was the more to be regretted as there was an excellent ford at Schmöchwitz, very near the field of battle.

By a new fatality, Blücher, who had broken his line in order to cross the river and resume the offensive, now learned, on reaching the heights of Trebelwitz and Betzhof, that our troops were making the passage; his columns were already formed for an attack; from the plateau of Weinberg he discovered all that passed in our ranks and counted our battalions and squadrons as they debouched. In order to engage them to better advantage, he directed the advanced guard of York, which formed his center, to fall back. Thus every circumstance corresponded with the nature of the ground and combined to secure to Blücher immense advantages. As soon as the favorable moment had arrived, the signal was given. Hardly had the columns of the eleventh corps crowned the heights between Janowitz and Weinberg, and the light cavalry of Sébastiani formed toward Eichholz, when the enemy fell upon them from every direction. Our right rested on the deep ravine of the Neisse, but the left was without support; it was here that the Russians directed their efforts. Their cavalry, under Wassiltschekof, assails and turns ours between Kleintintz and Eichholz. Sacken debouches from this last village with his infantry. The Prussians under York, who have drawn us forward, now face about and fall upon our line, which is soon driven

back upon the deep ravine intended to cover its right. Our cavalry, attacked by superior numbers, falls back on the infantry or disperses to the left; all are now driven pell-mell into the gulf of the Wuthende-Neisse, a dangerous torrent, which, in time of flood, becomes, as its name indicates, truly furious.\* The disorder is so great that Sébastiani, not being able to regain Kroitsch, where he has left his cuirassiers, descends this torrent to its junction with the Katzbach, where the remount of his squadrons are saved as if by miracle. To increase the evil, Souham, hearing the cannonade, renounces his march on Liegnitz and falls back with the third corps on Kroitsch, too soon for the combat. The cuirassiers which Sébastiani has left there in reserve, in ascending to the plateau, encumber the passage, which is now completely obstructed by the flying soldiers and the trains. On any other ground, this concentric maneuver of Souham would have repaired everything, but in such a gulf it only tended to increase the confusion. Every effort to ascend this steep hill, crowned as it is by a superior and victorious enemy, proves disastrous. General Tarayre proposes to conduct two divisions by Schmöchwitz to attack the enemy in flank; they cross the Katzbach at nightfall; but Sacken and Wassiltschekof, having already rid themselves of Macdonald, march to meet them and drive them back to the left bank; this tardy movement only serves to compromise them.

During this horrible *mêlée* Lauriston fights, with doubtful success, the corps of Langeron about the village of Hengersdorf; the enemy, superior in numbers, is near making him experience the same fate as the center; for, in addition to his inferiority, Lauriston is deprived of one of his divisions by extending it too far in the mountains toward Schönau. For us the decisive point of battle was at Hengersdorf; here the ground rose in an insensible glacis to the plateau of Weinberg. If Macdonald, faithful to my instructions, had directed the cavalry of Sébastiani and the eleventh corps to sustain Lauriston, and had left Souham the care of debouching by Nieder-Crain or Schmöchwitz, the battle would probably have been won by bringing two-thirds of our force upon the decisive point. Blücher, cut off from Bohemia, would have been driven back on Breslau.

Everything seemed to conspire against us in this unfortunate battle. The flood-gates of the heavens seemed opened, and it rained in perfect torrents, flooding the streams which flow from the mountains of Riesengeberg. The Neisse carried away all its bridges, and the affluents of the Bober so increased that stream as to render it a formidable obstacle. Macdonald,

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\**Wuthende* signifies *furious*.

being forced to hasten his retreat, now saw that all the elements had combined to render it disastrous. Lauriston had difficulty in reaching Goldberg, hotly pursued by the corps of Langeron. He did not even venture to remain in this city long enough to rally the division of Puthod, which he had left compromised in the mountains. The floods had only spared the bridge of Benzlow on the Bober; it was necessary to reach this in all haste, abandoning to the conqueror eighty pieces of artillery, the baggage, and several thousand prisoners. To increase our misfortune, Puthod's division, which had taken the right slope of the mountains, now found itself so engaged that it had not time to reach the main body, and the bridges in their rear were carried away by the flood. Not being able to pass at Hirschberg, they descended again opposite Löwenberg, but were no more fortunate here. These delays enabled Langeron to surround them with twenty-five thousand men. They now saw no means of safety but in cutting a passage, sword in hand, on Bunzlau; but being soon surrounded on the heights of Plagwitz and forced back upon the torrent, they laid down their arms, after losing a large number killed in the battle or drowned in attempting to cross the Bober, which can ordinarily be passed without difficulty.

Macdonald returned behind the Queis after having lost twenty thousand men, the half of his artillery, and a large part of his train. His troops, greatly discouraged and incapable of resistance, called loudly for reinforcements and for my presence to avenge their defeat. The marshal himself, not knowing what to do, begged that I would come in person to his assistance. I had hoped that he would hold out for some days at Görlitz, but on the third of September I learned that he had fallen back on Bautzen in frightful disorder.

**NAPOLEON MARCHES TO MACDONALD'S ASSISTANCE.**—It was, therefore, necessary that I should renounce going to sustain Ney against Berlin, and hasten to Macdonald's assistance. On the third of September I left Dresden with the corps which I had brought with me from Silesia, and the next day I joined, at Hochkirch, the army of Macdonald, who was preparing to continue the retreat on Bautzen. I faced it about and immediately made it advance; but Blücher had the prudence to avoid an engagement and repassed the Neisse and the Queis. I did not deem it proper to pursue him, as I still intended to march to the north in order to assist Ney. I therefore contented myself with restoring order and courage to Macdonald's army, and reinforcing it with the corps of Poniatowski, which was in observation in the environs of Zittau. I directed Marmont's corps on Hoyerswerda, and, on the sixth, returned in person to Dresden.



The advanced guards of the grand allied army had crossed the mountains, and now threatened to march on Pirna and Dresden. I deemed it necessary, in preference to everything else, to profit by the present occasion to wash out the affront of Culm and to bring down the presumption of that army. The sixty thousand men which I had left on the left of the Elbe being united in the camp of Dohna, I rejoined them there on the eighth, with my guards. The enemy fought in retreat; we pursued him to the mountains and occupied their summits. But, on the other side, Blücher had resumed the offensive and advanced to Bautzen, and Ney had suffered a bloody defeat at Dennewitz.

NEY'S DEFEAT AT DENNEWITZ.—It is an inconvenience inherent to vast theaters of war, that the general-in-chief cannot be present everywhere; my lieutenants, very good under my own eyes, were wanting in judgment and self-confidence when left to themselves. I experienced a sad proof of this during the present campaign; all those whom I placed at the head of our secondary armies proved themselves unequal to their command.

On the second of September my instructions to Ney from Dresden were as follows:

"We have just received news of the Duke of Reggio, who has deemed it proper to place himself beyond Wittenberg. The result of this untimely movement is that the corps of General Tauenzien and a strong body of Cossacks have gone in the direction of Luckau and Bautzen, and threaten the communications of the Duke of Tarentum. *It is truly difficult for anyone to have less head than the Duke of Reggio.*

"All here are in motion for Hoyerswerda, where the Emperor will have his head-quarters on the fourth. It is necessary for you to march on the fourth, to be at Baruth on the sixth. The Emperor will have, on the sixth, a corps at Luckau to form a junction. At Baruth you will be only three days' march from Berlin. Your communication with the Emperor will be established, and the attack of Berlin may take place on the ninth or tenth. All this cloud of Cossacks and this mass of poor infantry of the *landwehr* will fall back on Berlin from every direction, as soon as your march becomes decided. You will see the necessity of maneuvering rapidly in order to profit by the disorder of the grand army in Bohemia, which may otherwise make some movements when it learns the departure of the Emperor.

"The Duke of Reggio did not know how to attack the enemy; and he had the simplicity to expose one of his corps separately. If he had attacked the enemy properly, he would have been everywhere victorious.

"Give us positive information of your march."

These instructions are perhaps a little too absolute, and less wise than those given to Macdonald: it is, however, always understood that an order addressed to a commanding general of an army at a distance is to be taken in its spirit, and not literally; it must be subordinate to the position of the enemy. The slight advantage which the Allies had gained over Oudinot confirmed my opinion of their inferiority, and induced me to believe that the defeat of the seventh corps at Gross-Beeren resulted from neglecting the rules of war. I also attached too little importance to the Prussian militia, for I did not know their numbers. I had directed Ney to advance on Baruth, and this marshal, proud of our recent victory at Dresden, did not take suitable precautions to avoid a battle, or at least to be prepared for it. As I intended to sustain him in marching by Grossenhain on Luckau with fifty thousand men, in order to turn the army of Bernadotte and throw it on the Elbe and Magdeburg, it was essential for Ney to base himself by Dahme on Torgau, without troubling himself about the road to Wittenberg. After having driven back the advanced guard of Tauenzien at Zahne and Seyda, he directed himself on Juterbogk. The fourth corps at the left advanced to Naundorf, the seventh at the center to Tolmsdorf, the twelfth at the right to Seyda.

They were to break their line on the sixth at eight o'clock in the morning to pass Juterbogk. From the dispositions of Ney it would be impossible to imagine the object which he proposed to attain. He himself marched with the fourth corps by Dennewitz, where he arrived at ten o'clock in the morning, and encountered the corps of Tauenzien. Reynier, with the center, advanced by the road to Rohrbeck; Oudinot and the twelfth corps had orders to march on Oehna, and wait till the seventh had filed past. Ney pretends that he wished to refuse his left; but there is nothing in his dispositions to indicate this, for he made it his turning and acting wing. He ought to have known that Bernadotte was on the great road from Wittenberg to Berlin by Potsdam, and that in this movement he would expose his left flank: no measures, however, were taken to prepare for an attack in that direction. If Ney was ignorant of the enemy's position, it was an inexcusable fault, for he had occupied it ever since the combat of Gross-Beeren—that is, for the last twelve days.

The marshal, debouching at ten o'clock from Dennewitz, engaged the fifteen thousand Prussians of Tauenzien: the fourth corps succeeded in getting possession of the first heights in rear of the wind-mill; but Tauenzien having been reinforced by the left of Bülow, Morand's division was turned, and the corps forced to refuse its left in order to pivot on Rohrbeck. Reynier.

leaving later than he ought, finally arrived at Dennewitz; they could think no longer of the disposition of the morning, but were obliged to sustain the left of the fourth corps, threatened as it was by a superior enemy. It was now noon, and the twelfth corps had not even reached Oehna. The allied army, profiting by the information of the night before, made a natural movement to close up to the left; Bülow, placed with thirty-eight thousand Prussians near Kaltenborn, advanced to the assistance of Tauenzien as soon as he heard the sound of the cannon. Bernadotte, placed at Rabenstein, a distance of eight leagues, with seventy battalions and eighty squadrons of Russians and Swedes, united them first at Lobessen, and then advanced in second line towards Eckmonsdorf and Talichau; he arrived there at three o'clock. It has been shown that Ney defiled with the fourth corps before the front of the Prussian army without knowing it, or suspecting the threatening storm that was about to fall on his left flank. Reynier was to carry, in all haste, Durutte's division in the direction of Nieder-Gersdorf to support Morand's division; as the enemy showed himself in force towards Gehlsdorf, the Saxons were obliged to form a crotchet in order to face in that direction. General Thumen assailed Durutte's division at Gersdorf; Bülow turned upon the Saxons, and a serious contest took place on this point.

Oudinot, at the head of the twelfth corps, which was then marching towards Oehna at our extreme right, received orders to approach Dennewitz. Hearing the violent cannonade in the direction of Gehlsdorf, he marched towards that point. The enemy had already driven the Saxons from that village, when Guilleminot's division fortunately debouched, and restored our affairs. These two corps now vigorously repelled the attack of Bülow, and recaptured Gehlsdorf; the victory was doubtful, and, although Bernadotte had not yet engaged his Russians and Swedes, it might still be decided in our favor, or at least remain undecided. But Durutte's division, assailed at Nieder-Gersdorf by thirteen thousand Prussians of Bülow's corps, was driven back beyond Dennewitz, notwithstanding the most obstinate resistance. Ney, threatened by this attack on his left at the same time that Tauenzien forced Morand at the wind-mill, now drew back the fourth corps towards Rohrbeck. Durutte's retreat leaving the center unsupported, and Bertrand exposed beyond the marshy ravine of Agerbach, Ney, who had not failed to perceive the danger of this state of things, reiterated his order to Oudinot to come and second him between Dennewitz and Rohrbeck. This movement, if it had been punctually executed, would have accelerated his destruction; for at the moment when he was



stripping his left of its means of defense, Bernadotte was advancing at the head of forty thousand Russians and Swedes to assist Bülow on the same ground which Oudinot was ordered to leave. Guillemillot's left was threatened at the same instant by Borstel's brigade and four thousand horse, which turned the army by Seehausen. The Saxons, being left exposed to the blows of Bülow, were broken in their turn and driven back on Oehna. Guillemillot's division, being forced to engage itself, required support, and all the tenth corps thus entered into action without being able to reach its destination. The Prussians, who had driven back Durutte, now passed the stream between Dennewitz and Rohrbeck, and thus completed the defeat of the center, at the same time that the cavalry pressed in the left. Ney vainly attempted to reestablish his affairs by throwing the cavalry of Arrighi in the gap left by the enemy. Clouds of dust, driven by the wind into our faces, prevented us from making any dispositions, and for a time completely concealed the enemy from our view; besides, the Allies had superior squadrons to oppose to his center, and more than four thousand horse turned his right. As Oudinot found it impossible to assist the fourth corps, all the points were forced to yield. Ney could now do no better than to take the road to Dahme; Oudinot took the road to Schweidnitz and Annaburg; a part of the seventh corps accompanied the twelfth, and the remainder took the road to Hertzberg.

Here, as at Gross-Beeren, Bülow deserved all the honor of the victory. The only thing done by Bernadotte was to draw up a pompous bulletin complimenting those who, like himself, had been idle spectators of the event.

**REMARKS ON THIS BATTLE.**—The causes of this defeat have been much discussed; each one attributed them to others, whereas all were in some measure involved. Ney was here attacked while on the march, and when he least expected it; as was the case with Oudinot at Gross-Beeren. His right wing fought on the left and his left wing on the right—dispositions which plainly prove that the battle was entirely unexpected. There is a merit in gaining an unexpected battle; but here nothing was done to accomplish that result. Everything goes to show that Ney mistook the secondary for the principal, in attaching himself exclusively to Tauenzien's corps, which covered Jüterbogk. His own report, instead of throwing light on his combinations, renders them still more incomprehensible; he wished, he said, to refuse his left, and yet he marched at its head and made it his advanced guard. He wished to maneuver; and yet everything indicates that he knew nothing of the enemy's positions. Ney's intellect shone only in the midst of a battle, when the balls were flying

round him; there, his *coup-d'oeil*, his coolness, and his vigor were incomparable; but he was unable to combine his operations in the silence of the cabinet, while studying his maps. At the time when armies were encamped in each other's presence, Ney would have been the greatest fighting general of his age, for he could then always see his enemy before him; but in our times, when complicated movements are prepared in the cabinet, he was liable to fail, and he gave a sad proof of this at Dennewitz. The instructions which I gave him were not the best, I must confess, but then he was on the spot and should have remedied any defects. His army returned in frightful disorder under the guns of Torgau; it had lost fifteen thousand men killed, wounded, prisoners, and stragglers. This defeat was a fit companion to that of the Katzbach.

To defend the glory of this valiant warrior, some have pretended that Oudinot and Reynier did not obey him with zeal and the necessary punctuality. It is true that there was delay and a want of unity in the movements; but his orders were far from clear. Oudinot arrived too late, because he had been directed to wait till the seventh corps had filed past him. Admitting that he had arrived sooner, it proves nothing; for if Ney had beaten Tauenzien at Dennewitz, still the left would have been none the less exposed to all the efforts of Bülow and the Russo-Swedish corps. When Guilleminot was engaged at Gehlsdorf, Ney sent reiterated orders to Oudinot to fly to the support of Bertrand; if he had literally obeyed these orders, there would have been no doubt of the cause of the defeat, for the decisive point of the action was precisely that from which Ney called the twelfth corps. This order was one of the most unfortunate circumstances of the day, and, joined to the want of unity in the attacks made between ten and two o'clock, caused the loss of a battle which could only have been gained by well-combined maneuvers and a concert of action in their execution. It has been insinuated that the Saxons failed in their duty; it is true that their disorder was complete; but without the assistance of the twelfth corps, how was it possible for them to hold out against at least fifteen thousand men in the first line and as many more in the second? The circumstance which compelled me to suspend my march on Luckau was certainly very unfortunate; but it had no influence whatever on Ney's reverses. I had immediately sent an officer to inform him of it, on the evening of the third, promising, nevertheless, that I would come to join him as soon as I could get rid of Blücher. Even if he had not received this message in time, it would have made no difference; for I could not have reached Dahme till the seventh, and he would, nevertheless, have been

beaten on the sixth, from the very nature of the dispositions which he made.

REMARKS ON NAPOLEON'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.— I have described at considerable length these three disasters of Gross-Beeren, the Katzbach, and Dennewitz, because they had a notable influence on the results of the campaign. These multiplied checks have induced some to doubt the wisdom of my plan and the solidity of the principles on which it was based. Nothing is more unjust. If I had had troops more warlike and more accustomed to the fatigues of a campaign, and a greater number of good cavalry, I should have succeeded. A plan based on the alternate employment of a superior mass on the decisive point requires that the secondary armies which remain on the defensive should be so organized as to fight in retreat and prevent the enemy from cutting them up; but to do this requires good cavalry, especially if your infantry is inexperienced. To judge whether the system of central lines is defective, it is important to establish a parity of means; that is, to know what I could have done between the Elbe and the Katzbach with the veteran armies and the eighty thousand horses of the Allies.

I do not deny, however, that the system of central lines may be more advantageous with one hundred thousand men against three corps of thirty-three thousand each than with a mass of four hundred thousand against three armies of one hundred and thirty thousand each. In the first place, it is so difficult to subsist a large force when concentrated in a narrow space; then again, it is easier to maneuver against fractions of thirty thousand men, and to give them mortal blows, than it is against one hundred and thirty thousand combatants. The greater the masses the more the efforts of genius are subjected to the caprice of accident, and the greater the reaction of secondary events. Nevertheless, in this case it was not the system that failed, but the measures for its execution. Could I anticipate that Macdonald would expose himself to so sanguinary a reverse, by acting contrary to my instructions? It would perhaps have been better if I had caused him to retire behind the Queis, till after the result of the battle of Dresden. The same may be remarked of the operations of Oudinot and Ney against Bernadotte. I had no reason to anticipate their disasters. It, however, would have been better if, while striking on the decisive point with the troops under my own command, I had merely placed my secondary armies in observation on the defensive. If I deviated from these maxims, it was with the hope of diminishing the unfavorable chances which resulted from my inferiority in numbers, by everywhere taking the initiative; and the ill-



success of the campaign probably resulted from an excess of confidence in the application of a rule so incontestable. The result would have been different if I could have been everywhere myself, for I could easily have remedied, by good maneuvers, any local and temporary inferiority. Frederick triumphed at Leuthen against triple numbers; and why could not Macdonald, at the Katzbach, with eighty thousand men, have contended with ninety-five thousand? In fact, what was mainly wanting to me in this campaign was two good lieutenants, who understood strategic war: I was certain of nothing where I could not be in person. If I ever had reason to feel the faulty system of my staff organization, it was in these memorable operations. I, of course, could not expect of my lieutenants all that I myself could have done: that was impossible. Arbiter of the reputations of my officers as a great captain, and master of their fortunes as a sovereign, I held in my hands the two most powerful motives which influence the actions of men; as soon as I appeared on any point, confidence, enthusiasm, ambition, fear—all the passions were united around me, and I acted on my subordinates, making them perform prodigies. My lieutenants, on the contrary, everywhere encountered rivalries and distrust; with equal talent, they, therefore, could not have equaled me in their operations; and, for a still stronger reason, when the disparity of character and genius was greater than that of the means of action. Nevertheless, if the commanders of my secondary armies had understood strategic war, the campaign would certainly have taken a very different turn. Their faults rendered my position more critical every day. My armies were visibly melting away. I foresaw the time when it would be impossible to any longer sustain my defensive position. My marches on the Elbe, fatiguing as they were to our troops, produced no result, except to favor our enemies, who were interested in temporizing, inasmuch as they were expecting considerable reinforcements. General Benningsen, who had organized at Warsaw an army of sixty thousand Russians, was rapidly approaching the theater of war.

DEMONSTRATIONS ON BOHEMIA.—Under these circumstances it was necessary to change the line of operations, drawing myself from the center in order to operate on the extreme left of the Allies; but the theater of war, admirably suited for my first system, became more advantageous to my enemies as soon as I left the Elbe to approach the Saale. It only remained for me to try the offensive, at least to attempt to impose on the enemy. The vanguard of the grand army of the Allies had again passed the mountains, and debouched in the plain of Pirna; I marched against it with forty thousand men. On the fifteenth of Sep-

tember we reoccupied Peterswalde, and the next day we dislodged the enemy from Hollendorf. On the seventeenth I made a feint of descending into the valley of Töplitz; but my advanced guard, which had marched on Culm, being assailed in front and flank by forces infinitely superior, was driven back with considerable loss. Seeing that the enemy was prepared to receive us, I renounced my enterprise, and returned on Dresden.

**THIRD ATTEMPT AGAINST BLÜCHER.**—Not being able to do anything against the grand army, I hoped to take my revenge on Blücher, whom I knew to be weakened by a large body detached on Camentz. On the twenty-second I repaired to the army of Macdonald, and pushed it forward on Bautzen. After having crossed the forest of Gödau, we found ourselves on the twenty-third of September in the presence of Blücher's army, which occupied the position of Bautzen, while the corps which had been directed on Camentz, being now on its return, threatened our left and our communications with Dresden. A battle under such circumstances and against superior forces might produce the most disagreeable results. Being obliged to renounce all offensive projects, I felt the necessity of contracting the circle of my defense. I returned with the army of Macdonald into the position of Weissig, within two leagues of Dresden.

**NEW PLANS OF THE ALLIES.**—While I was thus seeking to find an opportunity to strike some important blow, the sovereigns and the grand army remained at Töplitz, waiting the arrival of Benningsen, who had now crossed the Oder. Those who understood military operations, and appreciated the geographical position of Bohemia, advised that this new army be left to cover Silesia, and that Blücher should file by his left on Bohemia so as to join the grand army, and, supporting his right wing near Königstein, debouch again on my communications with three hundred thousand men. The sovereigns approved this plan, and the order was issued. But Blücher was unwilling to act under Schwartzenberg, and preferred remaining on the opposite side to unite with Bernadotte. His pretext was that if the latter should be left alone before Berlin, that capital would be compromised; he thought it better to send Benningsen into Bohemia. This arrangement amounted to about the same thing; it was of little consequence whether Blücher or Benningsen was sent into Bohemia; the essential thing was to reinforce the decisive point against Dresden. The sovereigns approved this movement, leaving an open field for the ardor of Blücher, his staff, and his army. From this time forward all the chances of the campaign turned against me; I had no opportunities to apply my system of war, for there was no longer any proportion between our means.

THEY ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE.—Benningsen arrived at Töplitz near the end of September. The Allies were merely waiting for his arrival to assume the offensive. Blücher filed by his right and marched by Elsterwerda and Hirtzberg on the Elster, where he passed the Elbe the thirtieth of October, after having defeated General Bertrand, who, with eighteen thousand men, opposed the irruption of the Allies on the left of the river. In the meantime the Prince Royal of Sweden (Bernadotte) also crossed the Elbe at Acken and Koslau; and the grand army of the Allies, which Benningsen had replaced in the valley of Töplitz, debouched by Sebastiansberg on Chemnitz.

NAPOLEON MARCHES AGAINST BLÜCHER AND BERNADOTTE.—It was now evidently the intention of the Allies to establish themselves in mass on my rear in order to cut off my retreat. My only chance was to throw myself between their armies and endeavor to fight them in detail. I first resolved to march against Blücher. As I still hoped to preserve the line of the Elbe, I left Saint-Cyr at Dresden with twenty-seven thousand men, and detached the King of Naples to Freyburg with fifty thousand; these two corps were to hold the enemy in check on the side toward Bohemia. With the remainder of my forces I marched on Eilenburg, where, on the ninth, I rallied Ney's army, which increased my force to one hundred and twenty-five thousand combatants.\* I supposed Blücher at Duben, and the Prince of Sweden at Zörbig; I learned too late that Sacken, who was at Mockrena, had been separated from the army of Silesia. Had I known this in time, I would have pursued and destroyed him. But he again joined Blücher by a rapid march, which did him great credit. All my attention was turned in the direction of Dessau and Duben; if I had gained a decisive battle by destroying the bridge of Roslau and seizing that of Würtemberg, I would have destroyed that army. The first condition of success was that Murat should be ready to join me without allowing himself to be cut up by the enemy. I recommended to the Prince of Neufchâtel at four o'clock p. m. of the tenth of October, to communicate to him my project, addressing to the former the following instructions:

"You will write to the King of Naples that I have received his letter; that I have raised the blockade of Wittenberg; that

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\*Napoleon's army had at this time received a new organization in consequence of the losses sustained by several of his corps. The twelfth corps (Oudinot) had been incorporated with the fourth; the third (Ney's old corps, afterward Souham's) had been reduced to three divisions; Albert's division had reinforced Macdonald's corps (the eleventh) after the battle of the Katzbach; and Marchand's division had reinforced Reynier's corps (the seventh) after the disaster of Dennewitz.



I have separated Sacken's corps from the corps of Langeron and York; that I have ordered the Duke of Padua to send everything that can embarrass his movements to Eulenburg and to Wittenberg; that the Duke of Castiglione is at Lutzen or Leipsic this evening; that the Duke of Padua, having got rid of all that he can send away, will have at least fifteen thousand men, which, united with the Duke of Castiglione, will be to the King a reinforcement of thirty thousand; that one of the two following events will happen: that I will attack the enemy to-morrow and beat him; or that, if he retires, I will burn his bridges, by marching on the right bank. Therefore the King of Naples ought to maneuver to preserve Leipsic, and give me time to fight the army of Silesia; but if he is obliged to leave Leipsic, he ought to direct everything on the Mulde; that the bridges of Eulenburg and Duben are guarded; that my instruction in this case is to pass to the right of the Elbe and maneuver between Magdeburg and Dresden, debouching by one of my four places to surprise the enemy. The King of Naples ought to maneuver accordingly, and so forth."

It was important that Saint-Cyr should be informed at Dresden of the new direction which I intended giving to my operations. Berthier received orders to write to him in cipher, "that I was at Wittenberg, of which place I had raised the blockade; that the army of Silesia was retreating in all directions, on the left bank; that to-morrow I should oblige him to give battle, or to lose the bridges of Dessau and Wartenburg; that perhaps I should then decide to pass to the right bank with all my army; that it was by the right bank that I should move on Dresden."

I founded great hopes on the success of this plan, which might improve our affairs. I, in consequence, ordered Ney to push one corps from Wittenberg on both sides of the Elbe to Roslau, and another from Duben in the direction of Dessau, in the hopes of beating the enemy at the moment that I carried the bridge. But Blücher, being informed of his danger, agreed with Bernadotte to renounce his line of operations, to throw himself behind the Saale, and fled rapidly to the right on Zörbig, where the two armies effected a junction. On the eleventh they combined their flank movement by the right and gained Halle, where they passed to the left bank of the Saale. This timely movement destroyed the finest opportunity that I had during the campaign; my best combined projects failed; my star was falling.

**PROJECT OF MANEUVERING ON THE RIGHT OF THE ELBE.**—Seeing my operation fail from unforeseen accidents, I now formed one of the boldest projects of my whole life.

Blücher and Bernadotte having escaped me, it was probable that the grand allied army would extend itself to the left to connect with them. By remaining between these masses, I no longer had sufficient space for operating, nor the means for striking decisive blows. I should run the risk of a sanguinary reverse; on the contrary, the places of the Elbe and the Oder would permit me to make myself master of the country which the Allies had left to throw themselves into Saxony. I would be established between the Elbe and the Oder, while they would concentrate in the plains of Leipsic. I would get possession of Berlin, and destroy the corps which they had left before Magdeburg, Torgau, Dresden, Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin. Having no more bridges on the Elbe, they could do nothing against me, except by a forced passage of the river. I would make Prussia support the weight of the war, and thus prolong the contest.

The strategic theater of the war on which we were now to decide the destinies of Europe was nearly a square: The Elbe and the Oder formed two sides, of which I was master. The Baltic, which corresponds to the third side, was alike an obstacle to both; by maneuvering so as to get possession of the fourth side, I would place the enemy between two lines of fortifications, the sea, and my army; I would have no further need of secondary armies: a single victory like that of Dresden would be sufficient to annihilate the enemy; and at the head of two hundred and fifty thousand men I felt certain of gaining it.

This plan appeared too adventurous to my marshals, who desired to fall back behind the Rhine; they, therefore, pressed me to renounce it. I hesitated all the day of the twenty-second. I confess that this plan required more experienced soldiers than those which I then had, and, above all, more cavalry. I required abundant supplies for my garrisons, and it was important to have allies in Westphalia and Bavaria upon whom I could depend. If Germany had been as well disposed towards me as Poland, the chances of success would have been more favorable. But with five hundred thousand Allies between me and the Rhine, and Germany insurgent, the chances were complicated. I might, however, have opened a road on the left of the Elbe, or, if the Allies pursued me on Berlin, I might rally on me the garrisons of the fortifications, and throw myself into Bohemia. With my old soldiers of Arcole, of Rivoli, and of Austerlitz, I should not have hesitated to adopt this plan. But now my situation was different. As an emperor I feared to undertake what as a general I should have unhesitatingly adopted.

THE DEFECTION OF BAVARIA RENDERS IT IMPRACTICABLE.—The news of the defection of Bavaria, which we

received the same day, contributed not a little to shake my resolution. Since the commencement of the campaign this country had been acted upon by the suggestions of the Tugendbund and Austria. The King was sincerely attached to France, in whose service he had passed a part of his youth; he was full of loyalty and gratitude for what I had done for him, but he was too good-natured and too easily influenced. A strong party pretended that Bavaria had lost in independence what she had gained in territory, and that the Elector was more a king in 1804 than Maximilian Joseph, first sovereign of the Confederation of the Rhine. They painted me to him as insatiable of blood and power. They offered, on the one side, to guarantee to Bavaria the preservation of her territory and the establishment of her independence if she would pronounce against me; on the other hand, they threatened her with invasion and the partition of her territory if she took up arms against the coalition. Wrede, the ambitious Wrede, permitted himself to be seduced by this party, and soon became its principal leader. The presence of Augereau's little army towards Würzburg, my first success, and the openly manifested sentiments of the King had, for a time, imposed on the partisans of Austria. Maximilian had not left me ignorant of the intrigues of this party in his kingdom, nor of his own desire to remain faithful; and after what he had written to the Prince of Neuchâtel in July, I could not anticipate the possibility of his disaffection. His letter was dated Nymphenburg, July 26th, 1813; it runs as follows:

"I profit, my dear Prince, by M. de Fonteville to inform you of my return; I received yesterday, by two different conveyances, the news that seven thousand Austrians have arrived at Elferdingen; that they are fortifying themselves; that twenty-five thousand men are to arrive at Lintz; and that in all there will be seventy thousand men between Wels and my frontiers. I immediately sent one of my *aids-de-camp* to learn exactly the state of things. As soon as I receive his report I will send it to you by an estafette. This ought, however, to show you how much I need troops to guard my frontiers, and to prevent in time of war the Tyrolese and the Voralberg from penetrating to the heart of my states. . . . I have not yet seen M. de Fonteville; I expect him here in half an hour. I will give him all the information he may desire. *My attachment for the Emperor and for the cause of France has never varied for an instant.* You may, therefore, be certain that I will do all in my power to satisfy the desires of his imperial majesty. I only ask that he will not lose sight of the interests of my kingdom, and that he will come to my assistance in case of a war with Austria. However great the



efforts which I may make, it will not be possible for me alone to resist for a long time, if the enemy attempt, with a corps of sixty thousand men, the passage of the Inn, I not being able to count on the Tyrol. Wrede is indefatigable. His *corps-d'armée* does wonders. I expect to review them in a few days; would that it were twice as strong! . . . . Be so kind as to present my homage to the Emperor: tell him that I am more attached to him than ever, and that if I do not make great efforts, it is because the moral and physical means are wanting. Old Bavaria is sound; also the circle of the upper Danube, a part of the circle of the Iller, the country of Anspach, and the greater part of Salzburg. The Tyrol and the Bamberg, where there are many members of the old *noblesse*, Passau, and Baireuth are partly unsound. It might be well that they should leave, and that I should countenance their departure. The entire loss of trade and the wants that are the natural result of war are the causes of this state of feeling. You see, my dear friend, that I have nothing to conceal from you; I am sure you will not abuse my confidence. I have just been in Baden, and have crossed Würtemberg; the general cry is, 'Peace!' If it is made, all will be well, and I promise that in less than two years the general feeling will become as favorable as can be desired, and that it will remain so. I am long and prosy, my dear nephew; but it is a month since I wrote to you. Adieu. I embrace you.

*Max. Joseph.*"

The defeats of the Katzbach and Dennewitz had forced me to call Augereau's corps into Saxony, and it was impossible for the King and his minister, Montgelas, to resist the torrent; the leaders of the party carried their point, even in opposition to the wishes of the King. A treaty of alliance was signed with Austria at Ried, and Bavaria acceded to the coalition. As the loss of so necessary an ally greatly diminished my chances of success, I renounced my project of maneuvering between the Elbe and the Oder, the success of which depended upon my being able to throw myself in mass by Magdeburg on Westphalia, or by Dresden into Bohemia, basing myself on Bavaria. Having no longer this alternative left, it would have been absurd to lead a French army between the Elbe and the Oder, leaving in its rear an army already double its numbers, and which the defection of Bavaria would infallibly increase by all the population to the Rhine.

MARGH ON LEIPSIC.—After renouncing this project, it was dangerous to remain at Duben, and I was soon recalled in the direction of Leipsic, which place the grand army of the Allies was approaching, notwithstanding the efforts of Murat to retard its march. In operating against Blücher I had hoped to conceal my movements for some days, so as to have time to defeat and

drive him into the Elbe and then return upon the grand army. If this army itself had not had the intention of taking the offensive, my calculation would have been crowned with success; unfortunately, the Allies, being stronger than I supposed, had resolved to debouch into Saxony even before knowing what course I intended to pursue. This incident and Blücher's march on Halle deranged everything. The advanced guards of the Allies had already reached Borna and Pegau. I saw that all the forces of the Allies were to unite on my rear. But it gave me no uneasiness; I hoped that the movement of Reynier on Roslau, and of Ney on Dessau, inspiring Bernadotte and Blücher with serious fears for Berlin, would decide them to return in all haste by Balbi on the right bank of the Elbe, which would have again separated them from the grand army. In fact, the news of these movements alarmed the Prince of Sweden, who, on the thirteenth, fell back to Köthen; but Blücher held firm at Halle, and did not leave that place till he moved on Leipsic, after hearing of my return toward that city. It must be said in favor of the Prussians and Russians that they maneuvered well during this autumn campaign. The country people and the Cossacks informed them of all my movements, and they acted with promptitude.

The grand allied army was now nearly under the walls of Leipsic. It was very important for me not to be anticipated in my movements on this center of all the communications of the country. I resolved to unite all my forces; knowing that some decisive blows were to be given here, I neglected no means of augmenting my strength by drawing in my detachments. I had already drawn to Leipsic fifteen thousand men of the little army assembled under the orders of Augereau at Würzburg; they arrived there on the thirteenth of October, with a division of dragoons from Spain. In the present state of affairs, I could have desired to draw my troops from Dresden and Hamburg, for I felt that if I was not victorious, their loss would be inevitable, unless Saint-Cyr and Davoust should get timely notice and be skillful enough to effect their junction with Lemarrois and Narbonne, so as, in concert, to open a passage. I sent them orders to that effect, but they were intercepted.

THE ALLIES CONCENTRATE ABOUT LEIPSIC.—I left Duben on the fourteenth, and arrived at Leipsic on the fifteenth; it was well that I did so; for Murat, not being able to contend against such a mass, had fallen back in good order on Leipsic; but he had terminated this honorable retreat by a grave fault. He was in position on the twelfth, in rear of the defile of Magdeborn (the Gozelbach), the right toward Crostewitz and the left at Störmthal. He there received my letter from Duben, which in-

formed him of the change in my plan of operations and of my immediate return to Leipsic. He assured me that he would hold Leipsic and a position in advance till the fourteenth, and threw up some intrenchments to cover the position which he occupied. Marmont had received orders to join him, and ought to have been at Leipsic on the thirteenth. Murat was still further reinforced by Augereau's two divisions and some fine cavalry. He thus had with him five *corps-d'armée* and a numerous cavalry. Nevertheless, fearing to compromise so considerable a part of my army in a general engagement, and being full of the idea that I would first strike at the north of Leipsic against the combined armies, he suddenly determined to cross the Partha and to hold Leipsic only as a *tête-de-pont*; the order which I had already sent to Marmont, to turn back and observe the road to Halle at Spenditz, confirmed the King of Naples in this idea. His retreat was already begun on the thirteenth, when one of my officers informed him that I would be at Leipsic the next day; he arrested his movement near Liebert-Wolkowitz, after having yielded to the Allies the important defiles of Gröbern and Göhren; a circumstance which produced the most vexatious consequences.

Menaced on the fourteenth by the Allies, Murat felt the necessity of repairing his fault. Encouraged still further by the information that I would arrive in the course of the day, he made a vigorous stand at Liebert-Wolkowitz, and threw himself between Wachau and Magdeborn on the numerous cavalry of Barclay, who was closely pressing him. Our dragoons, who had just returned from Spain, burning to distinguish themselves, performed wonders. Notwithstanding the talents and bravery of Pahlen, and the charges of a part of the Russian reserves, we were on the point of gaining the victory, when a charge of Prussian cuirassiers on our scattered and harassed soldiers restored the combat in the enemy's favor.

It being urgent to scatter the tempest which was gathering against us from all points of the horizon, I had accelerated, as much as was in my power, the return of the force engaged between Duben and Dessau. It would have been advantageous to give battle on the fifteenth; but the thing was physically impossible; the mass of my forces were still too far off. Bertrand and the Young Guard arrived in the night of the fourteenth, toward Euterisch; Macdonald passed Duben; Souham, with the third corps, did not arrive till midnight; he was obliged the next day to take the road to Eulenburg in order to avoid the blocking up of the road. Seeing here that the bridge was burned, he ascended the Mulde to find a passage, and on the night of the fifteenth only reached Rothenhahn on the road to Leipsic. Reynier's



corps, which had descended the Elbe to Roslau, attempted to re-establish the batteau-bridge of Bernadotte, so as to return directly, but the difficulty and slowness of the operation forced him to fall back on Wittenberg, which retarded him by two days' march. All these incidents forced me to defer my attack till the sixteenth.

The sovereigns, on their side, being informed of my return to Leipsic, and fearing that I might overthrow Blücher, determined to attack me the same day. Proud of their success on the fourteenth, they deemed it advisable not to wait the arrival of Benningsen and Colloredo, who could not enter the line before the seventeenth, for fear that I might have leisure in the interval to strike at the army of Silesia. It was, therefore, resolved to attack me on the sixteenth, not so much with the hope of gaining a decisive victory as to gain time for the arrival of all the forces of the coalition on the field of battle where was to be decided the fate of the civilized world.

**THE SINGULAR PROJECT OF SCHWARTZENBERG.**—Schwartzenberg at first had the singular idea of throwing his reserve and the mass of his army into the *cul-de-sac* between the Pleisse and the Elster, from which he could debouch only by a narrow bridge in the middle of my army; while the right, under the orders of Barclay, composed of the corps of Kleist, Wittgenstein, and Klenau, would advance between Liebert-Wolkowitz and the Pleisse. If this arrangement had been followed, the total defeat of the grand allied army would have been certain. But the Emperor Alexander, after having vainly demonstrated to Schwartzenberg the foolishness of his project, positively declared that his troops and those of the King of Prussia should remain on the right of the Pleisse. Thus the grenadiers, the guards, and the reserves—thirty-five thousand men of the *élite*—were retained at the decisive point by the firmness of the Emperor Alexander. The Austrian generalissimo persisted, on his side, in carrying his own forces into the *cul-de-sac* of Connewitz. Giulay's corps was still detached by Zwenkau to turn Leipsic and get possession of the great road to Lindenau. This position of the Allies was too extended; Blücher and Bernadotte being then at Halle, it would perhaps have been better for the grand army to direct itself on Zeitz, so as to establish two hundred and fifty thousand men on my communications. Benningsen should have been directed from Colditz on Altenburg, to cover the road to Bohemia during this movement. Nevertheless, it is just to agree, that, as the march of Blücher and Bernadotte on the Saale was not the consequence of a plan concerted with the sovereigns, and as the latter had at Altenburg

only a vague notion of what the two armies of the North were doing, they could not form any plan of operations on such data. It was, therefore, natural that they should adopt the plan of marching directly against me, at the same time seeking to trouble my line of retreat. For this purpose it was agreed that the grand army of Bohemia should advance on Leipsic by the right bank of the Pleisse, carrying on my communications only the force necessary to get possession of the defiles and arrest the heads of my columns in retreat. Giulay's corps was sufficient for this; but it would have been well to give it three or four thousand more horse, for the Allies had plenty of cavalry. The remainder of the allied troops should then have followed the main army, throwing only a light division into the space between Rotha and Zwenkau, in order to keep up the communication with Giulay; to place forty thousand men in this funnel was a ridiculous idea.

FIRST DAY OF LEIPSIC, OCTOBER 16.—I did not at first perceive the exact bearing of the Allies' movement; but I felt that whatever course they might take, a vigorous effort on Wachau could alone gain me the victory. I had given to Ney the command of all the forces north of Leipsic—*i. e.*, the corps of Bertrand, Marmont, Souham. There was every reason to suppose that Blücher, filing from Halle by his right, would come to attack us by the road to Merseburg, in order the better to connect himself with the grand army. Nevertheless it was possible that he would carry his right on Leipsic by Skeuditz, and it therefore became necessary for me to prepare for either case. My first project had been to draw to me two of Ney's corps near Wachau, in order there to strike the necessary blow for restoring our affairs: the third corps, arriving from Duben, would relieve Marmont toward Möckern, where he had observed a position very favorable for resisting a superior force, and where he had thrown up some intrenchments to strengthen it. If this first disposition had been executed, I should have had forty thousand more men at Wachau, and the army of Bohemia would have been exposed to a defeat the more complete as Schwartzemberg accumulated fault upon fault. But while the Allies were preparing to attack me only partially, Fortune opposed me by a series of accidents which deranged all my plans.

I had expected that the Duke of Padua would be sufficient with seven or eight thousand men for the defense of Leipsic: on the approach of Giulay's entire corps, threatening the passage of Lindenau (the only one which remained in case of retreat), Ney thought he ought to direct Bertrand there; and at six o'clock this general was already in motion on Liebert-Wolkowitz. Marmont, on his side, had not yet been relieved by the third corps.

when, being delayed, as has been said, at the passage of the Mulde, he was informed of the approach of Blücher's advanced guard. His situation was critical; to retire without fighting would draw the enemy on Leipsic and prevent Marmont from assisting me at Wachau. He prepared to hold on between Möckern and Euterisch, so as not to lose Leipsic. Ney, thinking that this marshal was already acquainted with the localities, and that it would be as well to leave him on this point, resolved to replace him towards Wachau by the three divisions of the thirds corps which were to arrive at two o'clock. The result of these different contrarieties was that the forty thousand which I expected to reinforce me in order to assail the army of Bohemia did not arrive.

If the victory had been certain, Ney might have thrown only one division of Bertrand at Lindeneau, and the other on the northern *faubourg* of Leipsic, while Marmont and the third corps marched to Wachau; it is probable that Giulay and Blücher would not have been ready to make a serious attack on Leipsic on the sixteenth. Reinforced in time by Marmont and Souham, I might have turned the right of the Allies, and have thrown Barclay into the Pleisse, while Schwartzenberg so foolishly shut himself up in the *cul-de-sac* of Connewitz; I would have collected immense trophies, and, pursuing the enemy to Zeitz. I would have opened a new line of retreat on Naumburg, without troubling myself about Blücher's temporary occupation of Leipsic. But in truth this disposition would only have given me another victory, without, however, destroying or disabling my enemy; for Blücher and Bernadotte united could have followed in my rear, while Schwartzenberg, reinforced by Benningsen and Colredo with sixty thousand men, would still have had one hundred and fifty thousand combatants to oppose me. I should still have been in the midst of two hundred and forty thousand enemies. The parks of my army, united at Eulenburg, as well as Reynier's corps, which was on the march to that city, would have been cut off, and forced to throw themselves on Torgau. It would be difficult to decide what change in the respective situations of the parties a more complete victory at Wachau would have produced. What combinations could affect an enemy who in a single day received reinforcements of one hundred thousand men? It was the disorganization which such a defeat would have produced at the head-quarters of Schwartzenberg which alone could rescue me, and prove whether the abandonment of Leipsic by Marmont had been a prudent measure. In the uncertainty of the event, it would have been playing a hazardous game.

The battle began on the sixteenth of October, at nine o'clock in the morning—that is, two hours sooner than I desired. I had



intended to take the initiative, but the enemy first attacked us. Klenau on the right debouched in force by the woods of the university on Liebert-Wolkowitz and the Kohlberg. Wittgenstein moved on Wachau, and Kleist on Mark-Kleeberg. This first effort was sustained by Murat's forces. Lauriston vigorously defended Liebert-Wolkowitz; Belluno repulsed the enemy's attempts on Wachau; but Poniatowski had to abandon Mark-Kleeberg for a moment to the Prussians. I had just arrived from Reudnitz, near Liebert-Wolkowitz; the Young and Old Guards followed me; but they had not yet debouched on my right. The movement of the enemy made it necessary for me to change my dispositions. I sent Augereau from my left to the right, to sustain Poniatowski. Two divisions of the Young Guard, under Mortier, maneuvered at the left of Lauriston against the right of Klenau; the other two, under Oudinot, marched to the support of Belluno at Wachau. A fine mass of cavalry established itself as a third line in rear of the center; and my reserve of artillery, placed along the front, opened its fire upon the enemy. A heavy cannonade followed along the line, and the combat continued till near noon, with varied success. Klenau was repulsed by Mortier and Lauriston. Poniatowski, sustained by Augereau, recaptured Mark-Kleeberg. At the center Oudinot and Belluno drove back Wittgenstein on Störmthal and Gossa.

In the meantime Schwartzberg presented himself in person with the main body of the Austrians at the defiles of Connewitz and Dölitz, where he could not debouch. Lefol's division defended the first, and Sémélé's division from Augereau's corps covered the second.

Standing on the heights of Meysdorf, I was still full of hope; everything authorized me to expect a decisive victory; for Macdonald was finally debouching from Halzhausen, while Ney informed me from Euterisch, at half past ten o'clock, that Marmont was about marching to join me, and that even the third corps might follow him if Blücher should not appear in force on the road to Halle; finally, Bertrand's corps, which had bivouacked between Euterisch and Leipsic, would be sufficient to guard the town, and drive Giulay from Lindenau. I immediately make dispositions to act more vigorously on the offensive, and to strike a decisive blow. I order Latour-Maubourg to carry the positions of the Russian corps at the right and left of Gossa, and direct Victor and Lauriston to sustain him. The most brilliant success crowns this double charge, although Latour-Maubourg has his leg carried away by a ball, and a part of his corps somewhat thrown into confusion by this accident. Nevertheless Bordesoult's division of cuirassiers supplies its place; they throw them-

selves on the left of Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, carry a battery, charge upon the battalions, overthrow the division of light cavalry of the guard which makes a flank movement against them, and push on to the Emperor Alexander. This prince immediately engages the Cossacks of the *élite*, who served him as an escort. In a moment the batteries of the reserve of the guard are unmasked, Barclay's cavalry hastens to the threatened point, and as the wound of Latour-Maubourg prevents him from making suitable arrangements for sustaining the charge of our cuirassiers, it does not produce the result which I expected: the enemy even resumes the offensive on Gossa, and our squadrons re-form in rear, at the moment when our infantry is advancing to occupy the conquered ground.

Schwartzenberg, deaf, until ten o'clock, to all the representations of the Russian officers, had finally become convinced of the exposed condition of his right, and that it was necessary to return to its assistance. All the efforts of Merfeldt to debouch from Dölitz having been unsuccessful, the Prince then decided to return by Baschewitz on the right bank of the Pleisse, which, for his own glory, he should never have left; he brought back with him two divisions of cuirassiers and two divisions of grenadiers of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg. This resolution, although very tardy, had its effect. The divisions of Austrian cuirassiers passed the Pleisse at a ford, and debouched from Gröbern, at the moment when Kleist was warmly pressed. They fell between Augereau's corps and the cavalry, overthrew the latter, and pushed on to the Young Guard, at the very moment when Latour-Maubourg was effecting so much against the guard of the sovereigns on the heights of Gossa.

This charge of the enemy, which penetrated almost to me, gave me some uneasiness; on the other side the sound of cannon was heard at the north of Leipsic; Marmont, so far from being able to second me, was himself strongly engaged. The divisions of Russian grenadiers had just given renewed strength to the center of the Allies; the earth seemed to be covered with the enemy's battalions, in proportion as we extended our horizon. I did not venture to sustain the gap between Latour-Maubourg and Belluno with my Old Guard, and all the remainder of my forces was already engaged. Macdonald was engaged with Klenau, whom he had driven far enough. The fine cavalry from Spain which sustained him had been paralyzed by the wound of General Pajol, who commanded it. This state of things left me slight hopes of gaining a decisive victory. The Russians, rallied at Gossa, held there with savage obstinacy; the arrival of the guards and Austrian grenadiers who debouched on the right of the Pleisse, in

returning toward Crostewitz, had changed the chances of victory. Our first success was glorious, but it had not changed the situation of affairs. It was important to obtain other results before the close of the day. This motive induced me to attempt toward six o'clock a final effort. I was preparing for a decisive attack on Störmthal and Gröbern, when my attention was drawn to the rear of my right, where the enemy had just passed the Pleisse. Schwarzenberg, not wishing to give up his project of passing at Dölitz, and thinking that the arrival of the Austrian grenadiers at Mark-Kleeberg would facilitate the passage of Merfeldt, had directed him to renew his attempts. Five or six Austrian battalions, having gained possession of Dölitz, now sought to debouch, followed by the whole *corps-d'armée*. Sémélé's exhausted division could no longer resist them. I threw against them the Old Guard under General Curial, the only troops which remained disposable. Poniatowski also sent there his reserve; in an instant the head of Merfeldt's column was surrounded and captured; he himself was made prisoner with a thousand men; the remainder were driven into the Pleisse. The arrival of Brayer's division of the third corps completed the security of this point. However, the concentration of so many forces between Kluberg and the farm of Auenheim enabled the enemy to take Oudinot obliquely; and our center, instead of continuing its progress, deemed itself fortunate in maintaining its position against the masses which were opposed to it. Night scarcely terminated the protracted carnage.

Our affairs at the north of Leipsic had not been so successful. Marmont had just received orders to join me, when Blücher, anxious only for a fight, appeared in pursuit and forced him into an engagement; although this prevented him from arriving on the point where I expected to decide the combat, it would not have been so important if the divisions of the third corps which were to relieve him had arrived in time; they could either have taken his place, or have fought at his side. They, however, did not make their appearance till very late, toward Schönfeld, and Ney, who wished to leave the defense of Lindenthal to Marmont, carried the third corps to the right and left of Wachau when the battle was about terminated. Marmont, left to himself, had too strong a party against him. To increase the misfortune, Delmas' division, which was returning by the road from Duben with the artillery of the third corps, would have been compromised if the enemy had known how to profit by his superiority. Dombrowsky's division, which was to hold Wetteritz until his arrival, sustained the efforts of Langeron's corps, but could not preserve the village. Fortunately, the enemy's patrols mistook



Delmas' long column for a considerable corps, and were thus imposed upon. This general arrived at Wetteritz in the night, greatly harassed, but without any important losses. Ney, on being informed of Marmont's check and of the danger of Delmas, was obliged to fall back in order to favor the retreat of Delmas, as well as that of the sixth corps. If the seven divisions of Ney, Marmont, and Dombrowsky had been united, Blücher would no doubt have been beaten; but as the third corps lost the whole day in marches and counter-marches, it was impossible for Marmont's twenty thousand men to contend with sixty thousand. His troops, nevertheless, defended with rare valor the village of Möckern, where our soldiers of the marine covered themselves with glory. They were driven back on Euteritzch and Gohlis with the loss of twenty pieces of artillery and four thousand men *hors-de-combat*. An additional park of thirty pieces was captured in the night bivouac by the Cossacks.

This check was the more unfortunate for us, as it was important to preserve the possession of Taucha on account of Reynier's corps, which was returning from Wittenberg by Eulenburg. The fine defense of the sixth corps, and the return of the divisions of the third corps during the night, enabled us to accomplish this object.

**NAPOLÉON PROPOSES AN ARMISTICE, WHICH IS REFUSED.**—It was truly unfortunate for us that we had not gained a decisive victory on the sixteenth. Although the last reports from Saint-Cyr made me doubt the near arrival of Benningen, I knew that the Prince of Sweden would soon join Blücher. I would then be obliged to evacuate Leipsic, or to fight a new battle with all the chances against me. I was well aware that the loss of this city would render our position very precarious; with the few men that remained I could only hope to defend, foot by foot, the space that separated me from the Rhine; and as the loss of a battle could produce no other consequence, I determined to accept it. I, however, hesitated whether I should receive it before Leipsic or behind the Saale: my bad fortune prevailed. Nevertheless, before coming to blows again, I resolved to attempt to open negotiations. On the seventeenth I sent to the Allies General Merfeldt, who had been taken prisoner the day before, with proposals for an armistice, and the evacuation of all the places of the Vistula and the Oder, and even those of the Elbe. Under the pretext of referring the matter to the Emperor of Austria, Schwartzberg did not reply; and the Allies, being reinforced in the evening by more than one hundred thousand men, resolved to crush me on the morning of the eighteenth. I, however, did not sleep in the hope of a favorable

answer; I waited for Reynier's corps and my head-quarters, which were to join me from Eulenburg on the evening of the seventeenth. If I should receive no satisfactory answer to Merfeldt's mission during the day, it was my intention to draw in my lines towards Leipsic during the night, so as to retreat on the eighteenth. This delay was the more unfortunate as Giulay had just fallen back on Zwenkau, and nothing opposed my commencing the retreat on the seventeenth, immediately after the arrival of Reynier.

In fact, Schwartzenberg, like all pusillanimous generals, continually went from one extreme to another. Not content with being reinforced by two entire armies, he thought to draw Giulay into the narrow space between the Pleisse and the Elbe, in order to replace there the Austrian troops which had been withdrawn on the sixteenth to reinforce the center at Wachau; this measure, which opened to me the road to Erfurth, was without justification; for, after the arrival of a reinforcement of one hundred thousand men, it would have been much better to reinforce Giulay's corps, which was admirably placed for operating on our communications. I thus permitted to escape the only occasion which offered for effecting a safe retreat. I was influenced by the fear that this premature retreat might prevent the conclusion of the proposed armistice, and by the good augury for Merfeldt's mission which I derived from the absolute calm which reigned in the allied army. I was deceived: the Allies were only waiting for the arrival of all their forces for a general attack.

**THE ALLIES REINFORCED BY BERNADOTTE, BENNINGSEN, AND COLLOREDO.**—Bernadotte approached by the road to Landsberg; Benningsen, after leaving twenty thousand men before Dresden, marched with forty thousand men by Colditz on Leipsic; finally, Colloredo also rejoined the grand army with two Austrian divisions; all these corps arrived on the evening of the seventeenth. This gave the Allies an additional force of near one hundred and twenty thousand men. Seeing, on the night of the seventeenth and eighteenth, that Merfeldt did not return, I began to feel uneasy, and made preliminary dispositions for the evacuation of Leipsic; but the material was so considerable, and the defiles so long and numerous, that it required twenty-four hours to effect it with order in the presence of the enemy. However, as I had, (at Wagram, in twelve hours in the night, constructed six bridges and deployed an army on the Marschfeld,) I hoped to succeed here. I therefore resolved to maintain a firm attitude on the eighteenth, in order to approach Leipsic in the evening; but the enemy did not give me time.

SECOND DAY OF LEIPSIC, OCTOBER 18.—The great battle which was to decide the fate of Europe took place on the eighteenth of October. While still waiting for Merfeldt's reply, I was informed of the approach of the enemy's columns on all sides. I had but one hundred and fifty thousand men to oppose three hundred thousand. To avoid being turned, I placed my army in a semicircular position, with the wings resting on the Pleisse and the Partha. Bertrand's corps remained at the left of the Elster to defend the road to Naumburg. The enemy attacked us on all the points of this semicircle. The first positions of Holzhausen and Wachau were disputed only to give time to take a definitive position towards Probsthayde and Stötteritz. Here was fought the real *battle of the giants*.

This second battle of Leipsic, although the most important of the age in its results, offers but little of interest in its relation to the military art. Three hundred thousand Allies, crowded in a semicircle of three or four leagues, offered no weak point; however much I might maneuver, I was certain to find an impenetrable line, equally strong throughout. The battles of Fleurus, Friedland, and Essling are the only battles in our last wars that bear any resemblance to it. In all three it was an army attacked by concentric columns, with a river in its rear. In the first, Jourdan was placed like myself in a semicircle, with the Sambre behind him; but he was attacked with equal forces, and Cobourg occupied a line of ten leagues with less than eighty thousand men, so that it was not difficult to make a successful effort against any point of this too extended line. At Friedland the Russians, too much concentrated around the city, with the Alle behind them, were assailed by my four *corps-d'armée* in a circular and well-sustained line: their front being separated by a stream and a lake enabled me to break their left separately, which exposed their right to inevitable destruction. But I had none of these favorable chances in the second battle of Leipsic. The only hope of victory which remained was in the isolation of Blücher and Bernadotte on the right of the Partha, which enabled me to paralyze them the whole day by a weak corps of observation. But even this hope was not of long duration. These ninety thousand men, leaving Sacken's corps to attack the gate of Halle, passed the river in the morning between Taucha and Schönfeld, and assailed Ney. There was now no means of supplying by good combinations my inferiority in numbers and *matériel*: it had become a butchery, with no other object than to await the approach of night, in order to commence our retreat.

Notwithstanding our extreme inferiority in numbers, and the defection of the Saxon and Würtemberg troops, who in the



middle of the battle turned their arms against us, my army sustained itself admirably. I was myself surprised at the bravery and devotion of my young soldiers; a thousand pieces of cannon carried death into their ranks without breaking them; yet these were the same soldiers who had fought at the Katzbach and Dennewitz! Why this difference?

At break of day we begin our movement of concentration, at the moment when the enemy's masses are preparing to assail us on all sides. Belluno and Lauriston leave Wachau to take position, the first to the west of Probsthayde, and the second to the left of that village in the direction of Stötteritz. They are followed foot by foot by the enemy, who assails their rear guard, but without cutting it up. Poniatowski places himself to their right; Augereau closes the line between Lössnig and Connewitz. Oudinot, with two divisions of the Young Guard, serves as a reserve to this right wing. I place myself at the center behind Belluno at a quarter of a league from Probsthayde, with Mortier's Young Guard, the Old Guard of Curial, and the reserve of cavalry. Macdonald, who has yielded Holzhausen to the masses of Klenau and Benningsen, draws in the eleventh corps and Sébastiani's cavalry from Stötteritz and Molkau, to connect with Lauriston. Ney commanded the left, which extended from Paunsdorf to Schönfeld. Our line formed a kind of obtuse angle with the vertex at Probsthayde.

Blücher, leaving Sacken to assail the *faubourg* of Leipzig on the side of Gohlis and the intrenchments of the gate of Halle, attacks Schönfeld with the Russian corps of Langeron and St. Priest. Bernadotte assails Sellerhausen with Bülow and the Swedes. General Benningsen attacks Paunsdorf by his right and Zweinaundorf by his left, seconded by Klenau's corps. Kleist and Wittgenstein's corps, followed by the reserves, advance from Wachau on Probsthayde. The Austrians of Colloredo and Bianchi close the line to the Pleisse toward Connewitz. The interval between these two rivers was at this time abandoned to a light division; and Giulay receives orders, although too late, to carry himself again on Zwenkau so as to threaten the great road to Lutzen.

The enemy's masses employed a part of the morning in taking their positions. Toward noon the engagement becomes general; Colloredo, Bianchi, and the Prince of Hesse-Homburg attack our right along the Pleisse. The weak divisions of Augereau and Poniatowski heroically defend the approaches to Lössnig and Connewitz. At the point of yielding to an overwhelming superiority, they are sustained by Oudinot's two divisions of the Young Guard, which restores the combat and en-

ables them to maintain themselves with great firmness in these two villages and the broken ground that separates them from the Pleisse. At the center the allied sovereigns seem to wish to strike a decisive blow on the salient point of our line at Probsthayde; on this point the army of Bohemia directs its efforts. Wittgenstein and Kleist, sustained by the Russian reserves, throw themselves with audacity on this village. Fortunately, I had foreseen this; in addition to the corps of Belluno and Lauriston, I had assembled on this point the Old Guard, Mortier's Young Guard, and two corps of cavalry under the King of Naples. I also brought into line Drouet's artillery of reserve. The enemy advanced in very deep columns because the space becomes narrower as they approach, and there is no room to deploy. The movement is effected with such rapidity that only a part of the artillery can follow. Prince Augustus of Prussia forms the head of Kleist's column: Prince Gortschakof sustains him, and also the rest of Wittgenstein's corps. Their first battalions have already reached Probsthayde, when the second and third corps charge them with vigor and drive them back. Exposed to the fire of the sharpshooters who occupy the gardens and the village, and the one hundred pieces of cannon which pour grape into their ranks, and menaced by our columns, they halt in the space which separates the lines, and reply with a murderous cannonade, which is continued till dark. Further to the left, Kleist and Benningsen concentrate their march on Holzhausen and Zweinaundorf, from which they afterward debouch against the heights of Stötteritz and Molkau, defended by Macdonald and the cavalry of Sébastiani; these troops maintain themselves in their position with the same success as on the right.

My left wing, under the orders of Ney, was not so fortunate as the center. Blücher and Bernadotte, having passed the Partha at Taucha with ninety thousand men, directed themselves on Schönfeld and Paunsdorf, where they connected with the corps of Benningsen. This last village was occupied by the Saxons under Reynier. Marmont guarded the space from there to Schönfeld; Souham, with the third corps, served as a reserve. Marmont defends with much vigor the approaches and the village of Schönfeld against Langeron. Reynier, menaced by Bubna at the right and by Bülow at the left, retires on Sellerhausen. Ney, who sees all the danger of a retrograde movement, runs to the threatened places and brings Durutte's division on Paunsdorf. The Saxons, being left to themselves, advance toward the enemy; this movement is at first attributed to an excess of audacity; but all at once their artillery is turned against us, and our brave and astonished troops witness the most odious

defection ever recorded in the pages of history. Reynier, being now reduced to only the single division of Durutte, threatened on the right by Bubna and on the left by Bülow, is fortunate in finding a refuge at Sellerhausen. Marshal Ney sustains him with Delmas' division; Marmont draws in his right to maintain himself in line, and continues to defend Schönfeld with his left. The combat is continued with animosity on this part of the line; and it is not difficult for Bülow's corps, seconded by Bubna, the Saxons, and the Swedes, to penetrate to Sellerhausen, notwithstanding the defense of the handful of brave men under Durutte and Delmas. Ney's right is thus forced back in the direction of Reudnitz. Being informed at Probsthayde of the defection of my allies and the retreat of the seventh corps, and fully appreciating the evil results of permitting the enemy to penetrate to the *faubourg* of Leipsic, I fly with the cuirassiers of Nansouty on the threatened point. I find Ney occupied in rallying his right near Strassenhäuser. He throws himself on Bülow, whom I attack in flank with the cuirassiers of Nansouty from the direction of Mölkou, and drive back the head of his column on Sellerhausen. Being now more safe on this point, I return to my center, which requires all my care. The combat near Strassenhäuser degenerates into a murderous cannonade, as at Probsthayde. Bernadotte brings on this point the Saxon and Swedish artillery and the English rocket batteries, with which he overwhelms the brave soldiers of Delmas and Durutte; the first of these two generals, the intrepid and republican Delmas, falls under this murderous fire; his troops, again forced to yield to an overwhelming superiority, return to Strassenhäuser.

But if the enemy's artillery had a superiority over that of Delmas, ours had an equal advantage at Probsthayde over the deep masses of the enemy, who obstinately refused to retire. In vain did some of the Russian generals, certain that we would be obliged to retreat on the nineteenth, propose to stop this useless carnage, and to carry the reserves of cavalry and Giulay's corps on the road to Lutzen. This advice shared the fate of most other advice of the same character, and was not followed. The Allies, like Kutusof at Krasnoe, were satisfied with a half success which rendered certain our retreat beyond the Rhine. They, however, withdrew some of their masses, after leaving them for a long time uselessly exposed to our fire.

Blücher and Langeron had not encountered less obstacles in attacking Schönfeld, which was defended with great valor by Lagrange, Compans, and Frederick; it was many times lost and retaken. These troops of Marmont, weakened by the battle of the sixteenth, and by this bloody contest, were on the point of yield-



ing, in spite of the most glorious efforts. Compans was wounded; Frederick killed; Marmont saw his chief of staff and his *aids-de-camp* fall by his side; a few moments longer and the sixth corps would have been destroyed, when Ney threw upon the enemy the two divisions of the third corps, which had remained in reserve. Schönfeld, lost and taken for the seventh time, remained in our possession, when the retrograde movements of the right and the approach of Langeron's reserve induced Ney to retire his left to within pistol-shot of that village.

At the north of Leipsic, the corps of Sacken and York had made an unsuccessful attempt to carry the *faubourg* of Halle, which had been secured from a *coup-de-main*, and defended by Dombrowsky's division and the cavalry of the Duke of Padua. In the direction of Lindenau, Bertrand, having received reinforcements, easily drove away Lichtenstein's division of Giulay's corps and opened the road to Weissenfels.

It will be seen by this narrative that we lost very little ground on the left, while the rest of the line maintained its position, and none of our corps were broken, thanks to the little use which the enemy made of his cavalry. This was much for glory; but it could have no influence on the success of the campaign; for, in the desperate situation of our affairs, a half-success was equivalent to a defeat.

THIRD DAY OF LEIPSIC, OCTOBER 19.—The battle being continued till after dark, and the troops being worn out with fatigue and hunger, it was very difficult to effect a retreat in the night. To accomplish this with convenience required seventeen secondary bridges on the Pleisse and the Elster. The equipages should have filed on the eighteenth, under the protection of Bertrand's corps: on the contrary, they were left heaped up between the army and Leipsic; not only had Berthier done nothing himself to prepare for this retreat, but he had countermanded all the prudent measures taken by his staff officers, lest the preparations for retreat might discourage our troops. Nor had the chief of engineers supplied the necessary means for bridges; his park, it is true, had been left with the heavy equipages of the head-quarters at Eulenburg; but there were sappers in the second *corps-d'armée*, and tools and carpenters in the city of Leipsic. I had ordered three supplementary bridges to be thrown across the Pleisse; but this order, given in haste and a little too late, was not well executed. The bridges were badly constructed and gave way. In fact, everything in the army now seemed to depend on me alone; it was necessary for me to attend to everything.

We had crossed the Danube in eight hours at Wagram at night with one hundred and fifty thousand men; but it was on six fine bridges, where each corps had its debouch arranged beforehand, and where the baggage did not pass till long after the army. In retreat, through the streets of a city, by a single narrow bridge, the operation is very different; and there necessarily resulted great confusion and crowding: the cowardly always push first, and two or three broken wagons are sufficient to stop everything in such a narrow defile. All these evils happened to us.

The break of day on the nineteenth found us in all the frightful embarrassments of a retreat. We were obliged to receive still another battle in order to effect it. The troops were ranged around the *enceinte* of the *faubourgs*, which had previously been barricaded; they might easily be defended for twenty-four hours, if our troops should fight as at Dresden. We would thus gain time for the withdrawal of our forces, each corps passing successively from the combat into the line of retreat. Tactically speaking, our position was not bad, for Leipsic might be considered as a *tête-de-pont* covering the defile. There, however, was a lack of bridges to accelerate the retreat and prevent accidents. There were required two bridges above and two below the main road, covered with redans, connecting with the passage of Lindenau; and roads to these bridges should have been opened through the gardens. But we had returned from Duben only on the fifteenth; we had hoped to gain a battle on the sixteenth; and on the seventeenth had counted on an armistice; so that the necessary precautions for accelerating and securing a retreat had been neglected. The blame of this must rest on my major-general and the chief of engineers, rather than on me. I had passed the night in dictating such orders as were rendered necessary by our retreat upon the frontiers of France; I wrote to the council of the Regency, to Mayence, to Strasburg, and to the whole line of the Rhine; to the lower Elbe, to Italy, to Spain, to Dantzic, to the Oder, to Dresden, to Torgau. I thought of all the great combinations which would be required in future: it was for Berthier, my chief of staff, to attend to the remainder. As soon as it was day, I went to see the King of Saxony, to advise him to trust his fate to the generosity of the kings who had recognized him; but reminding him that France had always been a better ally to the House of Saxony than either Austria or Prussia.

On leaving the King, I saw the horrible jam in all the streets of Leipsic, and moved towards the defile. The battle was continued along the whole circumference at any attempt made by

the *corps-d'armée* to retire on the *faubourgs* of Leipsic. At the north, Sacken and Langeron attacked Pfaffendorf, which was defended by Durutte; Woronzof and Bülow attacked the gates of Grimma and Hinterthor, which were defended by Marmont and Ricard. At the south, Schwartzenberg pressed the Poles along the Pleisse; Barclay pushed Macdonald and Lauriston coming from Probsthayde by Strassenhäuser. It was impossible for me to direct any movement. At nine o'clock I went to the gate of Ranstädt, where the crowd and jam were frightful; I returned by the boulevards to gain the bridge. Belluno and Mortier had passed the defile; Souham and Marmont followed. Lauriston had formed his troops to pass in his turn.

But the successive evacuation weakened our lines, in proportion as the enemy's columns became more animated, and approached nearer to the city of Leipsic. They had already forced an entrance into the *faubourgs*, and had gained the western part of the boulevard which separates them from the old *enceinte*; the Badois had abandoned to them the gate of St. Peter, thus opening an access to the city, through which several columns of the Allies precipitated themselves. The three *corps-d'armée* which had remained for its defense had no other course than to gain in haste the great road, and to defend themselves on the right and left by means of the houses of the *faubourg* of Ranstädt.

They succeeded in throwing themselves into this space; but the immense parks and equipages blocked up all the passages. Nevertheless the mass would have been gradually retired, had not the officer who was designated to destroy the bridges after the passage confided the important charge of blowing up the bridge of the mill on the great arm of the Elster to a simple corporal of sappers. Langeron, following the boulevards from the north, extended himself in a parallel line to the west, and in order to gain our lines of retreat, his *tirailleurs*, being deployed in the gardens, succeeded in penetrating to the bridge. The corporal, on seeing the approach of the enemy, and thinking that only a few of our troops remained behind, put fire to the mines, and blew up the only means of retreat left to our rear guard. These troops were now without hope. The boldest threw themselves into the Elster, and attempted to swim across; Macdonald saved himself, but Poniatowski was drowned.\* A few thousand

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\*The terrible losses sustained by the French in this evacuation of Leipsic shows the immense importance of having with such large armies a sufficient number of properly instructed engineer officers and engineer troops for the management of mines and ponton bridges. The Russian campaign had destroyed the best part of this corps, and there had not been time to instruct others. The following is Thiers' account of this catastrophe:



effected their escape; but near fifteen thousand, hemmed in by the enemy's masses, were obliged to lay down their arms and surrender at discretion. Lauriston, Reynier, Prince Emile of Hesse, and some twenty other general officers were taken prisoners; and the enemy captured an immense booty in baggage, military stores, etc.

I was with the guard behind the last bridge of Lindenau when the bridge of the Elster was blown up; I formed it in line of battle, and stationed its batteries. We now found ourselves charged with protecting the retreat of the wrecks of the army to the Saale; and we fortunately succeeded in our object, although hemmed in by York on the side of Freyburg, and by Giulay on the side of Kosen. The most admirable order reigned in the entire passage of Weissenfels, where the staff-officers had redoubled their precautions, as if to repair their unpardonable neglect at Leipsic.

**REMARKS ON THIS BATTLE.**—The disaster of the bridge of Elster and the disorder in the retreat of the nineteenth of October have been adduced by my detractors, with the retreat

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"But whilst this terrible evacuation of Leipsic was thus taking place, a sudden catastrophe, which might have been but too clearly foreseen, spread despair among the ranks of those who for the common safety had been intrusted with the defense of the Leipsic *faubourgs*. Colonel Montfort, of the engineers, had been ordered to prepare a mine under the first arch of the bridge, along which our troops were now effecting their retreat, and he had, accordingly, done so, and had posted at the spot some sappers with a corporal, who awaited, match in hand, the signal to fire the train. In the meantime, Colonel Montfort, in a state of the most anxious doubt as to what he ought to do, expecting every moment to see the enemy debouch *pêle-mêle* with our soldiers, and unable to obtain any accurate information with respect to the several corps still in the rear, determined to proceed to Lindenau, for the purpose of receiving further instructions from Napoleon's own mouth, and set out towards the other end of the bridge, having first directed the corporal of sappers to fire the mine only in case he should see the enemy approaching.

"Whilst Colonel Montfort was struggling in the midst of the mass which encumbered the bridge; unable either to advance or recede, some of Blücher's troops, in pursuit of the remnant of Reynier's corps, appearing close to the bridge *pêle-mêle* with the soldiers of the seventh corps, occasioned cries of 'Fire the mine! fire the mine!' and the corporal, believing that the right moment had come, applied the match, and thus in a moment condemned twenty thousand of our troops, who were still in the Leipsic *faubourgs*, either to perish, or to become the prisoners of an enemy whom the feelings of exasperation with which this war was conducted had rendered inhuman.

"Believing that they had been betrayed, these men uttered shouts of indignation, and, swayed by the impulses of despair, now rushed upon the enemy, and now threw themselves into the Pleisse and the Elster, and endeavored to cross them by swimming.

from Russia and the disasters of Waterloo, to prove that I lost my judgment in reverses; they have even pretended that I myself remained at the bridge with the match in hand!

I have but two things with which to reproach myself at Leipsic. The first, in not having sent all our parks to Lindenau on the night of the seventeenth, and combined my battle on the eighteenth, so as to retreat during the night. The reason was that I still had some hopes of gaining the battle, and did not wish to precipitate the measures of evacuation. The second, in not having given a better organization to my staff, so as to provide, without express orders, for all such details. But this fault goes further back, and, as has already been remarked, resulted from a defective organization of my army.

It must, however, be confessed that when I renounced at Duben my march on Berlin to return to the plains of Leipsic, I ought to have regarded that place as our only anchor of safety. I should have said to myself, "If I gain the great battle between the Pleisse and the Partha, I have no need of defensive measures; but if I lose it, it is necessary to provide for securing my retreat against the attacks of a superior force." Engineers, sappers, and pontoniers should have been employed from the fifteenth, in con-

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"Poniatowski, who had been raised to the rank of marshal by Napoleon on the preceding evening, plunged with his horse into the Elster, and reached the other side, but there, weakened by many wounds, and unable to climb the steep bank, disappeared beneath the waters, buried in his glory beneath the ruins of our country and his own.

"Macdonald, making a similar attempt, was saved, but Reynier and Lauriston, surrounded by the enemy's troops before they had time to escape, were taken and carried before the allied sovereigns, when the Emperor Alexander, recognizing Lauriston as the wise ambassador who had endeavored to prevent the war of 1812, took him by the hand, and had both him and his companion treated with the utmost courtesy; a courtesy which he was far from displaying towards the unfortunate King of Saxony, who thrice during the morning sent officers to request an interview, which was refused, the only reply to his solicitations being, that he, the King of Saxony, had been taken with arms in his hands, and was, therefore, a prisoner of war; that the allied sovereigns would decide upon his fate, and would inform him of their decision.

"In the meantime, the broken ranks of the French army were continuing their retreat across the numerous arms of the Pleisse and the Elster, leaving twenty thousand of their soldiers either prisoners, or dying in the streets of Leipsic, or drowned in the blood-stained waters of the Pleisse and the Elster.

"This last of the four disastrous days of Leipsic raised the loss of the French army in killed, wounded, or prisoners to the number of sixty thousand men.

"The enemy had lost an equal number in action, but their wounded had received all the grateful care that German patriotism could lavish on them, whilst ours had met with, alas! how different a treatment."

structing a system of field-works connecting Lindenau with the *faubourgs* of Ranstädt, and covering three or four bridges, on which all the troops, the parks, and the baggage could have passed without difficulty at any hour of the day or night.

**NAPOLEON RETREATS ON ERFURTH.**—We continued our retreat without delay to Erfurth, where we arrived on the twenty-third of October. The combats of Leipsic had cost me fifty thousand men, including the unfortunate loss of our rear guard. With my remaining forces it was impossible to sustain myself beyond the Rhine. I therefore, on the twenty-fifth, resumed my march to pass that river.

**PURSUIT OF THE ALLIES.**—The Allies, satisfied with a victory far surpassing their hopes, remained two or three days at Leipsic to determine upon their future plan of operations. Klenau was detached on Dresden; Bernadotte and Benningsen on Hamburg; Blücher was to pursue me, turning Erfurth to the north, and to redescend on Gotha; Bubna followed me in rear by Naumburg. The grand army of the sovereigns threw itself to the south in the forest of Thuringia, to take a parallel line of march. A cloud of partisans annoyed our retreat on all sides. It was, however, effected at first without any remarkable event except the combat of Kosen, where General Giulay was sharply repulsed by the fourth corps.

**DEPARTURE OF THE KING OF NAPLES.**—Murat left me at Erfurth to return to Naples. He had received overtures from Austria, promising to interest herself in the preservation of his throne, if, like Bernadotte, he would join the coalition. Metternich, by a refinement of revenge, applied all his address in sowing defection even in the ranks of my own family. The insinuation which failed with the virtuous King of Saxony succeeded with Joachim. He made a mystery of these propositions, and excused his return to Naples on the pretended necessity of preparations for the defense of his kingdom. I, nevertheless, saw his object, for he had excited my distrust ever since his departure from Posen. I could easily have detained him, but I feared it might enable the English to effect the restoration of Ferdinand. Certain of the influence of my sister over her husband, I first represented to him the inevitable fall of his throne if I should be compelled to yield, and then took my leave of him with deep emotion. I felt a sad presentiment of the fate which awaited him.

**THREATENING MARCH OF THE BAVARIANS.**—I learned at Erfurth that the Bavarians, having united with the Austrians, were already in full march on Würzburg to intercept our retreat. Although I had known for the last ten days the



treaty of alliance concluded at Ried, I did not expect so prompt an aggression on their part. But as soon as the alliance was ratified, the Austrian and Bavarian armies mingled their ranks, and marched against me. Perhaps I might have retained Bavaria by sending the divisions of Augereau to Ratisbon and Straubing; the King would then have been obliged to unite his army with mine; and these eight divisions of infantry, forming with the cavalry near sixty thousand men, might have invaded Bohemia at the moment of the victory of Dresden; this powerful diversion would have decided me to maneuver on Prague by the right of Schwartzberg, instead of uselessly marching, first on the Bober, then on Duben, and then in the mountains of Töplitz.

By this union of the Bavarians and Austrians, the coalition had gained a new army of fifty-eight thousand men, of which Wrede took the command. On the fifteenth of October, he left Braünau, passed the Danube at Donawerth on the nineteenth, and reached Würzburg on the twenty-fourth. On the twenty-seventh he encamped at Aschaffenburg, where he detached ten thousand Bavarians on Frankfort, and with the remainder of his army established himself at Hanau on the twenty-ninth, barring to us the passage of the Main; it was a parody of the Beresina.

I was sensibly affected by this defection; it was the most unjust of all; for I had heaped benefits on Bavaria. The protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine was no more an imposition than her vassalage to the Austrian Empire; and if she deemed it odious, she had only to substitute for it a simple defensive alliance. Her alliance with France was a natural one, and had existed ages before. In remembering the enthusiasm of the Bavarians in 1805 and at Abensberg, and the devotion which they showed in the glorious campaign of 1809, my heart swelled with emotion. . . . And were these the same men? I did not accuse the army, but the intrigues of courtiers, the facile and debonair character of the King, and the ambition of Wrede. In fact, the Bavarians had sacrificed me for their own preservation; Maurice of Saxony did still worse toward Charles V.; but there was something more noble in his opposing a victorious monarch. I should have said nothing if Wrede had simply joined the enemy without thinking to cut off my retreat. I expected that he would annoy my flank and rear; but I did not suppose he would have the presumption to put me in irons!

We followed without obstruction the road from Erfurth by Gotha, Fulda, and Schluchtern. At this last place I first heard of Wrede's audacious maneuver. We had no time to hesitate. It was necessary to cut our way through these new enemies before the arrival of those in our rear. Blücher, leaving the road

to Eisenach, had gone north by Hersefeld towards the sources of the Nidda to fall on my left flank; Bubna followed me in rear, and the grand army was gaining my right by the mountains of Franconia. Raising myself to a level with the threatened danger, I was far from losing courage; I marched briskly on Hanau.

**THEIR DEFEAT AT HANAU.**—We had still eighty thousand disposable men, exclusive of twenty-five thousand wounded and stragglers; but they formed a long procession, extending to Fulda; I had but twenty thousand in hand. Wrede numbered fifty thousand. He placed himself audaciously, or rather imprudently, at the debouch of the forest of Lamboi, resting on the Kinzig. We attacked him on the thirtieth. While my tirailleurs, deployed in the forest, held in check the enemy's right and center, my cavalry pierced their left and threw it partly into the Kinzig. With the assistance of the Cossacks who preceded Blücher's march towards Bergen, half of this broken wing regained Hanover; the rest were drowned or taken prisoners. Wrede, seeing the danger of his position, maneuvered by his right to change his front, and secure his retreat on Aschaffenburg. My Old Guard, under Friant, drove him back. If I had had the corps of Bertrand, Ney; and Marmont about me, the Bavarian army would have been completely destroyed; I would have thrown it into the Main, by cutting off that road. But we had no time to lose; it was necessary to file on Frankfort immediately, for Blücher and Schwartzberg might arrive at any moment. Our columns marched all night in order to reach that city.

But as my rear guard of fourteen thousand men had not yet arrived at the height of Hanau, I left Marmont to hold this point, advising him to take the offensive in order to be more certain of his object. He accordingly attacked and carried the city of Hanau on the morning of the thirty-first, forced the bridge of Lamboi on the Kinzig, and drove back the enemy's right, thus gaining time for the arrival of the rear guard. Now retreating in his turn, he left Bertrand to guard Hanau till all had passed. Wrede, wishing to wash out his defeat, again took the offensive, and penetrated into Hanau, where he was repulsed and seriously wounded. The Bavarian corps occupying Frankfort did not venture to await our arrival, but recrossed the Main, and destroyed the bridge.

**THE FRENCH RETIRE BEHIND THE RHINE.**—On the second of November I arrived at Mayence, and my army there crossed the Rhine. Guilleminot, who brought up the rear, attempted to hold the heights of Hochheim, and was attacked by the Austrians with quadruple forces; but he had the good fortune to reach Cassel without suffering as much loss as might have been expected.

Our long retreat from Leipsic was not without disorder: fatigue and hunger carried off many of our troops, who also suffered much from a nervous epidemic fever. To old France this retreat was scarcely less fatal than that from Russia. Our losses for the last two years had been so great that the nation was in consternation; and if the Allies had pursued their march, they might have entered Paris with our rear guard. But the aspect of the military frontiers of France intimidated them. They wished to raise militia to blockade these fortresses before again engaging on a soil rich with the blood of the soldiers of the first coalition.

**CAPITULATION OF DRESDEN.**—Before attempting anything further, the Allies first occupied themselves in collecting the fruit of their great victory. The most important of all was the capitulation of Dresden, where I had unfortunately left twenty-five thousand men under Saint-Cyr. This great detachment has been the subject of much criticism. Certainly, if I had had no other object than the defense of Dresden, it would have been exceedingly foolish. But the object was to assist Murat in keeping the field as long as possible, in order to occupy the army of Bohemia, while I marched on Duben to crush Blücher. I expected to return by the right bank of the Elbe, after having captured Berlin. I have already shown what combination of circumstances forced me to renounce this project. I then, on the fourteenth of October, sent officers to Saint-Cyr directing him to descend the Elbe, and unite with the greater part of the garrisons of Torgau and Magdeburg. But none of them reached their destination. (After the loss of Leipsic, his fate was fixed. I hoped, however, that he would himself file on Torgau, draw to him some reinforcements from Wittenberg and Magdeburg, and unite with Davoust. The Allies had left before Dresden only one good division and the Russian militia of Count Tolstoy. He would undoubtedly have succeeded if he had undertaken it in time. But after the battle of Leipsic, the Allies sent Klenau at the head of twenty-five thousand Austrians to reinforce the blockading corps.

As his magazines were getting low, and our affairs seemed lost in Germany, Saint-Cyr agreed with the enemy to surrender the place on condition of a free passage for the garrison, which was afterward to be exchanged. The capitulation was agreed upon, and the troops had left the place, when the allied sovereigns disapproved of the arrangement and ordered his columns to return. But in the meantime the enemy had occupied the place and ascertained all its means of sustaining a siege. He, therefore, preferred to surrender as prisoners of war and throw upon



the Allies the odium of a violated capitulation. In this he was wrong. He should have remained in the place and required Klenau to furnish him with provisions till the return of the courier with the approbation of the allied sovereigns.

OPERATIONS BEFORE HAMBURG.—On the other side the army of Bernadotte was broken up; Tauenzien's corps was blockading Wittenberg; Bülow was detached into Westphalia and the confines of Holland; and a part of the Russian troops under Wintzingerode took the same direction. Bernadotte united his Swedes with Benningsen's corps, and marched on the Lower Elbe to join Walmoden, detach Denmark, and capture Hamburg. Davoust, in concert with ten thousand Danes, had kept the field in this vicinity with success. The Danes soon signed a peace; but that brave nation, who had gathered nothing but thorns from our alliance, did not imitate the example of those who had reaped all the advantages; they limited themselves to a wise and honorable neutrality. Davoust, being left alone, prepared for a vigorous defense. The duties of a valiant governor who prefers to bury himself under the ruins of a city intrusted to his sword, rather than to surrender it, do not accord with the interests of the citizens; Davoust has left at Hamburg a name abhorred, and the extent of this hatred may be regarded as the measure of the praise actually due to him. To blockade and besiege a city like Hamburg, with Haaburg and the islands, when it is defended by twenty-five thousand brave men and well provisioned, is no small task. Bernadotte and Benningsen spent five months without making much progress. Davoust defended the approaches with activity, and fought on the outside as long as he could. The place held out till after my abdication at Fontainebleau.

CAPITULATION OF DANTZIC.—Rapp was not quite so fortunate; he braved there for a year the attacks of the Duke of Würtemberg. The means of the besiegers were not in proportion to the importance of the place and the strength of the garrison. The whole force there was twenty-five thousand men, of which five or six thousand were not capable of doing service; three or four thousand were equivocal Neapolitans; the Polish division of Granjean and that of Heudelet. After a blockade of six months, they attempted a siege, which would have been a long one if the garrison had not capitulated for want of munitions and medicines. Rapp had the same fate as Saint-Cyr. He at first obtained a free sortie, which was not sanctioned. They, however, had reserved this sanction. Rapp had no other course than to surrender himself a prisoner of war.

## SIEGE AND BLOCKADE OF THE OTHER PLACES.—

The Russians blockaded Wittenberg, where General Lapoype made a very fine defense till 1814. Tauenzien's corps, with the Saxons who had joined the Russians, blockaded Torgau. This was followed by a *simulacrum* of a siege and a bombardment. The garrison was embarrassed with a mass of wounded men and equipages, which had taken refuge there at the battle of Leipsic; moreover, the troops had suffered greatly from the ravages of an epidemic fever. Narbonne, who commanded the place, was killed by a fall from his horse. He was succeeded by General Dutailles, having under him Brun de Villeret. The garrison, reduced to half its numbers and destitute of provisions, capitulated. Stettin, Modlin, Zamosc, and the citadel of Erfurth also surrendered during the month of December, after having accomplished all that could be hoped from resignation and devotion. Glogau held out till the end of the war. Magdeburg, being defended by a strong garrison, was only blockaded, at first by Benningsen and then by the Russian militia. Custrin, defended by Fornier-d'Albe, was only invested; its position on an island of the Oder rendered it as difficult of attack as it was easy of blockade. Moreover, the Prussians did not wish to destroy their places, being certain that in time they would be reduced by famine. For this reason the siege of Glogau was changed to a blockade, and the two places held out beyond all expectation, the first to the seventh of March, and the second to the tenth of April. This was the more honorable for Glogau, as of the five thousand men which formed its garrison, the governor was obliged to dismiss one-half, which was composed of German, Spanish, and Illyrian troops, and he had to guard, with the few that remained, an *enceinte* on both banks of the Oder.

OPERATIONS OF EUGENE IN ITALY.—In Italy there was nothing of a decisive character. The Viceroy, who had been sent there after the battle of Lützen, organized an army of forty-five thousand French and Italians. I hoped at one time to send Augereau to the valley of the Danube to act with the Bavarian army and Eugene against the gates of Vienna. This union of one hundred and twenty thousand men would have greatly embarrassed Austria. But the intrigues which paralyzed Bavaria from the commencement of the campaign forced me to renounce this project. The Austrians, being thus relieved from danger from the Inn and the Tyrol, sent General Hiller against Eugene with a superior force, which was assisted by the violent inhabitants of the Tyrol and the Illyrian Croats. The Viceroy occupied with the main body of his forces the famous passes of Tarvis and Laybach, while a detachment guarded the valley of the Adige to Prun-

ecken. Hiller, repulsed at Villach and Kraimburg, had some success near Fiume; but the Viceroy having carried there Pino's division, General Nugent was beaten like his chief. On being reinforced, Hiller passed the Drave on the nineteenth of September, and gained some advantages over the divisions of Verdier and Gratien. The Viceroy maintained himself at Tarvis. The middle of October the Austrian general, certain of the accession of Bavaria, ascended the Drave with his main body on Prunecken to join his right in the valley of the Adige and carry the theater of war by Trente on Verona; the left alone remained in the Friol. This movement was well conceived. The Viceroy, being no longer able to hold in the mountains, fell back at first behind the Isonzo, then on the right bank of the Brenta, of which he destroyed the bridges.

Eugene might have fallen with all his forces on the left of the Austrians, and gained their rear by the Drave, as I had done against Wurmser by the gorges of the Brenta; he had the additional advantage of possessing Mantua. But to attempt such enterprises required an impetuous character and reliable troops, which Eugene had not. Weakened by the garrisons of Mantua and Venice, and the defection of Bavaria having opened the Tyrol to our enemies, he deemed it more wise to fall back on the Adige about Verona.

Hiller, not daring to debouch on his rear by forcing Rivoli, filed by the gorges of the Brenta, in order to join his left and to advance toward Vicenza. New contests took place in the so often disputed position of Caldiero. It was carried by the Austrians, for all the advantages of this celebrated post are against Verona and in favor of troops debouching from Vicenza. General Nugent blockaded Venice in concert with an English division, and got possession by water of the port of Ferrara. Istria, Dalmatia, Illyria, the Tyrol, and the States of Venice fell into the power of the enemy in consequence of the battle of Leipsic and the unfortunate resolution of the Court of Munich. The Cabinet of Vienna, having decided upon the reconquest of Italy, sent there Marshal Bellegarde with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men under Klenau. Immediately after the fall of Dresden, this corps filed by Bavaria and the Tyrol on the Adige. We will describe their operations hereafter.

**SOULT'S OPERATIONS IN SPAIN.**—In Spain our affairs were not more favorable. In order to give vigor to the army of Joseph, I had determined to recall him to Paris and give the general command to Soult. I ought to have done this in 1811. But although this resolution was rather too late, I still hoped that the marshal would be able at least to check the success of



the British arms on the Pyrenees. He immediately resolved to advance to the assistance of Pampeluna. The project was well imagined; but the difficulty of the country and the situation of the respective parties rendered its success very difficult, if not problematical.

Soult descended from the Pyrenees by his left with forty thousand men in two columns, by Roncevaux and Maya. He himself marched by the first of these roads on Pampeluna, hoping to deliver the place and then turn against the center of the Allies. This maneuver was good; but the asperity of the mountains, the length of the march, and the obstinate defense of the English right under General Picton gave time for Wellington to approach with the main body. Reinforced by the Spanish troops from the siege of Pampeluna, he held Soult in check, while two English divisions under Hill and Dalhousie turned his right at the foot of the Col-d'Arrais, and threatened his communications by Lanz. Soult supported himself in his turn near Ostitz to rally on Drouet. This maneuver has been the subject of ridiculous criticism. If he had permitted his right to be forced and turned between Ostitz and Lanz, he would have suffered the same fate as Joseph at Vittoria. He thought it prudent not to risk a general battle in a country so difficult, where, in fact, he had everything to lose and little to gain. The enemies of the national glory of France have reproached me for having been too audacious, and attempt to criminate Soult for not having been more so! In fact, his movement, conceived on excellent principles, would have been more successful if the road from Roncevaux had been better, and his first marches had been conducted with more activity, precision, and vigor; but as soon as the enemy had time to collect superior forces, with the advantage of ground and roads, the chances were against him. It must also be observed that, by turning the English right, he would have thrown Wellington back upon the sea: what would have caused the destruction of a continental army would, on the contrary, have been a means of security to him. Soult returned to his positions after three successful combats, in which the enemy lost six or seven thousand men, while his own loss was much less.

The English general now warmly pushed the siege of San Sebastian, which place had already been unsuccessfully assaulted by General Graham. The regular attack was renewed the twenty-eighth of August, with forty-five pieces of ordnance, a part of which were sixty-eight-pound carronades: the breach was made practicable, and a second assault given on the thirty-first; it was more bloody than the first, and would also have failed, had not an explosion inside forced the garrison to retire to the castle.

Wellington lost his two highest officers of engineers and three thousand men, and the English soiled their laurels by the excesses committed upon a friendly and allied city.

Soult made some efforts to succor this place, and passed the Bidassoa near the mountain of Haya and opposite San Martial; but he found the enemy too strongly posted. The Spaniards especially distinguished themselves in the defense of San Martial, where they rivaled the best English troops; the miraculous effect of the influence on the valor of an army of a single chief who merits the full confidence of the soldier! After an engagement of some hours, the three French columns recrossed the Bidassoa. The castle of San Sebastian, being bombarded with heavy mortar batteries on the ninth of September, capitulated. The Allies found here one thousand two hundred men and five hundred wounded; the siege had cost them four thousand.

Wellington, reinforced by his siege corps and a number of Spanish troops, resolved to possess himself of the central and salient position of the Rhune, which took in reverse all the upper valley of the Nivelle and the great road from St. Jean-de-Luz to Bayonne; its possession was calculated to secure from all surprise his right, which was posted at the Col-de-Maya, and could descend at will on Bayonne; he caused this post to be attacked by three strong Spanish columns and an English division. Soult, being greatly weakened by detachments, made but little defense of this advanced post, and concentrated his forces behind the Nivelle. Pampeluna fell a few days after, for want of provisions.

Nothing remarkable occurred in the east of Spain. Suchet continued to maintain his position in advance of Barcelona, without being seriously troubled by the enemy. He was waiting with impatience for orders to resume the offensive, and disengage the twenty thousand men whom he had unfortunately left to garrison the places in the interior. But the battle of Leipsic and the retreat behind the Rhine destroyed these vain hopes, and soon forced me to ask from him reinforcements for the defense of the Rhone.

## CHAPTER XXI.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1814.

General State of France—Change of the French Ministry—Propositions of the Allies—Dissolution of the Chamber—Preparations for Defense—Negotiations for the Restoration of Ferdinand—Situation of Affairs in Italy—Extraordinary Efforts of the Coalition—They resolve to invade France—Their Motives of Action—They pass the Rhine—Napoleon marches against them—He attacks Blücher—First Combat of Brienne—Battle of Brienne—Congress of Châtillon—Faults of Blücher—Position of the two Armies—Combat of Champ-Aubert—Combat of Montmirall—Affair of Château-Thierry—Defeat of Blücher at Vaux-Champs and Etoges—He rallies his Army at Châlons—Movement of the Allies on Nogent—Napoleon flies to the Seine—Slow March of Schwarzenberg—Combat of Nangis—Combat of Montereau—Schwarzenberg evacuates Troyes—Operations of Eugene and Augereau—Proposal of an Armistice—New Disposition of the Allied Forces—Blücher marches on Meaux—Operations of Mortier and Marmont—Napoleon marches against Blücher—Blücher repasses the Aisne—Battle of Craone—*Ultimatum* of Châtillon rejected—Battle of Laon—Affair of Reims—Schwarzenberg on the Aube—His Vanguard crosses the Seine—The Empress and Regency retire to Blois—Napoleon moves against the grand Allied Army—Battle of Arcis—Remarks on Napoleon's Position—Success of the Allies in the South—New Project of Maneuvering on the Enemy's Rear—Operations of Blücher—The Marshals are separated from Napoleon—Alexander decides to march on Paris—Efforts of Napoleon to communicate with his Marshals—The latter retire on Paris—Difficulties of Napoleon's Situation—He flies to the Defense of the Capital—Battle of Paris—Situation of France—Want of Public Spirit in Paris—Conduct of the Emperor of Russia—Intrigues of the Factions—Abdication of Fontainebleau—Battle of Toulouse—Napoleon retires to Elba—Evacuation of Italy—Concluding Remarks.

GENERAL STATE OF FRANCE.—Notwithstanding our disasters on the Pyrenees, on the Adige, and on the Rhine, I still hoped to be able to defend, for a long time, the French soil. It is true that efforts to maintain ourselves on the Elbe, after the battle of Bautzen, had drawn from the interior of France



every one capable of carrying a musket. I therefore had but few resources left. It was necessary to garrison our frontier places, but this was not a time when citizens, making it a point of honor and of duty to defend their ramparts, require only a good leader and a few soldiers to assist them. Unfortunately, our troops, in returning to France, had brought with them a fatal typhus fever, which made cruel ravages in our ranks. Mayence was filled with the sick, and the contagion had extended even to Strasbourg, and the people on both sides of the river were affected; and even the soldiers who escaped the fever suffered a lassitude and loss of strength. This army presented a very different spectacle from that which passed the Rhine in 1805 to oppose Mack.

But what troubled me most was the general lukewarmness of public spirit in the interior. If I found France firm and resigned on my return from Moscow, I found her equally wavering and distrustful on my return from Leipsic. The reverses of Vittoria and Leipsic, and the approach of the masses of the coalition, had intimidated some, and revived the treasonable hopes of others. Intriguers, ever active in times of public danger, were exerting every means to overthrow my power, while others, who had lost their fortunes and privileges in the Revolution, forgot that they owed to me the preservation of their lives, and the restitution of a part of their property. They desired the triumph of the coalition, in hopes of regaining some ruined castles and portions of unalienated forests, or of living more at their ease in the restoration of feudal domination. Royalist committees were formed throughout the west of France and at Bordeaux. Perfidy and treason to the interests of France were organized in the very *salons* of the capital, and spread from there in the *landes* and in the *bagage*.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.—Measuring the extent of the danger, I had convoked the legislative body, in the hope that it would assist me with all the power of the laws. Being informed that Talleyrand's party had incited public opinion against the Duke of Bassano, whom they accused of being one of the principal instigators of the war, I determined to sacrifice my own affections, and remove this faithful servant from the portfolio of foreign affairs, and put Caulaincourt in his place. In this choice I was influenced by several motives: in the first place, the Duke of Vicenza had always opposed the war with Russia; and, on account of the esteem in which he was held by the Emperor Alexander, he might now facilitate negotiations. No one knew better than I did the unfounded character of the reports made against Maret, and I could not have given a stronger proof of my desire

for peace than in displacing him from office. Caulaincourt was at the same time made minister of foreign relations and plenipotentiary.

**PROPOSITIONS OF THE ALLIES.**—The coalition had just made some overtures by M. de St. Aignan, my envoy to Weimar, who, in passing at Frankfort, had had a conference with Metternich, Nesselrode, and Aberdeen. The first offered to treat, leaving us the line of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. I was ready to accept these conditions for myself and for France, but I wished at least to discuss what was to be done with Italy and Holland, which were still in our possession. To an empire like France, it was imposing on her the lowest of humiliations to refuse to treat with her respecting the fate of her nearest neighbors and allies.

**DISSOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER.**—The legislative body did not answer my expectations. Instead of feeling that, in the face of three hundred thousand Allies, it was the first duty of every patriot to assist, with every means in his power, in the defense of his threatened soil, they sought to discuss complaints against me, and to organize an untimely opposition. At the opening of the chamber I had sent them a frank and unreserved communication on the state of affairs; presenting to them a sincere exposition of our dangers, and of the hopes which still remained of peace. I had even laid before a joint committee of the senate and legislative body all my diplomatic correspondence, showing what I had offered the allied powers in order to obtain peace. Instead of responding to this confidence by providing the means of carrying on the negotiations, or of sustaining the national dignity and independence, the deputies charged with presenting to me the address of the Chamber spoke only of *future guarantees of the public liberty, and the exercise of political rights!* These words would have been honorable when I was victorious, but now, when all were bound to unite to save the state, they were of a factious character, tending to excite a schism in the government. I had but one of two courses to pursue: to yield to the factions, or to dissolve the legislative body. If I yielded, my throne was overthrown, my authority disputed, and France lost. The legislative body was dissolved, and I had recourse to the Senate to give legality to the measures necessary for the safety of all. This was unfortunate, as it gave to my enemies a

text for representing me to France as a despot, who no longer disguised his tyranny under rich harvests of laurels, and who was bringing all Europe upon France by the cruelty of his ambition. Those who thus excited discord under such circumstances are already judged. They connived with the conspirators who

sought the restoration of the Bourbons. These fervent apostles of liberty were more desirous of power than of the welfare of the state.

PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENSE. — Notwithstanding these contrarieties, I applied all my activity in reorganizing my little army. For the last twenty years our fortresses had neither been armed nor repaired, for they had not been threatened, and it now required the greatest efforts to place them in a state of defense. Neglecting all places of a secondary character, I directed my attention to the most important points. All our resources had been employed in reorganizing our army at Lutzen; and we now required one hundred millions of francs and two hundred thousand men to render our frontiers secure. If I had had a more provident ministry, and the nation had not been already impoverished, there would have been time enough to provide for the public security after the declaration of Austria. But the ministry could not venture upon such a measure after my disapproval of the levy of Fouché in 1809, and, moreover, France was not disposed for a levy *en masse*. I confess, nevertheless, that I ought to have organized the national guards immediately after the armistice of July; this would have given me the means of garrisoning our fortresses, and, in case of reverse, would have enabled my army to keep the field. This organization had been decreed in 1805, and had partially been made on two occasions since; but as the war had always been carried on beyond the frontiers of France, this measure had not received the extension of which it was susceptible. I remembered the thirteenth Vendémiaire, and desired to postpone the arming of the multitude as long as possible.

Some writers have asserted that *the only remaining means of saving France was a grand national movement; but that the loss of public liberty rendered the French indifferent to my fate.* History will decide upon the truth of these assertions; it will ask of these great apostles of ideal liberty, whether the people ought not to regard the independence of their soil as the first of their liberties; and if, in order to permit the declaimers of the tribune to censure the acts of the administration, it was necessary to admit foreign phalanxes into the heart of the state; and to receive the laws of the Pandours, in order to have the pleasure of dictating to their own government! Woe to the people who become the dupes of such aberrations! Deceived by the results of the grand movement of 1793, of which they understood neither the cause nor the effects, these gentlemen suppose a tribune and public journals the only requisite to make a nation rise *en masse* against the enemy! Let them examine the archives of the war office, and



then say how many *volunteers* went to the frontier, from the flight of Dumouriez in April, 1792, to the taking of Valenciennes at the end of July. . . . Not one! The law of the requisition furnished only between eighty and ninety thousand men, instead of three hundred thousand; and it required the law of the fifth of September—that is, *terror, the guillotine, and all the attirail of the revolutionary army*—to raise five hundred thousand men, ill-armed and ill-equipped. 'Perhaps it may be asked, What was the liberty which these brave men were asked to defend?

With wise people, public liberty consists of equality before the law, freedom of the press, the right to vote on taxes and military levies, and individual freedom, where this does not tend to the overthrow of public order. All these rights were respected by the institutions which I created and by the acts of my administration. A committee of the Senate was directed to see that no arbitrary arrests were made by the police; and if this committee neglected their duty, it was their own fault, for that was the object for which it was instituted. I caused the arrest of some fifty bad characters, mostly military demagogues, who wished to play the part of Brutus, by boasting in public that they would treat me like Cæsar! I shut up in the state prisons some fifty turbulent characters of different parties, who were attempting to raise insurrections, and some twenty priests, who sought to subject France to the ultramontane yoke. With the exception of these individuals, not a Frenchman who respected the laws was deprived of the enjoyment of his liberty.

I had preferred having the laws before the legislative body discussed by known and distinguished orators, in order to save France from the dangers of the tribune, after the commotions which had divided the French people into two nations. In doing this I rendered a service to the state; they have since seen the evils caused by a tribune occupied by unworthy or unknown orators. The vote by black and white balls, after the exposition of the motives of the proposed laws, was the most suitable mode of avoiding the return of anarchy or a dictatorship. In times of public tranquillity I should have been charmed at opening a field for the oratorical talent which distinguishes the French magistracy.

**NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE RESTORATION OF FERDINAND.**—I have been reproached with too much indecision in my course toward Spain. It is certain that if I had sent back Ferdinand immediately after my return from Leipsic, and at the same time had recalled Suchet into Languedoc, I would have had disposable on the Rhone thirty or forty thousand men of the old bands by the middle of February, instead of leaving them

to be invested in the fortifications of Catalonia. The propitious moment for effecting this restoration had passed; I have already remarked that I had refused to do it, at the beginning of 1813, on my return from Russia and previous to the battle of Vittoria, on account of the excess of my confidence in my resources, and from the fear of drawing Europe upon me by unveiling my weakness. But I ought certainly to have done it as soon as the rupture of the negotiations of Prague, the defeat of Joseph, and the defection of Austria placed the grand question of the empire of the civilized world in the fields of Saxony and the mountains of Bohemia. Suchet might then have withdrawn all his garrisons, which were uselessly compromitted in the fortifications of Spain, and have appeared on the Rhine with forty thousand old troops. The half of Soult's army would have been sufficient to guard the chain of the Pyrenees.

On my return from Leipsic, I no longer hesitated on the course to be pursued; negotiations were immediately begun with the Duke of San Carlos, and a treaty signed at Valençay on the eleventh of December. But it would not do to restore Ferdinand, except upon conditions which would be recognized by Spain, and would be calculated to make him my friend. Even Francis I. could not force the fulfillment of the treaty signed with Charles V. at Madrid; and there was nothing to prove that Ferdinand would not act in the same way toward me. I would have accepted whatever he desired if I had been assured that the Spaniards would cease their hostilities and separate from the English; but if Wellington remained in arms on the Pyrenees, this return of the King would only add strength to my enemies, by placing Ferdinand at the side of the Duke d'Angoulême at the English head-quarters. The party which conspired against me, and especially Talleyrand, resorted to a thousand intrigues to retard this restoration and to intervene in the ratification of the treaty, in order to destroy the prestige of my superiority. Caulaincourt himself was a dupe to these intrigues. Too much accustomed to persevere in my enterprises, I the more easily gave an ear to these perfidious insinuations, and thus postponed a measure which I adopted when too late. I merely asked of Soult two divisions from his army, to be directed on the Seine, and ten thousand men of Suchet, to be directed toward Lyons.

SITUATION OF AFFAIRS IN ITALY.—I had less hesitation in my course with Italy. I ordered Eugene to purchase, at the expense of Osoppo and Palma-Nova, an armistice of some days with Bellegarde, and to profit by it to echelon his army on Cremona and Milan, and then file by the Alps on Geneva. I calculated that, being master of Alessandria and Mantua, I could

in a few days plant my eagles on the Adige, if we obtained a decisive success in France. But to this success the coöperation of Eugene was necessary. In order to give more efficacy to this plan, Augereau was to form a corps of twenty-five thousand men at Lyons, of which the ten thousand soldiers of the *élite* from the army of Catalonia would form the nucleus. The union of these forces and Eugene would enable me to recapture Switzerland, and thus throw sixty thousand men on the communications of the enemy, and to operate in concert with this mass, augmented by all the insurgent population of the Franche-Comté, Alsace, and Lorraine. I hoped that Bellegarde, blinded by the temporary conquest of Lombardy, would have sufficient occupation in investing Mantua and Alessandria, without thinking of following Eugene beyond the Alps. But nothing of all this was done; some have attempted to attribute this to Eugene and his wife; the accusation is false. Reflecting afterwards that even the French regiments of his army were recruited from the Piedmontese, Tuscan, and Roman conscripts, who would abandon their colors in crossing the Alps, I left it optional with him to remain in Italy, if he could maintain himself on the Mincio, or if he feared to draw after him another victorious army on France. He preferred to remain and fight it out on the Adige, which he did with glory, honor, and loyalty.

It will be seen from these dispositions that I appreciated the immensity of the task which I had to perform, but that I was not intimidated by the responsibility. If I had fortifications to guard, the Allies had also to blockade Hamburg, Magdeburg, Stettin, Torgau, Wittenberg, Custrin, and Glogau; if they passed the Rhine, they would be obliged to invest Mayence and Strasbourg, which alone required an army. Making deductions of so many detachments, I calculated that the enemy would not have one hundred and fifty thousand men to advance to the Moselle. Here Metz and Thionville would require new corps for blockades. Not more than one hundred thousand Allies could reach the Marne. I hoped in the course of a month to organize as large a force. But one hundred thousand Frenchmen fighting for their altars and firesides, under my direction, ought in a short time to clear the country; and if the Viceroy had debouched by Geneva, the coalition would have paid dearly for their temerity in invading France.

#### EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS OF THE COALITION.—

But Europe had learned from us, from Spain, and from Russia not to spare any sacrifice. The Confederation of the Rhine turned against me all the energy which I had impressed on it. Its contingent of troops of the line was fixed at one hundred and



forty-five thousand men, including the Bavarians and Würtembergers already in the army; and as many *landwehrs*. If we deduct from these the forty-eight thousand Bavarians and Würtembergers already with the enemy, there will be left more than two hundred thousand enemies which I had not expected.

The militia were left to blockade our garrisons, while the armed masses of Europe penetrated into France; they were more numerous than I supposed. If to the eight hundred and ten thousand men which we have before enumerated we add the two hundred thousand Germans and the fifty thousand Russians of Labanof, we have a total of *one million one hundred and fifty-two thousand men* thrown against me, between August and September!

**THE ALLIES RESOLVE TO INVADE FRANCE.**—In the meantime the overtures of the coalition made through St. Aignan had not produced the immediate result which I had hoped. To choose a new minister, and to arrange his instructions respecting Italy and Holland, had occasioned a delay of some fifteen days, during which the Allies changed their resolution, and prepared to invade France, without waiting for a final answer to their propositions.

**THEIR MOTIVES OF ACTION.**—But this was not strange, if we reflect upon their divergence of interests on approaching our frontiers. For whom and for what were they now to fight? Could Austria's wishes be the same as those of Russia? or could Russia consent to all that England desired? The Emperor of Austria wished to offer me the line of the Rhine; but as soon as the question of Italy was discussed, the Cabinet of Vienna feared they might lose their coveted prey. The Allies had agreed not to treat separately. England had shown that Belgium and Antwerp interested her more than a continental monarchy; her plenipotentiaries protested against the offer made to St. Aignan; and the minister Castlereagh immediately departed from London to assist in the dissection of my empire. The Emperor of Russia wished to come to Paris to return my visit to Moscow, and to aid in the conquest of Antwerp, in order to obtain Warsaw. Austria espoused the maritime interests of England, because the preservation of my maritime establishments was of little importance to her; she consented to conquer Antwerp in order to be certain of regaining Milan and of retaining Venice!

The invasion, however, had some opponents who feared the influence of our fortifications and our national energy, and who saw the divergence in the political interests of the Allies. The question was decided in the affirmative through the influence of a committee of intriguers in France, who encouraged the ruin of

their country in order to satisfy personal ambition, and who sent secret agents to Frankfort to inform the Allies of the facility of pushing on to Paris. In the meantime another committee of Bernese oligarchs came to offer the Swiss territory to serve as a bridge over the Rhine; for the Austrians, as usual, sought a distant passage when they could have made one almost anywhere. The invasion was then resolved upon.\*

**THE ALLIES PASS THE RHINE.**—Being aware that my Continental System had incited the opposition of the merchants of Amsterdam, and that many of our fortresses in Holland were deprived of all means of defense, the Allies detached the corps of Bülow and Benkendorf against Holland. They took possession of all the country to the Waal without opposition, and Nimeguen and even Grave opened their gates without making any defense.

Blücher passed the Rhine near Mayence, and, leaving a corps at that place, advanced on Nancy. Wittgenstein passed at Brisach and crossed the Vosges mountains; but they were met on the way by a crowd of armed country people, who were prepared to dispute the invasion of their soil. In vain did the enemy pronounce death upon all villagers taken in arms, and burn to ashes every French village which attempted resistance: the plains of Alsace and the valleys of the Vosges threw out bands of laborers who made the isolated detachments of the armies of Prussia and Austria pay dearly for the excesses which they committed. They alone for a time suspended the march of the enemy. The inhabitants of Champagne and Franche-Comté followed their example; the people of Burgundy rose in their turn, and for some days I ventured to hope that love of country would do, in 1814, as much as the system of terror in 1793.

Schwartzenberg had invaded Switzerland, pushing three columns on Geneva, in order to seize the road of the Simplon and decide the evacuation of Italy. The grand allied army profited by the violation of the Swiss territory to cross Bâle, and advance on Bâle and Vesoul. In conformity to my orders, our corps

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\*Jomini denies the charge made against him of having advised the invasion of his own country—Switzerland. He says he used every means in his power to prevent that invasion by obtaining a promise from the Emperor of Russia to respect the neutrality of that country; but that this promise was broken by Austria on the solicitations of the Bernese oligarchs. Jomini also advised against the invasion of France in 1813, as contrary to the future interest of Russia, inasmuch as it would give to the English too great a preponderance, by depriving France of the means of opposing them. If the march on Paris was a memorable triumph, its fruits, he says, have been far from satisfactory. His opinions are fully sustained by reliable authorities.

yielded to the enormous superiority of the enemy, to concentrate toward Châlons. The first engagement took place at Langres, where my Old Guard sustained a combat in order to give us a few days' repose.

Now began that ever-memorable campaign which gives immortality to the handful of brave men who did not despair of their country. Their confidence animated mine; witnessing their patriotism, their devotion to my person, their valor, was I culpable in supposing that nothing was impossible for such soldiers?

**NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD AGAINST THEM.**—The enemy was now within a few leagues of Paris. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of my means, it was necessary to do everything in my power to prevent their arrival. On the twenty-fifth of January, after having assembled the chiefs of the National Guard of Paris, and received from them the oath of fidelity, I left the capital for Châlons. I had again confided the regency to the Empress Maria Louisa, and given the title of Lieutenant of the Empire to my brother Joseph, who was to preside in the council. On my departure I bade adieu to my wife and son. . . . My heart was bursting with emotion. . . . A sad presentiment agitated me. . . . I was bidding them an eternal farewell!

The allied sovereigns, with their grand army of one hundred and twenty thousand men, were advancing from Langres on Chaumont; Blücher, with about fifty thousand men, had passed Nancy and directed his march towards Joinville and St. Dizier on the Marne. I had, to oppose these masses, only about seventy thousand men still scattered along an extensive line. Mortier, with fifteen thousand men, formed the right at Troyes; at the center, between Châlons and Vitry, Ney, Victor, and Marmont had collected about forty-five thousand men; finally, Macdonald, with nine thousand men coming from Namur, had passed Mézières and was approaching Rethèl.

**HE ATTACKS BLÜCHER.**—I knew that the Allies were advancing imprudently in separate corps; but as this usually happens in war, I had no exact data as to the precise positions of these corps or their strength. I knew, however, that by pushing rapidly with my center from Vitry by St. Dizier and Joinville, on Chaumont, I would succeed in placing myself between the army of Blücher and the grand allied army, and attack them before they could unite their forces. On the twenty-seventh of January we marched on St. Dizier. This city was occupied by the Russian cavalry of Blücher's army, which was readily withdrawn. I here learned that Blücher with twenty-six thousand Russians had passed the Marne at Joinville, and already filed on



Brienne, directing himself towards Troyes; but that General York with twenty thousand Prussians was still at St. Mihiel on the Meuse. We had thus cut in two the army of Silesia. I resolved to profit immediately by this circumstance to fall on Blücher before he could be joined by the grand allied army, which was in march from Chaumont on Bar-sur-Aube.

**FIRST COMBAT OF BRIENNE.**—On the twenty-eighth we reached Montierender; the twenty-ninth we marched on Brienne. Blücher was preparing to leave this city, to march on Troyes, and General Sacken, with a corps of eighteen thousand men, already occupied Lesmont. Unfortunately, an officer whom I had sent to Mortier with orders to approach me was taken by a party of the enemy; from his dispatches Blücher learned that I was about to debouch on his rear; he recalled Sacken's corps in all haste. My infantry, whose march was greatly retarded by the bad condition of the roads, which are here almost impracticable in the winter, did not arrive before Brienne till about four o'clock in the afternoon. Blücher, reinforced by the Russian cavalry of the grand army, had collected there about twenty-eight thousand men. We attacked him. The Russians defended themselves at Brienne with obstinancy in order to cover the movement of their park on Lesmont. We carried the citadel, but the enemy held the city. This combat cost each party about three thousand men, without leading to any result. In the night Blücher retired, not by the road by which he came, but in the direction of Bar-sur-Aube, through which the grand army of the Allies was to pass.

On the thirtieth I moved in advance. The enemy's cavalry covered the retreat of the army of Silesia, which occupied the position of Trannes. I established mine in that of Rothière. Prince Schwartzberg, who commanded the grand army, transferred his head-quarters to Bar-sur-Aube. The greater part of his army concentrated on that place; but the corps of Wittgenstein and Wrede, making about forty thousand men, were thrown on Joinville, in order to secure the communication with York's corps, which arrived the same day at St. Dizier.

**BATTLE OF BRIENNE.**—Being informed that Blücher was already in a position to be sustained by the grand army of the sovereigns, I did not venture to attack him at Trannes, for fear of encountering very superior forces. On the other side, it was important to unite with Mortier, so as to cover the road to Paris; and as the bridge of Lesmont had been destroyed, it was necessary to hold for twenty-four hours at Brienne in order to restore it. This was the only road which we could take, inasmuch as there was no direct road from Lesmont to Arcis, by the right bank of the Aube. It was therefore necessary at any price

to gain one day, to march to Troyes, rally there Mortier and Macdonald, and wait to see more clearly the projects of the enemy. I hoped that they would pass the following day in uniting their forces, and combining an attack which would have given us time to effect my projects. I thought that, with the desire to profit by their superiority, they would make wide movements on my flanks, and enable me to fight them in detail. But, unfortunately, they had resolved at Chaumont to concentrate their masses, and give me battle on the first of February.

The attack was begun at noon; my army sustained it admirably. On the right Gérard heroically disputed the bridge of Dienville with the Austrians of Giulay; at the center Sacken threw himself with impetuosity on Rothière, which was defended by the Young Guard under Duhesme; our cavalry, under Colbert, Pire, and Guyot, charged most admirably upon the masses of the Russian infantry; it was on the point of breaking them, when Wassiltschikoff attacked and drove it back. Vainly did Nansouty and Grouchy present themselves on their flanks; it was too late: Sacken's infantry, emboldened by the success of the cavalry, attacked and carried Rothière. A good part of Duhesme's division and twenty-four pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

But, notwithstanding this check, I should still have had hopes of victory, if Wrede had not debouched at the same instant from the woods of Souleine, at the head of twenty-five thousand Austro-Bavarians, who threatened to crush our left. I went in person with a brigade of cavalry, one of infantry, and a battery, but this feeble reinforcement did not prevent Marmont's being driven from the heights of Marvilliers. I now resolved upon a retreat, but as it was necessary to gain time, I threw Oudinot with a division of the Young Guard on Rothière, and charged Grouchy to second Belluno on the heights of La Giberie. Unfortunately, the enemy was too strong; General Rotherbourg, penetrating to the middle of Rothière, was received there by Sacken and Blücher in person, who repelled him while the Russian grenadiers were near surrounding him. On the other side the Prince of Würtemberg, also reinforced by two Russian divisions, had just carried the heights of La Giberie, driven back Belluno beyond Petit-Mesnil, and effected his junction with Wrede. Our danger was imminent; but night rescued us from embarrassment; the order for a retreat was given at eight o'clock, and executed in good order by means of the artillery of the guard, which burned Rothière. We fell back on Brienne and Lesmont, abandoning fifty-four pieces of cannon and three thousand prisoners; we lost, besides, four thousand killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy was not less than six thousand men.

This check at the beginning of operations in France was the more to be regretted as it discouraged our own troops and raised the hopes of our foreign and domestic enemies. I, however, could not reproach myself for it, as the loss of the bridge of Lesmont and the want of a road from Brienne on Arcis left me no option but to fight. The next day I crossed the Aube at Lesmont and continued my retreat on Troyes. The Duke of Ragusa, left on the opposite bank of the river to favor our retreat, soon found himself surrounded by twenty-five thousand Bavarians. It required extraordinary coolness and intrepidity to effect his escape; but this marshal was equal to his task. At the head of his division he threw himself on the enemy, repulsed them, and, conqueror of the Bavarians, crossed the village of Rosnay, which opened to him a road to Arcis by the right bank of the Aube. Broken by this check, the enemy no longer thought of pursuit, which might easily have been continued, as on the very night of the battle they had a heavy corps on the left of the river. On the third, we reached Troyes without loss. Nevertheless our affairs appeared desperate, since in engaging the greater part of my disposable forces I had not been able to gain a victory over a half of the allied army; for a stronger reason, could I hope for any greater success when they should unite all their forces? I, however, felt it our duty to defend the territory of France, foot by foot, and to the last drop of our blood. In such a disadvantageous contest, it was necessary, like Francis I., to resign ourselves to the loss of everything save honor. But I still had great hopes on the arrival of Eugene's army at Geneva, the levy of the National Guards, and the troops of the *élite* from the army of Spain.

CONGRESS OF CHÂTILLON.—The overtures made to St. Aignan finally led to a congress at Châtillon on the Seine. Lord Castlereagh landed in Holland, and, having first assisted in re-installing the Prince of Orange, joined the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns at Langres. He there immediately made known the pretensions of England, and on his complaints the Allies withdrew their offer of the limits of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, in which Antwerp was included. The representatives of the four great powers figured in this congress. Stadion represented Austria, and Count Razumousky represented Russia. Both were my sworn enemies. The latter, for a long time disconnected from public affairs, hated me with the most bitter animosity. Having taken part in producing the coalition of 1805, he had been severely handled in the articles of the *Moniteur*, which had excited his rancor. Moreover, he regarded me only as the conqueror of Friedland and Austerlitz, whom it was now



necessary to humiliate. The interest of the Russian Empire was not his only motive of action. It is unfortunate when the destinies of nations are intrusted to men of violent personal animosities; however great their merit, their judgment is false. Russia only wished the duchy of Warsaw. Prussia, her old possessions, or an equivalent of five millions of inhabitants; Austria desired Italy. I could agree to these sacrifices; it was also necessary to satisfy England; but without Antwerp she regarded peace as disadvantageous to her. I had then to resign the provinces which I had received from the Directory and dishonor my reign, or resolve to conquer or die.

The first overture to Caulaincourt, who represented me at Châtillon, was that it was necessary for me to return to the limits of 1792. This entirely changed the negotiation, for my instructions to him had been based on the propositions of Frankfort. The battle of Brienne and the arrival of the English minister had thus overthrown every thing. My minister asked for new instructions. He also asked of the Allies to know what division was to be made of my spoils.

These new pretensions showed that I had nothing to hope from a congress which seemed more disposed to judge me than to negotiate with me. I had, therefore, to trust only in my sword, and my affairs were daily becoming worse. In Italy, Murat had thrown off the mask and decided against me, thus endangering the position of the Viceroy. In Belgium, where General Maison had taken the command of a small corps of ten or twelve thousand men, Bülow's corps and Graham's English division had made preparations for the siege of Antwerp; Carnot commanded there, and the means at his disposal made me confident of a good defense. But the allied forces were accumulating with frightful rapidity. The Duke of Weimar was marching toward Belgium with a new corps of twenty-six thousand German confederates; this would enable the Allies to withdraw Bülow's corps to reinforce the army of Blücher. There was not a moment to be lost; Europe in arms was pressing on me with all her force. Nevertheless, as I was expecting two divisions of good troops from the army of Spain, and some hastily organized battalions of National Guards, I determined to gain time. I communicated to my council the humiliating conditions of the Allies. All, with the exception of Count Cessac (Lacué), were of opinion that I should accept them in order to save France. The history of Carthage ought to have taught these pusillanimous councillors that a state is not to be saved by humiliating itself before implacable conquerors. I gave Caulaincourt *carte-blanche* to subscribe to all the sacrifices. I recommended to him to separate the question

of Belgium from that of the left bank of the Rhine. In authorizing him to yield Belgium first, it was evident that on the first European war this province would return to us in a few days. At the worst, if they insisted on this double sacrifice, he could sign it, and as the power of confirming the treaty rested in me, I could refuse its ratification, or elude its execution; for I could never consent to save my throne at the expense of honor.

**FAULTS OF BLÜCHER.**—In the meantime, having united with Mortier, I resolved to profit by the nature of the country behind Troyes to arrest, at least for a few days, the progress of the Allies; but a report received from Macdonald opened a new field for my hopes, and induced me to adopt other measures.

After the battle of Rothière, if the Allies had followed in mass the road to Paris by Troyes, they might have reached the gates of the capital. This was the opinion of the Emperor Alexander; but the allied generals wished to maneuver; Schwartzberg with the grand army crossed the Aube, and marched with slow and uncertain steps on Troyes, to act in the basin of the Seine. Blücher was to operate in the valley of the Marne by Epernay, Dormons, Château-Thierry, and La Ferté-sous-Jouarre; and the glory of preceding his colleague to Paris drew him into a series of false movements. I received this information on the evening of the fifth, and immediately resolved to take advantage of these faults. I retired to Nogent, where I could fall upon the left flank of Blücher, if he continued to march alone on Meaux.

**POSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES.**—I left Troyes on the sixth, and passed the Seine at Nogent on the seventh. Blücher continued to extend himself along the Marne, threatening Meaux. I saw that the moment had arrived to attack him: I left twenty thousand men with Oudinot and Victor to defend the course of the Seine and the roads from Troyes to Paris against the enterprises of the grand allied army, and with the remaining twenty-five thousand marched, on the ninth, from Nogent to Sézanne; on the tenth I advanced on Champ-Aubert. Blücher had the gallantry to second my designs, by dividing his forces. Sacken with fifteen thousand Russians had already reached La Ferté-sous-Jouarre; York with twenty thousand Prussians was in march on Château-Thierry; Champ-Aubert was occupied by the Russian division of Olsowzief, composed of five thousand infantry; finally, the Prussian marshal himself was yet at Frère-Champenoise with the Prussian corps of Kleist and the Russian corps of Kaptzewicz, who had just joined his army, forming here a total of twenty thousand men. Thus this army of sixty thousand combatants could oppose to my blows only isolated divisions.

**COMBAT OF CHAMP-AUBERT.**—General Olsowzief was the first attacked; the combat commenced about nine o'clock in the morning. The Russians, although destitute of cavalry, defended their position for the whole day with valor; but, being overwhelmed by superior numbers and surrounded, they were entirely destroyed. Olsowzief himself was captured, with three thousand men and twenty pieces of artillery. Fifteen hundred Russians were killed. This affair, although important in itself as our first success, became still more so in its consequences. Our position at Champ-Aubert cut the army of Silesia in two, and Sacken's corps was greatly compromised. Not wishing to give him time to escape, I immediately marched against him. Leaving Marmont at Etoges to hold Blücher in check with eight or nine thousand men, I moved on the eleventh with the remainder of my forces from Champ-Aubert to Montmirail.

**COMBAT OF MONTMIRAIL.**—I arrived here at ten o'clock in the morning. Blücher, seeing, when too late, the necessity of concentration, had ordered Sacken and York to fall back on Montmirail. These two generals deemed it their duty to execute this order; but Sacken had hardly reached Vieux-Maisons when he learned that we had anticipated him at Montmirail. On the other side, York informed him that, being delayed by the bad state of the roads, he could not reach that place before the close of the day. It would have now been prudent for the Russian general to file by his left to fall back on Château-Thierry, where the Prussians had guarded a bridge over the Marne; but Sacken deemed it his duty to obey the orders of his general, and to cut his way, sword in hand, by attacking us in the position which we occupied in advance of the city, a little above the branching of the streets to Château-Thierry and La Ferté. The affair was warm, and our victory complete. Night alone prevented the entire destruction of the enemy. As it was, he lost twenty-six pieces of cannon and four thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners.

**AFFAIR OF CHÂTEAU-THIERRY.**—The next day, reinforced by fifteen hundred horse, we pursued him to Château-Thierry, where he repassed the Marne in great disorder. The rear guard of York, which was partly deployed on the road to this city, was pierced by the cavalry of Nansouty and thrown into the Marne. This affair cost the Allies at least three thousand men. On the thirteenth we passed the Marne at Château-Thierry. The enemy had continued their retreat on the road to Soissons. Mortier pursued them with a corps of four or five thousand men on Rocourt.



**DEFEAT OF BLÜCHER AT VAUX-CHAMPS AND ETOGES.**—To complete the defeat of the army of Silesia, I now had only to crush the corps of Kleist and Kaptzewicz. Blücher admirably seconded my plans. The Prussian marshal, distinguished for his operations in Silesia and Saxony, seemed blinded by hatred and presumption. Not comprehending my maneuver, he had remained for forty-eight hours with his arms folded at Vertus, where he had gone from Frère-Champenoise on the morning of the eleventh. On the thirteenth he marched in the direction of Montmirail. Marmont, being too weak to seriously engage him, fell back to Vaux-Champs. I saw with pleasure Blücher running blindly into my snare. Leaving Mortier at Rocourt to observe the remains of Sacken and York, I left Château-Thierry, with the remainder of my guard and the cavalry of Grouchy, for Montmirail, where I arrived at eight o'clock on the morning of the fourteenth. I here met Marmont, and immediately ordered him to take the offensive against the enemy, who had advanced to Vaux-Champs. We carried this village. Blücher, seeing himself attacked when he thought himself in pursuit, ordered a retreat; it was honorable, but disastrous for the enemy. His columns, warmly pressed in rear and turned by the cavalry of Grouchy, experienced immense losses on their retrograde march on Etoges. This battle cost him an additional loss of ten colors, fifteen pieces of artillery, and about eight thousand men *hors-de-combat* or prisoners.

**HE RALLIES HIS ARMY ON CHÂLONS.**—Blücher retired on Châlons, where he was joined by the corps of Sacken and York, who made a long *détour* by Reims. The army of Silesia found itself weakened by the loss of twenty thousand men; but a reinforcement which it received at Châlons again increased its numbers to forty-five thousand combatants. On the other side, the arrival of Wintzingerode's corps, which had finally got possession of Soissons by a *coup-de-main*, was calculated to lend him powerful aid. Notwithstanding this, the disorder was so great in his army when it reached Châlons that, if I had pushed it warmly, I should have annihilated it. But the danger of the capital called me in another direction. This was unfortunate, for in war, as in smithery, it is necessary to strike while the iron is hot.

**MOVEMENT OF THE ALLIES ON NOGENT.**—While I was thus occupied on the Marne, Paris was threatened on the side of the Seine. The marshals whom I had left on the roads from Troyes to Paris were too weak to arrest the grand army of the Allies if it acted together and with vigor; but Schwartzenberg was tied down by the instructions of his cabinet, which had

ordered him not to pass the Seine. My father-in-law pretended to wish to spare the territory of his son-in-law, and to be willing to preserve for him the monarchy of Louis XIV., minus Lorraine and Alsace. All military dispositions were made subordinate to the political thermometer of the Congress at Châtillon. The enemy had occupied Troyes on the seventh; he did not leave there till the tenth, and then advanced eccentrically on Nogent, Sens, and Auxerre. The Würtembergers got possession of Sens on the eleventh. Generals Wittgenstein and Wrede were less fortunate before Nogent; the detachment left in this city by Marshal Victor defended it with intrepidity. Despairing of being able to force this post, the enemy's generals determined to turn it. On the twelfth Wittgenstein remained before Nogent while Wrede pushed on to Bray, which place he carried without opposition, the National Guards who were stationed there having fled without firing a shot! The loss of Bray forced Bourmont to evacuate Nogent. Oudinot and Victor attempted to oppose the progress of the Allies across the Seine, but, seeing it impossible, they fell back by Nangis on Guignes behind the Yères, where they were reinforced, on the fifteenth, by some detachments from the army of Spain and by the corps of Macdonald, which the victory of Montmirail had rendered disposable.

NAPOLEON FLIES TO THE SEINE TO SAVE PARIS.— Paris in the meantime was in alarm; they sent me courier after courier pressing me to come to their assistance. I was now ready to do so, as the army of Silesia, thrown back on Châlons, gave me no more inquietude. I left Marmont with ten thousand men at Etoges to observe Blücher, and Grouchy with three thousand horse at Ferté-sous-Jouarre to serve as a reserve to Marmont and Mortier. With the remainder of my guard I left Montmirail on the fifteenth, and directed myself by Meaux on Guignes. The cavalry marched night and day and the infantry traveled *en-poste*. In this way we made thirty leagues in thirty-six hours and reached Guignes on the sixteenth, where we found the army of the marshals, which again gave me a force of thirty thousand combatants. I should have had less distance to march if I had fallen by Sézanne on Nogent or Provins, supporting the marshals on this city in order to gain the right flank of Schwarzenberg and throw his line on Montereau, instead of establishing myself on his front; but the difficulty was to secure a junction with the three corps established behind the Yères (Victor, Macdonald, and Oudinot); and, bringing with me only the guard under the orders of Ney, it was necessary to begin by securing the means of attacking a superior army without compromising my troops in an isolated movement.

**THE SLOW MARCH OF SCHWARTZENBERG.**—Prince Schwartzberg, hearing of Blücher's multiplied defeats, did not deem it his duty to cross the Seine with all his forces; he was content to throw on the right of the river the corps of the Prince of Würtemberg, of Wrede, and of Wittgenstein, which established themselves at Montereau, Donemarie, and Provins. Count Pahlen, with the vanguard of Wittgenstein, pushed on to Mormant.

**COMBAT OF NANGIS.**—Convinced that it was only by extreme activity that I could compensate for my inferiority in numbers, I took the offensive on the seventeenth, directing all my forces on Mormant. The advanced guard of Pahlen, being unexpectedly attacked, was almost all captured; the Allies put themselves in retreat. Oudinot pursued them on Provins, Macdonald on Donemarie. Victor, being charged with gaining Montereau, encountered on the road a Bavarian division, which he defeated; but this prevented him from reaching Montereau the same day. The enemy lost three thousand men and fourteen pieces of cannon. This eccentric pursuit was a fault; I ought to have thrown all my forces on Provins or on Bray.

**COMBAT OF MONTEREAU.**—On the eighteenth we continued to advance to the Seine. Wittgenstein repassed the river at Nogent, and Wrede at Bray; but the Prince of Würtemberg, fettered by the ill-conceived instructions of Schwartzberg, had the temerity to accept an engagement before Montereau with the second corps. The position, covered by a numerous artillery, was good so long as they remained firm, but passing a *coup-gorge* in the rear, it was really a dangerous one. Victor attacked it first without success; but General Gérard carried himself there with his reserve, which was composed of peasants; I gave him the command, and he threw all into the defile: I hastened to the place with some squadrons, which completed the victory. Montereau and the bridge were carried by a charge, and the Würtembergers driven to Marolles with the loss of six thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners. We had lost two thousand and five hundred men and the brave General Château, an officer of great hope; he was the son-in-law of the Duke of Belluno, and his chief of staff.

**SCHWARTZENBERG EVACUATES TROYES.**—These checks discouraged the Allies, and Schwartzberg retired on Troyes, soliciting Blücher to fly to his assistance. I passed the Seine on the nineteenth at Montereau, and the following days marched on Troyes. On the twenty-second we arrived before that city. The grand army of the Allies, concentrated at Troyes, occupied both banks of the Seine. Blücher, coming from Châl-



ons by Arcis, was at Méry, and in immediate connection with Schwartzberg. This junction is the best proof that I had lost a part of my advantage in throwing myself on the left of the grand army. I should have produced greater results, and at least have had less ground to march over to turn and break its right: an operation which would have prevented any junction with Blücher. Be that as it may, I expected that the Allies would profit by the union of such large forces to offer me a decisive battle. I was resolved to accept it, for we could not retreat without drawing the enemy on the capital; but, to my great astonishment, they did nothing and continued their retreat. The events which had taken place in the South had redoubled the fears of Schwartzberg, as they singularly opposed the views of his master on Italy.

These successes had revived my hopes, less by their positive results than by the expectation that they would electrify France, and that a national movement would lead to the expulsion of the enemy from our territory. I only required fifty thousand National Guards to assist me in forcing the Allies back into Germany; but these fifty thousand men were not raised! In my present victorious attitude the propositions made to Caulaincourt could not be accepted. I feared that he might use the unlimited powers which I had given him at the instance of my counselors, to accept these propositions; but, fortunately, he was in no haste to consummate my humiliation. These powers were now withdrawn. Some men, very little versed in the diplomatic affairs of Europe, have accused him of having neglected these ten days, during which he had a *carte-blanche*: nothing can be more unjust. In doing this he might have saved my crown, but France would have gained nothing; instead of a brilliant monarchy, she would have been only an abased empire. I felt grateful to him for sparing my glory by declining to sign any such propositions. At the moment when I withdrew his powers, he was required by the Allies to submit a counter-project, if he did not accept that which was presented to him as the *sine qua non* of the coalition. This gave place to new delays, at which I was not displeased; for I hoped everything from time, not thinking that every day would draw closer the bonds of an alliance justly regarded as monstrous. But before stating what took place at the diplomatic head-quarters of the sovereigns, I will briefly describe the events which had occurred in the South.

OPERATIONS OF EUGENE AND AUGEREAU.—The defection of Murat for a moment exalted the hopes of the Cabinet of Vienna; but the slowness of his advance on the Po to operate in concert with Marshal Bellegarde, the mystery which covered

his march, the relations maintained with the Viceroy, made them suspect the fidelity of this new ally. On the other side, it was evident that the King of Naples delayed only to declare in favor of the successful party; and on the news of my first reverse in France, Eugene would be assailed on all sides. The Austrians had already pushed detachments from Geneva on the communication of the Simplon. A storm was threatening Piedmont and Upper Italy. The English were preparing for a descent at Leghorn to join Murat. The Viceroy, though surrounded by enemies, did not lose his courage: his first care was to evacuate the line of the Adige in order to concentrate his defense on the Mincio, with Mantua as his point of support. Bellegarde, attributing this retreat to fears inspired by Murat's approach to his communications, thought to profit by the circumstance to fall upon the Viceroy, and made every preparation to pass the Mincio near Pozzolo on the seventh of February. Eugene, anticipating this maneuver, had reinforced his right at Goito, and carried his guard, reserve, and head-quarters to Mantua, from which he debouched skillfully on the left flank of the Austrians, and drove it back to Valeggio. His numerical weakness prevented him from taking full advantage of this victory; but he so imposed on Bellegarde that that marshal, forced to return to the left bank of the Mincio, only made a feeble attempt to pass it, when he knew that one-third of the Viceroy's army had been detached to Parma against Murat. The Austrian general repulsed in this attempt, and in his ill-combined maneuver by the mountains of Gavardo, remained on the defensive.

At this epoch, although rather late to effect the diversion which I had ordered on Geneva, it was still possible to obtain important results. Augereau had organized at Lyons a corps, composed principally of the veterans drawn from Catalonia. He was to advance on Geneva, raise Switzerland, reestablish the communication of the Simplon, join the divisions which Eugene was to bring from Italy, and advance with that prince toward the Upper Jura, in order to act in Burgundy in concert with me. Augereau did in part march on Geneva, but in detachments, and occupied himself for ten days with mere accessories; and the defection of Murat having prevented the army of Italy from joining him, the allied sovereigns had time to detach against him considerable forces. With one-half of the energy and activity which he had shown at Castiglione, he might have overthrown Bubna and organized our partisans in Switzerland; and God only knows what would have been the result.

NEGOTIATIONS AT LUSIGNY.—These events had caused no little sensation at the Austrian head-quarters, which were

already considerably shaken by my success on the Seine. The Allies, now become more yielding, had proposed to me an armistice, which was negotiated at Lusigny. It was quite natural that my father-in-law should seek to direct the negotiations at Châtillon. By depriving me of Italy and securing to himself my influence in Germany, he would have no more points of difficulty with me, and could make a display of his generosity. In order the better to accomplish his purposes, Metternich exposed in a council the equivocal situation in which the Allies were placed by these reverses on the Marne and the Seine, by the spirit manifested in the provinces which they occupied, and by the unexpected appearance of Augereau's corps toward Geneva. His object was too evident to be mistaken. The Emperor Alexander, disgusted at the manner in which they carried on the war, hesitated whether he should not unite his guards and Wittgenstein's corps to Blücher's army, and carry on his operations in a more military manner. As I have already said, this prince was anxious to go to Paris in order to return my visit to Moscow; he was excited against me, and had sworn my destruction. The choice which he made of Count Razumowsky, to represent him at Châtillon, was the best possible proof that he had no intention of treating with me.

On the other hand, it appeared to him just that the acquisition of the duchy of Warsaw should indemnify his empire for the great efforts which it had made; and to obtain this it was necessary to give Italy to Austria, a suitable indemnity to Prussia, and Antwerp to the English; but to accomplish this object it was necessary to reduce me to the last extremity. It was only the fear that the Austrians would formally separate from the coalition that prevented Alexander from uniting with Blücher and marching on Paris. But to remedy all the past evils, it was decided that the grand army should remain on the defensive at the center, and carry the Austrian reserve and the new *corps-d'armée* of the Germanic Confederation on the Rhine, while Blücher, reinforced by the corps of Wintzingerode and Bülow, should operate with one hundred thousand men in the valley of the Marne. They flattered themselves by this *mezzo-termino* to neutralize the influence that state policy had had on the direction of military operations, and to strike decisive blows with Blücher's army, which would be under the more immediate direction of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. The conditions proposed at the armistice of Lusigny not being acceptable, it was necessary to resort again to the sword.

NEW DISPOSITION OF THE ALLIED FORCES.—In accordance with the system agreed upon at Vandœuvre, the



grand army fell back to Chaumont; and Blücher prepared to advance on Meaux. We have just seen that he was to be reinforced by the troops of the old army of Bernadotte. Wintzingerode had just been joined by Woronzof's corps; and Bülow had been relieved in Belgium by the twenty-five thousand newly organized troops of the Germanic Confederation, under the orders of the Duke of Weimar. Finally, Count St. Priest was in march from the Rhine toward the Ardennes.

**BLUCHER MARCHES ON MEAUX.**—Without waiting for all his reinforcements, the Prussian marshal put himself in motion to march a second time on Meaux, with the hope of driving Marmont to the Marne, and of advancing on Paris by the right bank of that river. On the twenty-fourth of February, he passed the Aube at Baudemont and advanced on Sézanne, where Marmont was encamped. The latter, in order not to expose himself to be cut up, retreated on Ferté-sous-Jouarre, where, on the twenty-sixth, he united with Mortier, who had maintained his position between Soissons and Château-Thierry, against the new corps of the Allies which had invaded France from the north. That of Wintzingerode was in the environs of Reims, and Bülow had just arrived at Laon.

**OPERATIONS OF MORTIER AND MARMONT.**—The marshals at Ferté-sous-Jouarre, weakened by the garrison which they had been obliged to throw into Soissons, had not over twelve thousand combatants of all arms. Hoping to destroy this handful of men, Blücher pushed from Rebais on Ferté-sous-Jouarre the corps of York and Kleist to occupy Marmont and Mortier, while the Russian corps belonging to his army marched on Meaux so as to turn their right and cut them off from Paris. Fortunately, the marshals saw the projects of the enemy. On the twenty-seventh they moved from Ferté-sous-Jouarre to Meaux. They arrived there very *à propos*; Sacken's advanced guard was already in possession of the *faubourg* at the left of the Marne, and was about to penetrate into the city. The presence of our troops defeated his projects. Blücher, seeing himself anticipated at Meaux, resolved to operate by the left bank of the Marne. He withdrew the Russian corps to Ferté-sous-Jouarre, where he passed the Marne with the mass of his army and directed his march on Lizy, leaving only York's corps on the left bank to cover his rear. The marshals, again divining his projects, prolonged their forces by their left to bar the passage, bordering the right bank of the Ourcq. On the twenty-eighth they marched from Meaux on Lizy. The corps of Kleist, forming Blücher's advanced guard, was already beyond the Ourcq; but as the other corps of the army of Silesia were not in position to sustain him,

he did not venture to engage alone, and fell back on Fullaines, after destroying the bridge of Lizy. Thus Blücher saw all his projects foiled; while, on the other side, I was preparing to force him to give up the offensive and to think only of his own security.

**NAPOLEON MARCHES AGAINST BLÜCHER.**—I reëntered Troyes on the twenty-fourth; the grand army of the Allies retired with so much precipitation that I could not pursue them without compromising the capital, which was now seriously threatened by Blücher. I therefore only sent Marshal Macdonald in pursuit with thirty-five thousand men, while, with the remaining twenty-five thousand, I resolved to give the Prussian marshal another lesson of prudence by maneuvering on his rear. I left Troyes the twenty-seventh, and passing the Aube at Arcis, arrived at Herbisse. The next day I continued my march by Frère-Champenoise and Sézanne to Esternay. Blücher, checked in front by Marmont and Mortier, and threatened in rear by my army, whose numbers were greatly exaggerated, found himself very much embarrassed. Thinking, however, to profit by the first day of March to defeat the marshals, he ordered Sacken to make demonstrations towards Lizy, while the corps of York and Kaptzewicz passed the Ourcq at Crouy to turn their left; but the bridge of Crouy being destroyed in time, the whole ended in an attempt by the Russians to force a passage at Gèvres, which was easily defeated by Marmont. The same day, towards evening, I arrived at Ferté-sous-Jouarre with the head of my column. We immediately commenced the construction of a bridge across the Marne. During the night the marshals were reinforced by six thousand men sent by my brother from Paris.

**HE FORCES BLÜCHER TO REPASS THE AISNE.**—Blücher now saw the necessity of a retreat, but this was no easy matter. I was in position to intercept the roads to Châlons and Reims. The only one which remained open was that to Soissons; but that city, abandoned by Wintzingerode in consequence of my success at Montmirail, had been again occupied by our troops, and placed in a better state of defense. However, there was no alternative. On the second of March the army of Silesia marched on Soissons, where Blücher had directed Bülow and Wintzingerode to unite with his army. Marmont and Mortier pursued him on the road to Soissons, hotly pressing his rear guard; while I maneuvered on his left to prevent him from throwing himself on Reims.

On the third I passed the Marne, and on the fourth arrived at Fismes. I had now strong hopes of destroying the army of Silesia, which, having no permanent bridge on the Aisne, would be thrown upon that river, and exposed to infallible ruin. Un-

fortunately, Soissons was commanded by General Moreau, an imbecile; not appreciating the importance of his post which was surrounded, by Bülow and Wintzingerode, he thought he was doing wonders in obtaining the liberty of his garrison, and consented to capitulate on the third, without having exhausted his means of defense, and at the very moment when a distant cannonade announced to him the importance of holding out. Blücher, fortunate in escaping such imminent peril, passed the Aisne in the night of the third and fourth, and established himself on the right bank of this river, between Soissons and Craone. On the fifth Mortier and Marmont attacked Soissons; but that city, defended by a garrison of eight thousand Russians, resisted with success. The loss of Soissons deranged my plan; I nevertheless determined to continue to maneuver against the enemy's left, with the hope of cutting him off from Laon, and of throwing him into the angle formed by the Aisne and the Oise. On the sixth, we moved in mass on Bery-au-Bac, where I crossed the Aisne, and pushed on to Corbeny.

**BATTLE OF CRAONE.**—I had thus succeeded in gaining the left of the enemy. It was now important to attack him before he could change his position. I resolved to make the attack instantly, although I had not yet been joined by Marmont's corps, which constituted my rear guard. Accordingly, on the seventh we debouched from Craone against the position which the enemy occupied in rear of this town between Ailles and Vassognes. I had with me only twenty-eight or thirty thousand men, while Blücher had three times as many; but he had engaged the greater part of his forces in a wide and ill-combined movement to the left of the Lette, with the intention of turning my right. It resulted from this that we had only to deal with the Russian corps of Sacken and Woronzof, which the Prussian marshal had left between the Aisne and the Lette to serve as a pivot for the movement of his army. Moreover, the infantry of Sacken had received orders to retire, and the cavalry alone remained to protect the retreat of Woronzof. The latter, holding the most secure point of the plateau, chose to fight in a post where we could neither maneuver nor bring our forces into action, and accordingly awaited us under the protection of a formidable artillery. His corps showed much tenacity in the defense of the strong position which he occupied. The combat was terrible. As Woronzof had his flanks protected by deep ravines, we could attack him only in front. He was on the point of being pierced, when Sacken's cavalry, thrown forward at the opportune moment, restored the equilibrium. It was only by redoubling their efforts, like Ney, that our young soldiers (who had been organized only fifteen days)



succeeded in forcing the Russians to fall back on Chavignon, where they were rejoined by the garrison of Soissons. We pursued them to Filain; the victory was ours; but our loss made it a dear one. On both sides there was a loss of more than six thousand men *hors-de-combat*. This was little for the Allies, but much for us. Victor and Grouchy were seriously wounded.

**ULTIMATUM OF CHÂTILLON REJECTED.**—It was in the midst of the bloody and useless trophies of this battle that I received the news of the unfavorable issue of the negotiations of Châtillon. Instead of being disunited by my success, the Allies had drawn closer the bonds of their union by a treaty signed at Chaumont on the first of March. They bound themselves not to treat separately, and to redouble their efforts to carry on the war. In order to provide for the expenses of this war, they issued in common a paper circulation under the guarantee of England. Thus Europe lavished not only iron, soldiers, and gold, but all the resources of her credit, to crush that France who opposed to her only my genius, my activity, and the heroic devotion of a handful of brave men. The nation, pressed down under the weight of my reverses, succumbed to the efforts of enemies to whom they had previously given an example of energy, devotion, and patriotism.

Strengthened by this new alliance, the sovereigns had maintained their original pretensions without being troubled by my successes. They knew that victory would finally destroy my feeble resources, and that I must succumb sooner or later. But I could not believe that they would not eventually abate their demands. The attitude which they had assumed in consequence of my last victories, their demand for an armistice which they had several times before refused, the expected arrival of Augereau in Switzerland—all these circumstances militated in my favor. I had already seen them, in consequence of my first victory, retreat on the Rhine, accusing each other of being the cause of the reverses which resulted only from the bad direction given to their masses by a tortuous policy. After this, how could I accept what the Allies improperly called the limits of 1792? I would have asked nothing more if they had given me the monarchy of Louis XVI., for, as I have already had occasion to say, at no epoch of my greatest power was my relative situation as advantageous as that of France at the end of the American war. It was to deceive France and Europe, to publish that I refused the same territory which excited the pride of Louis XVI. and the envy of the civilized world. All was changed since 1792; and if these conditions had appeared to me intolerable in 1805, when Spain and Holland were yet in our alliance, under what aspect ought I to regard them when these

countries, in the hands of our enemies, were to augment with all their strength and resources the fearful preponderance of England? The France of 1792, without the family alliance of Austria, Naples, and Spain, without the alliance of Tipposaheb, without its navy and its colonies, was to the England of 1814 not one-quarter what the France of Louis XVI. was to the England of 1792. It was not the same on the continent; for France had lost all her ancient allies; Poland, who had formerly sought her kings in the family of ours, was partitioned out, and her weight now cast into the balance of our new enemies. Isolated in the midst of Europe and hemmed in on all sides, France would be but the shadow of her former greatness. It was evident to those most blind that, even with the limits of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, she would be not only below the relative state of Campo-Formio, but still much below her relative grandeur after the sad termination of the Seven Years' War. Indignant at such harsh conditions, I ordered Caulaincourt to reply by a counter-project equally exaggerated. Thenceforth, there was not the least hope of an understanding. In order to cut the Gordian knot, I determined to again attack Blücher.

**BATTLE OF LAON.**—On the eighth of March, the Prussian marshal had assembled all his army at Laon; it numbered about one hundred thousand men. I had but thirty-five thousand combatants, even including Marmont's corps. But we were in a situation not to count our enemies. If I did not attack, the Allies would take the initiative; it was better to profit by the temporary moral effect of our victory at Craone, in attacking the enemy, than to lose that effect by allowing him to attack us. I advanced toward Laon by the road to Soissons; Marmont directed himself by that of Bery-au-Bac. On the ninth I attacked the enemy's position; the combat continued all day without anything decisive. The Allies preserved their position, and we maintained ours in the villages before their front. Blücher, having had time to reconnoiter the state of our forces, determined to make a night attack upon Marmont, who had not yet effected his junction with me. The corps of York and Kleist debouched from Athies and marched against him. The marshal's troops, thinking only of repose, were completely surprised; they fled to Bery-au-Bac, leaving in the hands of the enemy two thousand five hundred prisoners and forty pieces of artillery. Being deprived by this disaster of the coöperation of Marmont, I had only twenty thousand men left; I nevertheless determined to make the most of a bad game. I calculated that the enemy, in order to secure the defeat of Marmont, had probably moved the mass of his forces on his left leaving Laon but feebly secured. He had, in fact, directed



toward Bery-au-Bac about sixty thousand men, but near forty thousand yet remained at Laon, a sufficient force to repel our reiterated efforts, on the tenth, to force their position. However, we thereby gained time for Marmont to secure his retreat, for Blücher, alarmed at our obstinacy, ordered back on Laon the corps which had filed on Bery-au-Bac. This new concentration of all the enemy's forces left us not the least chance of success. By attempting any longer, with my little army, to resist the quadruple forces of the Allies, I would risk being enveloped. On the eleventh I fell back on Soissons, where I repassed the Aisne; Marmont fell back from Bery-au-Bac to Fismes. Some reinforcements received from the *dépôts* again increased the total force of my army to thirty-five thousand men.\*

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\*The following comments on Marmont's conduct on this occasion are copied from Thiers:

"Marmont, unprotected at the village of Athies, in the midst of the plain, awaited Napoleon's instructions, which he had sent Colonel Fabrier, at the head of five hundred men, to learn. Was it well of Marmont to remain stationary, or ought he not rather, after having during the day caught a sight of the immense masses of the enemy's cavalry, to have taken up a position for the night in the rear, towards Festieux, for example, a kind of little hillock by which he had debouched into the plain, and where he would have been in perfect safety? But the mistaken fear of abandoning the spot he had conquered in the afternoon restrained him, and deterred him from making the retrograde movement that prudence would have suggested. What was still less excusable, as he did remain amidst hordes of enemies, was the not multiplying precautions against a night attack.

"With a characteristic thoughtlessness that detracted from his good qualities, Marmont deputed to his lieutenants the duty of providing for the common safety. The latter allowed the young tired soldiers to scatter themselves in the neighboring farms; they did not even think of protecting the battery of forty pieces that had cannonaded Athies with so much success. It was young marine-gunners, little accustomed to land service, that tended these cannon, and they had not taken the precaution to limber up their guns, so that they might be able to remove them at the first appearance of danger.

"Everybody, commander and officers, trusted to the darkness of night, of which they ought, on the contrary, to have entertained the deepest distrust.

"There were, alas! only too many reasons for distrusting this fatal night, for Blücher, as soon as he heard Marmont's cannon, believed that the attack by the Reims route was the true attack, and that the other, which had occupied the day on the Soissons route, was only a feint. He consequently decided to bring down the mass of his army on the Reims route. He immediately put into motion Sacken and Langeron, who had remained in reserve behind Laon. They had orders to make a circuitous march round the city, and join Kleist and York; Blücher, besides, sent part of his cavalry, which on that side could not fail to be useful.

"The day was far advanced when this movement was terminated; still the Prussian general was not willing to bind himself to preparatory arrange-



**AFFAIR OF REIMS.**—Success was now absolutely necessary to remove the bad impression of my retreat from Laon. Fortune, or rather the fault of the Russian general, soon furnished me an occasion. Count St. Priest, who commanded a new corps of twelve thousand men belonging to the army of Silesia, had arrived at Châlons, from whence he moved on Reims, which was carried without difficulty, the little garrison having no great means of defense. After this exploit, St. Priest remained at Reims intermediary between the grand army of the Allies and that of Blücher. I saw that it would be easy to defeat this corps alone; and, on the thirteenth, put myself in march on Reims, leaving Mortier at Soissons with twelve thousand men. At four o'clock in the afternoon we arrived before that city; the enemy,

ments, and conceived the design of profiting by the darkness to effect a night surprise by leading on his cavalry *en masse*.

"Towards midnight, in fact, when Marmont's soldiers least expected it, a mass of horsemen dashed upon them, uttering terrific cries. Old soldiers, accustomed to the vicissitudes of war, would have been less surprised, and sooner rallied; but a sudden panic spread through the ranks of this young infantry, that took flight in every direction. The artillerymen, who had not thought of arranging their pieces so that they might be easily removed, fled without thinking of them. The enemy, amid the darkness, become mixed with us, and make part of the tumult; while their horsed artillery pursue us, firing grape, at the risk of killing Prussians as well as French.

"All hurry on in indescribable disorder, not knowing what to do, and Marmont is carried away at the same pace as the rest. Fortunately, the sixth corps, which formed the nucleus of Marmont's troops, recover a little of their *sang-froid*, and stop at the heights of Festieux, where it would have been so easy to find a secure position during the night. The enemy, not daring to advance farther, suspend the pursuit, and our soldiers, delivered from their presence, rally at length from their disorder.

"This accident, one of the most vexatious that could befall a general, particularly on account of the consequences it involved, cost us materially only some pieces of cannon, two or three hundred men put *hors-de-combat*, and about a thousand prisoners; the greater number of whom returned next day; but our enterprise, already so difficult and complicated, was defeated. On learning during the night this deplorable skirmish, Napoleon gave way to the most violent anger against Marshal Marmont; but giving away to anger would not repair the mischief, and he immediately began to think what was best to be done. To give up the attack and retire would be to commence a retreat that must lead to the ruin of France and his own.

"To attack, when the movement confided to Marmont was no longer possible, and when he could be confronted by masses of the enemy assembled between Laon and the Soissons *chaussée*, to attack under such circumstances would have been rash. Either course seemed to lead to destruction.

"Listening only to the promptings of his own energetic soul, Napoleon determined to make a desperate attempt on Laon, and see whether chance, so fruitful of events of war, might not do for him what the most skillfully laid plans had not been able to effect.

"Napoleon was about to throw himself on Laon when Blücher anti-

surprised at our abrupt appearance, had scarcely time to take position in front of that city on the road to Fismes. We attacked him, and threw him beyond the Vesle. Count St. Priest was mortally wounded; his troops were thrown into disorder. While their rear guard defended themselves in Reims, I turned the city by forcing the passage of the Vesle at St. Brice. The rout of the enemy was decided; the mass of his corps gained Bery-au-Bac; the troops of the rear guard scattered, and directed their flight by the roads to Neufchâtel, Rethèl, and Châlons. The enemy lost eleven pieces of cannon, two thousand and five hundred prisoners, one thousand and five hundred wounded, and seven hundred killed; we lost less than a thousand men *hors-de-*

dated him. The latter had first thought of sending half his army against Marmont, believing his to be our principal column.

"But in his staff numerous voices were raised against this project, and it was proved to him that, above all things, he ought to oppose Napoleon in front of the city of Laon. Blücher, who was ill that day, and more inclined than usual to yield to the advice of his lieutenants, had, therefore, suspended the prescribed movement, and determined to direct his efforts straight before him—that is to say, on Clacy, whence Napoleon threatened to turn his position.

"At the very moment that Napoleon was putting his troops in motion to renew the attack, three divisions of Woronzof's infantry, advancing on our left, deployed around the village of Clacy, intending to carry the place. General Charpentier, who had replaced Victor, was at Clacy with his own division of the Young Guard and that of General Boyer, but very much reduced in number by the late engagements. Ney had on his side advanced to the left to support General Charpentier; he placed his artillery a little in the rear and diagonally, so that he could take the Russian masses *en écharpe* that were about to fall on Clacy. At nine in the morning an obstinate engagement commenced around this unfortunate village, whose site, happily for us, was slightly elevated. General Charpentier, who during the past days had displayed as much energy as skill, allowed the Russian infantry to advance within musket-shot, and then received them with a terrible fusillade. The officers and sub-officers exposed themselves incessantly, seeking to compensate for the want of training in their young soldiers, who in every respect exhibited an unexampled devotedness. The first Russian division was received with so destructive a fire that it was driven back to the foot of the position, and immediately replaced by another that received like treatment. The assailing troops were exposed not only to the fire from Clacy, but to that of Marshal Ney's artillery, which, happily posted as we have just related, committed fearful ravages in the enemy's ranks. In truth, some of the projectiles from this artillery knocked off some of our soldiers at Clacy, but in the enthusiasm that prevailed we only thought of checking the enemy, and destroying them, no matter at what price.

"The same attack, renewed five times by the Russians, failed five times through the heroism of General Charpentier and his soldiers. The Russians, repulsed, fell back on Laon. Napoleon, again conceiving some slight hopes, and flattering himself with having, perhaps, tired out the tenacity of Blücher, ordered Ney's two divisions (Meunier and Curial) to advance straight on Laon, through the Semilly suburb, which we had not evacuated.



*combat.* I remained three days at Reims to give some repose to my troops before carrying them on the Aube and Seine, where the grand army of the Allies had taken the offensive.

#### OPERATIONS OF SCHWARTZENBERG ON THE AUBE.

—After the evacuation of Troyes, Prince Schwartzberg had continued his retreat to Chaumont, where he established his general head-quarters and his reserves. The other corps of his army still remained on the right bank of the Aube, having before them Marshals Macdonald and Oudinot, the former occupying Ferté-sur-Aube and the second Bar-sur-Aube. Having learned that I had turned my efforts against Blücher, the Allies, after consultation, took the initiative. On the twenty-seventh of February

Our young soldiers, led by Ney to the hillock, overturned everything before them, ascended one side of the triangular peak of Laon, and taking advantage of the conformation of the land, which here was hollowed and receding, they succeeded in attaining the walls of the city. But Bülow's infantry stopped them at the foot of the ramparts, then pouring forth showers of grape, forced them to redescend this fatal height, before which our good fortune deserted us. Napoleon, however, who did not yet abandon the hope of driving Blücher from his position, sent Drouot at the head of a detachment to a great distance on our left, to try whether it would not be possible to advance along the route of La Fère, and annoy the enemy sufficiently to make him let go his hold.

"Drouot, whose sincerity was never called in question, having, after a daring reconnoissance, pronounced this last attempt impracticable, Napoleon was obliged to admit the belief that Blücher's position was impregnable.

"The position of each had been so during the last twenty-four hours; Blücher had been as powerless against Clacy and Semilly as Napoleon against Laon. But Napoleon's position would not continue impregnable twenty-four hours longer, should Blücher execute his project of marching *en masse* by the route from Laon to Reims, to drive Marmont back on Bery-au-Bac, and cross the Aisne on our right. It was therefore impossible for Napoleon to remain where he was; he was obliged to retrace his steps, and fall back on Soissons. However painful this determination might be, still, as it was indispensable, Napoleon made up his mind without hesitation, and the next morning, the eleventh of March, he repassed the defile of Chivy and Estouvelles, to fall back on Soissons, whilst Marmont, posted on the bridge of Bery-au-Bac, defended the Aisne above him.

"The enemy took especial care not to pursue this angry lion, the thought of whose return made even a victorious enemy tremble. Napoleon could therefore return to Soissons without disquietude.

"These three terrible days—the seventh at Craone, the ninth and tenth at Laon—had cost Napoleon about twelve thousand men; and if they cost the enemy fifteen thousand, that was a poor consolation, because our adversaries had still ninety thousand soldiers, whilst we had little more than forty thousand, including even the small division of the Duke of Padua, who had come to reinforce Marshal Marmont.

"But the worst of all was, not the numerical, but the moral loss, and the military consequences of the last operations."



Wittgenstein and Wrede attacked Oudinot and dislodged him from Bar-sur-Aube, after an obstinate combat, which cost about three thousand men on each side. The next day the Prince of Würtemberg and Giulay forced Macdonald to abandon Ferté-sur-Aube. The following day the Allies slowly advanced on Troyes, where Macdonald had concentrated his army; but as this army, weakened by detachments, did not amount to more than twenty-five thousand men, Macdonald did not dare run the chance of a battle; he evacuated Troyes on the fourth of March, and retreated to Nogent, where he repassed to the right bank of the Seine.

**HIS VANGUARD PASSES THE SEINE AT PONT.—** Prince Schwartzberg, satisfied with his return to Troyes, remained there ten days with his arms folded, waiting with patience for news from Blücher. On the evening of the fourteenth he learned that I had been repulsed before Laon. This good news excited his ardor and determined him to resume the offensive; nevertheless, this was done with the greatest caution, and only the corps of Wrede and Wittgenstein crossed the Seine at Pont. On the sixteenth the latter attacked the left of Macdonald, who evacuated Provins and established himself near Maison-Rouge, on the road from Provins to Nangis; the Allies did not advance any further. At the report of my return, Schwartzberg gave himself up again to his habitual perplexities; fearing to be taken in flank or rear by my handful of men, he resolved to fall back on Brienne in order to cover his communications and the ground between the Aube and the Marne. On the seventeenth the different corps of the grand army put themselves in retreat, ascending the Aube and the Seine. The same day I began my operations in the direction of Troyes.

**THE EMPRESS AND REGENCY REMOVE TO BLOIS.—** As Paris continued to be the objective point of the enemy, I deemed it best to provide for the safety of my family. Joseph had received orders to remove with the council of ministers to the Loire as soon as the danger became pressing. It would have been better, without doubt, in the month of February, when the capital was threatened, to send the regency, the Senate, and administrative authorities to Nevers or Clermont. Then probably affairs would have taken a different turn, and the occupation of Paris by the Russians and Prussians would not have had the same importance, as in that case there would have been no legal authorities there to betray my interests and those of France. But I feared at that epoch to alarm the capital, and I had then but little confidence in the National Guards; it was, however, the Senate and high functionaries whom I ought to have distrusted.

**OPERATIONS OF NAPOLEON AGAINST THE GRAND ALLIED ARMY.**—Being forced to leave Marmont and Mortier on the Aisne with twenty thousand men to hold the army of Blücher in check, I could, therefore, take with me only eighteen thousand, notwithstanding the several reinforcements received from Reims; but I expected to be joined on the Aube by the army of Macdonald and by six thousand men whom General Lefèbvre-Desnouettes was to bring me from Paris. Moreover, I had already seen what terror was inspired by my name alone at the headquarters of Schwartzenberg. My first march was from Reims to Epernay. On the eighteenth I arrived at Frère-Champenoise, and on the nineteenth, at Plancy. My light cavalry passed the Aube and advanced on one side to Bessy and on the other to Méry. The Allies were in full retreat in the direction of Troyes and Lesmont. If I had supposed that they would give me battle between the Seine and the Aube, I would have waited at Plancy for Lefèbvre-Desnouettes and Macdonald, without risking my feeble corps in the midst of their army; but as nothing on their part indicated such a resolution, I determined to push them warmly with what troops I had in hand, without giving them time to reconnoiter.

**BATTLE OF ARCIS.**—On the twentieth I marched from Plancy on Arcis; my cavalry ascended the left bank of the Aube, and the infantry the right bank. We found Arcis evacuated, and established ourselves in front of that city on the roads to Troyes and Lesmont. The cavalry formed the right, and the half of the infantry, which had already passed the Aube, established itself on the left. The remainder of this arm was still on the march from Plancy to Arcis. I had regarded this place only as a point of departure for the pursuit of the enemy; on the contrary, we were obliged to sustain here a decisive combat.

The Emperor Alexander began to be wearied with the indecisive movements which political policy had assigned to the allied armies; it seemed to him disgraceful that the most formidable armies of Europe, commanded by their sovereigns in person, should be continually repulsed by a mere handful of men. He had at last declared in a council that they must unite with Blücher and act in a single mass on Paris to dictate there a peace which they could not impose on me at Châtillon. In accordance with the deliberations of this council, the allied army concentrated its forces on Arcis; Wrede's corps, which was nearest to this city, received orders to reoccupy it. At two o'clock p. m. the Bavarian general commenced his attack; my infantry maintained its position and defended with success the village of Grand-Torcy; but my cavalry was defeated by that of the Allies. The strag-



glers threw themselves on the bridges of Arcis; the moment was critical. If the enemy should carry these bridges, my left, deprived of all means of retreat, would be destroyed. Seeing the importance of the moment, I made every effort to rally my right, and succeeded only by placing myself at their head, sword in hand; the bridges were preserved and my infantry took advantage of them to pass to the left of the Aube. The combat was continued till midnight: We experienced sensible losses, but kept our position. Thinking that Schwartzenberg had fought only to cover his retreat, I determined to pursue the enemy with my troops, now considerably reinforced. On the night of the twentieth I had been joined by the corps of Lefèvre-Desnouettes, and on the morning of the twenty-first, by twelve thousand men from the army of Macdonald. The remainder of Macdonald's troops had not yet passed Plancy. But the enemy, instead of retiring, had united all his army, and was preparing to give battle. My advanced guard discovered this army drawn up in several lines from Chaudrey-sur-Aube to the rivulet of Barbuise. The enemy had near one hundred thousand men, and I not thirty-five thousand. To accept a battle with so great a disparity of forces, in a vast plain with a miry river behind me, would expose my last resources to infallible ruin. Imperious necessity imposed a retreat, and I resigned myself to it.

This retreat, executed in the presence of the enemy, might have been disastrous; but, fortunately, Schwartzenberg, preoccupied with the idea of our attacking him, did not think to pursue us till two o'clock p. m. The greater part of my army had already passed the Aube. Oudinot's corps alone remained on the left bank in the city of Arcis to cover my march. This rear guard was rudely assaulted; the Allies penetrated into the city and obliged Oudinot to recross the river.

REMARKS ON NAPOLEON'S POSITION.—My situation was now eminently perilous. On the very day of the battle of Arcis, the Congress of Châtillon had dissolved. The allied sovereigns, having determined to overthrow my throne, were about to give free play to their military force; and my father-in-law, wearied with the course which he had adopted, less from his attachments for me than for the interests of his daughter, promised to offer no obstacles to this plan. Count d'Artois was at Vesoul, and the Duke d'Angoulême at Bordeaux; La Vendée was rising. Hemmed in by the enemy's two masses on the Aisne and Aube, the weakest of which was incomparably stronger than all my disposable forces on the theater of war, it was now impossible for me to undertake anything serious against either of them. I had yet a small army in Italy, and strong garrisons in the North.



I had finally sent back Ferdinand into Spain, and directed Suchet to restore to him the places which we still occupied on the Ebro; but it had become impossible for the armies of Spain to come to my assistance, for they were now strongly engaged against Wellington, who, the middle of February, had resumed the offensive and invaded Gascony.

**SUCCESS OF THE ALLIES IN THE SOUTH.**—On the arrival of the Duke d'Angoulême, who gave him hopes of a *point-d'appui* in the provinces in the South, and hearing of the departure of two of Soult's divisions, Wellington resolved to pass the Adour and the Gaves, as soon as the roads became practicable. Soult, having only forty thousand men, and half of these conscripts, with which to oppose seventy-five thousand combatants, and being turned by his left, was obliged to retreat. He wisely resolved not to direct himself on the interior of France, but in a line parallel to the frontier of the Pyrenees; he reached Orthès, where he decided to give battle. This action, in which the English gained nothing but the field of battle, nevertheless obliged Soult to continue his movement on Toulouse. Wellington, solicited by the royalists to detach a corps on Bordeaux, had sent Beresford to that place. This city, once so celebrated for its patriotism, received the English as the Romans received their triumphant legions, and France had the misfortune to see her own citizens the first to welcome the invaders.

**BOLD PROJECT OF NAPOLEON.**—It will be seen from this brief review of my situation, that I was now obliged to resort to the most desperate means, as nothing less than extreme measures could afford me any chance of safety. The fate of France now depended on me alone; and no place was of importance except made so by my presence. As ten victories in Champagne had not softened the hatred of the enemy, it was necessary to remove the theater of operations on a point where my success would obtain more important results. To make peace and save the Empire, it was necessary to replant our eagles on the banks of the Rhine. This object could not be accomplished by combats. We were too weak for that. I had no other resource than to maneuver on the enemy's communications; at the risk of losing my own. I do not deny that the chance was hazardous, but it was the only hope of safety left.

I resolved to run this chance, throwing myself in mass by St. Dizier toward the Upper Meuse; I there expected strong reinforcements drawn from the garrisons of Lorraine and Alsace; and by raising the departments which had been overrun by the enemy, I would threaten the line of operations of the grand army, which would be seriously compromised. By thus compelling the

enemy to retrace his steps, I would have the advantage of drawing him on ground singularly favorable for my strategic operations. A partial victory might destroy the armed force of the enemy, while, in case of a check, I could have time to recruit under the protection of our fortresses. I would leave Paris exposed; but this was of little importance for me, whose capital was at my own head-quarters. As this plan of operations has not been justified by success, there are not wanting critics who regard it as absurd; for parlor generals, like the vulgar, judge everything by the results. These same critics would have praised my combinations to the skies, if Schwartzberg had fallen back on Bâle, as there was every reason to suppose he would. But what better could I do? I had no option. It was necessary to attempt this operation, which, I confess, accelerated my fall before it was carried into execution, or to remain between the Seine and the Marne before the immense superiority of the enemy, and exposed to a more slow but more certain destruction. What impartial man will venture to blame my decision? If I had attempted it immediately after the victory of Montereau, and at the same time recalled Suchet to Lyons, who will say that I could not have obtained important results?

On the evening of the twenty-first of March I pushed my advanced guard to Sommepeuis; the remainder of my army echeloned from this town to the Aube. On the twenty-second I passed the Marne at the ford of Frignicourt, and marched on Faramont. Macdonald came to Dosnon. The Allies had thrown a garrison into Vitry; I summoned the place to surrender; it refused. It not being my intention to amuse myself with a siege, I passed on and reached St. Dizier on the twenty-third; Macdonald passed the Marne at Frignicourt, and arrived at Villotte. On the twenty-third I reached Doulevant.

The news of my retreat from Arcis had not produced the effect on the enemy which I had hoped. Schwartzberg, stimulated by the Emperor Alexander, and by the partial success gained over my rear guard at Arcis, and ignorant of my projects upon his communications, did not fall back on Chaumont as I had hoped. On the contrary, he had passed the Aube to follow me towards Vitry, as much to watch my movements as to protect his line of operations, and connect himself with Blücher. On the twenty-second the grand army passed the Aube at Ramecourt, Songy, and Lesmont, pushing forward parties as far as Vitry.

**OPERATIONS OF BLÜCHER.**—Blücher, on his side, unable to believe that he had gained a victory at Laon, intimidated by



the defeat of St. Priest's corps, and remembering the rude blows which I had given him the month before, had remained inactive for ten entire days behind the Aisne. However, when he learned that I had left Reims, he prepared to cross that river, and resolved to detach Wintzingerode with eight thousand horse to restore his communications with Schwartzberg. For this purpose a heavy body of Russian cavalry passed the Aisne on the right of Marmont, and threatened to cut off his retreat. This marshal, who, with nine thousand men, found himself exposed to eighty thousand, had reason to fear being surrounded at Bery-au-Bac; he decided to blow up the bridge, and fall back on Fismes, where Mortier joined him after having evacuated Reims, which Wintzingerode occupied on the twentieth without opposition. The concentration of the two marshals at Fismes was very well, on the supposition that my enterprise on Arcis had been crowned with success; but was unfortunate for the execution of my new project. I could not blame them, as they could not have known my present plan, and heretofore it had been their task to cover my communications with Paris.

Freed from the presence of Marmont at Bery-au-Bac, Blücher threw bridges over the Aisne, and sent the corps of Kleist and York in pursuit of our columns, while Wintzingerode took the road to Reims for the object already mentioned. Everything seemed to combine, as if by enchantment, to destroy my project; for, at the moment when Schwartzberg approached the North, leaving the road to Chaumont exposed, Blücher, who before had resolved to march direct to Paris, took, by chance, the resolution to move to the south towards the army of Bohemia. *Thus, the two grand armies of the enemy, instead of pursuing diverging lines, concentrated their forces towards a single line, at the very moment that my two little masses separated from each other.*

**MARMONT AND MORTIER ARE SEPARATED FROM NAPOLEON.**—The order to join me at Vitry, it is said, did not reach the marshals till the evening of the twenty-first, after their arrival at Fère-en-Tardenois. On this point must rest the judgment that will be given of their march. In addition to this unfortunate delay in receiving my orders, a still greater *contretemps* now occurred. The Cossacks, on the twenty-second, captured a courier with my letter to the Empress communicating my project. Blücher immediately resolved to push the corps of Sacken and Langeron on Reims and Châlons, in order to connect himself with Schwartzberg, who, he learned, had marched in the direction of Vitry. This circumstance rendered the situation of the two marshals very critical. From Fère-en-Tardenois they could no longer return to Reims, as that city was in the possession



of the enemy, and the corps of York and Kleist had followed them on Fismes. They could not expect to reach Châlons by Epernay, for Wintzingerode was already master of that road. They therefore resolved to march on Château-Thierry, in order to gain the road to Montmirail, and thus reach Vatry, an intermediate point between Châlons and Vitry. This circumspection, very natural for a corps of seventeen thousand men before two large armies, destroyed all my hopes.

Many writers have imputed blame to my lieutenants: but I confess that it was difficult for them to act otherwise than they did. Blücher marched on the twenty-third to Reims, and on the twenty-fourth to Châlons. If Marmont had received my order at Fismes, as has been said by some, it is certain that he might have forced his passage on the twenty-second through the cavalry of Wintzingerode, which could not have disputed Reims. But if that marshal received the order only at Fère-en-Tardenois, he is blameless; it was difficult to precede Blücher at Châlons. By marching on the twenty-second from Fère on Epernay, it was not physically impossible to reach Châlons on the twenty-third, but Wintzingerode was already there, and, being certain to be sustained by Blücher, he would not have abandoned the city. Moreover, the road from Fère-en-Tardenois to Epernay is very difficult, and it would have required two hard days' march to reach Châlons.

**THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER DECIDES TO MARCH ON PARIS.**—At the very moment when mere chance had given a concentric direction to the enemy's masses, the Emperor Alexander, having learned my project by an intercepted letter, and certain of the approach of Blücher, assembled at Sommepeuis those of his generals in whom he had most confidence, and proposed to them the question, *whether it was most advisable to advance on Paris, without troubling himself about my movement on Lorraine, or whether he should fall back on the Rhine.* All agreed with him that the first was the preferable course. Even Schwartzemberg, who had been left free by my new project, in separating from the cabinet of the Emperor of Austria, who had retired from Bar-sur-Aube to Dijon, decided for this bold march. The information was immediately communicated to Blücher, and as soon as the allied sovereigns were certain that the junction of their armies was fully consummated, they prepared to march on Paris by the roads from Vitry to Sezanne, and from Châlons to Montmirail. General Wintzingerode, with eight thousand horse and more than forty pieces of cannon, marched from Vitry on St. Dizier to cover their movements, and make us believe he was followed by the whole army. On the twenty-fifth he occupied St. Dizier,

and pushed his advanced guard to Eclaron on the left of the Marne.

This determination of the sovereigns was without doubt the best which they could have adopted. But I had no reason to expect so fundamental a change in the principles upon which they had acted for the last two months.

**EFFORTS OF NAPOLEON TO COMMUNICATE WITH MORTIER AND MARMONT.**—I had been joined at St. Dizier by Caulaincourt, but I could receive no news of Marmont and Mortier. The return of my negotiator had redoubled the audacity of the malcontents at my head-quarters: seeing my fall approaching, they began to ask themselves whether it was necessary for them to share my fate by exposing themselves to the same chances. It seemed that the honor and the independence of France were of no account in this conflict, where each thought only of his own preservation.

The army alone manifested true devotion.

In the meantime, to profit by my new situation, I pushed Oudinot to Bar-sur-Ornain. This was his native country, and he was to raise Lorraine. My light cavalry threw itself by Joinville on Chaumont, from which the Emperor of Austria was obliged to decamp in all haste on Dijon. I had been at Doulevant for twenty-four hours in a painful state of uncertainty, when, on the twenty-sixth, a considerable force of the enemy was discovered approaching from the direction of St. Dizier. I could not doubt its being the army of Schwartzemberg, and that its unexpected appearance had alone caused the delay of my marshals. How could I imagine that it was the army of Blücher, which I had left at Soissons behind the Aisne, separated by the corps of Marmont and Mortier? I had no time to hesitate, and marched against the enemy to defeat him, and open the road to Châlons, thinking that I was at last to join my marshals. Sébastiani and Milhaud drove back the squadrons of Wintzingerode to Bar and St. Mihiel, and inflicted on them a loss of twelve hundred men *hors-de-combat*. What was my astonishment when I learned from the prisoners that it was the army of Silesia that I had before me! They even spoke of the march of two armies on Paris; but I could not credit such a complication of unfortunate circumstances. I stopped at St. Dizier, and, the twenty-seventh, made a forced reconnoissance on Vitry. Here all my misfortunes were confirmed. The junction of the enemy's armies had been effected on the twenty-third, and the report of their march on Paris was but too well founded. A powerful party in the capital had invited them there; besides, they had just gained a victory at Frère-Champenoise. Notwithstanding this thunderbolt, I still hesita-

ted to renounce my plan. But to execute it with any hope of success required the assistance of the twenty-five thousand men which Marmont, Mortier, and Pacthod were to bring me. But instead of adding to the force of my army which was to decide the fate of the Empire, they were likely to be surrounded and compromised in the midst of two powerful armies of the enemy. Moreover, all my generals exclaimed against the imprudence of abandoning Paris. For a time I resisted all their clamors. I feared less for my own fate than that of my old companions in arms, and finally yielded to these importunate and pusillanimous representations. But before speaking of my return to the capital, let me describe the operations of the marshals.

**THE MARSHALS RETIRE ON PARIS.**—Marmont and Mortier, on leaving Château-Thierry, had taken two different roads. The first arrived, on the evening of the twenty-fourth, at Sommesous, and soon perceived that it was now impossible to join me, for his reconnoitering parties discovered the presence of an immense army on the plains between Châlons and Vitry, and the approach of the numerous columns that marched against me. He was obliged to wait the junction of Mortier, who had taken the road from Villeseneux and Chaintrix, ignorant of the vicinity of a formidable army. Marmont, however, began his retreat on Frère-Champenoise, where he waited for Mortier's columns.

The Allies, having received information of the presence of these two corps, commenced their movement, on the twenty-fifth, to crush them—Blücher from the road from Montmirail, and Susanne and the grand army by that from Vitry to Frère-Champenoise. The last brigade of Mortier's corps, retarded in its march, was overtaken at Frère-Champenoise by the cavalry of the Allies; and, after having received in square several charges sustained by artillery, it left the remains of six battalions in the hands of the enemy.

The corps of eight thousand National Guards which left Montmirail with a grand convoy of artillery had just arrived on the Soude, without the marshals having received timely notice of their march, the orders for which were issued directly from my staff. Being attacked near Frécon by the Russian cavalry of the army of Silesia under the orders of Wassitsckof, it reached Frère-Champenoise in the hope of here joining the marshals. But it was now attacked by the Emperor Alexander, who had pushed the rear guard of Marmont at the head of the reserve of the Grand Duke Constantine. Our squares repulsed repeated charges of the enemy; but in resuming the march they fell into disorder. Two squares were separated and broken; the three others, reduced to



a single mass and exposed to the fire of sixty pieces of artillery, were pierced and captured, notwithstanding a resistance very honorable for militia, who, perhaps, were here under fire for the first time.

This unfortunate check not only cost me ten thousand men and eighty pieces of cannon, so maladroitly sacrificed, but deprived me of twenty-five thousand combatants upon whom I had counted to reinforce the army which was to deliver Alsace and Lorraine.

The marshals had no other course but to retire on Paris in all haste, and it was very far from certain that they could even reach there, for the Prussian corps of Kleist and York, at Château-Thierry, might easily prevent them. Fortunately, these Prussians had pushed forward only their infantry on Ferté-Goucher, having sent their cavalry in the direction of Sézanne to communicate with Blücher. The embarrassment of the marshals was, nevertheless, very great, when on their arrival at Ferté-Goucher, on the twenty-sixth, they found that city in the hands of the Prussians, who barred to them the great road from Sézanne to Paris. Being too weak to force a passage, sword in hand, they turned off to Provins, where they arrived on the twenty-seventh; the next day Mortier marched on Guignes, and Marmont to Melun. The same day the Allies entered Meaux, and their advanced guard pushed on to Ville-Paris. These events, so disastrous in themselves, became still more so by the consternation which they caused in the capital. The dispatches which I received proved that the approach of danger, instead of electrifying all minds, seemed to completely discourage them.

**DIFFICULTIES OF NAPOLEON'S SITUATION.**—This news plunged me into new perplexities; wherever I cast my eyes, all was disaster. I first thought to fall on the rear of the Allies' columns; I might undoubtedly turn Vitry by the ford of Frignicourt; but further information proved that we could scarcely reach them before they passed the Marne at Meaux or Lagny; they were sufficiently strong to dispute with me the passage of this river with a part of their forces, while the remainder attacked Paris. There seemed then no means of saving the capital. It was possible, however, that by directing my march on the left of the Seine, Paris would hold out till I could arrive. To increase my misfortune, my small army was now scattered. The main body was with me at Vitry; a considerable corps had pursued Wintzingerode to Bar-le-Duc. All my light cavalry had been pushed on Chaumont, to intercept the enemy's line of operations. The Emperor of Austria, who was there with his diplomatic and administrative head-quarters, saved himself in all haste at Dijon,

hotly pursued by our partisans. I designated Troyes as the point of concentration for all my corps. I myself returned to St. Dizier on the evening of the twenty-seventh, and on the twenty-eighth went to Montierender.

**HE FLIES TO DEFEND THE CAPITAL.**—I had not yet lost all hope; I thought that the sight of the Cossacks at the foot of Montmartre would move all hearts, and that the Parisians, forgetting for the moment their ill-founded distrust, would make it a point of honor to repulse the enemy and defend, to the last extremity, the walls of the capital. This populous city might easily put on foot twenty thousand National Guards, who, with the *dépôt* of the troops of the line in the place, could form an army of forty thousand men to defend the strong position which covered Paris on the right of the Seine; positions for the establishment of batteries had been marked out, and with proper activity they might have been armed with two hundred guns. The occupation of the capital being, therefore, not an affair of a day, I flattered myself that I might yet arrive in time to revive its defense by my presence and the troops who followed me. I took the post, and, traveling all night, reached La Cour-de-France. What was my surprise at here meeting General Belliard with Mortier's cavalry! The army of the marshals was following near by; Paris then had fallen!

**BATTLE OF PARIS.**—During the day of the twenty-ninth, the Allies had continued their march on Paris by the left bank of the Marne, leaving the corps of Sacken and Wrede at Meaux to cover their rear. The same night Mortier and Marmont had reached Charenton, and, on the morning of the thirtieth, occupied the heights which command Paris from the north. Reinforced by all the recruits of the *dépôts* of the guard, they had twenty thousand men under arms; but the National Guards furnished only five thousand men to sustain the troops of the line, and they put in battery only a small part of the disposable garrison-artillery; with this exception, they employed all the resources of the place. The brilliant youth of the Polytechnic School and of the Veterinary School of Alfort, the hope of an entire generation, volunteered to serve the artillery, which had only mutilated invalids to point the guns. If we compare this conduct with that of the inhabitants of Vienna and Berlin when we entered these cities, we shall find that Paris exhibited still more patriotism than they. The Allies had one hundred and twenty thousand men; their grand army attacked the heights of Belleville, while Blücher assailed Montmartre. The combat began with the day; my troops, notwithstanding their extreme in-

feriority in number, justified their ancient fame; they firmly disputed their last battle-field. Compans covered himself with glory at Romainville; old Marshal Moncey bravely fought at the head of the National Guard, which assisted Mortier in the defense from Montmartre to the Seine. It was not till four o'clock p. m. that the enemy succeeded in crowning the heights of Belleville and Montmartre, from which they threw their projectiles on the *faubourgs*. There was now no resource but to defend, foot by foot, the streets; but this could not be done without the hearty coöperation of the inhabitants, and the marshals were doubtful whether they were disposed to make this effort. Moreover, there was no one among these chiefs of sufficient head to conceive and execute such energetic measures. My brother Joseph, to whom I had given the command-in-chief, at Paris, was the first to leave. The marshals, with his authorization, entered into a treaty with the enemy. The capital opened its gates, and the troops of the line who had defended the approaches profited by the night to fall back on Essonne.

SITUATION OF FRANCE.—I returned to Fontainebleau, my soul weighed down to death. By rallying all my troops, I could yet dispose of fifty thousand men; but this force, which would have been sufficient to prevent the entrance of the Allies into Paris, was not sufficient to drive them out. The news from the south was far from favorable; the English were in possession of Bordeaux, and the Austrians of Lyons. The Anglo-Sicilian army of Bentinck, disposable in Catalonia, came to attack Genoa; my empire was falling on all sides. No human force could retard its overthrow, after France refused to unite her fate with mine. The French people had not displayed the energy which I expected in the defense of their soil; the small number of men who took up arms covered themselves with glory; the rest well merited the fate which befell them.

WANT OF PUBLIC SPIRIT IN PARIS.—I must confess that twenty years of war, the conscription, anticipated for two years, the cohorts of the *bans* levied in 1812, had exhausted the class which furnishes the best soldiers. Since the year 1800, the word *Patrie* was no longer heard in the streets nor in the *salons* of Paris. Nevertheless, the word *honor*, which made to vibrate every heart in France, supplied its place. The remembrance of the grand movement of 1793 was still fresh in my memory; the independence of France was so closely connected with the integrity of the soil that I was unable to conceive the apathy of the nation at such a decisive crisis.

The orators of the tribune seized the moment of peril to declaim and excite discord, when all resentments should have been



stified. Public scribblers, with whom Paris swarmed and whom I had subjected to salutary restraints, now applied their pens to compose political pamphlets. The *salons*, filled with fops and old women who wished to guide the state, opened upon me their noisy batteries. In a word, the same nation which in 1793 had condemned to death the young girls who went to Verdun to compliment the King of Prussia, in 1814 represented the defenders of their country as freebooters, and the soldiers of the coalition as heroes! They did not blush to deck themselves in bonnets à la *Blücher* eight days before his cannon thundered on Paris. The brave men who covered themselves with glory in defending the capital against a force ten times their own, exhausted with hunger, found no merited succor in traversing the city; but the shops, which had been closed to them, were thrown open to the Pandours! All heads were turned. Bordeaux even excelled Paris, and the English were there received as liberators! Lyons alone went into mourning at the appearance of the Austrians!\*

\*After describing the sudden change of opinion in Paris against Napoleon, Thiers says:

"Such was the fierce explosion of anger to which, by a terrible reaction in sublunary things, Napoleon was exposed; he who during twenty years had been so servilely flattered, he whose deeds had excited the admiration of the astonished world.

"But he was too great not to remain unmoved by such indignities, whilst he was at the same time conscious that his own acts had produced this revulsion of public feeling. And the flatteries lavished at the same time on the allied sovereigns made the picture of humanity still more pitiable.

"Alexander, undoubtedly, by his own conduct and the example he gave his allies, deserved the thanks of the French people. But if ingratitude can not be sanctioned under any circumstances, gratitude ought to be measured in expression when addressed to the conquerors of our native land. Yet it was not so, and the Royalists went so far as to say that the allied sovereigns, who had suffered so much from the French, displayed great magnanimity in taking so gentle a vengeance. The flames of Moscow were every day recalled, not by Russian, but by French writers. They were not content with praising Marshal Blücher and General Sacken, brave men, whose praise was natural and well-deserved from Prussian and Russian lips, but these writers sought out a French emigrant, General Langeron, who served in the army of the Czar, and related with complacency how he had distinguished himself in the attack on Montmartre, and with what well-merited reward he had been loaded by the Russian monarch. Thus, amongst the many changes of our great and terrible revolution, patriotism, like liberty, was doomed to reverses; and just as liberty, the idol of every heart in 1789, became in 1793 the object of universal execration, in like manner patriotism had now fallen into such disrepute that the act of bearing arms against the natal soil, an act condemned in every age, now met laudation. Weary days of reaction, when the public mind, losing its primary notions of right and wrong, rejects what it had adored and adores what it had rejected, and esteems the most shameful contradictions a happy reconversion of truth."

## CONDUCT OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA IN PARIS.—

But I will render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's: and I must confess that the sojourn of Alexander at Paris contrasted with my treatment of Moscow and of Smolensko at my departure from these places; his conduct was noble and generous: it is true that it was for his interest to seek to gain the good will of the Parisians, and that France has paid dear for that generosity. But as it sprung from the heart, it is none the less worthy of eulogy. His entrance into Paris was more like that of Henry IV. than that of a conqueror who came to avenge the explosion of the Kremlin and the ravage of his empire. An immense crowd saluted him with acclamation, and crowded to see him pass. They believed that, satisfied with my fall, he would not enrich himself with the spoils of the Empire.

INTRIGUES OF THE FACTIONS.—My reign had been no field for the intrigues of women. With the exception of the wives and families of my army, whom I loaded with favors, they loved me not: mothers reproached me with the conscription, as though that had been my work; women of gallantry reproached my severity; dowagers of the Faubourg Saint-Germain treated me as a parvenu soldier, and they never could pardon me for eclipsing the old *régime*. They received the Allies with acclamations, and waved their handkerchiefs from all the windows of the boulevards through which the *cortège* passed. Intriguers presented this fortuitous circumstance as a manifestation of public opinion. To believe them, France was sighing for the princes which the same generation had refused to recognize: they pretended that these handkerchiefs were the oriflamme of the Valois, the flag of Philip Augustus!!! It was a fine theme for the poetic heads of demagogues, and for the machinations of the Talleyrands, the Dalbergs, the Fouchés, the Duponts, the Vitrolles, etc. The club of these gentlemen, directed by the ex-Bishop of Autun, after having moved heaven and earth to bring the Allies from Frankfurt and Chaumont to Paris, easily acquired credit with the sovereigns; it persuaded them that the nation wished me no longer; and, certain of finding support among the old men of the Senate, with whose conduct I had not always been satisfied, they hastened to obtain from this mutilated body a vote conformable to their designs. The second of April, the Senate, which I had created and loaded with benefits, declared me dethroned, and instituted a provisional government. It must, however, be remarked that this resolution was passed by a factious minority; for, of the one hundred and forty members composing that body, only sixty-six took part in it, and these were not the men for



whom I had done the least. They were presided over by Talleyrand, whose name will pass to posterity as the synonym of an apostate and a sycophant.\*

\*The following is Thiers' account of some of Talleyrand's intrigues at this epoch:

"The man destined soon to fill this void—M. de Talleyrand, whom by a secret instinct Napoleon had foreseen as the author of his fall, and whom the public by an instinct as correct looked upon as the necessary author of an approaching revolution—M. de Talleyrand found himself at this moment in a state of extreme perplexity. In virtue of his rank as Grand Dignitary, he ought to follow the Regent; but by leaving he rejected the great part that awaited his acceptance; and by not leaving he exposed himself to be taken in an overt act of treason, which might involve serious consequences, if Napoleon, by a sudden stroke of good fortune—always possible in his case—should reappear as conqueror before the gates of the capital. To extricate himself from this embarrassment, he sought an interview with the Duke of Rovigo to obtain permission to remain at Paris, saying that, in the absence of the entire government, he would be able to render important services.

"The Duke of Rovigo, suspecting that these services would be rendered to some other than to Napoleon, refused the desired permission, which, in fact, he had not power to accord. M. de Talleyrand sought the prefects, but could not obtain what he desired; and not knowing how to cover with a specious pretext his prolonged stay at Paris, he took the resolution of stepping into a carriage, and affect at least a willingness to follow the Regent. Towards the close of the day, as the battle ceased to rage, he presented himself, without passport and with great traveling pomp, at the barrier leading to the Orleans route.

"The barrier was occupied by the National Guards, highly irritated against those who, during the past two days, had deserted the city. A kind of tumult was raised about M. de Talleyrand's carriage; some contemporaries regard this as a national outburst, others believe it to have been pre-arranged.

"His passport was demanded; he had none; a murmur was raised against this neglect of an essential formality; and then, with an affected deference to the opinion of the brave defenders of Paris, he retraced his steps and returned to his mansion.

"The greater part of those who contributed to detain him, and who were not desirous of a revolution, little suspected they had detained the man who was about to effect one.

"Not being fully satisfied as to the formality of his conduct, M. de Talleyrand repassed to the house of Marshal Marmont, who, the battle now over, had hastened to his dwelling, situate in the Faubourg Poissonnière. People of every class flocked thither, seeking, on some side, a government, and crowding round the man who, at this moment, seemed to represent one, since he was head of the only force existing in the capital. (Marshal Mortier was subordinate to him on all important occasions.)

"The two prefects, a portion of the municipal body, and several distinguished personages were present. Everyone spoke of the late events with emotion, and according to his individual sentiments. Seeing the marshal, whose face was blackened with powder, and his coat rent by balls, the assembly felicitated him on his courageous defense of Paris, and then proceeded to talk of the situation of affairs.



ABDICATION OF FONTAINEBLEAU.—The troops who surrounded me at Fontainebleau, although few in number, were so devoted and capable of so much heroism that I might still have attempted some feat of arms. I, at first, thought of doing this, as, in the impossibility of conquering, every combat, whatever its issue, would at least add the *éclat* of my fall. Besides, who knows what would have been the result of a retrograde step of the Allies? If we could not drive the enemy from Paris, it was easy to fall back behind the Loire, to rally Soult, Suchet, and Augereau, forming together a mass of one hundred and twenty or one hundred and thirty thousand men, throw them into our frontier line of fortresses, and fight as the Romans did in Spain when Hannibal was threatening the heart of the republic. The

“There was a species of unanimity in condemning what they called the cowardly desertion of those that Napoleon had left in the capital to defend it, and against Napoleon himself, whose mad policy had brought the armies of Europe to the foot of Montmartre. The Royalists—and there was a considerable number present—did not hesitate to say that the French ought to throw off an insupportable yoke, and boldly named the Bourbons. Two influential bankers, MM. Peregau and Lafitte, the one connected by the ties of blood, the other by those of friendship, with the Duke of Ragusa, attracted attention by the vivacity of their language. The second especially, whose secular success had just commenced, and whose versatile and brilliant talents had attracted general attention, spoke strongly, and went as far as to exclaim, on hearing the name of the Bourbons pronounced: ‘Well, be it so, give us the Bourbons, if you wish, but with a constitution that will guarantee us against a fearful despotism, and with peace, of which we have been so long deprived.’ This unanimity of feeling against the imperial despotism, carried so far as to make the upper *bourgeoisie* consider the Bourbons, with whom they had never come in contact, very acceptable, produced an extraordinary impression on all present.

“It was suggested in the assembly that they ought not to think exclusively of the army; that the capital, too, ought to engage their attention. Marshal Marmont replied that he was not empowered to treat for the capital; it was therefore thought proper that the prefects, with a deputation from the Municipal Council and the National Guards, should be deputed to wait on the allied sovereigns, and demand from them that treatment to which Paris had a right from civilized princes, who, since the passage of the Rhine, had announced themselves as the liberators, and not the conquerors of France.

“Whilst these discussions were at the height, M. de Talleyrand arrived. He had a private conversation with Marshal Marmont. He wished at first to obtain something resembling an authorization of his stay at Paris, the which no person was less in a position to grant than the marshal, but he began to set less value on this permission when he saw what was passing around him.

“He instantly conceived the idea of making this visit facilitate a *dénouement* which he now began to regard as inevitable, and which should, of necessity, be accomplished by him. No man was more open to flattery than Marshal Marmont, and none knew better than M. de Talleyrand how to

marshals,\* wearied with the war, thought differently; they demanded to know what were my hopes, my resources, and the term of their sacrifices. They spoke to me of abdication as the means of saving France; I felt that I owed to my country this sacrifice of self-love, and was resigned to the measure. I, however, did not

administer the draught. The marshal had, during this campaign, committed serious errors, but discoverable only by military men, whilst he had, at the same time, displayed heroic bravery. On this very day especially, the thirtieth of March, he had acquired lasting claims on the gratitude of his country. His face, his hands, his dress, bore testimony to what he had done. M. de Talleyrand praised his courage, his talents, and especially his understanding, very much superior, as he affirmed, to that of other marshals. The Duke of Ragusa, as usual, became very much elated when told that he was endowed with high intelligence, in which his fellow-commanders were deficient, and it must be acknowledged that in this respect he possessed what they could lay no claim to.

"He listened, consequently, with a sentiment of profound satisfaction to what the arch-tempter, who was preparing his ruin, told him. M. de Talleyrand took some trouble to point out the serious position of affairs, and the necessity of extricating France from the hands that had destroyed her; he gave the marshal to understand that under existing circumstances, a soldier who had defended Paris so gloriously, and who had still under his command the men at whose head he had fought, possessed the means of saving his country, which had now no master. M. de Talleyrand went no farther, for he knew that no person is seduced at the first attempt. He took his departure, and left the unfortunate Marmont intoxicated with vanity; and now, amid the disasters of France he sketched for himself, in imagination, the most brilliant destiny, whilst the simple-minded and upright soldier who had been his colleague on this same thirtieth of March, Mortier, whose face too was blackened with powder, devoured his grief in the loneliness to which his modesty and uprightness consigned him."

\*Thiers thus speaks of the conduct of Napoleon to his officers at this time:

"He thought it very natural that people should quit him, for these officers, who had always obeyed his commands, except on the last day, were naturally anxious to rally round the Bourbons, in order to preserve the rank which was the just reward of the labors of their life.

"He only wished they had been a little more frank, and to encourage, he addressed them in the following noble language:

"'Serve the Bourbons,' he said to them, 'serve them faithfully; no other course remains to you. If they act wisely, France, under their rule, may be happy and respected. I resisted M. de Caulaincourt's earnest entreaties to make me accept the peace of Châtillon. I was right. For me these conditions were humiliating; they are not so for the Bourbons. They find France as they left her, and may accept her ancient limits without compromising their dignity. Such as she is, France will still be powerful, and though geographically diminished, she will be still as morally great as before, by her courage, her arts, and her intellectual influence over the rest of the world. If her territorial extent is diminished, her glory is not. The memories of our victories will remain to her as a monument of imperishable greatness, and which will always have immense weight in the councils of Europe.



deceive myself as to the results of this abdication; but as this form might some day be of use to my son, I no longer hesitated. A numerous party was in favor of placing this child on the throne, as the means of preserving the revolution with my dynasty; I for a moment participated in this hope, and charged Caulaincourt and Ney to offer to the Emperor Alexander to treat on this basis. This prince hesitated: he had had time to see that the mad acclamations of a population of women, and of a few thousand malcontents of all colors, were at least very equivocal signs of the national spirit. Many parties besieged him with their fears and their hopes. He judged that if the army received reinforcements from the National Guards, and pronounced strongly in my favor, the position of the Allies in Paris would become precarious. He was deliberating what course to pursue, when it was announced to him that Marmont and his *corps-d'armée* had abandoned me.

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“Serve France under the princes who bring back at this moment Fortune, so fickle in times of revolution. Serve France under them as you have done under me. Do not make the task too difficult for them, and leave me, but give me a place in your memory.”

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“Napoleon told M. de Caulaincourt how much he was pleased with the conduct of Marshal Macdonald, who, though so long antagonistic to him, acted in this trying moment like a devoted friend; he took an indulgent view of Marshal Ney’s nobility, and speaking of the conduct of his lieutenants with a slightly disdainful gentleness, said to M. de Caulaincourt:

“Ah! Caulaincourt, men, men! My marshals would blush to act as Marmont has done, for they express the strongest indignation at his conduct, but they are very sorry that he has so far outstripped them on the road to fortune. They would be very glad, without dishonoring themselves, to do as he has done, to acquire the same rights to the favor of the Bourbons.”

“He afterward spoke of Marmont with vexation, but without bitterness:

“‘I treated him,’ he said, ‘as if he were my own child. I have often had to defend him against his colleagues, who did not appreciate his intellectual advantages, and who, judging him only by what he appears on the field of battle, made no account of his military talents.

“‘I created him marshal and duke through personal affection and regard for the recollections of childhood, and I may well say that I reckoned on his fidelity. He is, perhaps, the only man whose desertion I was not prepared for; but vanity, weakness of mind, and ambition have misled him. The unhappy man does not know what awaits him; his name will be forever dishonored. Believe me, I have no longer a thought about myself—my career is finished, or very nearly so. Besides, what desire could I now have to reign over hearts that have grown weary of me, and are eager to offer their allegiance to another? I think only of France, which it is frightful to leave in this state—clipped, crippled, after having had frontiers so vast! Oh, Caulaincourt, that is the most poignant of the many humiliations heaped on my head! Oh, if these dolts had not abandoned me, I would have rebuilt the fabric of her greatness; for, be assured, the Allies, main-



This incident determined his course; he thought my cause had now become desperate in the eyes even of the army. He did that army injustice. The brave men who composed it were attached to me for life or death. Their hearts told them that, after my fall, there would be no glory, or prosperity, or integrity of territory for France. I was in their eyes the tutelary angel of their country. They had never seen it so beautiful and flourishing as during my reign. If, at other epochs, I had delivered it from the furies of anarchy, and the odious presence of foreign troops, why might I not eventually come out victorious from this new contest? The hope of saving France inflamed their noble courage. They counted for nothing the fatigues and dangers which I had shared with them, and whose reward should be an immortal glory. But intriguers and royalists, compromised by their first steps towards the conquerors, hastened to present the dishonorable act of two ungrateful generals as the opinion of the army;

taining their actual position, having Paris behind them and me in front, would have been destroyed. Had they left Paris to escape the danger, they should never have entered it again. The very fact of their leaving the city, at my approach, would be in itself a signal defeat. That unfortunate Marmont has frustrated this glorious result. Ah, Caulaincourt, what joy it would have been to restore the greatness of France in a few hours! Now, what is to be done? I would have about one hundred and fifty thousand men, with those I have here and the troops Eugene, Augereau, Suchet, and Soult could bring; but I would be obliged to retire behind the Loire, entice the enemy to follow, and thus extend indefinitely the ravages to which France has been so long exposed, and try the fidelity of many, who, perhaps, would not bear the test better than Marmont—and I should make all these efforts to prolong a reign which, I clearly see, is drawing to a close. I do not feel sufficient energy to make such efforts.

“Undoubtedly, in prolonging the war, we should find means of improving our position.

“I am informed, on all sides, that the peasants of Lorraine, Champagne, and Burgundy cut down isolated parties of the enemy. Within a short time the people will conceive a horror of the enemy; the Parisians will tire of Alexander's magnanimity. This prince is gracious in his manner, he pleases the women; but so much graciousness in a conqueror soon becomes revolting to the national pride of the conquered. Moreover, the Bourbons are coming, and who can foresee the consequences.

“To-day they reconcile France with Europe; but to-morrow in what state will she be in relation to herself? They represent external peace, but internal war. You will see what they will have done with the country in a year. They will not keep Talleyrand six months. There would be many chances of success in a prolonged struggle—chances both political and military—but at the price of fearful calamities. Besides, at this moment, something more is needed than myself. My name, my statue, my sword, all cause alarm. I must yield. I am going to recall the marshals, and you will see their delight when I extricate them from their difficulties and authorize them to do as Marmont has done, without compromising their honor.”

but so far were the troops from participating in this defection, that it was necessary to employ a *ruse* to get them to Versailles, where they rose up against the treason of their own generals. But whatever weight was thrown into the scale in favor of my dynasty by the energetic protestations of Marmont's corps, the Senate destroyed all by recalling to the throne the brother of Louis XVI. All was now lost for my son as well as for myself. Not deeming the crown worth the consequences of a civil war, as a sequel to the existing foreign war, I now signed an unreserved abdication.\*

It has been pretended that the Allies had no choice, and that they would have been greatly embarrassed at repelling the lieutenant of the kingdom, who had already arrived at Nancy, by trampling under foot the principles for which they had been fighting for the last twenty years. Such arguments are too absurd; if Russia, Austria, and Prussia had consented to treat of my abdication on condition of recognizing my dynasty, and of discussing the conditions of a definitive peace with a council of regency, the *mouchoirs blancs* would certainly not have prevented their doing so. They yielded less to necessity and the intrigues of some personages than to their own views of convenience and of a durable peace.

In taking the crown I had sheltered thrones from the people; in restoring it to the Bourbons they thought to secure them from successful soldiers. The impartial statesman will say that in the universal shipwreck of France, the return of the Bourbons seemed favorable for the country. Without that return, the kingdom, abandoned to the government of a regency, would have been exposed to the horrors of civil war, and the country placed in a situation perhaps still more delicate than on my return from Egypt. The recall of the legitimate princes seemed calculated to save France from anarchy. It was to be supposed that twenty years of misfortune had taught these princes some salutary lessons; that they had forgotten much and learned much; they were better situated than anyone else to reconcile old France with new France; they required only the head and heart of Henry IV.

I felt, when too late, that I had committed an error in not

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\*The following is the formal abdication of Napoleon at Fontainebleau, dated April 6th, 1814:

"The allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the reestablishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor, faithful to his oath, declares that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the thrones of France and Italy, and that there is no personal sacrifice, not even that of life itself, which he is not willing to make for the interests of France.

Napoleon."

putting a difference of religion between my dynasty and that of the Bourbons. It was not the mediocrity of talent, nor the political faults of James and of Charles II., which a second time hurled the race of the Stuarts from the throne of England, but the opposition of religious opinion. If, at the epoch of the concordat, I had embraced the reformed religion with all the men attached to the public administration, all France would have imitated my example, and my son would probably have succeeded me on the throne.

Russia was not inclined to favor my dynasty: in the first place, personal animosity had succeeded to the sentiments which Alexander had entertained for me in 1807; in the second place, he reflected that my son, as a minor, with Maria Louisa as regent, would be under the influence of Metternich, and thus add to the power of Austria. England, flattering herself that she would be able to exercise an ascendancy over the Bourbon refugees, and wishing to give a triumph to the principles which Pitt had always alleged as a pretext for all his wars, was the more interested in the overthrow of my family, not from affection for the princes whose restoration she had more than once opposed, but because, by their return now, she could accomplish her own views.

A general peace followed the recall of the Bourbons; but its results were hard; France lost everything. It was a treaty in which each one demanded ample indemnifications for his sacrifices and his expenses; but Louis XVIII. had expended nothing, and could not ask, with a good grace, for anything in the partition of my spoils. Carnot has reproached the Bourbons for having so easily yielded Belgium; but this was a *sine qua non*, without which England would not treat with them; and their return without a maritime peace would have led to a war still worse than that to which they were putting an end. Moreover, what means had they left to refuse this cession? The battle of Toulouse had just completed the ruin of our affairs.

**BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.**—Soulé was making every preparation to defend this city, when Wellington presented himself to attack it, six days after my abdication. A confused report of the events which had occurred at Paris was not sufficient to deter this marshal from defending a French city when it was attacked by the English; but party spirit, always ready to misrepresent circumstances and pronounce men guilty, has not failed to accuse Soulé of crime in making this defense. They have compared him to the celebrated William of Orange, who fought the battle of Mons after a treaty of peace had been signed, and out of pure animosity to Louis XIV. The comparison is unjust; for the



Prince of Orange knew that peace was signed; whereas Soult had received only vague rumors of the entrance of the Allies into Paris; there was still a state of war, and he repelled a hostile aggression.\* He was beaten. It is true that his left and center had repelled all the attacks of the enemy on Toulouse. His right, resting on the rivulet of Ers, was turned by Beresford at the head of the divisions of Cole and Clinton. This general had marched with the first of these between the rivulet and our redoubts in a parallel, and, to say the least, an audacious movement. Soult, who had watched this movement, threw upon them the reserve under Taupin, in two columns. Imitating my example at Rivoli, when Lusignan prolonged himself on my rear, he cried out to his soldiers: "*These English are ours, I give them to you!*" But Fortune

\*Napier says:

"Marshal Soult and General Thouvenot have been accused of fighting with a full knowledge of Napoleon's abdication. This charge, circulated originally by the Bourbon party, is utterly unfounded. The extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot through the advanced posts has been already noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to induce Sir John Hope to make a formal communication, and the governor could only treat it as an idle story to insult or to deceive him, and baffle his defense by retarding his counter-operations while the works for the siege were advancing.

"For how unlikely—nay, impossible—must it not have appeared, that the Emperor Napoleon, whose victories at Montmirail and Champ-Aubert were known before the close investment of Bayonne, should have been deprived of his crown in the space of a few weeks, and the stupendous event be only hinted at the outposts without any relaxation in the preparations for the siege.

"As false and unsubstantial is the charge against Soult.

"The acute remarks of an English military writer, that if the Duke of Dalmatia had known of the peace before he fought, he would certainly have announced it after the battle, were it only to maintain himself in that city and claim a victory, is unanswerable; but there are direct proofs of the falsehood of the accusation. How was the intelligence to reach him? It was not until the seventh that the provisional government wrote to him from Paris, and the bearer could not have reached Toulouse under three days, even by the most direct way, which was through Montauban. Now the Allies were in possession of that road on the fourth, and on the ninth the French army was actually invested. The intelligence from Paris must therefore have reached the Allies first, as in fact it did, and it was not Soult, it was Lord Wellington, who commenced the battle.

"The charge would therefore bear more against the English general, who would yet have been the most insane as well as the wickedest of men to have risked his army and his fame in a battle where so many obstacles seemed to deny success. He also was the person of all others, called upon by honor, gratitude, justice, and patriotism, to avenge the useless slaughter of his soldiers, to proclaim the infamy and seek the punishment of his inhuman adversary.

"Did he ever, by word or deed, countenance the calumny?

"Lord Aberdeen, after the passing of the English Reform bill, repeated the accusation in the House of Lords, and reviled the minister for being on

cruelly deceived his expectation, and turned against him the maneuver on which he founded his hopes of victory. Taupin leads his troops to the charge by battalion; he is killed; his troops hesitate: they are exposed to a murderous fire, and suffer terrible losses without inflicting any injury on the enemy; finally, they recoil and retire in disorder. Soult, frustrated by the result of an attack which he thought infallible, hastened to leave Toulouse in order to save his line of retreat. The events at the capital ren-

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amicable terms with a man capable of such a crime. Lord Wellington rose on the instant, and emphatically declared that Marshal Soult did not know, and that it was impossible he could know, of the Emperor's abdication when he fought the battle. The detestable distinction of sporting with men's lives by wholesale attaches to no general on the records of history save the Orange William, the murderer of Glencoe.

"And though Marshal Soult had known of the Emperor's abdication, he could not, for that, have been justly placed beside that cold-blooded prince who fought at Saint-Denis with the peace of Nimeguen in his pocket, because he 'would not deny himself a safe lesson in his trade.'

"The French marshal was at the head of a brave army, and it was impossible to know whether Napoleon had abdicated voluntarily or been constrained. The authority of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other intriguers, forming a provisional government, self-instituted, and under the protection of foreign bayonets, demanded no respect from Soult. He had even the right of denying the Emperor's legal power to abdicate.

"He had the right, if he thought himself strong enough, to declare that he would not suffer the throne to become the plaything of foreign invaders, and that he would rescue France even though Napoleon yielded the crown. In fine, it was a question of patriotism and of calculation, a national question which the general of an army had a right to decide for himself, having reference, always, to the real will and desire of the people at large.

"It was in this light that Soult viewed the matter, even after the battle, and when he had seen Colonel Saint-Simon.

"Writing to Talleyrand on the 22d, he says:

"The circumstances which preceded my act of adhesion are so extraordinary as to create astonishment. The 7th, the provisional government informed me of the events which had happened since the 1st of April. The 6th and 7th, Count Dupont wrote to me on the same subject. On the 8th, the Duke of Feltre, in his quality of war minister, gave me notice that, having left the military cipher at Paris, he would immediately forward to me another. The 9th, the Prince Berthier, vice-constable and major-general, wrote to me from Fontainebleau, transmitting the copy of a convention and armistice which had been arranged at Paris with the allied powers; he demanded, at the same time, a state of the force and condition of my army; but neither the Prince nor the Duke of Feltre mentioned events; we had then only knowledge of a proclamation of the Empress, dated the 3d, which forbade us to recognize anything coming from Paris.

"The 10th, I was attacked near Toulouse by the whole allied army, under the orders of Lord Wellington. This vigorous action, where the French army, the weakest by half, showed all its worth, cost the Allies from eight to ten thousand men. Lord Wellington might, perhaps, have dispensed with it.' "

dered these movements superfluous, and this battle, lost by one of my lieutenants, reconciled me in some degree to my abdication.

**NAPOLEON RETIRES TO ELBA.**—Either out of respect for an old warrior, or to make a parade of their generosity, the Allies allowed me to select my place of retreat; I chose Elba, as being near Corsica, where I was born, and touching Italy, the first theater of my glory. They accorded to me the title which afterward seemed to give them so much offense.\* Finally, they permitted me to take with me a small number of my old soldiers, with whom I had run so many hazards—men whom misfortune had not discouraged. Little did they think that, one year later, the Emperor of the Island of Elba, with this mere handful of brave men, would again make the conquest of France!

I set out accompanied by the commissioners of the allied powers. In crossing France in order to reach my place of exile, I had occasion to observe the difference of opinion respecting me. If I was cherished and regretted in the environs of Paris and in the East, I was equally hated in the South. They did not even respect my misfortune, and it was necessary to put myself under foreign protection to preserve my life against the very people who had so often been intoxicated with my triumphs. A year afterward I compared myself to Themistocles; and I believe I shall not be accused of wanting in modesty in putting myself on a parallel with that illustrious Athenian.

**EVACUATION OF ITALY.**—While *en route*, I received news which it was natural to expect; the Kingdom of Italy could not survive the Empire. Threatened by the defection of Murat and by his march on the Po, by the appearance of the English at Genoa and of Bubna on the Simplon, Eugene still kept up his courage. A fanatical revolution excited at Milan by partisans of Austria, and still worse, by the news of my fall, finally induced him to conclude an arrangement for the evacuation of Italy by the handful of French who remained with him. In political commotions there is always a class of men who suffer; those who had had the confidence of Austria before 1796 and during the reaction of 1799 did not possess mine, and they now aspired to a change which would restore their influence. Making a pretext of the heavy taxes imposed, they excited the populace of Milan to rise against the minister of finances, Pirna, whom they inhumanely massacred. This movement gave me great pain. Italy owed everything to me, and I had conceived for her future projects

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\*The conduct of England in 1815, on this subject, exhibited a petty meanness unworthy of a great nation.



the most generous; her ingratitude revolted me, although I had already had plenty of occasions to know the human heart.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.—However great my fall, it does not destroy all my works. I leave it for connoisseurs to judge of my campaign of 1814; if they are honest, they will regard it, with those of 1805 and 1809, as the most memorable and the most scientific of modern times. Even making proper deductions for the influence of state policy on the operations of the Allies, they will not deny that my movements are models of activity, energy, and strategic *coup-d'oeil*. With seventy thousand men in the field, I held my way against more than three hundred thousand, and was oftenest victorious. The devotion of my brave soldiers in these alternate marches against Blücher and Schwartzberg, where we had every day to march ten leagues, and every day to fight new masses of fresh troops, confident and proud of their victories; this devotion, I say, is not less worthy of attention. The present generation has attempted to tarnish their laurels; posterity will avenge them; already it begins to render them justice, for their worst enemies no longer dare to separate their glory from that of France. Manes of the brave men of Montmirail, of Champ-Aubert, of Montereau, repose in peace! Your glory is unfading; your exploits will incite the enthusiasm and respect of ages the most remote.

I must, however, say that the demoralization had, at Brienne, begun to reach my head-quarters. Berthier and his hangers-on seemed no longer able to conceal their fatigue and disgust. Instead of submitting without murmur to the sacrifices imposed on their rank, they were continually discussing, in my *aut-chambres*, the words *peace* and *repose*; as though these had been appropriate words when France was inundated with enemies, and when we owed to the nation the example of enthusiasm and the most absolute devotion. The conduct of my marshals at Fontainebleau was not the result of a spontaneous despair, but the natural consequence of the lamentations with which they had continually besieged me after the battle of Dresden. I had put them, it is true, to severe tests, after the fatal passage of the Niemen in 1812; but from that time there was not a moment in which I had power to arrest, as has been pretended, the course of events. The Emperor of Russia had resolved not to treat with me without receiving guarantees which had been for me so many humiliations. If at Prague the mediation of Austria had been in my favor, that prince would have retired behind the Vistula, but would not have concluded peace, or would have inserted such conditions that I could not have accepted it. Nor did England then

desire peace; for she even demanded of me Antwerp, when I still held Dantzic and Hamburg. Austria made a semblance of proposing peace, because she well knew that after being driven behind the Rhine, I could no longer defend Italy, and she coveted Lombardy. The contest between Europe and myself could only be decided by my fall, or by victories which would enable me to dictate peace to Germany.

The detractors of my glory have not hesitated to compare my defense of France with that of Henry II. against Charles V., and of Louis XIV. against Eugene and Marlborough, and to give me all the disadvantage of this ridiculous parallel. Charles V. attacked Metz with fifty thousand men; the place was defended by fifteen thousand under Guise-le-Balafré; the peasants of Champagne were sufficient to save it. Louis XIV. saw the power of the Emperor and of England waste itself, for six months, before Lille, and three more before the little fort of Landrecies; it was not an army of seventy thousand men that could subjugate an empire like France with such a system of operations. It is absurd to compare such events with the *invasion of a million and a half of men*, with all Europe to sustain them. This invasion, executed with rapidity and in a few weeks' time, at an epoch when no active army could be raised in France to oppose them, was, nevertheless, several times on the point of failing from the astonishing activity of our defense. It would, in fact, have utterly failed, if, instead of intrigues and intestine divisions, we had opposed to the enemy *union, patriotism, and devotion*.

## CHAPTER XXII.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1815.

Napoleon at Elba—Division of Parties in France—Course pursued by Louis XVIII.—Different Forms of Government—Defects of the Charter of Louis XVIII.—Errors in its Administration—Napoleon's Reasons for returning to France—His Departure from Elba—His Reception in France and March on Lyons—The Bourbons prepare for Defense—Decrees of Lyons—Ney declares for the Emperor—Napoleon resumes his Authority as Emperor—Composition of his Ministry—His Position towards Europe—General Coalition against him—Declaration of the Congress of Vienna—Operations of the Duke d'Angoulême in the South of France—Troubles in La Vendée—Affairs of Naples—Preparations to repel Aggression upon France—Motives of Napoleon's defensive Attitude—He refuses to adopt revolutionary Measures—The Champ de Mai—Opening of the Chambers—Their Addresses—Dogmatic Controversies of the Deputies—Napoleon's Reply—Military Preparations of Napoleon—Preparations of the Allies—Napoleon's general Plan of Campaign—He joins his Army—Plan of Operations—Opening of the Campaign—Passage of the Sambre, June 15th—Measures of the Allies—Decisive Movement prescribed to Ney—He delays its Execution—His Delay in marching on Quatre-Bras—Reconnoissance of the Position of the Prussians—Dispositions for forcing their Position—Battle of Ligny—Ney repulsed at Quatre-Bras—Position of Affairs on the Morning of the Seventeenth—Grouchy sent in Pursuit of the Prussians—The Reserves and Left Wing march against the English—Commencement of the Battle of Waterloo—First Appearance of the Prussians—Napoleon hastens the Attack on the English—Ney's first Attack on the Center—Attack of the Left on Hougomont—Ney's second Attack—Bülow debouches on Planchenois—General Charge of the French Cavalry—Arrival of Blücher and Bülow—Wellington's Dispositions—Defeat of the French Right—Last Efforts and Rout of the French Army—Operations of Grouchy—Maneuvers of the Allies—The French retreat on Avesnes—Napoleon's Return to Paris—Military Resources of France—Conspiracies of Napoleon's Adversaries—Disposition of the Populace—Napoleon's second Abdication—He retires from France—He is exiled to St. Helena—His Death.



NAPOLEON AT ELBA.—Europe, familiar for the last twenty years with my victories and gigantic enterprises, was quite astounded at the rapid fall of my empire, and unable to conceive that six months could be sufficient to bring the Allies from the Elbe to the banks of the Seine, and to enable them to dictate to France the disgraceful treaty of Paris. The Congress of Vienna endeavored to reconcile the numerous claims, urged on all sides, for a share of the spoils of that bold conqueror who, two years before, had dared to put one foot upon Cadiz, and the other upon Moscow. The task was a difficult one; for this congress was expected to reëstablish the political equilibrium so strongly shaken, and to regulate the international relations of Europe, so completely overthrown by the storms of the French Revolution. Fallen from the throne of the most powerful empire to the petty sovereignty of the island of Elba, in consequence of my abdication of Fontainebleau, and separated from my wife and son in a manner disgraceful to the House of Austria, and for which history will one day justly reproach my enemies, I retired in a kind of exile to Porto-Ferrajo, like Scipio in his asylum at Linternum, more displeased with the desertion of friends than with the persecution of enemies. Although condemned to be but a passive spectator of the great events of the world which I had directed for fifteen years by the superiority of my genius, I nevertheless felt a presentiment that, sooner or later, I should be called to reappear upon the stage; I understood men and the times too well to be deceived as to the extent of the embarrassment in which the Bourbons would be involved when they resumed the government of a country so much changed since they had left it, and so deeply humiliated by the disastrous circumstances attending their restoration to power. I was therefore confident that, so soon as the first intoxication occasioned by the general peace had partially subsided, the most energetic portion of the French nation, so deeply humiliated by the conditions of the restoration, would regret my abdication and desire my return. But the uncertainty of the time when this would take place, and my utter inability to control events, prevented me from forming any definite plans. In the meantime I found some consolation in projecting a history of my life, and in animating the drooping hopes of my partisans. But important events followed each other in such rapid succession that I was drawn from my retirement much sooner than I had anticipated.

DIVISION OF PARTIES IN FRANCE.—Independently of the private information which I received from Queen Hortense and others of my faithful friends, the newspapers furnished me

sufficient information concerning the general state of affairs; for, notwithstanding the strict censorship of the press, and in spite of the falsehoods usually circulated in the public journals, the different passions, of which they were the interpreters, were apparent to the least observing, and the excitement which raged in the kingdom was made known to the world.

It seemed that Louis XVIII. had at first fully appreciated the spirit of the age, and persuaded himself that the majority of France desired to consolidate the results of the Revolution. This prince judged, after twenty years of experience, that his party was too weak to resist the wishes of the great mass of the middle classes, who, in a country stripped of aristocratic institutions, finish always by dictating law to the nation. To maintain himself upon the throne, he felt it necessary to reign with this majority; that is, in compliance with the principles of the Revolution: *Henry IV. had said that Paris was well worth a mass; Louis XVIII. thought the crown of France well worth a constitution.* It was evident that he could not govern by the ancient magistracies of the kingdom—no vestige of them remained; nor could he hope to rule the France of 1814 by the defunct *états* of Brittany, Languedoc, or Burgundy. It was necessary, therefore, to reconstruct the government on an entirely new basis, and, if he did not submit to the revolutionary principle, he must take the alternative of doing over again the work of the Revolution by virtue of the *divine right* upon which he founded his claim to the throne. He decreed a charter. Many have blamed Louis XVIII. for this measure; and, judging of the act by its effects, we are compelled to admit that it imperfectly accomplished its object. If it had been possible to seize the supreme power with a vigorous hand, and to govern by means of royal ordinances, it is incontestable that, for him, it would have been the safest course; but this being impracticable, it was left for the King to decide what form of government should be substituted for the one which had just been overthrown by the combined European powers. To revive the *parlements* or provincial *états* was utterly impossible. To substitute for my glorious and energetic empire the absolute power of a *camarilla d'émigrés* was the dream of some wiseacres; if this course had been adopted, the restoration would not have continued six months. A lady, exhibiting a superiority of genius and penetration when discoursing on any subject other than politics, has asserted that the Bourbons could have taken the Empire just as they found it. "The bed was so well made," said she, "that it was only necessary to lie down in it." This saying of Madame de Staël, which received so much applause in the

salons of Paris, was mere nonsense. How could the brother and successor of Louis XVI. acknowledge a senate which had betrayed its own founder, and had twice disposed of the throne in less than ten years! A legislative body which had raised its voice only when the country was invaded by a million of foreign enemies, and had become a turbulent arena of party passions, at a time when all patriots should have rallied around the head of the government, no matter what its character, was utterly unworthy of public confidence, and its reëstablishment could not have been acceptable to the French people. Moreover, the imperial institutions were so little pleasing to the visionary advocates of liberalism that these factious leaders of the Senate, who had overthrown my empire, were eager to force upon the Bourbons a charter of their own; but Louis XVIII., having decided to reject this illegal act, owed it to the ruling opinions to grant another which would guarantee the threatened interests of community.

**COURSE TO BE PURSUED BY THE KING.**—The King had only to choose between two courses of action: the first, to grant a charter, as he actually did; the second, to govern provisionally as Dictator, and to convoke a Constituent Assembly to form, in concert with his ministers, a national compact, which, being sanctioned by the notables of France, should become irrevocable, and thus offer the double advantage of securing the interests of the throne as well as those of the nation. The first plan appeared to him the more prudent, as it was a voluntary concession and implied no acknowledgment of the principles of national sovereignty—principles specious in theory, but readily degenerating into an elective monarchy. Moreover, it was doubtful, to say the least, whether any complete, strong, and well-matured system of government could emanate from a French constituent assembly, no matter how restricted in numbers. If, instead of an elective assembly, a commission of some forty or fifty members had been selected by the provisional government, to draw up and decide upon the terms of the national compact, as was done after the eighteenth Brumaire, what guarantee would such authority have presented, or what force could such a charter have had? A king has always a right to give laws where none exist, but what right has an assembly of fifty lawyers, stripped of all legitimate authority, to impose a contract upon a king, on the one side, and upon the entire nation, on the other, without submitting it to the vote of the primary assemblies, or, at least, to notables especially appointed for that purpose by the nation? But these two means were both inconsistent with the principles of the Bourbon monarchy and the interests of the crown. Holding all my power from popular election, I could not establish my government upon



any other basis; but the case of the Bourbons was entirely different.\*

DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.—When, in the course of events, the government of a country is destroyed, and a new one is to be substituted in its place, we are at liberty to select either of the following: first, an hereditary absolute monarchy; second, an hereditary monarchy of limited powers; third, an elective monarchy; fourth, an aristocratic or oligarchic republic; and fifth, a democratic republic. Much may be said both for and against each of these forms in the abstract, but in truth their advantages and disadvantages result rather from the particular circumstances of their application than from anything belonging intrinsically to the forms themselves. A government suited to America, or to the petty Swiss cantons, would be utterly absurd for one of the large European states.

DEFECTS OF THE CHARTER OF LOUIS XVIII.—We have shown that, a new form of government being necessary, Louis XVIII. granted a charter to the nation in order to prevent their forming one for themselves. This charter should have been a kind of indissoluble compact, connecting the interests of the throne and the interests of the nation, forming, in short, a kind of brief declaration of rights. Unfortunately, it was so framed as to satisfy neither party. The royalists, like the Spanish priests, wished a new master who would permit them to govern the country according to their own pleasure. The returned *émigrés* could see in the restoration of the Bourbons only the means of recovering their lost property and privileges. The clergy hoped to recover the ancient wealth and influence of the Church. The *noblesse* had been created anew, but it had no prerogatives or power; it was too exclusive to be democratic, and too pusillanimous to be aristocratic; highly offensive to the nation in its character, without even the means of self-defense. All these parties were ready to tear in pieces the charter at the earliest opportunity, because some of its clauses were favorable to the nation. On the other hand, the stipulations for a national legislative power were accompanied with so many restrictions as to afford good grounds for doubting the sincerity of the new government on this and other points connected with popular rights. If Louis had not too much feared the establishment of bad precedents in admitting

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\*The author explains, in a later edition of this chapter, that his political remarks have reference solely to monarchical governments of limited powers like that of France, and that they are entirely inapplicable to republican governments like that of the United States of America, or to despotisms like those of Russia and Austria.

dogmas looking toward an elective system, he could have increased the strength of his new edifice by giving it the sanction, if not of the whole country, at least of the new chambers. For this purpose it would have been sufficient for the King to arrange a royal *séance*, declaring the compact binding upon himself and his descendants, and upon the nation and its deputies; all swearing to maintain in its integrity the charter which ever afterward was to be equally obligatory upon the monarchy and its subjects, and to form a basis of public rights entirely new.

ERRORS IN ITS ADMINISTRATION.—But instead of acting in this frank and open manner, the King let it be plainly seen that he was merely yielding to present necessity, and that an opportunity only was wanting to impose a more despotic rule. Surrounded by twenty thousand *émigrés*, who were clamorous for office; old imperial employees, who wished to retain office; Jacobins, equally avaricious of the spoils of place; *doctrinaires*, who believed themselves the only men in France capable of conducting the affairs of state; old royalists and high clergy, who opposed both the constitution and those holding office under it—under such circumstances the only safety for Louis XVIII. was to pursue a firm and straightforward course, regardless of party influences. But this the King was incapable of doing. He intrusted the administration of affairs to a ministry which was without credit and entirely influenced by the coteries of the Tuileries. There was nothing but contradictions and inconsistencies in the system of government; words and deeds were without correspondence, (for at heart the government was far from wishing to carry out the measures it had promised in writing.) The *émigrés* demanded back their sequestered property, and to calm their importunities they were promised ultimate satisfaction, though in utter violation of the charter. Instead of putting down new pretensions and confirming the existing state of affairs, they pursued directly the opposite course. The purchasers of the national property were threatened with projects of restitution; brochures, attributed to Chancellor Dambray, opposed the legality of these sales and demonstrated the justice of restitution. The factious leaders of parties—the men who had surrendered Toulon to the English, and those who had recovered it; the defenders of the divine rights of the throne, and those who had led Louis XVI. to the scaffold—were soon involved in the most virulent disputes. Fearing the consequence of such discussions, the government abolished the liberty of the press and of the tribune. In order to quiet public feeling and to soften down the violent party spirit springing from the excesses of the Revolution, I had established a

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 public censorship. This was not done through any interest of personal power, but for the good of the country. The evils resulting from it were due to its bad administration, rather than to its principle; for, on account of the deadly feuds engendered by the Revolution, a limited censorship was necessary for a time in order to harmonize contending factions. But the government of Louis XVIII., instead of confining it to the factious partisan newspapers of the day, made the restriction far too general; and as this censorship seemed contrary to the promises of the declaration of Saint-Ouen, and to the spirit of the modified charter, the liberals, republicans, and *doctrinaires* raised incessant clamors and cried out, "Despotism and deception!" To other causes of agitation is to be added the dissatisfaction produced by the onerous treaties with foreign powers. Every one truly French at heart, and who retained a particle of national pride and patriotism, was indignant at the readiness with which Count d'Artois, even before having stipulated any of the conditions of peace, signed an order to surrender to the Allies a hundred fortresses still occupied by French troops. The treaties of Paris, made by the point of the sword with a rigor justifiable perhaps in certain cases, were in this instance too severe even for the interests of the powers imposing them, for they implanted the seeds of bitterness in the hearts of all friends of the Empire and of the Revolution. All believed, whether with reason or not, that the Bourbons might have preserved at least a part of Belgium, Savoy, and the line of the Rhine as far as Coblentz, if they had not been too eager to get possession of the Tuileries.

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 The minister Ferrand, in a discourse from the tribune, classed all Frenchmen in two categories: those who had pursued the *right line*—that is, who had fought with the *émigrés* and in La Vendée; and those who had pursued the *curved line*—that is, who had admitted the Revolution and the Empire: a strange apostrophe to a whole nation, a singular means of supporting a law for restoring the unsold property of the *émigrés*! The government had retained the soldiers of the Empire, because it feared them and had no others to oppose to their influence; and, in passing them in review, heightened the glory of their enemies; crowds of *émigré* and Vendéan officers demanded the confirmation of their rank in the very army which they had opposed, thus encumbering the *cadres* of the army and staff, to the detriment of the veterans of a hundred battles. Thus military dissatisfaction was added to civil discontent. No one could confide in the existing state of affairs, for all things seemed unstable; there was no security of party interests, for all seemed compromised; nor of opinions, for they were stifled; nor was there any refuge in the strength



of government, for it was without head, or arm, or will. A new contest seemed inevitable, and in the clash of interests and shock of factions, I again might become the arbiter of the destinies of France.

#### NAPOLEON'S REASON FOR RETURNING TO FRANCE.

—The state of affairs in France inspired me with the desire and hope of returning there, and the information which I received of the proceedings at the Congress of Vienna was greatly calculated to strengthen this feeling. The congress had much difficulty in effecting a satisfactory division of the spoils; Austria, France, and England had agreed in the eventual treaties to guarantee Saxony against the pretensions of Prussia; Russia supported these pretensions, and the dissatisfied sovereigns of these last two countries already spoke of returning to their own capitals; even the day of their departure was said to be fixed. In return for the support promised by the Bourbons to Austria and England, they demanded the expulsion of Murat from the throne of Naples, and the restoration of that branch of their own family. This demand was supported by the personal interests of the venal Talleyrand, because the restoration of the legitimate government of the Two Sicilies would secure to him the incomes of the rich principality of Benevento. (Moreover, I learned that the ministers of Louis XVIII. had proposed to the congress to remove me from the Isle of Elba, and to exile me to St. Helena.) This was a gratuitous violation of the treaty of Fontainebleau, for I had then done nothing to expose me to the wrath of these sovereigns.\* My feeble means of defense were not sufficient to resist the execution of this scheme, and resolving not to await their attack, (I conceived the audacious project of reascending the throne of France.) Small as was the number of my forces, they were stronger than those of the Bourbons, *because they were allied to the honor of their country*, and although that honor may sometimes slumber, it never dies in the hearts of Frenchmen. Fully trusting to the strength of this support, I passed in review the little army which was to second me in this great and hazardous enterprise. These soldiers were ill-clad and ill-supplied, for I had not the means even of equipping them. (Our preparations were brief, for we carried only our swords.)

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\*Jomini says that the French government did not pay the two millions stipulated to be annually paid by the treaty of Fontainebleau, but made the exile of Napoleon from Europe a condition for its fulfillment. Napoleon was informed of these facts by the Empress Maria Louisa, and this circumstance, together with the false information which he received of the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna, decided him to return immediately to France.

**HIS DEPARTURE FROM ELBA.**—Favored by the fortuitous absence of the English commissioner and the English fleet stationed to watch the Isle of Elba, our little flotilla set sail and, experiencing no accident, accomplished the voyage in five days. On the first of March I again saw the coast of France at Cannes, near the same beach of Frejus where I had landed fifteen years before on my return from Egypt. Fortune seemed again to smile upon me, as I returned a second time to my country, to raise again its fallen colors and to restore its independence. In again touching the French soil I could not but experience the most lively emotions. I saluted it as the parent of heroism and the home of genius. We debarked without obstacle. I had as yet formed no definite plans, for I had not sufficient information of the actual state of the southern departments upon which to base them. I was, therefore, to be guided by circumstances. But it was necessary to act promptly, and to secure at the outset some strong point of support. Grenoble was the nearest fortified town of importance, and one well suited to my purpose; I therefore marched as rapidly as possible in that direction, for I well knew that my ultimate success depended very much upon the possession of this fortress. At length my little army reached this point of destination, having marched eighty-four leagues in six days!

**RECEPTION IN FRANCE AND MARCH UPON LYONS.**—My reception on the way answered my most sanguine hopes, and seemed to double the chances of my ultimate success, by giving me the assurance that the mass of the people, uncorrupted by passion or interest, had still preserved their pristine character, though wounded by the national humiliation. On the sixth of March I discovered at Vizille the first troops sent out to oppose me: they refused to parley with my officers. Certain that everything depended upon this first rencounter, and accustomed to take a prompt and decided part, I advanced fearlessly in front of these troops, and laid bare my breast to receive their fire. This act of rash confidence strongly moved the feelings of these old soldiers; far from seeing in me the audacious rebel and exciter of civil wars, as has been represented by the royalists, they could only distinguish their Emperor marching at the head of his old warriors, who had so often traced the road to victory. They did not long hesitate. This detachment of the fifth regiment of infantry was soon followed by the entire seventh, commanded by Labédoyère, who voluntarily ran forward to meet me. The people and soldiers now welcomed me with shouts of joy; Grenoble opened its gates, and I advanced towards Lyons with five thousand men.

**THE BOURBONS PREPARE FOR DEFENSE.**—At the first news of my debarkation, the Bourbons were struck with

astonishment; nevertheless, they hoped to intercept my progress; they offered a reward for my head, and proceeded against me as against a rebellious subject in arms against the state. The Count d'Artois and Macdonald set out immediately for Lyons; the Duke d'Angoulême left Bordeaux to establish a center of royal authority at Toulouse; Ney, recalled to Paris, was sent into the East; and finally the Chambers were hastily convoked in extraordinary session. It is even said that the most fiery of the ministers of the restoration (M. de Blacas), wishing to employ against me means more certain than the sword, hired a man named B—— to assassinate me. This individual has since published an account of his exploits, but I prefer to believe it untrue, or at least greatly exaggerated.\* Certain of having glory and France on my side, I felt confident of success. No sooner were the royal troops brought in presence of my own, than they ran together, and embraced each other with cries of "*Vive l'empereur!*" Macdonald escaped with difficulty, and the Count d'Artois had barely time to take post and return to Paris. The Lyonnaise received me with even greater enthusiasm than on my return from Marengo. This reception very much affected my feelings, and redoubled my courage and confidence in the future.

**CELEBRATED DECREES OF LYONS.**—At Lyons I issued several decrees calculated to affect public opinion. Much complaint had been made by the *tiers-état* against the restriction of the press and the privileges of the nobility. The condition of the country immediately after a revolution unexampled in history rendered this restriction necessary for public repose. I knew well the benefits of a free press, and I appreciated the advantages of the tribune; and I also knew the evils resulting from these same sources. But I hoped that the present circumstances were such as to enable France to profit by their advantages and to avoid their evils. At any rate, I determined to make the experiment. I therefore proclaimed the abolition of all privileged *noblesse*, the freedom of the press,† and the sovereignty of the nation.

**NEY DECLARES FOR THE EMPEROR.**—Preceded by these memorable decrees, I continued to advance upon Châlons, where I was joined by the troops which Ney had assembled for the purpose of opposing me. This marshal was no statesman,

\*See the brochure published by Moronval, Quai des Augustins, in 1816, which contains an account of this project and the causes of its failure.

†Jomini thinks that the reestablishment of the unrestricted liberty of the daily press is a fault, and one of which Napoleon was the first victim. The periodical press and books, he says, ought generally to be exempt from the censure, but the daily press, he thinks, cannot be so in France without danger, at least in times of great political excitement.



and all his political religion consisted in avoiding civil war created for private interests. (This was his motive at Fontainebleau, when he contributed to provoke my first abdication.) "*Tout pour France, rien pour un homme,*" was his motto; a dogma very respectable in appearance, but which, when carried too far, may cause great faults, and induce one to forget the most sacred duties. At the first news of my return, Ney thought only of the scenes at Fontainebleau and the dangers of civil war; he therefore accepted in good faith the appointment to repel me by force of arms, and so far forgot himself as to utter imprudent and unsuitable menaces against his ancient chief. But he was soon convinced, by his journey in Burgundy and in Franche-Comté, of the unanimity of popular sentiment in my favor; his own soldiers unfurled the national colors in his presence; two officers sent secretly to him assured him of my wish to forget the past. Placed in the same alternative as Marlborough between James II. and William, he did not hesitate to throw himself into the ranks rendered illustrious by his many brilliant feats of arms. Yielding to a single dominant idea, he acted with impetuous haste, without reflecting that he might thereby violate other sacred duties, from which he might so easily have relieved himself by retiring to Besançon till after my entrance into the capital. The striking contrast between his proclamation at Sous-le-Saulnier and his promises to Louis XVIII. will remain as an unfortunate blot in the history of his glorious career, because it gives a false idea of his character by having all the appearance of premeditated treason—a crime of which he was utterly incapable.

Nothing could now arrest my progress, as I pursued my triumphal march at the head of ten thousand men. My adversaries had no other resource than the camp hastily assembled at Melun; but the soldiers of this camp, brothers of those of Grenoble, Lyons, and Châlons, were more disposed to rejoin their eagles than to fight against them. Astonished at the rapidity of my progress, the Bourbons knew not what course to take. It is impossible to describe the agitation and confusion which now reigned in Paris, and particularly in the palace of the Tuilleries. Louis XVIII. preserved his usual calmness and resignation; but, yielding to the advice of those around him, he allowed himself to be drawn into resolutions the most opposite, and measures the most contradictory. On the one side he threw himself into the arms of the *doctrinaires*, and intrusted Benjamin Constant to draw up royal proclamations that should gain for him the confidence and love of the French! Placing himself under the ægis of the National Guards and revolutionary partisans, he made an appeal

to all loyal royalists, and to the army which he had so ill-treated! Even Fouché was on the point of being ordered to the palace to be consulted, when it was decided to arrest him; but the wily sycophant made a timely escape from his hotel, and reached through a garden the house of Queen Hortense, where he found a refuge. Then followed a partial change of ministers; the police was confided to Bourrienne, formerly my private secretary and the friend of my youth, and now my calumniator and declared enemy; all received in turn caresses and promises; the National Guard and Royal Volunteers were appealed to; such were the measures resorted to by MM. Blacas, Ferrand, and Dambray to repel or capture the conqueror of so many people! The Chambers, which had been convoked in so much haste, met in time to exhibit to the world the utter worthlessness of public assemblies deliberating in the presence of real danger, and to prove to Europe that the time had passed forever when senators awaited death in their curule chairs. This meeting of the Chambers had no other result than to give some speakers an opportunity of repeating the declamations against the imperial despotism inserted by Benjamin Constant in the *Journal des Debats*, and to give the King an occasion to present himself in state to the Chambers, with his brother and nephews, to take there to the charter an oath of fidelity which would have been much more appropriate at the time of its promulgation—an oath which, on the part of Count d'Artois, was generally suspected to be insincere. Two days after this sentimental but tardy homily, the troops of the camp of Melun came over to join mine *en masse*, and the next day, March 20th, I entered the Tuileries. The Bourbons had barely time to escape to Belgium; the Duke d'Angoulême alone kept up a contest for some days in the South.

NAPOLEON REASCENDS THE THRONE.—Thus was this astonishing revolution terminated in twenty days, without having cost a single drop of blood. France had now changed her aspect; the nation, restored to itself, had resumed its ancient bearing. It was free from the yoke imposed by the foreigner, for it had just performed the highest act of free will of which any people can be capable. The grandeur of my enterprise effaced the recollection of my reverses; it restored to me the confidence of the French people; I was again the man of their choice. *in the chambers*

COMPOSITION OF THE NEW MINISTRY.—While awaiting the formation of definitive institutions of government, it was necessary to organize a temporary administration, by placing men at the head of the several ministerial departments. The war department was confided to Davoust, the marine to Decrès,

the finances to Gaudin, foreign affairs to Caulaincourt, whose pacific views were well known to the Allies, the seals to Cambacérès, the interior to Carnot, and the police to Fouché. The selection of these last two—old adepts in Jacobinism—was a sufficient pledge to the mass of the people against all cries of despotism. Carnot I knew well. This stern old republican had refused me the Empire in 1815. His mind was stamped with a probity that no circumstances could change, but to this honest and energetic will there was added a love of opposition and of Utopian theories. His military arrangements in 1793 and 1794 had given him a reputation for talent in military defense, and his republican notions and stern integrity made him another Cato in the eyes of the multitude. It was now necessary to animate the courage of the people for self-defense, and no one was better calculated than Carnot to accomplish this object. Fouché had a most decided character for intrigue; he mistook craft and roguery for great talent for business. He was an Utopian demagogue, and yet he knew the shallowness of such theories. He wished a strong government, and yet opposed every measure calculated to give it strength. He was popular with a certain class, and I hoped to turn that popularity to account. I knew his character well, and was perfectly aware that he was unworthy of confidence. But I knew also that he would not remain a silent spectator of coming events. I must, therefore, either use or destroy him. If I locked him up at Vincennes or exiled him without judgment, there would have been good grounds for suspecting me of despotism. I, therefore, determined to run the risk of using him, and to counteract his intrigues by keeping him under the strictest watch. My leniency cost me dear. The clients of these old ex-conventionals, and those that ranged themselves under the Utopian banners of the Lafayettes, Lanjuinais, and the Benjamin Constants, proved more dangerous as friends than as enemies.)

NAPOLEON'S POSITION TOWARD EUROPE.—Having thus attended to the formation of my council, I felt how urgent it was to look at the aspect of foreign affairs. I had refused the peace offered me at Châtillon with the limits of 1792, because I was then on the throne of France, and the conditions were too humiliating; but now there was nothing to prevent me from abiding by the conditions imposed on the Bourbons; returning from the Isle of Elba, I could not be responsible, either in the eyes of France or of posterity, for what had been done by others in my absence. In informing Murat of my departure, I had charged him to send a courier to Vienna to carry there my engagement to abide by the treaties of Paris, and to occupy myself only with the interior of France. Unfortunately, I then had no suitable



person to send to the Emperor Alexander to demonstrate to this prince how much the rivalry of England would one day annoy him, and how important it was for Russia that France should have a government strong, national, and opposed to the interests of England. As I could no longer occupy myself with my former projects on the Vistula, and as France and Russia could no longer be rivals, it is difficult to say what effect such a mission might have produced on the mind of the Russian monarch; but it is unfortunate that the trial was not made. At any rate, it is very natural to suppose that the positive assurances given by me to the sovereigns of Europe would have had some influence: for Europe, astonished at my return and at the energy of the French people, must have expected a repetition of the scenes of the Revolution, if this people were again provoked to employ all their resources in propagandism. Success would have been quite certain if the congress had been dissolved, as I was erroneously informed, so that I could have treated with the cabinets separately.\*

GENERAL COALITION AGAINST HIM.—But the sovereigns, being still assembled, they felt their self-love irritated; their interests had so clashed since the fall of my empire that they had found it difficult to continue negotiations; but the fear of losing all these rich spoils again united the disputants, and all my efforts to preserve peace were unavailing. It was in vain that I protested my adhesion to the treaties; they refused to believe me. They dreaded the influence which the example of the French people might have upon their own subjects, and therefore were inclined to treat my return merely as a military revolt. Moreover, Austria, trembling lest I might dispute Italy with her, entirely forgot the connections which the events of 1814 had already broken. Russia, thinking that she could preserve Warsaw only by allying herself to her natural rivals, sacrificed everything to secure this result. Prussia had been soliciting Austria to allow her to extend her territory at the expense of Saxony, but she now eagerly accepted what had been offered her in lieu of this, lest she might lose all. England, governed at this time by mediocre men, thought she again saw my imperial eagles hovering over Bologne, Antwerp, and Egypt, and made lavish of her subsidies in order to sustain herself against an imaginary danger.

THE CONGRESS PUTS NAPOLEON UNDER THE BAN OF NATIONS.—Thus all the interests of these sovereigns seemed

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\*The conduct of the European powers toward France in 1830 would seem to confirm the correctness of this assertion. Napoleon had left Elba on the faith of articles written from Vienna by Latour-Dupin, and inserted in the *Journal-des-Debats*. This paper announced the departure of the King of Prussia and of the Emperor Alexander as certain.

opposed to my existence. The declaration of the thirteenth of March, declaring me an *outlaw*, sufficiently proves the fears inspired by my name. If we add to these motives the fear felt by Talleyrand lest my return might cause the sequestration of the ten millions of Bernese stocks held by him in England and lest his fortune in France might be compromised by his banishment, it will be easy to understand the violence of that famous declaration which has generally been attributed to his pen. To quiet these powers it was necessary for me to assure Russia of Warsaw, and Austria of Italy; this I could have done if the negotiations had been conducted separately at St. Petersburg and at Vienna. But the declaration of the thirteenth of March left little chance of success. Nevertheless, I at first hoped that this declaration was mainly intended to second the resistance of the Bourbons and to deter me from any ulterior projects against Europe. Nothing was more natural than that the powers who had placed Louis XVIII. on the throne of France should wish to maintain him there; but since this prince had been so easily forced to a second emigration, the face of the question was entirely changed, and I had good reason to hope that the cabinets would be disposed to retrace their steps when they learned the rapidity of my triumph and the unheard-of success of my enterprise, and also of my pacific intentions. Unfortunately, the treaties of alliance, *offensive and defensive*, signed the twenty-fifth of March, between the great powers, soon destroyed this illusion.

OPERATIONS OF THE DUKE D'ANGOULÊME.—But exterior embarrassments, resulting from the proceedings of the Congress of Vienna, were not the only ones I now encountered. The Duke d'Angoulême, appointed by Louis XVIII. his lieutenant in the South, had organized the royal government at Toulouse, and, in concert with M. de Vitrolles and the Count Damas, had prepared to resist my empire. The mercantile population of Marseilles, whose love of lucre exceeded their love of liberty, and the fanatic inhabitants of Languedoc, whose religious dissensions were closely connected with their political quarrels, were easily induced to side with the royalists. The Duke, with their aid and that of some regiments which yet remained faithful, formed three columns with which to ascend the Rhone and retake Lyons and Grenoble. But the greater part of his forces soon declared for my cause. Dauphiny declared against the Bourbons, and the tricolored flag again floated at Toulouse and at Montpellier, and the Duke, surrounded on all sides, signed, on the ninth of April, at Pont-Saint-Esprit, a convention agreeing to evacuate France. Grouchy at first refused to ratify it, but I hastened to give it my sanction.

**TROUBLES IN LA VENDÉE.**—At the same time troubles broke out in La Vendée, and I was forced to send there fifteen thousand old soldiers. The skill and activity of Generals Lamarque and Fravot soon smothered the flames of civil war. Larochejacquelin was slain at the combat of Mathes, and signal victories were gained at Saint-Gilles and Roche-Servières; but, on account of the peculiar localities and the obstinate character of the inhabitants, hostilities did not entirely cease for a long time.

**AFFAIRS IN NAPLES.**—While those events were taking place in France and at the Congress of Vienna, Murat rendered my affairs still more complicated by his untimely commencement of hostilities in Italy—an enterprise worthy of his whimsical and adventurous character. Hearing of the negotiations between France and Austria for dethroning him, he demanded of the latter power a free passage through Italy, to take vengeance for the menaces of the minister of Louis XVIII.; of course this was refused. Hearing of my debarkation, he flattered himself that he could suddenly repair, in my eyes, his defection of 1814. He thought the moment had arrived when he was to play a great part, and, by promising the people of Italy a national insurrection, was to become the arbiter of great events. He debouches, on the twenty-second of March, from Ancona with forty thousand men, drives the Austrians from Cesena, and, favored by the population of Bologna and Modena, rapidly invades the country of the Po as far as Placentia, while another column invades the Roman states and Tuscany. He everywhere scatters proclamations, announcing that he comes to unite all Italy under the same flag; and takes formal possession of the provinces which he crosses; he even meditates the invasion of Lombardy across Piedmont, when he is arrested by the declaration of the English minister with threats of war. The Austrians soon assemble and throw against him General Bianchi, with twenty-five or thirty thousand men. Leaving Florence with the mass of his forces, this general marches by Foligno in order to cut off Murat's retreat, at the same time that Neipperg is to threaten him by the route of Ancona. The King of Naples, to avoid such a result, is obliged to retire in all haste: a decisive rencounter takes place at Tolentino on the second of May; the Neapolitan army is defeated and dispersed in all directions. Murat reaches his capital with only a small escort; he is now deserted by his warmest partisans, and compelled to fly from Naples to seek refuge in France; he debarks at Toulon. A convention signed at Capua, on the twentieth of May, restores Ferdinand IV. to the throne of the Two Sicilies. Never was anything



more untimely than this operation of Murat. If Austria had had the least inclination to recede from the declaration of the thirteenth of March, this was to render the thing impossible; and even supposing that the Cabinet of Vienna had resolved to persist in it, everything should have been avoided that was calculated to strengthen the bonds of the coalition. In a military point of view, it was taking the initiative prematurely, for he commenced even before knowing whether or not I could second his operations. As a diversion, the King of Naples could have been of much avail; but in attempting to act the principal part in the war, he committed a great absurdity. Thus twice did Murat compromise the Empire; the first time (in 1814), by declaring for its enemies; the second (in 1815), by taking arms *mal-à-propos* in its favor. He expiated, by a chivalric death, two faults that precipitated him from his throne; his memory as a soldier will ever be glorious.

PREPARATIONS TO REPEL AGGRESSION.—But the fatal result of this premature opening of hostilities by the King of Naples, the success of the Austrians, the reports which reached France of what was passing at Vienna and in the rest of Europe—all these were of a nature to inspire a just fear in the least discerning. A formidable war was again about to threaten the national existence, and all hope of dissipating the storm was now gone; I had to decide either to brave it, or to fly from it like a coward; in such a dilemma could I hesitate? If personal honor had alone been at stake, I could have sacrificed it for the future welfare of France; but the honor of the nation was more involved than my own. A people of thirty millions, which had just raised one of its citizens to the highest power, could it, on a diplomatic declaration of a foreign congress, drive away this adopted chief, and submit to the yoke which these foreigners wished to impose? Some have reproached me for continuing to occupy the throne after the reception of the declaration of Vienna. In their opinion I ought to have frankly exposed to France the position in which she would be placed toward Europe, alarmed and rushing to arms against myself, and then to have proposed to the nation to decide on one of the three following propositions:

1st. To submit without delay to the clemency of Louis XVIII.;

2d. To proclaim for Napoleon II., with a regency, or some other form;

3d. To declare the nullity of the abdication of Fontainebleau, and recognize anew the empire of Napoleon himself:

That, if the nation had adopted this last part, then the fate of France had been irrevocably connected with my own, and all desertions from me would have been cowardice or felony!

The fervent and unreflecting apostles of national sovereignty may find something specious in these ideas, but really they are without sagacity: in the first place, I did not despair of recalling Austria, and perhaps Russia, to sentiments more favorable to my cause; I many times renewed the attempt, and even sent General Flahaut to Vienna with this intention: but if such hope had not existed, could I think of flying for ever from France, to which Louis XVIII. would have immediately returned with the Allies, and all the men who had devoted themselves to my cause would have been given up to the fury of the *reactionnaires*? Such a course would have been humiliating to the smallest prince in Europe; how then could I submit to such a proscription? Moreover, by abdicating in the early part of April, I should have left France without a government, at a moment when eight hundred thousand men were ready to fall upon her! There was no choice: it was necessary to fly, and to recall Louis XVIII., or to fight! This alternative was a hard one, and the chances were frightful, but there were no others. In adopting this alternative I felt certain that, if properly seconded, I should triumph over these enemies of myself and of France.

Other critics on my course at this time have been as rash as the above were weak: these pretend that, instead of yielding to the approaching storm, I should have anticipated it, and profited by the first rising of the people to show, by invading Belgium and proclaiming liberty throughout Europe, how redoubtable was the popular power; whereas my pacific attitude stifled the popular enthusiasm! Pitiful declamation! To throw a people in working blouses and armed with pikes upon the warlike legions of all Europe! A large army was requisite, and to obtain this it was necessary to preserve, with all care, the precious nucleus then existing, and to form around this the people which were then being levied and organized.

The pacific attitude with which I have been reproached consisted in working sixteen hours a day for three months to create this army. I increased the *cadres* of the regiments of the line from two to five battalions, and reinforced those of the cavalry by two squadrons. I organized two hundred battalions of movable National Guards, forty battalions of Old and Young Guards, twenty regiments of marines. The old disbanded soldiers were recalled to their colors; the conscriptions of 1814 and 1815 were levied; even the old retired officers and soldiers were induced to return to the line. On the first of June—*i. e.*, in two months—the effective force of the French army had been increased from two hundred thousand to four hundred and fourteen

thousand; by the month of September it would have numbered seven hundred thousand men; but for this time was wanting.\*

#### MOTIVES FOR NAPOLEON'S DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE.

—It would have been absurd, in the midst of these preparations, for me to think of invading Belgium in order to secure the line of the Rhine. This question was discussed immediately after my arrival in Paris, but more than one obstacle opposed it. At first I had in hand only forty thousand men, La Vendée was in insurrection, the Duke d'Angoulême was marching on Lyons, and the Marseillais on Grenoble. It is necessary to be master of one's own house, before attempting to rule in others. A still stronger reason opposed this invasion. How could I take such a step after writing the letter in which I had offered the sovereigns a sincere and lasting peace. It might have been rash to hope for the good will of the others, but there were still motives for trusting to that of my father-in-law. In 1814 the Emperor of Austria had sought to prevent my dethronement; at the moment of my return, the discussion was becoming warm with Russia on the partition of Galicia and the fate of Saxony. There was then every reason to hope that the Cabinet of Vienna would consent in 1815 to what its negotiator had proposed in 1814: to maintain me on the throne, if I would consent to relinquish Italy. I proposed this, and in spite of the famous declaration of the thirteenth of March, I might still flatter myself that I should yet see the father of Maria Louisa return to his former sentiments. Moreover, the French had blamed in me a too great *penchant* for war; public opinion was in favor of peace, if it were possible, and would not have sanctioned a declaration of war, so long as there was any chance of maintaining peace. Even admitting that it was easy to foresee that these pacific measures would not prevent a war, there was but slight chance of gaining anything by marching upon Brussels, guarded as it then was by the Germanic Confederation with an army of occupation; the fortresses of Luxemburg and Mayence no longer belonged to France, but, together with the places of Holland, secured to the Allies several *débouches* on the left of the Rhine; under these circumstances it is not very certain that an invasion of Belgium would have been advantageous; it might have transferred the first battle-field from the Sambre to the Meuse or the Moselle, but it would have done nothing more. Supposing that Luxemburg and Antwerp could have been gained without a siege—a supposition altogether improbable—it would have been necessary to garrison them, and this the

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\*These details differ in some respects from those given by Napoleon in his St. Helena dictations.



French were not then in a condition to do; if, on the contrary, these fortresses had remained in the enemy's hands, of what use would Brussels have been to us, surrounded as it was by Maestricht, Luxemburg, Berg-op-Zoom, and Antwerp? Was it not, under these circumstances, more wise to retain the old regiments, and so incorporate them into the new organization as to double its effective power, rather than to scatter them in Belgium?

**NAPOLEON REFUSES TO RESORT TO REVOLUTIONARY MEANS OF DEFENSE.**—Some deemed it necessary to commence a new revolution in order to profit by the passions and blind devotion it might produce. Fouché advised this, and also Carnot, who still remained a Jacobin under the mantle of a count of the Empire. I knew too well the difficulty of restraining popular storms within proper bounds, to again destroy the fabric of social order. To unchain the revolutionary tiger is to drench the country with fraternal blood, and anarchy is far from infallible as a means of saving a nation; it succeeded in 1793, but it was by a combination of circumstances unexampled in history, and which probably may never again recur. In the coming contest I wished no other than legitimate passions—the enthusiasm and energy naturally resulting from a popular conviction that my success was inseparably connected with the glory and honor of France. This point the nation itself was to decide, through its electors, at the Champ-de-Mai. If they should decide in favor of the new political organization and institutions, my own fate and that of France would become inseparable.

**THE CHAMP-DE-MAI.**—At length the so much desired first of June arrived; the ceremony took place with great pomp in the Champ-de-Mars. Clothed with the imperial mantle, surrounded by my dethroned brothers and the *doctrinaire* Lucien, the great state functionaries, marshals and prelates, I was seated on a superb throne, erected near the Ecole Militaire. Just around me were assembled twenty thousand electors seated in amphitheater form; beyond these were the deputies of the armies; still further on were fifty thousand men *en grande tenue*; and then an immense concourse of spectators, giving a magnificent aspect to this political solemnity. It was begun by divine service, after which M. Dubois d'Angers pronounced a fine discourse in the name of the electors of France, and proclaimed the acceptance of the additional act. I replied to this discourse in the following words:

“Gentlemen, electors of colleges, and of departments! Gentlemen, deputies from the army and navy to the Champ-de-Mai!

“Emperor, consul, soldier, I owe everything to the French

people. In prosperity, in adversity, in the field of battle, in the council, on the throne, in exile, France has been the only and constant object of all my thoughts and actions. Like the King of Athens, I sacrificed myself at Fontainebleau for the people, in the hope of seeing realized the promise of thereby securing to France her natural frontiers, her honors, and her rights. Indignation at beholding those sacred rights, the fruit of twenty-five years of victory, disregarded or forever lost; the cry of withered honor, the wishes of the nation, have brought me back to a throne which is dear to me, because it is the palladium of the independence, of the rights, and of the honor of the French people.

“Frenchmen! in traversing, amid the public rejoicing, the different provinces of the Empire, I trusted that I could reckon on a long peace, for nations are bound by the treaties made by their governments, whatever they may be. My whole thoughts were then turned to the means of securing our liberty by a constitution resting on the wishes and interests of the people; and for this object have I called the Assembly of the Champ-de-Mai. I soon learned, however, that the sovereigns, who resist all popular rights and disregard the wishes and interests of so many nations, were resolved on war. They intend to extend the kingdom of the Low Countries, by giving it for a barrier all our fortified places in the North, and to reconcile all differences by sharing among themselves Lorraine and Alsace. We must, therefore, prepare for war.

“Before personally exposing myself to the risks of the battlefield, I have made it my first care to establish the constitution of the nation. The people have accepted the act which I presented to them. When we shall have repelled these unjust aggressions; and Europe shall be convinced of what is due to the rights and independence of twenty-eight millions of Frenchmen, a solemn law, enacted according to the forms prescribed by the constitutional act, shall combine the different provisions of our constitutions, which are now scattered, into one body.

“Frenchmen! you are now about to return to your departments; tell your fellow-citizens that the times are perilous: but that, with union, energy, and perseverance, we shall emerge victorious out of this struggle of a great people against its oppressors; tell them that future generations will severely scrutinize our conduct; and that a nation has lost everything when it has lost its independence. Tell them that the foreign kings, whom I have raised to their thrones, or who are indebted to me for their crowns, and who in the days of my prosperity courted my alliance and the protection of the French people, are now aiming

their blows at my person. Did I not know that it was really against our country that these blows are aimed, I would sacrifice myself to their hatred. But tell your fellow-citizens, also, that while they retain for me the sentiments of love, of which they give me so many proofs, this rage of our enemies will be impotent.

“Frenchmen! my will is that of the people; my rights are their rights; my honor, my glory, my happiness can never be distinct from the honor, the glory, and the happiness of France.”

These words were pronounced with a firm and energetic voice, and produced the most lively enthusiasm. At their conclusion, I took the oath of fidelity to the charter, and Cambacérès, in the name of the electors, swore, *in the name of France*, the fidelity of the French people to the new government. This oath was repeated spontaneously by all the electors and deputies, and by the great majority of the spectators; then followed the distribution of colors to the deputations of the army, to the troops present, and to the National Guard. A few days after, the electors set out for their departments, having proclaimed the acceptance of the act additional, and appointed deputies for the new assembly.

OPENING OF THE CHAMBERS.—On the seventh of June I opened the two Chambers with the following discourse:

“Messieurs of the Chamber of Peers, and Messieurs of the Chamber of Representatives! For the three months past, circumstances and the confidence of the people have invested me with unlimited power. At this moment the most anxious wish of my heart is accomplished; I have just commenced a constitutional monarchy. Men are too weak to secure the future; legal institutions alone can fix the destinies of nations. A monarchy is necessary to France, in order to secure the liberty, the independence, and the rights of the people. Our constitutions are scattered; one of our most important occupations will be to consolidate them into one body, and arrange them into one simple system. This labor will recommend the present epoch to the gratitude of future generations. It is my ambition to see France enjoy all possible liberty; I say *possible*, for unrestricted liberty leads to anarchy, and anarchy always resolves itself into absolute government.

“A formidable coalition of kings threatens our independence; their armies are approaching our frontiers. The English have attacked and taken one of our frigates in the Mediterranean. Blood has been shed in time of peace. Our enemies rely upon our internal divisions. They incite and foment civil war. . . . Legislative provisions are necessary to prevent this. I place un-



reserved confidence in your wisdom, your patriotism, and your attachment. The liberty of the press is inherent in the existing constitution, and no change in that respect can be made without changing all our political system; but it is necessary for the public good that there be some restrictions, especially at the present crisis. I recommend this subject to your special attention.

“The first duty of a prince may soon call me at the head of the children of the nation to fight for our country. The army and myself will do our duty; and you, Peers and Representatives, give to the nation the example of confidence, energy, and patriotism. Like the senate of the great people of antiquity, resolve to die rather than survive the degradation and dishonor of France. The sacred cause of the country shall be triumphant.”

ADDRESSES OF THE CHAMBERS.—The Chambers voted different addresses; both dwelt upon the necessity of submitting the absolute power to constitutional forms and rules. They promised, in case of reverses, to show perseverance and to redouble their attachment to the imperial cause, now become the cause of France. The Peers assured Europe that, with the new institutions, the seductions of victory could never draw the chief of the state beyond the bounds of prudence. To this recrimination on the part I replied: “The contest in which we are now engaged is a serious one; the seduction of prosperity is not the danger that now threatens us: it is under the Caudine forks that the foreigner would make us pass. The justice of our cause, the public spirit of the nation, and the courage of the army are powerful reasons to hope for success. But should we experience reverses, then shall I expect to find in the Chamber of Peers proofs of attachment to the country and its chief. (It is in difficult times that great nations, like great men, display all the energy of their character, and become objects of admiration to posterity.)”

Posterity will agree, in reading this discourse, that I, at least, foresaw all the dangers to which France was exposed, and neglected nothing calculated to prepare her for the contest. My answer to the Chamber of Deputies was still more pointed.

THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES THREATENS TO ENGAGE IN DOGMATIC CONTROVERSIES.—This Chamber did not hesitate to exhibit its impatience to rush into the arena of constitutional debates. “Faithful,” it said, “to its mission, it will fulfill the task devolving upon it in this noble work; it asks, in order to satisfy the public will, that the national deliberation shall rectify as soon as possible the defects in our institutions resulting from the urgency of our situation. *And while your Majesty shall oppose to a most unjust aggression the honor of the national*

arms and the force of genius, the Chamber of Representatives will endeavor to attain the same object by immediately drawing up a pact whose perfection shall cement still closer the union of the throne and the people, and fortify in the eyes of Europe the guarantee of our engagements for the amelioration of our institutions."

This was a clear annunciation that they intended to profit by the absence of the Emperor to establish public controversies upon a constitution, without waiting for the initiation of the government, which still formed the fundamental basis of the existing legislation. This assumption of authority by the Chamber was like that of the Constituent Assembly of 1789, but under circumstances still more dangerous; in a word, it was a revolutionary act, changing the entire face of the government. This address of the Chamber indicated plainly enough that its main object would be to hamper the new government, and to reduce its sphere of action to a mere nullity: an absurd and dangerous course of conduct, always indicating either national decay or approaching anarchy.

**NAPOLÉON'S REMARKABLE REPLY.**—I appreciated this address of the Chamber at its full value, but preferred to show moderation in applauding the intentions of the *doctrinaires*, and at the same time calling their attention to the danger resulting from these untimely discussions. "In these grave circumstances," I replied, "my thoughts are absorbed by the impending war, on the success of which depend the independence and honor of France. I shall set out to-night to place myself at the head of my armies. . . . During my absence I shall be pleased to hear that a committee appointed by each house maturely consider our institutions; the constitution is our rallying-point, and it should be our polar star in these moments of danger. But all public discussions, tending to diminish directly or indirectly the confidence that should be reposed in the government and its dispositions, will be a national evil; it will be placing the ship of state in the midst of rocks, without helm or compass. The present crisis is all-important; let us not imitate the example of the Lower Empire, which, surrounded on all sides by barbarians, became the jest of posterity by engaging in abstract discussions at the moment when the enemy's battering-ram was thundering at the gates of the capital."

I was truly grieved at the course pursued by the Chamber, for I well knew that, instead of satisfying public opinion, these measures would tend to fatal results; phrases being substituted for things, stormy debates for calm and firm administration, the arrogant assumption of authority by the Chambers could lead to



no other end than a division in the state. Factionists seized upon this error of the Chambers to incite public opinion against the government, at the moment when it was absorbed in devising means to repel the invaders. Pamphlets of all descriptions, drawn up both by the Bourbonists and demagogues, attacked every measure of government at the moment when all should have united in sustaining these measures; this was not the moment to remedy political evils, whatever may have been their nature. To such an excess was the license of the press carried that publications were issued promising *apotheosis to those who should deliver France by what means soever from the yoke of Napoleon, and that no jury could be found to condemn them!*

**MILITARY PREPARATIONS.**—But, notwithstanding the opposition of the factions, the public excitement led to beneficial results. The National Guards were readily levied, and means were found to arm the inhabitants of the principal cities. Paris alone furnished twenty battalions of *tirailleurs-fédérés*, a force of little value in the open field, but which might supply the place of regulars in garrisoning the fortifications, aid the government in executing its measures, and assist in the defense of the cities. My thoughts were made *sad* at the unfortunate state of the political interior, but I hoped that the nation would appreciate its position, and exert all its energy to maintain its independence, and I redoubled my exertions in stimulating the ardor for military preparations. The armories, abandoned by my predecessor, resumed such an activity as to produce four thousand fire-arms per day; the movable National Guards were organized in all parts of the Empire, at the same time that the conscription was levied. I have already said that the army of the line had been doubled in two months (from the first of April to the first of June), and that a vast system of defense secured its increase to seven hundred thousand by the first of September.

**PREPARATIONS OF THE ALLIES.**—The fate of French independence, therefore, depended in a great degree upon the possibility of postponing hostilities till the beginning of August. Far from allowing me this time, the Allies, profiting by the lessons I had already taught them, marched post-haste towards the Rhine and the Meuse. The English and Prussians exhibited an unusual activity in their preparations, and the Russians marched in two months from Poland to the banks of the Rhine. The Allies, who were disputing about Saxony and Cracovia, were still in arms, and with their numbers equal to the war complement; they had the match already lighted, and it did not require twenty minutes to dispatch from Vienna, on the same day, four orders of



march, putting all Europe in motion. France had not retained the same formidable attitude as the rest of Europe: everything tending to a national defense had been abandoned; on my arrival there were neither soldiers nor arms. Some have attempted to draw a parallel between the efforts of 1793 and 1815. In much less time I should have accomplished as much as the "Committee of Public Safety" without having recourse to a "Revolutionary army," or to the twelve guillotines by which it was attended; but the Allies of 1815 acted very differently from those of the first invasion; they did not, like Mack and Cobourg, pass three months before Valenciennes: the times had in all respects changed. The sea was everywhere covered with British convoys, bringing troops and siege-equipages. The wealth of India, seconded by the great progress of manufactures, had transformed England into an immense arsenal, which forged, with wonderful activity, artillery, military munitions, and trains necessary for the allied armies. There was nothing like this in 1793.

At the end of May, Wellington and Blücher had united two hundred and twenty thousand English, Prussians, Belgians, Hanoverians, and Brunswickers between Liége and Courtray, The Bavarians, Würtembergers, and Badois assembled in the Black Forest and the Palatinate. The Austrians hastened to join them; their Italian army united with the Sardinians on the Alps. The Russians, by forced marches, had already crossed Franconia and Saxony. In fine, a million of men were ready to fall upon France; it might almost have been said of this coalition that it had found the secret of Cadmus, to raise up men from the bosom of the earth.

#### WORKS FOR THE DEFENSE OF PARIS AND LYONS.—

However great my activity in organizing the army and frontier defenses, I still feared that the allied armies would be more numerous than my own if hostilities should commence before August; in that case the destinies of the Empire would be decided under the walls of Paris and Lyons. More than once had I thought of fortifying the heights of Paris; but the multiplicity of other engagements and fear of exciting popular alarm had prevented its execution. There were two modes of fortifying this capital: the first, by a system of detached forts connected by field-works, and strengthened by properly maneuvering the waters of the Seine; the second, by an *enceinte* of field-works strong enough to resist a *coup-de-main*. The last was adopted because it required less time than the other. The capital of a country contains the *élite* of the nation; it is the center of public opinion, and the *dépôt* of all its wealth and strength; to leave such an important point without defenses is national folly. In times of

national misfortunes and great national calamities, states have often been in want of armies, but never of men capable of defending their walls. Fifty thousand National Guards, with two or three thousand cannoneers, might defend a fortified capital against an army of two hundred thousand men. But these same fifty thousand undisciplined men, commanded by inexperienced officers, would, in the open field, be put to rout by a mere handful of regular cavalry. Paris has many times owed its safety to its walls; if, in 1814, it had been capable of resisting only eight days, what a change might it not have produced in the affairs of the world! If, in 1805, Vienna had been well armed and better defended, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the war, the battle of Austerlitz would never have taken place. If, in 1806, Berlin had been fortified, the army beaten at Jena would have rallied there, and have been rejoined by the Russian army. If, in 1808, Madrid had been fortified, the French armies, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would never have ventured to march on that capital, with the English and Spanish armies at Salamanca and Valladolid. In fine, the fortifications of Vienna twice saved Europe from the Mussulman saber.

I directed General Haxo to fortify Paris. This able engineer intrenched the heights at the north from Montmartre to Charonne, completed the canal of Ourcq, so as to cover the plain between Villette and Saint-Denis. This city was to be intrenched and covered by the inundations of the Rouillon and the Crou. From the western base of Montmartre there was a line of intrenchments resting on the Seine above Clichy; at the eastern extremity the park of Bercy, the spaces between Vincennes and Charonne were also covered. These works were armed with seven hundred pieces of cannon. On the south, the *faubourgs* between the Upper Seine and the Bièvre, and from the Bièvre to the Lower Seine, were also to have been defended; the *enceinte* here had already been marked out when the enemy appeared before Paris.

General Léry was charged with the defensive works at Lyons; they were pushed on with vigor; four hundred and fifty iron pieces of heavy calibre, brought from Toulon, and two hundred and fifty brass pieces, armed the ramparts, or formed the reserve. Everything seemed to promise that the patriotic and brave inhabitants of this city, sustained by a *corps-d'armée*, would make a noble resistance to the enemy.

Besides these works, I prepared to fortify Laon, Soissons, and the passes of the mountains, and had ordered immense works for placing the long-neglected frontier fortresses in a state of defense. At the beginning of June these works were all in



progress, but still very incomplete, and although the effective force had been increased, as has already been said, from two hundred to four hundred thousand men, a large number were still in the regimental *dépôts* and in the frontier fortresses, so that I now had only one hundred and eighty thousand ready for the field; by the middle of July this number would amount to three hundred thousand and the fortresses be garrisoned by National Guards and a few good regulars.

NAPOLEON DECIDES TO FALL UPON THE ANGLO-PRUSSIANS.—All attempts to prolong the negotiations proved vain, and I had now only two courses to pursue: the one, to march against the Anglo-Prussians at Brussels or Namur by the middle of June; the other, to await the Allies under the walls of Paris and Lyons. The latter had the inconvenience of exposing the half of France to the ravages of the enemy; but it offered the advantage of gaining till the month of August to complete the levies, and finish the preparations, so as to fight with united means the allied armies when enfeebled by several corps detached for observation. On the contrary, by removing the theater of war to Belgium, I might perhaps entirely save France from invasion; but I might also thus draw on the Allies by the first of July, six weeks sooner than they would come of their own accord. The army of the *élite*, broken by reverses, was no longer capable of sustaining a too unequal combat, and the levies were incomplete. On the other hand, this course offered the hope of surprising the enemy, and was more conformable to the spirit of the French people. One can act the Fabius, like the Emperor of Russia, with a boundless empire, or like Wellington, on another's territory. (But in a country like France, with its capital at seventy leagues from the frontier, the case is very different.) If there had been no political factions in France, and the entire nation had been ready to rally around its chief and conquer with him, it would have been better to await the enemy at the foot of Montmartre. But when interests and opinions were divided, and political passions ran high, and a factious legislative body was exciting divisions and animosities in the capital, it would have been dangerous to there await an invasion. A victory beyond the frontiers would procure me time, and silence my political enemies in the interior. All things considered, it seemed advisable to attack Wellington and Blücher separately, and to endeavor to destroy successively the enemy's masses; and the courageous energy of the soldiers seemed to promise a certain victory; moreover, at the beginning of the campaign a decisive blow might dissolve the coalition. To accomplish so desirable an object, it was

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important to collect a strong force, but I could not strip the other points of the frontier of all defense; small corps were necessary at Bordeaux, at Toulouse, on the Var, in Savoy, at BÉfort, and at Strasbourg. These corps, though feeble in themselves, were important to check the enemy's advance, and to secure points of vast importance for levying the National Guards, and organizing other means of defense. Unfortunately, La Vendée still remained in insurrection, in spite of the success of the movable columns. (Civil war is a political cancer, which must be extirpated in the germ, or the safety of the state is compromised.) I was, therefore, obliged to detach even a part of my Young Guard to reinforce the corps of General Lamarque. These several detachments, reduced to one hundred and twenty thousand combatants the force of the principal army which was to assemble between the Meuse and the Sambre, from Philippeville to Maubeuge. Although the enemy had at least two hundred thousand men in Belgium, I did not hesitate to attack them, for it was now necessary to act promptly, lest I should have all the allied armies on my hands at the same time.

NAPOLEON JOINS HIS ARMY AND REORGANIZES IT.—I left Paris on the twelfth of June; the next day I inspected the armament of Soissons and Laon, and on the fourteenth took up my head-quarters at Beaumont! The organization of the army was much modified; I gave the command of *corps-d'armée* to young generals who, having their marshals' batons to gain on the battlefield, would show more ardor for the triumph of my cause. This baton was bestowed on Grouchy, who had shown talent and vigor in the campaign of 1814, and in the expedition against the Duke d'Angoulême. Soult was appointed major-general in the place of Berthier, who had abandoned his colors to follow the Bourbons, and who precipitated himself from the window of the palace of Bamberg, ashamed, it is said, to see himself in the midst of the enemy's columns, which were defiling below him to attack his country!\* Davoust remained minister of war. Mortier was to have commanded the Guard, but he did not recover his health in time. Ney and Grouchy were to command the wings of the principal army as my lieutenants. Suchet commanded the army of Italy; Rapp, on the Rhine; Brune, on the Var; Clausel and Decaen observed the Pyrenees.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—I had four lines of operations from which to select. I could unite my masses to the left

\*This is the generally received account of the death of Berthier. Some, however, have said that he fell by the hand of a personal enemy. His fate will serve as a warning to those who, led astray by political feeling, may be tempted to oppose their country's cause in time of war.

towards Valenciennes, march by Mons on Brussels, fall upon the English army, and drive it back on Antwerp. At the center I could march by Maubeuge on Charleroi, between the Sambre and Meuse, so as to strike the point of junction of the two armies of Blücher and Wellington. More to the right I might descend the Meuse towards Namur, fall upon the left of the Prussians, and cut them off from Coblenz and Cologne. Finally, it was possible to descend between the Meuse and the Moselle, or between the Meuse and the Rhine, to fall upon the corps of Kleist, who covered the Ardennes and the communication of the Prussians with the Rhine.

This last operation would lead to nothing but menaces, and against a general like Blücher, it could produce no decided results; moreover, it led too far from the proposed object. An attack on the Meuse would have been more wise, but that would have thrown Blücher on Wellington, and effected a junction which it was important to prevent. The inverse maneuver, by Mons, against Wellington, would have produced the same result in a different way, throwing the right of the Allies upon their left. I therefore chose the center, where I could surprise Blücher *en flagrant délit*, and defeat him before Wellington could come to his rescue. To appreciate the nature of this plan, it must be remembered that I was not to attack a single army, under a single chief, and with a common interest, but, on the contrary, two armies, independent of each other, having two separate and divergent bases of operation; that of the English being on Ostend or Antwerp, and that of the Prussians on the Rhine and Cologne; a decisive circumstance, greatly increasing the chances of success for a central operation which would divide them so that they could be fought separately.

BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN.—The plan and commencement of this campaign form one of the most remarkable operations of my life. Nine corps of infantry or cavalry cantoned from Lille to Metz, by marches most skillfully concealed, concentrated before Charleroi, at the very instant that the guard arrived there from Paris! These movements were combined with so much precision that one hundred and twenty thousand men found themselves assembled, the fourteenth of June, on the Sambre, as if by enchantment. Wellington, occupied in giving *fêtes* at Brussels, thought me at Paris at the moment my columns presented themselves, on the morning of the fifteenth, to cross the river Sambre. My troops occupied, the night before, the following positions: the right, of sixteen thousand men, under Count Gérard, at Philippeville; the center, of about sixty thousand,

under my own direction, near Beaumont; the left, of forty-five thousand men, at Ham-sur-Eur and Solre-sur-Sambre. So little idea had my enemies of these movements that their armies were not even assembled. Blücher had the first of his corps at Charleroi, the second at Namur, the third at Dinant, the fourth, under Bülow, at Liége, and the fifth, under Kleist, covered Luxemburg. When I reached the army, I learned that Bourmont had just deserted (on the fourteenth) from Philippeville to join Louis XVIII. and the Allies. Blamable as was such a step, it is believed he did not aggravate it by divulging my plans of operation; on this subject even a common soldier, in such a case, should keep silence. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, the simple information of my arrival was an important matter, for it destroyed in part the effects of the surprise, Blücher having immediately ordered the concentration of his forces.\* Wellington's forces were still in their cantonments between Oudenarde and Nivelles on the Scheldt, ready to move at the first signal. I did not know the precise composition and position of all the enemy's corps, but I was certain that the mass of the Prussians were cantoned between Charleroi and Liége, and that the Anglo-Belgians were between Ath and Brussels, with advanced guards towards Mons and Tournay. The road running from Charleroi to Brussels was, therefore, the point of junction of the two armies, and to this point I directed my operations, in order to scatter the enemy's forces, and fight them separately.†

\*It has been said that a drummer, who deserted from the Old Guard, gave Blücher the first information of Napoleon's approach.

†The following table, given by Jomini in his last work, exhibits the strength and position of the hostile forces at the beginning of the campaign:

#### I.—THE ALLIES.

##### 1.—Prussians under Blücher.

	STRENGTH.	POSITION.
1st corps, <i>Ziethen.</i> { 4 divisions of infantry: Steinmetz, Pirch 2d, Jagow, and Henkel..... Cavalry of Roder, 3,900.....	32,800	{ On the Sambre between Thuin and Auvouley.
2d corps, <i>Pirch.</i> { 4 divisions of infantry: Tippels-Kirch, Krafft, Brause, and Langen..... Cavalry of Jurgas, 4,000.....	31,800	About Namur.
3d corps, <i>Thielmann.</i> { 4 divisions of infantry: Borecke, Kempfen, Luck, and Stulpnagel..... Cavalry of Hobe, 2,500.....	24,000	{ About Ciney and Dinant.
4th corps, <i>Bülow.</i> { 4 divisions of infantry: Haacke, Ryssel, Lostyn, and Hiller..... Cavalry of Prince William of Prussia, 3,000..	30,300	Near Liége.
5th corps, <i>Kleist.</i> { About.....	30,000	{ Luxembourg and Bastogne.
Total, not including Kleist, 136 battalions, 135 squadrons, 320 cannon.....	118,900 combatants.	



**JUNE 15, PASSAGE OF THE SAMBBE.**—Success depending on celerity, the French army passed the frontier on the fifteenth at break of day, and directed their march on Charleroi. The corps of General Reille at Ham-sur-Eur, being nearest the enemy, was to pass the Sambre at Marchiennes, and direct itself on Gosselies; that of Erlon, being more in rear, at Solre-sur-Sambre, was to follow in the same direction. The center or corps of battle, with the reserves of cavalry under the orders of

2.—*Anglo-Netherlanders under Wellington.*

	STRENGTH.	POSITION.	
1st corps, <i>Prince of Orange.</i>	2 English divisions, Gnards and Alten.....	10,800	{ About Enghien and Smbise. From Oudenarde to Nivelle. Braine-le-Comte.
	Anglo-Belgians, Indian Brigade, Divisions Stedman, Perponcher, and Chassé.....	24,300	
	Cavalry of Collaert.....	4,600	
2d corps, <i>Genl. Hill.</i>	5 Anglo-Hanoverians, divisions Clinton, Coleville, Picton, Lambert, and Decken...	34,600	{ Ath, Renaix, Oudenarde, Lenze, and Brussels. From Ghent to Mons.
	Cavalry of Lord Uxbridge.....	9,850	
Corps of Brunswick—infantry and cavalry.....	6,750	Brussels, Mechlin.	
Contingent of Nassau.....	3,000	Brussels, Genappe.	
Artillery.....	6,000 scattered.		
Total, 123 battalions, 114 squadrons, 240 cannon.....	99,900 combatants.		

3.—*Other Troops of the Allies.*

The grand Austro-Russian Army under Barclay de Tolly and Schwartzenberg, more than.....	350,000
The Austro-Sardinian Army in Italy.....	100,000

To these must be added the Swiss, Spaniards, and small German contingents, making in all but little less than a million of men in arms against France.

II.—THE FRENCH.

1.—*Active Army in Belgium.*

	STRENGTH.	POSITION.
1st corps, <i>D'Erlon.</i>	4 divisions of infantry: Gnyot, Donzelot, Marcognet, and Durutte.....	{ At Solre-sur Sambre.
	1 division of cavalry, Jaquenot.....	
2d corps, <i>Reille.</i>	4 divisions of infantry: Bachelu, Foy, Jerome Bonaparte, and Girard.....	Ham-sur-Eur.
	1 division of cavalry, Piré.....	
3d corps, <i>Vandamme.</i>	3 divisions of infantry: Habert, Berthezene, and Lefol.....	Beaumont.
	1 division of cavalry, Morin.....	
4th corps, <i>Gérard.</i>	3 divisions of infantry: Vichey, Pecheux, and Hulot.....	Philippeville.
	1 division of cavalry, Molin.....	
5th corps, <i>Lobau.</i>	3 divisions of infantry: Simmer, Jeannin, and Teste.....	Beaumont.

Grouchy,\* marched from Beaumont on Charleroi, and the right from Philippeville on Catelet, where it was to cross the Sambre and prevent the Prussian division at Charleroi from retreating on Namur.

These movements, although unknown to the enemy, did not entirely accomplish their object. The corps of Reille crossed the Sambre with success and reached the road to Gosselies, preceded by the light cavalry of the guard; but that of Gérard, leaving Philippeville and having a longer march by the worst possible roads, arrived too late at Catelet to reach the road to Gilly in time to accomplish its object. The center also had very bad roads to travel over from Beaumont to Charleroi, and Vandamme, who was to form the head of this column, left his camp a little

	STRENGTH.	POSITION.
Guards.....	{ 2 divisions of the Old Guard, Friant and Morand.....8,000 1 division of Young Guard, Duhesme...4,000 Cavalry of the Guard, 19 squadrons of light and 13 of heavy.....4,000 Engineers and artillery..... 2,400 }	18,400 Beaumont.
<i>2.—Reserves of Cavalry.</i>		
1st corps, <i>Fajol.</i>	{ Divisions of hussars and chasseurs, Soult and Subervic..... }	2,800 Beaumont.
2d corps, <i>Excelmans.</i>	{ Divisions of dragoons, Spraley and Chastel. }	3,000 Beaumont.
3d corps, <i>Milhaud.</i>	{ Divisions of cuirassiers, Wotier and Delort. }	3,600 Beaumont.
4th corps, <i>Kellerman.</i>	{ Divisions of cuirassiers, Sheritier and Rous- sel..... }	3,700 Beaumont.

This gives for the active French army in Belgium and the reserves of cavalry, a total of 167 incomplete battalions, 166 squadrons, 346 cannon, and 120,300 combatants.

*3.—Other French Corps in Garrison or Observation.*

Rapp commanded the Army of the Rhine.

Beliard commanded a corps at Metz.

Lecourbe commanded a small corps of observation at Belfort.

Suchet commanded the Army of Italy in Savoy.

Brune commanded the corps of observation on the Var.

Decaen and Clausel commanded the corps of observation of the Pyrenees.

Lamarque commanded the corps of La Vendée.

It has already been shown in the text that these were mere skeletons of corps, possessing little strength in themselves, but available for observation, for assembling or organizing the new levies, and for securing important strategic points.

\*Grouchy at first commanded all the cavalry, but when the army was completely organized, he took command of the right wing.

too late.\* The Prussian generals, whose divisions were scattered along the line, had on this account much more leisure than I intended, to collect their forces and abandon Charleroi; two or three battalions only were overthrown in partial combats. The first division of the corps of Ziethen, wishing to retire from Piéton by Gosselies, and finding this point already occupied by the advanced guard of Reille, sought to reach Heppignies. The second division reunited at Gilly on the road to Namur. The corps of Reille, having driven the Prussian division from Gosselies, and seeing it direct its retreat by Heppignies on Fleurus, detached the division of Girard in pursuit, and with the other three divisions continued its march on Frasne. The light cavalry of the guard, which preceded it, drove from this town the advanced guard of the Prince of Weimar, who now concentrated his brigade on Quatre-Bras. The light cavalry of Grouchy, having debouched from Charleroi on Gilly, found there the two divisions of Ziethen, and had to await the infantry of Vandamme, who was debouching with difficulty by the bridge of that city, which was greatly encumbered. In this position the two parties exchanged some cannon-shot. While my columns were thus debouching from the bridges of the Sambre in search of the enemy, I established myself in advance of Charleroi at the branching of the roads to Gosselies and Fleurus, where I waited to receive the reports of my officers, and to determine upon the movements to be given to the masses which had been so suddenly and skillfully assembled.

**MEASURES OF THE ALLIES.**—It may be well, before going further, to briefly review the measures taken by the Allies against the storm which was about to fall upon them. If their generals had allowed themselves to be surprised, it must be confessed that they made their preparations with skill. The Anglo-Prussians were to take the offensive on the first of July, and, in the meantime, every precaution was taken to prevent this plan from being counteracted. All partial and general rallying-points were well indicated. To prevent me from maneuvering to separate their armies, Blücher was to rally his army on its right, in rear of Ligny, while Wellington was to rally his on its left, on Quatre-Bras; but, wise as were these dispositions, the celerity and impetuosity of my movements might, nevertheless, defeat them. In pursuance of the plan agreed upon by the Allies, Blücher dispatched an order, on the fourteenth at midnight, to Ziethen, to fall back, fighting, on Fleurus, and directed at the

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\*Jomini thinks the delay of Vandamme caused by an error in the transmission of orders, for he was not a man likely to be tardy, and, indeed, at this time his ardor, excited by personal jealousy, needed restraint rather than stimulus.



same instant the corps of Pirch to assemble at Sombref; he ordered Thielmann to come in all haste from Dinant to Namur; while Bülow was to assemble at Hanut. These movements were evidently based on information received from deserters, but Blücher had not counted on my abrupt passage of the Sambre and on a decisive battle for the next day.

DECISIVE MOVEMENT PRESCRIBED TO NEY.—I did not at this time know all the circumstances of the Allies, or the details of their positions and movements; but I knew sufficiently well that Blücher would seek to collect his forces somewhere between Namur and the road from Charleroi\* to Brussels, so as to form a junction with the English. To anticipate this, I determined to seize upon Sombref on the one side, and the central point of Quatre-Bras on the other; master of these two points, I could act, as occasion might require, upon either of the two hostile armies, and prevent their junction. I therefore gave to Grouchy a verbal order to push on the same evening as far as Sombref, if possible; Marshal Ney, who had just come from Paris by post, received orders to take command of the left wing formed of the corps of Reille and Erlon, and to march without delay on the road to Brussels in the direction of Quatre-Bras,† and to push forward his advanced guards on the three roads branching from that place, in order to collect correct information of the enemy. Having learned at the same moment that the cavalry of Grouchy had been checked near Gilly by a part of the corps of Ziethen, I hastened there to order an attack; the enemy, seeing the infantry of Vandamme arrive, retired fighting, and, at the end of a pretty warm cannonade, Excelmans and Vandamme dislodged him from the woods of Soleilmont and Lambusart, where the third division of Ziethen had collected.

NEY DELAYS ITS EXECUTION.—In the interval while this was passing on the right, Marshal Ney, having arrived between Gosselies and Frasne, and hearing the cannon thundering in the direction of Gilly, where Vandamme and Grouchy were attacking the second division of Ziethen, thought this combat might modify my projects, and, instead of pushing on rapidly as far as Quatre-Bras, established himself in front of Gosselies. I

\*Those who now visit Charleroi may be surprised that so strong a place should be so readily abandoned by the Allies, and so easily passed by Napoleon; but it must be remembered that in 1815 it was not defensible. The strong works that now partially surround this city have been built since the peace, and, it is said, with English money and under the direction of Wellington.)

†Quatre-Bras is a small village named from the meeting of four roads, from Namur, Charleroi, Brussels, and Nivelles.

was a little vexed at this, but as night came on without the right wing having attained its object, I regarded the delay of the left the less objectionable as Quatre-Bras might be reached in time on the following morning. The troops of the corps of battle and the cavalry bivouacked between the woods of Lambusart and the village of Heppignies, which was occupied by the division of Girard and the corps of Reille; the Guard and the corps of Lobau were in reserve about Charleroi; the forces of Count Gérard\* remained near Châtelet; and the corps of Erlon had not passed Jumet. At ten o'clock in the evening I returned to Charleroi, where I was occupied with the vexatious news of the operations of the Chambers and Jacobins at Paris, the organization of my army, and the direction of movements based on the further information gained of the enemy. The right wing of my army under Grouchy was composed of the corps of Vandamme and Gérard, and the cavalry of Pajol, Excelmans, and Milhaud; the left wing, under Ney, of the corps of Reille and Erlon, with the cavalry of Valmy and Lefèvre-Desnouettes; the reserve of about twenty-eight thousand men was formed of the corps of Lobau and the Guard. I myself was occupied at head-quarters early in the morning, and left my lieutenants, Ney and Grouchy, to complete at sunrise the operations left incomplete on the night before—to occupy Sombref and Quatre-Bras. To make more certain of these operations, I sent my *aid-de-camp* Flahaut to Marshal Ney at eight o'clock in the morning, with a written order to march rapidly on Quatre-Bras, to establish himself there strongly, to make an examination of the three roads, and then detach a good division of infantry with the light cavalry of the Guard upon Marbais, in order to connect himself with the right wing, which was about to establish itself at Sombref. This dispatch was to be preceded by a similar one given by the major-general. These orders reached Gosselies near eleven o'clock, but Ney had left to join the advanced guard of Beille near Frasné, so that he did not immediately receive them.

While these things were taking place at my head-quarters, the troops of Grouchy drove back the rear guards of Ziethen from Fleurus; they retired upon the corps of battle, formed on the heights between Ligny and Saint-Amand, in the presence of which the French troops found themselves near eleven o'clock.

NEY AGAIN DELAYS HIS MARCH ON QUATRE-BRAS.  
—I had just arrived near Ligny, and was about to observe the

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\*This general should not be confounded with General Gérard; the first commanded the fourth corps, and the other the fourth division of the second corps.

enemy's position, when I learned that Ney had again thought best, for several reasons, to delay his march on Quatre-Bras, and to wait where he was till he should learn my decision on the new information sent to me. Thwarted by this deplorable incident, I reiterated the order for Ney to push rapidly on to Quatre-Bras, it being understood that he was to detach the eight thousand men upon Marbais, as had already been directed through General Flahaut. I at the same time repeated, that Grouchy was about to occupy Sombref, and that he would certainly have to contend only against the troops coming from Brussels. Walewski, a Polish officer, was the bearer of this letter.

**RECONNOISSANCE OF THE PRUSSIAN POSITION.**—While this officer was galloping on the road to Gosselies, I ascended the mill of Fleurus, to examine the Prussian corps. The position was a difficult one in front, covering the little stream of Ligny; the left extended to the environs of Sombref and Tongrines; the center was near Ligny; the right behind Saint-Amand. This great town, formed of three distinct villages (which were called Saint-Amand-le-Château, Saint-Amand-la-Haie, and Saint-Amand-le-Hameau), protected the right wing, the flank of which rested on Wagnèle. The second line and reserves were between Sombref and Bry. Thus six great villages, four of which were difficult to be taken, on account of the stream in front, covered like so many bastions the enemy's line; his reserves and second line, placed in columns of attack by battalions between Sombref and Bry, could sustain it at all points.\*

**DISPOSITIONS FOR FORCING THIS POSITION.**—Having finished this reconnoissance, I had to choose between three plans of operation: 1st, to stop immediately the march of Ney's columns; order the cavalry of Kellerman to take position at Frasne so as to cover the line of retreat on Charleroi; then throw the seven divisions of Reille and Erlon, by the old Roman road, on Marbais, in order to turn Blücher and take him in reverse, while I attacked him in front. 2d. To prescribe this movement to the corps of Erlon only, leaving that of Reille with the cavalry of Kellerman defensively in the direction of Frasne and Quatre-Bras, in order to observe the enemy, and cover the road to Charleroi. 3d. To prescribe to Ney to fall with impetuosity on the enemy found at Quatre-Bras, and drive him on Genappe in

\*The four divisions of Ziethen's corps formed the first line; those of Pirch's corps the second at Bry and Sombref. The left under Thielman, which arrived only at nine a. m., was near Tongrines. Gourgaud says this reconnoissance was made at about ten o'clock, but Jomini seems to think it was later. There is still some doubt respecting the details of these operations of the sixteenth. The main facts, however, are as related in the text.



the direction of Brussels, then fall back on Bry in the direction of Namur to coöperate in the attack upon Blücher.

Under ordinary circumstances, perhaps, the first project would have been most conformable to the rules of the art, but now it might endanger our natural line of retreat on Charleroi. Thinking that in all probability Ney, receiving the orders dispatched in the morning by Flahaut, had by this time rendered himself master of Quatre-Bras, and might, after having beaten the Anglo-Belgians, assist in the defeat of Blücher, I determined to adopt the second plan.\*

**BATTLE OF LIGNY.**—I now made my dispositions to attack the Prussians. The corps of Count Lobau, left at first near Charleroi, was ordered to march in all haste to Fleurus. The left of the corps of battle under Vandamme presented itself before the village of Saint-Amand; the center, under Count Gérard, presented itself before Ligny; the Guard placed itself in rear of these two attacks; the cavalry of Grouchy deployed on the right to keep in check the left of the Prussians, just reinforced by the arrival of the entire corps of Thielmann. The attack began between two and three o'clock at Saint-Amand, of which Vandamme got possession in spite of a vigorous resistance; but the Prussians, favored by the village of La-Haie, and the heights commanding it, advanced their second line and retook it. Count Gérard experienced the same opposition at Ligny, of which he could occupy only a part. I knew from this opposition that the enemy was in stronger force than I had at first supposed, which rendered it still more important to maneuver so as to turn his right flank and prevent his falling back in that direction. I therefore dispatched another formal order to Ney,† directing him to maneuver

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\*In pursuance of this plan, it would seem, the following order was dispatched to Ney:

“In Bivouac before Fleurus, 2 o'clock p. m.

“*M. le Marshal*,—The Emperor directs me to inform you that the enemy have united a body of troops between Sombref and Bry, and that, at half past two Marshal Grouchy, with the third and fourth corps, will attack him.

“It is the intention of His Majesty that you also attack whatever is before you; *that after having pushed the enemy vigorously*, you fall back to assist in enveloping the corps just mentioned. If this corps were first beaten, His Majesty would then maneuver in your direction to facilitate equally your operations. Inform the Emperor immediately of your dispositions, and of whatever shall take place on your front.”

†This order, dispatched at a quarter past three o'clock, was as follows:

“In Bivouac before Fleurus, from a quarter to half past 3 p. m.

“*M. Marshal Ney*,—I wrote to you an hour since that the Emperor would attack the enemy in the position he had taken between the village of Saint-Amand and Bry; at this moment the forces are sharply engaged. His Majesty directs me to say that you are to maneuver immediately so as to

with his forces on Bry and Saint-Amand. I supposed that ere this he had occupied Quatre-Bras, and would be now on his way towards the flank of Blücher, so that the order would reach him in time; fearing, however, that, from the recent and unaccountable delays of the left wing in executing my orders, this also might be in some way thwarted, and knowing that the corps of Erlon had not yet passed Frasne, I sent General Labedoyère to communicate to Count d'Erlon the order given to Marshal Ney, and to direct him to commence its execution.

In the meantime the battle was continued throughout the line with great fury. A second attack of Vandamme on Saint-Amand, favored by the division of Girard, which had crossed the ravine and turned the enemy, put us in possession of this village; but the brave Girard purchased with his life a success which was of short duration; for Blücher, having carried there a part of his reserves, the village of Saint-Amand was retaken and disputed with great fury. They fought still more fiercely at Ligny, which place Gérard had several times carried without being able to retain it; forced to leave the division of Hulot in observation on his right, and thus reduced to ten thousand combatants, he maintained himself with a most brilliant valor against more than twenty-five thousand Prussians, in the lower part of the village, where the little stream cuts it in two. The Guard, placed in rear of these two attacks, disposed itself to sustain either as occasion might require. At the extreme right, Excelmans maneuvered skillfully to prevent the left of the Prussians from debouching from Tongrenelle, while Pajol observed Boignée, and the cuirassiers of Milhaud sustained the right of Gérard. This was the state of the battle at half past five, and I was becoming impatient at hearing nothing of the movements prescribed to Ney, nor of his operations at Quatre-Bras (for the noise of a violent cannonade and the direction of the wind had prevented me from hearing his attack), and I was preparing to dispose of the Guard when Vandamme informed me that a strong column had appeared in the direction of Wagnèle, and that the division of Girard, deprived of its general, and at the same time attacked by superior forces, was obliged to retire towards Saint-Amand-le-Hameau. General Vandamme announced that he had at first taken this column for a detachment which Ney was to direct on Marbais; but as it was

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envelop the enemy's right, and to fall by main strength on his rear; his army is lost if you only act vigorously. The fate of France is in your hands; therefore do not hesitate a moment to make the movement ordered by the Emperor, and direct yourself on the heights of Bry and Saint-Amand to assist in a victory perhaps decisive: the enemy is taken *en flagrant délit* at the moment when he seeks to unite with the English.

"Duc de Dalmatie."

much longer, and as his scouts had reported it to belong to the enemy, he should fall back in retreat unless promptly sustained. Although I could not comprehend how a column could thus slip between me and Ney, nevertheless it was barely possible that it might be a reinforcement sent from Quatre-Bras to Blücher, or a corps of his own army sent around by the old Roman road beyond Wagnèle to turn the left of Vandamme; it was therefore necessary to ascertain definitely the state of the case, and accordingly I sent one of my *aids-de-camp* to reconnoiter. This officer reported in about an hour that it was the corps of Erlon, which, instead of marching to the north towards Bry or Marbais, had inclined too much to the south in the direction of Villers-Peruin, drawn there without doubt by the noise of two or three hundred pieces of cannon which were thundering in the direction of Saint-Amand. My main attack had already been too long delayed, but the appearance of the corps of Erlon was a sufficient indication that Ney himself could not be far off, and would now direct this portion of the left wing as had been ordered, and I therefore commenced the march on Ligny, for, it being now half past six, no further time was to be lost. By this impetuous debouch from that village with a division of the Guard, the infantry, and the cuirassiers of Milhaud, the enemy's center was pierced and a part of it thrown on Bry, and a part of it on Sombref.

The Prussians fought well during the whole day, and the battle was undecided when I advanced with a reserve; Blücher, seeing the departure of the Guard from the environs of Saint-Amand, and thinking this movement the commencement of a retreat, attacked himself what remained on Saint-Amand, in the hope of pursuing the French. Being soon undeceived, he headed a charge with the few cavalry he could collect. But of what use was the courage of a general-in-chief in such a *mêlée*? His horse having been shot under him, he fell to the ground,\* and for some ten minutes was in the hands of the French cuirassiers without its being known, and at last, through the presence of mind of his *aid-de-camp*, Nostitz, he regained Bry on the horse of a lancer. At nightfall our victory was complete. But before noticing its results, let us follow the operations of Ney on the left.

**NEY REPULSED AT QUATRE-BRAS.**—Ney, from the delays already mentioned, did not reach his position till two o'clock, with three incomplete divisions of Reille's corps. Pirch's division of light cavalry, and a brigade of Kellerman's cuirassiers, and for

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\*It is said that while Blücher was thus entangled with his horse, he was actually ridden over by two regiments of cavalry.



the first hour engaged the enemy in skirmishes; but at three o'clock, hearing the cannonade at Saint-Amand, he took the resolution to make a serious attack upon the Allies. But things had here very much changed since morning. General Perponcher, seeing how important it was, for rallying the army of Wellington and effecting its junction with Blücher, to hold this place, took position here with his division and the brigade of the Prince of Weimar, in all nine thousand men. These forces, commanded by the Prince of Orange, might easily have been routed, had they been attacked with two *corps-d'armée* in the morning. At eleven o'clock Wellington had withdrawn to this place the advance posts from near Frasné, and, at the moment Ney brought the divisions of Beille to the attack, the enemy was reinforced by the English division of Picton from Brussels and the division of the Duke of Brunswick. Nevertheless (Ney fought with his usual vigor.) The division of Foy on the left marched on Quatre-Bras and Germioncourt, while that of Bachelu attacked the village of Piermont. That of Prince Jerome attacked, a little later, the wood of Bossut on the extreme left. Everywhere the French troops pushed the enemy with vigor. Wellington, certain of being soon reinforced, received these attacks with his usual *sang-froid*; nevertheless the troops of the Prince of Orange and Picton were driven from these posts with considerable loss. The arrival of Brunswick's corps restored the equilibrium, and the field was disputed with great fury; (Brunswick himself fell pierced with balls.) Ney now received the order of the major-general and heard at the same time that Erlon's corps was directed on Bry. He had no reserve of infantry, and most of his cuirassiers had been left with Erlon near Frasné. Running to Kellerman he said to him: "My dear general, the fate of France is here involved, and we must make an extraordinary effort; take your cavalry, and plunge into the middle of the English army; I will sustain you with Piré." At these words Kellerman unhesitatingly charged at the head of his brigade of brave men, overthrew the sixty-ninth regiment, carried the batteries, and, piercing through two lines, reached even to the farm of Quatre-Bras, where the reserve of English, Hanoverian, and Belgian infantry received him with so murderous a fire that his soldiers were forced to retreat. Kellerman's horse being slain under him, he remained dismounted in the midst of the English, and had great difficulty in escaping again to his own army. The French infantry, incited by so fine a charge, renewed its efforts on Quatre-Bras and the wood of Bossut, the greater part of which was occupied by the division of Prince Jerome. But at this critical moment, the division of English Guards and the division of General

Alten, coming into line after a forced march, gave Wellington so great a superiority that Ney could have no further hope. He had sent to Erlon an imperative order to come to his assistance, instead of taking position on Bry, but this corps was now too far off to arrive in time, so that the marshal was obliged to fall back on Frasné, with a loss of four thousand men *hors-de-combat*; the Allies, entering only successively into action, had lost five thousand. Wellington pursued Ney at first with some vigor, but Roussel's division of cuirassiers protected his retreat. Erlon, imperatively recalled by Ney when already beyond Villers-Peruin, marched to rejoin him with three divisions and the light cavalry of the Guard, leaving the division of Durutte between Villers-Peruin and Saint-Amand, to cooperate, if necessary, on Bry. This division remained here all night inactive on the flank of the rear guard that had been left by Blücher in this village, which it occupied till one o'clock in the morning, while the corps of Ziethen retired, by favor of the darkness, on Gilly, that of Pirch on Gentinne, and the left, under Thielmann, took the direction of Gembloux.

A fatality seemed to have presided over all the operations of my left wing. If it had moved, as I directed, on Quatre-Bras, on the evening of the fifteenth, or the morning of the sixteenth, it could very easily have beaten the isolated division of Perponcher, have occupied the position, and detached two divisions on Marbais and Bry, to complete the overthrow of Blücher. But when Ney received the order in the afternoon to march on Bry, the thing was impossible, for he had just engaged a superior force at Quatre-Bras. As it was, he had better have remained at Frasnés, for no advantage was gained at Quatre-Bras, and his recall of Count d'Erlon rendered this corps utterly useless, at a time when it might have had an important influence on the fate of Blücher's army. (Our victory at Ligny was a glorious one, for, with sixty thousand men, we had beaten ninety thousand.) In two days the enemy had lost from eighteen to twenty thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners, and forty pieces of cannon. My army was full of enthusiasm and confidence, ready to fly to new victories. Under any other circumstances the battle of Ligny would have been decisive. But, for reasons already given, all my plans for the cooperation of my left wing failed. Nor did I know that Durutte passed the night on the flank of the Prussian line of retreat, so near that his advanced guards heard distinctly the noise caused by the march of their trains, and the confusion of their columns. Had I known this, I should have pushed these troops forward to harass the retreat, and, in spite of the darkness of the night, and

— *rebat*



the failure of the intended coöperation, I might have gained much by a well-regulated night pursuit.

At break of day the rear guard of Blücher had disappeared from Bry; that of Thielmann was seen on the road from Sombref to Corroy-le-Château in the direction of Gembloux intermediary between the road to Namur and that to Brussels by Wavre. Blücher had committed a great fault in accepting battle, and he now thought it necessary to remedy, as promptly as possible, the influence which this defeat would have upon his army; unable to reach Bousseval directly, he resolved to rally on Bülow, and seek to gain communication with the English by Wavre. Consequently Thielmann was directed on Gembloux, and Ziethen and Pirch fell back by Mont-Saint-Guibert on Bierge and Aisemont; and the Prussian marshal dispatched his chief of staff to concert with Wellington some plan for forming a junction either in front or in rear of the forest of Soignes.

**THE MORNING OF JUNE 17.**—On the morning of the seventeenth, I waited with equal anxiety for Ney's report of the operations on Quatre-Bras, and the news from Paris of the political operations of the Chambers and the Jacobins. In the meantime I ordered the cavalry of Pajol to follow the Prussians on the road to Namur, which was their natural line of operations; Excelmans on the road to Gembloux, and Monthion in the direction of Tilly and Mont-Saint-Guibert. I also regulated my affairs of administration and visited the field of battle to succor the wounded of both parties; this care was the more necessary as the moving hospitals (*ambulances*) had been unable to follow the armies in their forced marches.

**GROUCHY SENT IN PURSUIT OF THE PRUSSIANS.**—I at length received, by my *aid-de-camp* Flahaut, the details of the unfortunate affair of Quatre-Bras, at the same time that Pajol announced the capture of some Prussian cannon at Mazy, on the road to Namur. I now resolved to turn against the English with my reserve and left wing, and sent Grouchy with his seven divisions of infantry and two corps of cavalry in close pursuit of the Prussians.

**THE RESERVE AND LEFT WING MARCH AGAINST THE ENGLISH.**—My advanced guard marched for Quatre-Bras near ten o'clock, and the Guard at eleven. (The weather was terrible; it rained as though the flood-gates of heaven were open) nevertheless, my troops showed themselves no less eager in the pursuit.

**THE ENGLISH RETREAT.**—On arriving at Genappe, I found only the English rear guard. Wellington, hearing acci-



dentally of Blücher's defeat at eight o'clock in the morning (the officer sent with the dispatch lost his way and was killed), abandoned Quatre-Bras and hastened to put his *impedimenta* in retreat on the road to Brussels, covering it with the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge. The French followed in close pursuit as far as Maison-du-Roi and the heights of Planchenois, where the army arrived at nightfall. The enemy manifested an intention to maintain himself in front of the forest of Soignies, but we thought it was only the rear guard covering the retreat of the army through the forest; however, as it was too late to begin an attack that night, our different corps bivouacked near Planchenois. (The rain continued to fall in torrents all night.) At three o'clock in the morning, I went the rounds of the posts and assured myself that the enemy had not moved; Wellington had therefore resolved to fight; this was exactly what I wished; to meet and attack the two armies separately was the main point considered in the plan of campaign. (Blücher had already been defeated) and forced to retreat on a line diverging from the other army, and I had detached after him a sufficient force to increase the distance of separation and effectually prevent a junction. The other army was now in the toils, and my only apprehension was that it would refuse battle.

GROUCHY ORDERED TO OCCUPY THE DEFILE OF SAINT-LAMBERT.—Nevertheless, to profit with security by this happy chance it was best to entirely prevent the junction of the allied armies. I therefore dispatched a courier, in the early part of the night of the sixteenth, to Grouchy at Wavre, with an order to occupy without delay the defile of Saint-Lambert, so that if he did not take an active part in the coming battle by falling on the left of the English, he could at least give them some trouble, and at the same time cover my flank. But at midnight I received Grouchy's report, saying that he had arrived at Gembloux at five o'clock in the evening and was passing the night there, having marched only *two leagues!!* This delay was exceedingly vexatious, as he might well have reached Wavre about the same time that I had La-Belle-Alliance, as the distance was but little greater. But as he could not have received the order which I had sent to Wavre, another was immediately dispatched to Gembloux, hoping that he would receive it in time.

REASONS FOR ATTACKING THE ENGLISH.—My army had been much harassed by rains, bad roads, and forced marches. Under ordinary circumstances it would have been best to allow it some repose, and afterward to dislodge Wellington by maneuvers. But other armies were about to invade France, and my

presence would soon be needed elsewhere. Moreover, Blücher would soon rally, and, with reinforcements, again attempt to force a junction with the right of the Allies; it was, therefore, necessary to end with the English as soon as possible.

**POSITION OF THE ALLIED ARMY.**—They occupied, in front of Mont-Saint-Jean a fine plateau, the slope from which, like the glacis of a fort, was favorable for their fire and offered them a good view of our operations. The right extended to the rear of Braine-la-Leud, and a corps of Netherlanders of fifteen thousand men was still detached as far as Halle to cover the road from Mons to Brussels. The position in itself had great defensive advantages, the villages of Braine and Merbes, the château of Hougomont, La-Haie-Sainte, La-Haie, and Frichefont forming, as it were, advanced bastions which flanked and secured the whole line; but it was just on the brink of the vast forest of Soignies,\* with no possible outlet for a great army, with its immense *matériel* and numerous cavalry.

**PLAN OF ATTACK.**—As the enemy had decided to await battle, it became necessary to determine the plan of attack. To maneuver by the left to turn the enemy's right might cut off his retreat on that side of the forest, but it would separate me from the center of operations, and throw Wellington in the direction of Blücher; moreover this wing was secured by the farm of Hougomont (now converted into a strong field-work) and the great *bourgs* of Braine-la-Leud and Merbe-Braine. To attack with the right to crush the enemy's left was preferable, inasmuch as it maintained a direct relation on an interior line with Grouchy. But as the ground in this direction was unfavorable, I therefore determined to assail the left and pierce the center. To attack the center only, as at Montenotte, Rivoli, and Austerlitz, can be done when this point is left unsecured, which very seldom happens. In the present case the maneuver of Wagram and Moskva was preferable. The mass of my forces was directed on the center; the extreme left was to be assailed only by the division forming the right of the corps of Erlon, which was to attack Papelotte and La-Haie;† Ney was to conduct the three other divisions to the right of La-Haie-Sainte;‡ the corps of Reille was to support this movement at the left of the road to Mont-Saint-Jean; the divisions of Bachelu and Foy, between this road and the farm

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\*The traveler will now find this forest much changed, and far more accessible for an army than it was in 1815. Much of the timber has been removed within the last few years.

†These two places must not be confounded; the first was at the left wing of the Allies, and the other at the center.

of Hougomont; that of Prince Jerome, conducted by Guillemillot, was to attack this farm, which constituted the salient point of the enemy's line. Wellington had formed loop-holes in the walls of the château and garden, and secured the enclosure of the park, occupying the whole with the English Guards.\* Count Lobau, with the sixth corps and a mass of cavalry, followed as a third and a fourth line to the center, on the right and left of the road, so as to support Ney's attack upon La-Haie-Sainte; finally twenty-four battalions of the Guard and cuirassiers of the Duke of Valmy, forming the fifth and sixth lines, were ready to bear upon the decisive point.† I had purposed to begin the attack early in the morning, but the torrents of rain which had fallen during the night and previous day had so softened the ground that it would have been hardly possible for the artillery and cavalry to maneuver. As the weather began to clear up, the attack was delayed in order that the ground might become more firm; in the meantime the several corps were placed in position.

**COMMENCEMENT OF THE BATTLE OF LA-BELLE-ALLIANCE, OR WATERLOO.**—At eleven o'clock the attack commenced with artillery and musketry against the farm of Hougomont, which Jerome endeavored to carry; a few moments after, Ney presented himself near Frichemont at the opposite extremity of the line. A few cannon-shot were exchanged, when it was ascertained that the stream, although narrow and shallow, was so very muddy that it was necessary to turn to the west of Smouhen, it being difficult to pass lower down in face of the enemy's batteries. Ney, obliged thus to withdraw a part of his right to the center, at length succeeded in forming these four divisions of the corps of Erlon, and it was only by Herculean efforts that he could form his artillery in the soft ground, where the carriages sunk to their hubs in the mud.

**FIRST APPEARANCE OF THE PRUSSIANS.**—The marshal soon began a violent cannonade against the enemy's left, merely waiting for my signal to fall upon it. I was about giving this signal a little after twelve o'clock, when strong columns were discovered on the right in the direction of Lasne and Saint-

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\*The thick walls of the house, chapel, and garden, pierced with loop-holes and arranged for a double tier of fire, were almost impregnable; exterior to these was a ditch with a good embankment covered with a thick hedge; and the whole was surrounded by a thick woods, which have since been removed. The whole formed an excellent field fortification, which from its position produced a marked effect upon the operations of the battle.

†Jomini says that Napoleon may offer this plan of battle as a model to the masters of the art, for nothing can be better.



Lambert; these I supposed to be the detachment asked of Grouchy, though, after his report received the night before from Gembloux, I had hardly expected him so soon; nevertheless, by setting out very early in the morning, he might have reached here by noon. To promptly ascertain the true state of things in this direction, I dispatched General Homond with three thousand horse towards Pajeau, where they could either cover our flank or open a communication with Grouchy, as the circumstances might require. They soon after brought in a Prussian hussar with an intercepted letter, announcing the approach of Bülow with a force estimated at thirty thousand men.

NAPOLEON DETERMINES TO HASTEN THE ATTACK UPON THE ENGLISH.—Notwithstanding this vexatious *contre-temps*, my affairs were still far from desperate; if Grouchy had permitted Bülow to penetrate between us, he certainly must be near at hand in pursuit, and if so, the chances of the battle were still unchanged. I therefore ordered Ney to begin the attack, and, to secure the threatened flank, I moved the two divisions of Count Lobau in the direction of Planchenois, where they could serve as a reserve to Ney or oppose Bülow, as the circumstances might require. The Prussian corps, if followed up by Grouchy, as I had every reason to believe it was, would thus find itself between two fires in a *coup-gorge*, and would become an additional trophy to the conqueror. Nearly a hundred cannon were now thundering against the enemy's center to the right and left of La-Haie-Sainte; it was here that the principal effort was to be made; and if Ney, seconded by Lobau and the Guard, should succeed in penetrating here as he did at Friedland, I would command the road through the forest of Soignies, which constituted the enemy's only chance of retreat.

NEY'S FIRST ATTACK ON THE CENTER.—Near one o'clock, Ney threw himself at the head of the corps of Erlon, which deployed in columns by division in order to cross more rapidly the space between it and the enemy. This movement, executed with close and deep masses under a murderous fire, and in a horrible mud, caused a slight undulation in his columns; a part of his artillery remained behind, and continued a distant fire upon the enemy's batteries, while the infantry was passing the ravine. The extreme right division of this corps moved in the direction of Smouhen in concert with the light cavalry of Jaquinot. A brigade of the left attacked the farm-house of La-Haie-Sainte, where it met a strong resistance, and experienced considerable losses. The remainder of this corps, having all the difficulties of the deep mud and the formidable fire of the enemy's artillery,

reached the part of the first line formed of the Belgian brigade of Bylant (division of Perponcher) and pierced it by a vigorous charge. But they were now suddenly assailed by the English division of Picton, placed in the second line, and lying hid behind a rise of ground favorable for their concealment. The combat now becomes furious; the English infantry are deployed and envelop with their concentric fire the compact corps of Ney. Picton falls dead; but his troops hold firm, and the French column, arrested by this murderous fire, begins to waver. At this instant Lord Uxbridge advances the English cavalry of General Ponsonby to charge it in flank: emboldened by success, they charge in the interval between the second and third columns, and precipitate themselves on Ney's reserve of artillery, a part of which remains in rear, on account of the mud; they saber the soldiers of the train and the cannoneers, and carry away the horses, thus depriving the infantry of a part of its cannon. Seeing the operations of these horsemen, I throw out against them the cuirassiers of Milhaud and a brigade of lancers; in a few minutes they are completely destroyed, and Ponsonby is slain; but the French infantry has been broken, and a part of its cannon have been rendered immovable.

**THE LEFT ATTACKS HOUGOMONT.**—While these things were taking place against the left and left center of the Allies, Jerome, seconded by Foy, had, with difficulty, dislodged the enemy from the park of Hougomont; but all efforts were vain against the embattled walls and château, where Wellington himself conducted the reinforcements to the English Guards, who defended this important post with the most admirable valor. Wellington was waiting for the promised aid of Blücher, and he sought every means to prolong the contest. For him there was no hope of retreat; he must conquer or die. Seeing my efforts directed towards the center, he hastened to close his line, calling from Braine-la-Leud and Merbe-Braine twenty battalions of Belgians and Brunswickers, and placing them successively in reserve behind the right and center. He himself then repaired to the defense of Hougomont. General Foy, on his side, wishing to second the attacks made on the château by the division of Jerome (conducted by Guilleminot), sought to pass this post, and fell upon the line of Lord Hill and the Brunswickers, who were formed in rear of a cross-road which ran along in front of the enemy's line from the Nivelles road to near Papelotte. But being wounded in the shoulder by a ball, and seeing his troops cut down by a murderous fire without hope of dislodging the enemy, Foy renounced his project, and the combat on this point degen-

erated into a cannonade and skirmishes without advantages to either side.

**NEY'S SECOND ATTACK.**—In this interval Ney applied all his energy and force of character to repair the check which he had received in his first attacks; his right, in possession of Smouhen, debouched on Papelotte, and the marshal himself directed a new attack on La-Haie-Sainte. The division of Donzelot, sustained on the left of the road by a brigade of Valmy's cuirassiers, and on the right by a brigade of Quinot's infantry, at last succeeded in routing the Scotch and Hanoverian battalions; and at four o'clock his troops, after the most glorious efforts, remained masters of these two points. During this contest I passed along the lines of Ney and Milhaud amid a shower of bullets; General Devaux, commandant of the artillery of the Guard and reserve, was killed at my side—an irreparable loss at the moment when I was directing him to renew the decisive maneuvers of Wagram.

**BULOW DEBOUCHES ON PLANCHENOIS.**—At four o'clock the possession of La-Haie-Sainte and Papelotte gave us a decided superiority, and all the chances were in our favor, but at this moment I learned that Bülow had debouched from the wood of Frichefont, and attacked Count Lobau. I now feared that Grouchy had not followed this Prussian corps, and that I should be obliged, unassisted, to fight both armies. But Bülow was unsustained, and from my central position and the advantages already gained, I still felt confident of success, and resolved to fight them successively. Bülow had now advanced so far that his bullets reached the Charleroi road in rear of my center; it was therefore necessary to force him to retreat. Accordingly, at five o'clock, I directed against him the Young Guard under the brave Duhesme, sustained by General Morand with a part of the Old Guard, intending afterwards to fall upon Wellington with the united reserves; in the meantime Ney was merely to sustain himself in possession of La-Haie-Sainte and Papelotte.

**GRAND CHARGE OF THE FRENCH CAVALRY.**—At this time, the marshal, finding himself too much isolated by the attacks of the corps of Reille about the château of Hougomont, urgently asked for reinforcements. Having then no infantry at my disposal, I assigned to him the cuirassiers of Milhaud. Wellington, on his side, encouraged by the attack of Bülow, and reinforced by the troops of his extreme right, conceived the hope of regaining possession of the park of Hougomont and the farmhouse of La-Haie-Sainte. For this purpose the Hanoverians were directed, at five o'clock, on the latter post, and at the same time the English under Lord Hill on the former. At this moment,



Ney, whose troops were suffering terribly from the enemy's fire, seeing the light cavalry of his right forced by the English horse, sought to get possession at all hazards of the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean, and threw his brave cuirassiers on the center of the Allies. Unfortunately, his infantry was not in condition to give it more than a feeble assistance. Nevertheless, these squadrons, encountering the Hanoverians in march on La-Haie-Sainte, fall upon them, saber a regiment, capture the enemy's artillery, force the German legion which had formed in square, and even charge upon others; the enemy forms his troops in squares by regiments, rescues his cannoneers and artillery horses, and, by a well-sustained fire, repels the efforts of this heroic cavalry,\* which, charged in its turn by the English cavalry of Lord Somerset, rallied and resumed the attack even under the fire of the enemy's line.

This was a glorious operation, most heroically executed; but it was ill-timed; it should have been executed sooner, in concert with the first attack of Erlon, or have been deferred until the return of the Young Guard, so as to form a combined effort of the three arms united. But the plateau was crowned; and it was now necessary to sustain Ney where he was, or to allow his troops to be cut off. I therefore ordered Kellerman, after six o'clock, to advance with his cuirassiers to the left of the road to La-Haie-Sainte, and to overthrow everything before him. Unfortunately, and contrary to my intention, the heavy cavalry of the Guard followed this movement. Milhaud, seeing these reinforcements, renews his attacks. These ten thousand horse cause great havoc in the enemy's line, capture sixty pieces of artillery, force two squares, and their progress is checked only by the infantry of the second line; the combined English, Belgian, Hanoverian, and Brunswick cavalry, under Lord Uxbridge, now charge upon the French; but these rally again at a little distance, and drive back the Allies' horse upon their infantry. The repeated efforts of this cavalry are glorious beyond description, and the impassible perseverance of their adversaries is also deserving of the highest praise. But disorder now begins in the combined army, and the alarm even reaches Brussels, where we are every moment expected to appear. Bülow, attacked by Lobau, Duhesme, and a detachment of the Old Guard under Morand, is driven back on the road to Pajeau; finally, Grouchy's cannon are now heard on the Dyle, and, in spite of all the *contretemps*, victory seems certain. To give it the finishing stroke, I order, at half

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\*Wellington himself assured the author, at the Congress of Vienna, that he never saw anything more admirable than the ten or twelve reiterated charges of the French cuirassiers against troops of all arms.

past seven, all the Guard to unite, and carry the position of Mont-Saint-Jean. This effort must certainly incline the balance most decidedly in our favor.

BLUCHER DEBOUCHES ON SMOUHEN, AND PIRCH AND BÜLOW ON PLANCHENOIS.—But this illusion was of short duration; the French cavalry had hardly rallied its victorious squadrons when new columns of the enemy were discovered from the plateau, coming from Ohain: it was Blücher himself, who had arrived with the corps of Ziethen in the direction of Papelotte. At the same time, the corps of Pirch, having debouched from Lasne, was already in action to second Bülow at Planchenois. I could not know the strength of these forces, but I feared that their arrival would snatch from me the victory. Nevertheless, I thought it possible to restore the equilibrium, and perhaps to force back the English, by refusing my right, which was now threatened by greatly superior numbers, and direct my principal efforts by my left on Hougomont and Mont-Saint-Jean; this was a bold, and by some considered a rash measure, inasmuch as it changed my line of retreat from Charleroi to the causeway of Nivelles, and endangered my communication with Grouchy; but its character cannot be properly judged of, as circumstances at the time prevented its execution. Disorder began to reach the cavalry, and the division of Durutte was threatened by triple forces on the plateau between Smouhen and the *chaussée*; it was important to sustain Erlon without even waiting the return of the Guard commanded by Morand and some other detachments. I put myself at the head of the division of Friant, which were the only troops disposable, and conducted it to La-Haie-Sainte, at the same time that I ordered Reille to make a new effort in the direction of Hougomont. This attack, led on by myself, restored courage to the French cavalry and to the remains of the corps of Erlon; if the whole division of Morand had been present, there would still have been some chances of success; but, forced to keep some battalions in hand towards Belle-Alliance, I could unite only four on the summit of the plateau in advance of La-Haie-Sainte. Ney, sword in hand, led them against the enemy.

WELLINGTON'S DISPOSITIONS.—In the meantime Wellington, certain of the near approach of Blücher on his left, thought to regain the park of Hougomont and La-Haie-Sainte; he threw the division of Brunswick and a Belgian brigade on the latter of these points at the moment that the few heroes of the guard charged bayonet upon the line of Anglo-Hanoverians. The Prince of Orange, seeing the importance of this movement, attacked them lively at the head of a regiment of Nassau, while the

division of Brunswick attacked them on the other side; but the prince fell from a shot, while showing his men the road to victory. The brave soldiers of the Old Guard at first sustained the shock, but being unsupported in the midst of enemies who had just been reinforced by the Belgian brigade *de-chasse*, and exposed on all sides to a murderous fire, they fell back to the foot of the plateau which already had cost so much blood. In the meantime I succeeded in uniting six other battalions of the Old Guard which had been detached to different points, and I was making dispositions to second the efforts on Mont-Saint-Jean, when the disorder which began to show itself on the right of the corps of Erlon compelled me to form these battalions in squares to the right of La-Haie-Sainte.

**DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH RIGHT.**—While these things were passing on the front of the French army, between the hours of eight and nine, the Young Guard and Lobau were fighting with rare bravery against the continually increasing forces of the Prussians. Seconded by the arrival of the corps of Pirch, Bülow succeeded in driving back these brave men, who had been weakened by the withdrawal of the Old Guard, and were now overpowered by the double opposition of Blücher and Ziethen on their left flank. On the arrival of the latter, the cavalry of Wellington's left wing (brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur), which had suffered least during the combat, flew to the center to second his efforts there. Ziethen, who had debouched at eight o'clock at the summit of the angle formed by the French line toward Frichefont, easily crushed Durutte, at the same time that he turned the left of the crotchet formed by Lobau and the Young Guard. Pirch turned Planchenois and Bülow attacked it in front. All this part of the imperial army, broken and pierced by forces quadruple their own numbers, took refuge in flight. Duhesme and Barrois were severely wounded; Lobau was taken prisoner in the act of rallying his soldiers; Pelét forced his way with a handful of brave men which he drew about him. The heroic defense of these twelve or fifteen thousand French, against sixty thousand Prussians, who were favored by the nature of the ground, has drawn a tribute of admiration even from their enemies.\*

**LAST EFFORTS AND ROUT OF THE FRENCH.**—Wellington, seeing that the attack of Blücher is giving the decisive blow, collects his best troops, regains the park of Hougomont, and, at about nine o'clock, falls upon the Old Guard with an overwhelming superiority. The combat is most furious; General

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\*Vide report of General Gneisenau.



Friant and Michel are severely wounded; the remnant of the cuirassiers and the cavalry of the Guard do wonders; but all is in vain. Assailed by sixty thousand Prussians assembled on the left of Wellington, the entire French right is driven back in disorder on La-Belle-Alliance: the Guard is obliged to fight both to the front and rear; the cavalry of Wellington profits by this disorder and charges between the corps of Reille and the Guard, which is formed in squares, at the same time that Blücher takes the line in reverse. These masses render it impossible to rally the troops of Count d'Erlon and Reille. The Prussian artillery have so far advanced as to reach with their fire the *chaussée* to Charleroi far in rear of the line; this contributes not a little to the disorder, and the (darkness of the night finishes our overthrow.) Infantry, cavalry, and artillery take, pell-mell, the road to Genappe, some even seeking to gain the road to Nivelles, that to Charleroi now being occupied. I remain with a few brave men under Cambronne, on a piece of rising ground, endeavoring to stem the torrent of the enemy, and at last am obliged to effect my retreat across the fields, accompanied only by my staff, not having left even a battalion with which to check the enemy.

OPERATIONS OF GROUCHY.—Having related the fatal results of the appearance of the Prussians upon the field of Waterloo, it may be well to notice the circumstances under which this junction, so fortunate for the Allies, was effected.

Grouchy, as has already been said, left Gembloux on the seventeenth at noon. It must also be remembered that the corps of Thielmann had retired from Sombref in the same direction for the purpose, undoubtedly, of forming a junction with Bülow, who had just arrived there after a forced march of twelve leagues, while Blücher's right, composed of the corps of Ziethen and Pirch, had retired by Mont-Saint-Guibert on Bierge and Aisemont. Grouchy, on his arrival at Gembloux, learned in the evening that Bülow and Thielmann had united there in the morning and had afterward marched in the direction of Wavre, forming together a mass of fifty-two thousand men. The corps of Gérard, on account of the violent storm which had drenched the troops and rendered the roads almost impassable, did not reach Gembloux till eleven o'clock in the evening, and Grouchy resolved to set out for Wavre at six o'clock the next morning, with the corps of Vandamme, leaving Gérard till eight o'clock to rest his troops.

Here was Grouchy's great fault. As soon as Blücher had renounced his natural base on the Meuse, it was evident that his object was to form a junction with Wellington, assume the offensive, and revenge himself for the defeat he had just sus-

tained. Even admitting that my order to Grouchy was to follow on the heels of the Prussians, and that I had directed the pursuit on Namur (as has by some been alleged), the order had evidently become impossible of execution, and the marshal was now master of his own course of action. But the order afterwards transmitted by General Bertrand, to march on Gembloux, sufficiently indicated the object which I wished him to accomplish. It was, most certainly, his duty to pursue the Prussians; but to do this, it was not necessary to follow in the trail of the retreating columns. To harass the enemy's rear guards with light troops, while the main force is directed on the flank of the retreating columns—or a lateral pursuit, as it is called—was the method followed by the Russians in 1812 at Wiasma, Krasnoi, and on the Beresina. The same method has been adopted with similar success in other instances; but never have there been more favorable circumstances for such an operation than in the case of Grouchy. His principal object evidently was to keep the Prussians away from the left wing of our army; to harass them in their retreat was only a secondary object. By marching his infantry parallel to the Prussian columns, and at the same time harassing their rear with his light cavalry, he would have attained the double object of preventing any junction with the English, and have avoided the danger of fighting in defiles. He had the choice of three principal routes: that of the right by Sart-a-Walhain, which Blücher had followed; that of the left by Mont-Saint-Guibert, and along the Dyle to Wavre; or, by passing this river at Moustier, and reaching Wavre by the left, thus avoiding the defiles of the right bank. All these three routes were nearly of the same length, but the left brought Grouchy three leagues nearer the other wing of the French army, while the route on the right carried him three leagues in the other direction. The first, therefore, had the advantage of nearly an entire march, and in addition placed Grouchy between the two allied armies. There was no reason, then, why Grouchy should hesitate to march, on the eighteenth, at the break of day, in all haste, on Moustier with Excelmans, Vandamme, and Gérard, directing the cavalry of Pajol and the division of Teste on Wavre, in the pursuit of the enemy's rear guard. He could reach Moustier by ten o'clock, and could then direct his infantry on Wavre by Limale, and the dragoons of Excelmans on Saint-Lambert, or march upon Lasne itself, when he heard the heavy cannonade of Waterloo. Instead of taking this wise resolution, Grouchy directed his forces on Sart-a-Walhain. The marshal was, apparently, induced to pursue this course through an obstinate desire to follow literally in the trail

of the Prussians, and through ignorance that half of the Prussian army had passed by Gentines and Mont-Saint-Guibert. To this fault is to be added that of a tardy departure in the morning, so that Vandamme did not pass Sart-a-Walhain, nor the head of Gérard's columns reach that village, till near noon. Grouchy had just been joined by this last general when the sound of a heavy and distant cannonade gave the signal of a serious battle: Gérard recommended to Grouchy to march immediately in the direction of the battle, persuaded that in marching to the cannon, as Ney had done at Eylau, he might decide the victory. "If Blücher," said he, "has effected a junction with Wellington, we will find him on the field of battle, and your order will be executed to the letter. If he should not be there, our arrival will decide the battle. In two hours we can take part in the engagement; and if we destroy the English, what will Blücher, already beaten, be able to do?"

This certainly was wise counsel, and, had it been followed, might have produced a decided influence on the event of the battle; but it must be confessed that it could not promise the same advantages as if this movement had been made at break of day from Gembloux. Considering the frightful state of the roads, the bad condition of the bridges, and the marshy defile of the Dyle, and, above all, the presence of Thielmann's corps extending from the heights of Bierge on Limale to oppose this passage, it may, perhaps, at that hour of the day, have become impossible for Grouchy to reach Lasne or Saint-Lambert before seven or eight o'clock in the evening. But even in that case, had he arrived too late to save the battle, he certainly could have made the defeat less disastrous. It is now impossible to say what course Blücher and his counselors would have pursued if Grouchy had appeared in the direction of Moustier; but it is certain that this operation would have greatly embarrassed the Prussian general, and no one can decide what would have been the ultimate results of that embarrassment. But whatever may have been the result of the battle, no one can say that Grouchy would have run any risk in following the advice of Gérard; it was one of those operations that might have had a very beneficial influence, and could hardly have produced any evil results.

**MANEUVERS OF THE ALLIES.**—While the army of Grouchy was committing these fatal errors, their adversaries executed a maneuver both skillful and bold. The Prussian marshal, who bivouacked on the evening of the seventeenth about Wavre, sent his chief of staff, Gneisenau, to Wellington, to combine their ulterior operations. It was agreed that if the French



should attack the English in front of the forest of Soignies, Blücher, favored by the Dyle and the direction of its course, would fall upon the French right; and if, on the contrary, the attack should be directed upon the Prussians at Wavre, Wellington would march to their assistance, falling upon the French left. Blücher, seeing the false direction of Grouchy's march, and learning from his scouts that the main attack was directed against the English, determined to fly to their assistance. This he could now do without fear, Grouchy's error having left his operations in this direction unchecked. He therefore dispatched the corps of Bülow and Pirch, at four o'clock on the morning of the eighteenth, for Saint-Lambert, and marched himself with that of Ziethen on Ohain, in order to form a junction with the left of the English. Thielman was left with twenty-five thousand men at Wavre to defend the Dyle, with orders to follow the other corps if Grouchy should not appear. This plan was well conceived, and great praise is due to the allied generals who so skillfully took advantage of the error of my lieutenant.

In accordance with these wise dispositions, Bülow was traversing Wavre between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, when a violent fire broke out in the principal street, which was the only passage through the town. The advanced guard, having already passed this burning defile, continued its route; but the artillery could not immediately follow, the column being detained for a time to extinguish the fire. Towards twelve o'clock the advanced guard, formed at Saint-Lambert, awaited the arrival of the corps which debouched between three and four o'clock from the environs of Pajeau; the corps of Pirch had passed Lasne between five and six o'clock; Blücher with the corps of Ziethen, being delayed by counter-marches, did not reach Ohain before seven o'clock in the evening. The part taken in the battle by these sixty-five thousand Prussians has already been noticed; at the same time the corps of Thielmann, stationed on the heights of Bierge, which command the valley of the Dyle, was watching for the approach of Grouchy. This marshal arrived at Wavre at four o'clock, and disposed his forces to attack the enemy's troops left there to dispute the passage of the Dyle. At five o'clock p. m. he received the order which had been sent to him at Gembloux in the morning; he now directed Pajol with eight thousand men on Limale, and with the remainder of his forces attacked the detachment of Thielman. In this combat, which continued from Wavre to the Bierge mill, Gérard was wounded. The battle was very creditable to our arms, but what was passing at Mont-Saint-Jean rendered the success more injurious than useful.

THE FRENCH ARMY RETREATS ON AVESNES.—The wreck of my army reached Genappe in great disorder; in vain did the staff-officers attempt to rally and form some of the corps; all was pell-mell. It would be unjust for this to censure my brave troops; never had they fought with greater valor; but, crossed by adverse circumstances and overwhelmed by a vast superiority of numbers, they yielded only when their strength and munitions were entirely exhausted. Owing to the darkness of the night and the rapid pursuit of Blücher's able chief of staff, Gneisenau, it became impossible to make a successful stand for covering the retreat; and the troops, being checked and confused in the barricaded avenues of the defile of Genappe, were subjected to heavy losses. In this way the disastrous retreat was continued till the fugitives were rallied under the cannon of Avesnes. From Quatre-Bras I dispatched several officers with orders for Grouchy to retreat upon Namur; I then went to Charleroi, directed the scattered troops, defiling through this place, upon Avesnes, and afterward repaired to Philippeville, in order to be in more direct communication with Grouchy, Rapp, and the forces on the Rhine. Grouchy with his remaining thirty-five thousand men fell back upon Namur in order to take the road of Givet and Meziers; Prince Jerome had rallied twenty-five thousand men with two hundred pieces of cannon behind Avesnes; he received orders to march them on Laon. It was also determined to direct upon the same point the forces of Grouchy, and all that could be drawn from the interior, from Metz, and from the corps of Rapp, leaving in Lorraine and Alsace merely enough to garrison the fortifications.

We had, indeed, sustained severe losses, including the prisoners taken in the retreat, but still these losses were less than those sustained by the enemy. The imperial cause was shaken, but not yet lost. There was still every reason to hope, if all Frenchmen would unite in hurling back the invading armies of Europe with the same courage as the Spartans of Leonidas, the same energy as the Russians in 1812, or the Spaniards of Palafox. But, as unfortunately for them as for me, internal dissensions distracted their minds and blunted their patriotism.

NAPOLEON'S RETURN TO PARIS.—While my forces were collecting at Laon, there was time enough for me to repair to Paris and there organize the means of national defense. The council of war, called at this time, were divided in opinion on the policy of this step. The majority of the members, however, advised it, and accordingly I set out on the night of the twenty-first, with the intention of being back by the twenty-fifth. In

six days I could organize things in the capital for the great national crisis, complete the defenses of Paris, and collect the reserves that could be obtained from the *dépôts* and the provinces. This return, so natural, to Paris, was misinterpreted by my enemies; they pretended to regard my departure from the army as an act of cowardice. I had shown at *Arcole*, at *Eylau*, at *Ratisbon*, at *Arcis*, and at *Waterloo* even, that a cannon-ball had no terrors for me; and if I had despaired of the resources of France, I could have died at the head of the wreck of my army. If I had now left this army, it was only after it had retreated beyond the reach of the enemy, into positions from which the lowest general of the rear guard could conduct them to *Laon* as safely as I could; but who could supply my place at the helm of state, which at this moment, unfortunately, was not at my headquarters, but at the *Tuileries*?

**MILITARY RESOURCES STILL LEFT TO FRANCE.**—In eight or ten days I hoped to return to *Laon* at the head of one hundred thousand men and four hundred pieces of cannon, to punish the Anglo-Prussians for invading the soil of France. This force, of course, would not enable me to disperse the armies which the allied sovereigns were leading toward the defiles of the *Vosges*, but it would give me time; and, with the three hundred thousand men to be assembled on the *Loire* in July, France might still conquer her independence and save her glory, for other nations have rescued themselves from still greater dangers. After the battle of *Waterloo*, her condition was critical, but it was not desperate. All arrangements had been made on a supposition of a defeat in *Belgium*. The forces assembled between *Laon* and *Paris*, the troops of the *dépôts*, and the twenty-five thousand select men under *Rapp* might all be concentrated around *Paris* early in July; by that time the artillery would be repaired and greatly increased. Independent of this, the capital had for its defense thirty-six thousand *National Guards*, thirty thousand riflemen, six thousand gunners, six hundred cannon in battery; it was formidably intrenched on the right bank of the *Seine*, and in a few days the engineers would render defensible the works on the left bank. The *English* and *Prussian* armies, weakened by their great losses, would cross the *Somme* with very reduced forces, and would be compelled to wait there for the coöperation of the *Austrian* and *Russian* armies, which could not reach the *Marne* before the middle of July. *Paris* had, therefore, twenty days to prepare for defense. to complete her armaments, her supplies, her provisions, her fortifications, and to collect troops from all parts of France. *Lyons* also was well armed, provisioned,



and intrenched. The defense of all the fortified places was secured. They were commanded by select officers, and garrisoned by faithful troops. Everything might be retrieved; but it required character, energy, and firmness on the part of the officers, the government, the Chambers, and the whole nation; it required them to be animated by sentiments of honor, of glory, and of national independence—to take, as a model, Rome after the battle of Cannæ, and not Carthage after that of Zama. Should France assume this lofty tone, she would be invincible; her population was more military than that of any other nation. The means of carrying on the war were abundant, and fit for every purpose.

Without recurring to the ages of the Scipios, there are sufficient examples in modern history, such as Spain in 1808, and Russia in 1812. Some will say that the circumstances of France were different from Spain and Russia, and that she was too much exhausted in men and resources to hope for a similar result. Such reasons merit no answer; pusillanimous minds never want pretexts for submission, in preference to incurring the obligation of "victory or death." It is not given to all to think like Spartans.

CONSPIRACIES OF NAPOLEON'S ADVERSARIES.—Notwithstanding these unfounded fears of the faint-hearted, the army and the revolutionary party were in favor of resistance, without stopping to count the sacrifices it might require. But the factious leaders of radicalism sought to turn this feeling to their own account, and to separate the cause of France from that of her constituted rulers. Everything was to be sacrificed to the selfish views and Utopian doctrines of these men. They thought to resist armed Europe with decrees! Even Lafayette had the credulity to believe that Europe was fighting only against my ambition, and that the allied sovereigns would lay down their arms before his Gallo-American doctrines; but he found, when too late, that it was precisely against these same doctrines that the sovereigns had declared war.

Great disasters, like volcanoes, are announced by a commotion in the subterranean elements. On the twentieth of June, Paris was agitated by the most alarming reports. Fouché dispatched his secret agents through the capital to promulgate the opinion that my abdication was the only thing that could save the country, and at the same time assembled at his house his friends of the Chambers—Lafayette, Manuel, Dupont de l'Eure, Flaugergues, Dupin, and Henri Lacoste—for the purpose of devising means to secure this abdication. Fearing lest the dissolution of the Chambers might put an end to their own usurped authority, it was agreed in this conclave that Lafayette should propose the

next day to the Chamber to declare itself permanent, and to pronounce him a traitor to the country who should order its dissolution. As a reward for this, the *grand citoyen*, who had accompanied the people from Paris to Versailles in 1779, was anew to be decorated with his favorite title of commandant of the National Guards of the kingdom!

While the infamous Fouché and his friends were thus secretly planning my overthrow, and the usurpation of the reins of government by themselves, I arrived, at four o'clock in the morning, at the palace Elysée-Bourbon, where Caulaincourt was waiting for me with great impatience. Instead of speaking of dissolution, the first words spoken by me were to announce the project of convening the two Chambers in extraordinary session, in order to lay before them the true state of the disasters of Waterloo, and to ask of them the means necessary to save France, after which I would hasten to rejoin the army. The ministers were immediately called together to deliberate on the measures to be taken to save the country. I expressed to them frankly my own views of the resources of the French, of their ability to repel the invaders, and of the necessity, in the present crisis, of establishing a dictatorial power. This power might be established either by the Emperor or by the Chambers. A majority of the ministers thought the latter the most efficacious and legal method of proceeding. But was there any confidence to be placed in this factious Assembly, led on by traitors, demagogues, and men of Utopian and impracticable theories? Caulaincourt feared that the dissolution of the Chambers would lead to the same frightful results as in 1814. Fouché, steeped in dissimulation and treason, based all his schemes of mischief and personal aggrandizement on the influence of his party in these assemblies. Decrès, on the contrary, reposed no confidence in them. Regnault de Saint-Jean d'Angély himself, that obsequious and complaisant orator, dared to suggest that the Chambers would undoubtedly require a new abdication, and even insinuated that if it were not voluntarily given, they would demand it. Lucien, remembering the eighteenth Brumaire, was of opinion that the Emperor should dissolve the Assembly, and himself save France. Carnot, the old republican leader, best understood the nature of the crisis and the means necessary for a desperate national defense. In his opinion, the French soil was, at any price, to be freed from foreign invaders, and the best means of accomplishing this object was to constitute a dictatorial power with all the energy of the Committee of Public Safety in 1793. If Carnot was no great statesman, he at least possessed the energy of a real old Roman, and let it ever be remembered in his praise that in the

darkest hour of French history he shook off the shackles of party prejudice and thought only of his country's honor and glory.

While these grave questions were discussed at the palace of Elysée-Bourbon, and while every exertion was made to preserve harmony with the Chambers, as the only plank of public safety, the partisans of Fouché were hatching their plots of revolution and treason in the Assemblies. Rumors of dissolution were perfidiously circulated among the members, and in a moment of excitement, the deputies, influenced by jealousy or cowardice, voted the decree denouncing as a traitor whoever should dare to pronounce a dissolution! The dissolution of the Chambers was one of the rights secured to the Emperor by the constitution which these very men had adopted, and yet these pretended apostles of law and order assumed a power over the constitution to condemn me in anticipation for the execution of this very law! To reach me, they did not hesitate to trample under foot the constitution and laws of their country, and to sacrifice to their own ambition the glory and honor of France.

This decree, in itself utterly illegal and revolutionary, directed the ministers to appear before the Assembly; Lucien accompanied the ministers and demanded, in the name of the Emperor, the appointment of a committee to take into consideration measures necessary to secure the public safety; a committee was appointed, it is true, but it was composed of my bitterest enemies, men of petty ambition, mediocre talent, and Utopian views—Lanjuinais, Lafayette, Grenier, Flauguergues, and Dupont de l'Eure; this committee, instead of seeking to secure the national independence and save the national honor, talked of foreign treaties and republican principles, and, Nero-like, fiddled the tune of natural and constitutional rights while the enemy was approaching the gates of the capital!!

THE PEOPLE SIDE WITH NAPOLEON.—In the meantime the lower classes of the people, distrusting the factious and traitorous leaders of the Chambers, assembled around the palace of Elysée-Bourbon, rending the air with cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" and demanding arms. Lucien endeavored to persuade me to profit by this enthusiasm, and make another eighteenth Brumaire, much more legal than the first, by ordering a dissolution of the Chambers in the legal forms, and, if necessary, compelling its execution. The idea of saving the country by arming the lower classes of the people against the first magistrates was revolting to my mind. I was no admirer of insurrectionary movements. Moreover, this measure, more like that of the thirty-first of May, 1793, than the eighteenth Brumaire, would tend rather to divide than to unite public feeling. The crisis demanded a



union of all classes, and this alone could save the country. It would not have been difficult for me to crush the opposition and destroy the weak and traitorous men who had conspired to overturn my throne. But in doing this, could I save France? While striving with internal enemies, could I oppose sufficient strength to check the million of armed men who were striking at the independence of my country? Could I consent to overthrow the whole social fabric of France, to satisfy my own military vanity? The foolish and factious leaders of the Chambers were insane enough to imagine that Europe would hasten to lay down its arms before their puny decrees; they thought to give a triumph to their Utopian doctrines by sacrificing the only man capable of guiding the nation gloriously through the gigantic contest; these men, and these alone, are responsible for the humiliations they prepared for their country.\*

HIS SECOND ABDICATION.—Seeing that these men had determined either to rule or ruin France, I had but one course to pursue—to resign; I therefore dictated to my brother Lucien the following abdication in favor of my son:

“Frenchmen! In commencing the war to sustain the national independence, I counted on the union of all efforts, of all wills, and of all the national authorities; I had good reason to hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of foreign powers against me. The circumstances seem changed, and I now offer myself as a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they be sincere in their declarations, and direct their hostilities only against my person. My political life is ended; and I proclaim my son, under the title of Napoleon II., Emperor of the French. The existing ministers will form the council of government. The interest which I feel in my son induces me to invite

\*There is no more painful picture in the history of nations than that of a people, in times of great public danger, governed by mediocre men, by Utopian theorists, and factious, selfish, and profligate politicians. When great men are stricken down by party jealousies and party intrigues, and when good men shrink from office rather than come in contact with the rottenness with which it is too often surrounded, or expose themselves to the partisan abuse, increased and intensified by the license of the press, which is poured upon them if they repel this corruption, there is little hope for the nation. If it finally becomes virtuous and independent, it is only after long abasement and severe suffering.

France in 1814 and 1815 is not the only example in history. The fall of Rome is the most striking of all. This republic and empire was undermined and destroyed by factious intriguing politicians, who debauched the people for their votes, corrupted public virtue in pursuit of office, and drove into the retirement of private life all who were capable or willing to save the country. France, after great suffering, reconquered her independence, but Rome was utterly destroyed by the corruption of her own political rulers.

the Chambers to organize without delay the regency by law. Let all unite for the public safety, and the maintenance of the national independence!"

Determined to exile myself from Europe and go to America, I hoped that the Allies would be satisfied with the hostage I had just placed at their discretion, and that they would leave the crown on the head of the son of Maria Louisa. This stipulation had been made on an understanding with the leaders of the Chambers; and I believed it the best means of fusing the old and new interests, and of preventing civil war. The republican leaders were utterly incapable of governing France; the Bourbons, if again restored by foreign bayonets, would sooner or later be again hurled from their thrones, for this dynasty had become odious to the French people. To avoid a repetition of the scenes enacted between 1789 and 1804, it was necessary to avoid the extremes of ultra democracy on the one hand and old legitimacy on the other. No government that did not fuse together these separate interests could be of long duration.

Whatever may have been the views of the allied sovereigns on this point, all action on the subject was dispensed with by the singular course pursued by the leaders of the Chambers, who still flattered themselves that they could dictate laws to France and force Europe to observe them. Unwilling to acknowledge Napoleon II., or to establish a regency, they hastened to form a provisional government, in the hope of seizing upon the reins of state, treating for their existence with the allied sovereigns, and of receiving the Bourbon government only on such conditions as the Chambers should impose; an absurd dream, for could it be supposed that Louis XVIII. or the allied sovereigns, armed for the support of legitimate thrones, would consent to principles that struck at the root of the old dynasties? But let us return to the military operations of the Allies.

Informed by the traitor Fouché of my abdication, and of the anarchy existing at Paris, the Anglo-Prussians advanced upon the capital with a rapidity and carelessness that might readily have led to their own destruction. In seeking to turn the fortifications erected on the north of Paris, the Prussians passed the Seine alone near Pecq, while Wellington remained on the right bank, unable to sustain them. The French army, then commanded by Davoust, and encamped in the vicinity, might easily have fallen on them with seventy thousand men, and, driving them into the Seine, have utterly annihilated them. I proposed to the provisional government to take the command of the army, and to resign it when I had conquered; but base intrigues prevented me from washing out the stain of Waterloo, and of taking

leave of France by a victory which would have enabled her to treat honorably with the allied sovereigns, instead of surrendering at discretion, as was done by the provisional government, to a British general and a Prussian marshal. Instead of accepting my offer, Fouché, who was in active correspondence with Wellington, resolved to secure my person, and in fact I was placed in a kind of captivity under the guard of General Becker, lest I might of my own accord place myself at the head of the army. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the troops was so great that this miserable government had the greatest difficulty in suspending hostilities, and General Excelmans destroyed an entire brigade near Ville-d'Avray, at the moment that the authorities were exerting themselves to restrain the patriotism and courage of his comrades.

**HE RETIRES FROM FRANCE.**—I immediately afterwards departed for Rochefort. The minister Decrès proposed that I should repair to Havre, where there was an American vessel ready to sail. But the position of this port on the English Channel was objectionable, and, moreover, it was now too late to reach the vessel in time. I purposed sailing from Bordeaux in a vessel belonging to my brother Joseph. I was deterred by my legal advisers from embarking in a commercial port, and Joseph, sailing without me, reached America in safety. It has been positively affirmed that Fouché informed Wellington of my place of embarkation, and organized the means of capturing me. Immediately on leaving Rochefort I was pursued by an English cruiser, and, seeing that it would be difficult to escape, I made directly for the vessel, placing myself under the safeguard of British honor and British laws. I wrote to the Prince Regent the following letter, which I sent to the commander of the cruiser, and the next day embarked on board the *Bellerophon*, being received by Captain Maitland with a general's salute:

"Your Royal Highness,—

"Exposed to the factions which divide my country, and to the hostility of the great powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career. I come, like Themistocles, to seat myself at the hearth of the British people. I put myself under the protection of their laws, and I claim it from Your Royal Highness, as from the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies."

**AND IS EXILED TO ST. HELENA.**—On reaching the shores of England, I found, to my disappointment, that I had made an erroneous estimate of British hospitality; I was received as a criminal, and sentenced to be imprisoned for life upon



a lonely and desolate island. To this barbarous treatment I entered the following formal protest:

"I protest solemnly, in the face of heaven and of men, against the violation of my most sacred rights, by the forcible disposal of my person and of my liberty. I came freely on board the *Bellerophon*. I am not the prisoner, I am the guest of England. Once on board the *Bellerophon*, I was immediately entitled to the hospitality of the British people. If the government, by giving orders to the captain of the *Bellerophon* to receive me and my suite, intended merely to lay a snare for me, it has forfeited its honor and sullied its flag. If this act be consummated, it will be in vain that the English will boast to Europe of their loyalty, of their laws, of their liberty. British faith will have been lost in the hospitality of the *Bellerophon*. I appeal therefore to history. It will say that an enemy, who made war for twenty years on the people of England, came freely, in his misfortune, to seek an asylum under their laws. What more striking proof could he give of his esteem and of his confidence? But how did they answer it in England? They pretended to hold out an hospitable hand to this enemy, and when he had surrendered himself to them in good faith, they sacrificed him!"

HIS DEATH.—Posterity will decide upon the character of this act, and I leave to its judgment the treatment which I received from the English.\*

A prisoner upon another hemisphere, I had no other occupation than to defend my reputation against the many slanders which the malignity of party spirit invented against me, and to prepare for history the memoirs of my life. Death surprised me while thus engaged, and the work was necessarily left incomplete.† Nevertheless I am satisfied; I can now rest in peace;

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\*Lord Holland and the Duke of Sussex both protested against the bill for detaining Napoleon. The following is the protest of the former:

"Because, without reference to the character or previous conduct of the person who is the object of the present bill, I disapprove of the measure which it sanctions and continues.

"To consign to distant exile and imprisonment a foreign and captive chief who, after the abdication of his authority, relying on British generosity, had surrendered himself to us in preference to his other enemies, is unworthy of the magnanimity of a great country; and the treaties by which, after his captivity, we have bound ourselves to detain him in custody, at the will of sovereigns to whom he had never surrendered himself, appear to me repugnant to the principles of equity, and utterly uncalled for by expediency or necessity. (Signed) *Holland*."

†Most readers are familiar with the history of Napoleon's exile in St. Helena, and the petty annoyances which he suffered from the governor—a treatment as disgraceful to Sir Hudson Lowe personally as it was unworthy of the great nation which he represented.

pigmies may rise up against me, but they can never obscure my glory; I have gained in the victories of Montenotte, Castiglione, Rivoli, the Pyramids, Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Abensberg, Ratisbon, Wagram, Dresden, Champ-Aubert, Mont-

The following narrative of Napoleon's death, by Thiers, is brief and interesting:

"The year 1821 came at last, that year that was to terminate the wondrous career of Napoleon. At the commencement of January his health improved, but only for a few days. 'It is a respite,' he said, 'of a week or two, and then the disease will resume its course.' He then dictated a few pages touching Cæsar to Marchand; they were the last he wrote. About the same time, he saw the death of his sister Eliza announced in the papers: It pained him deeply. She was the first person of his family that had died since he had attained the use of his reason. 'She has shown me the way,' he said, 'I must follow.' The symptoms of his disease returned now with greater violence than ever. Napoleon's complexion became livid, his glance was expressive of as much power as ever, but his eyes were sunken, his legs swelled, his extremities became cold, and his stomach rejected every species of food, and these ejections were accompanied by a discharge of blackish matter. February brought no other change than an increased intensity of the symptoms. Not being able to digest any food, the august invalid became weaker every day. He was tormented by intense thirst, and his pulse, once so slow, beat with feverish rapidity. He wished for air, though he could not endure it when admitted. The light pained him, and he now never left the rooms in which were his two camp-beds, being removed occasionally from one to the other. He did not dictate any more, but had Homer read to him, and the account of Hannibal's war in Livy, not having been able to procure Polybius.

"His health became still worse in March, and on the seventeenth, thinking that during a short drive he could breathe more freely, he was put into a carriage, but when brought into the air, he very nearly fainted, and was borne back to the bed in which he was to die. 'I am no longer,' he said, 'that proud Napoleon whom the world has so often seen on horseback. The monarchs who persecute me may set their minds at rest, I shall soon remove every cause of fear.' Napoleon's faithful servants never left him. Montholon and Marchand remained day and night by his bedside, an attention for which he showed himself profoundly grateful. The grand marshal told him that neither he nor his wife would leave, and Napoleon thanked him warmly. The grand marshal asked permission for his wife to visit him. 'I am not fit to be seen,' he said; 'I shall receive Madame Bertrand when I am better. Tell her I thank her for the devotion that has kept her for six years in this desert.'

\* \* \* \* \*

"Napoleon devoted several days to making these arrangements, and committing them to writing. His labor suffered frequent interruptions from pain and weariness. All was arranged at length, and, with his usual love of order, he had a legal document drawn up of the transfer of his will, and all that he possessed, to his testamentary executors, that there might be no cause of dispute after his death. He desired that the rites of the Catholic faith should be observed at his burial, and that the dining-room in which he was accustomed to hear mass should be converted into a *chapelle ardente*. Dr. Antomarchi could not help smiling as he heard these orders given to the Abbé Vignale. Napoleon considered this as a want of respect to his



mirail, Ligny, glory enough to efface the disaster of Waterloo; my Five Codes, worthy of the approbation of the seven sages of Greece, will remain a monument to posterity not less creditable to my genius than are my military feats; the great works of improve-

authority, his genius, and his death. 'Young man,' he said, in a severe tone, 'perhaps you are too clever to believe in God; I am not in that position; a man cannot become an atheist merely by wishing it.' This severe lesson, spoken in terms worthy of a great man at the point of death, overwhelmed the young doctor with confusion; he made a thousand excuses, and made profession of the most satisfactory moral principles.

"These preparations for death weakened Napoleon, and perhaps hastened his end. Still it was both a moral and physical relief to him to have arranged his affairs and secured, as far as he could, the fate of his companions. Meeting death with a smile as dignified as it was grateful, he said to Montholon and Marchand, who never left him: 'It would be a great pity not to die, now that I have arranged all my affairs so well.'

"The end of April had arrived, and every moment increased his danger and suffering. He had no relief from the spasms, vomitings, fever, and burning thirst. Napoleon was relieved by occasionally drinking some drops of fresh water brought from the foot of the peak of Diana, the spot where he had wished to have a dwelling erected. 'I wish,' he said, 'if it is possible, that I should be buried on the banks of the Seine, or at Ajaccio in my family domain, or, should my body be fated to continue a prisoner, at the foot of the fountain whose waters have afforded me some relief.' This his friends promised with tears, for they no longer concealed from him a state he so well understood himself. 'You will return bearing with you the reflection of my glory, with the honor of your own fidelity. You will be esteemed and happy. I go to meet Kléber, Dessaix, Lannes, Masséna, Bessières, Duroc, Ney! They will come to meet me. They will experience once more the intoxication of human glory. We shall speak of what we have done. We shall talk of our profession with Frederick, Turenne, Condé, César, and Hannibal.' Then pausing, Napoleon added with a peculiar smile, 'Unless there should be as great an objection in the upper spheres as there is here below to see a number of soldiers together.' This *badinage*, alternating with the most solemn discourse, produced a profound effect upon those present. On the first of May the agony seemed to commence, and he was in constant torture. On the second and third Napoleon was in high fever, and suffered continual spasms. Whenever his sufferings abated, his mind was as radiant as ever, and he spoke with clearness and serenity. During one of these intervals, he dictated, under the title of first and second revery, two notes on the defense of France in case of an invasion. On the third he became delirious, and amid his ravings these words were distinguishable: 'My son. The army. Dessaix.' It would seem as though he had a last vision of the battle of Marengo recovered by Dessaix. The agony continued during the entire day of the fourth, and the noble countenance of the hero was terribly distorted. The weather was terrible; it was the bad season at St. Helena. Sudden gusts of wind tore up some of the planted trees. On the fifth of May there was no doubt but that the last day of his extraordinary life had dawned. All his servants kneeling round his bed watched the last flickerings of the vital flame. These were, unfortunately, attended with bitter sufferings. The English officers, assembled outside, listened with respectful interest to the accounts the servants gave of his agony. Towards the decline of day, his life and



ment and of art which I have constructed in France and in Italy will attest my greatness to the remotest ages. To the reproach of ambition, I will say with Mahomet:

“Je fus ambitieux;  
Mais jamais roi, pontife, ou chef ou citoyen,  
Ne çut un projet aussi grand que le mien.”\*

### EPILOGUE.

No sooner had Napoleon ended his recital, than his illustrious auditors declared, with unanimous voice, that, although he had failed in the execution of his vast projects, he surpassed them all in his force of genius and greatness of soul.

Each in particular eulogized those traits which most resembled his own: Alexander praised Napoleon for his generosity to his conquered foes; Cæsar admired his having built up

sufferings decreased together; the cold extending from the extremities became general, and death seemed about to seize his glorious victim. The weather had become calm and serene. About twenty minutes past five, when the sun was setting in waves of light, and the English cannon gave the signal for retiring, those around the bed perceived that the patient did not breathe, and cried out that he was dead. They covered his hands with kisses, and Marchand, who had brought to St. Helena the cloak the First Consul had worn at Marengo, laid it over his body, leaving only his noble head uncovered.

“The convulsions of the death agony, always so painful to witness, were succeeded by a majestic tranquillity of expression. That face so wondrously beautiful, now restored to the slenderness of youth, and the figure clad in the mantle of Marengo, seemed to present again to the witnesses of that touching scene, General Bonaparte in the meridian of his glory.”

\*Allison thus describes the removal of Napoleon’s remains from St. Helena to France:

“Time rolled on, and brought its usual changes on its wings. The dynasty of the Restoration proved unequal to the arduous task of coercing the desires of the Revolution, weakened, but not extinguished, by the overthrow of Napoleon: a new generation arose, teeming with passions and forgetful of the sufferings of former times; and the revolt of the barricades restored the tricolor flag, and established a semi-revolutionary dynasty on the French throne.

“England shared in the renewed convulsion consequent on these momentous events; a great organic change in the constitution placed the popular party for a course of years in power; a temporary alliance, founded on political passion, not national interest, for a time united its government with that of France; and under the auspices of M. Thiers’ administration, a request was made to the British to restore the remains of their Great Emperor to the French people.

“This request, received in a worthy spirit by the English administration, was immediately complied with, in the hope, as it was eloquently though fallaciously said at the time, ‘that these two great nations would henceforth bury their discord in the tomb of Napoleon.’

“The solitary grave in St. Helena was disturbed; the lonely willow

an empire out of the scattered fragments of public liberty, and established his power with legions destined to defend that liberty; Frederick applauded his spirit of order and economy, and was particularly pleased at seeing his own system of war receive such new and extensive developments.

From that moment the four heroes became inseparable, and their conversations form an inexhaustible source of political and military instruction, and constitute the principal charm and delight of the illustrious shades who inhabit the fields of Elysium.

no longer wept over the remains of the Emperor; the sepulcher was opened in presence of all the officers of the island and many of his faithful followers; and the winding-sheet, rolled back with pious care, revealed to the entranced spectators the well-known features of the immortal hero, serene, undecayed, in his now canonized military dress, as when he stood on the fields of Austerlitz or Jena. The body was removed from its resting-place with the highest military honors; the British army and navy in the island, with generous sympathy, vied with each other in doing honor to their great antagonist; and when it was lowered amidst the thunder of artillery into the French frigate, England felt that she had voluntarily, but in a right spirit, relinquished the proudest trophy of her national glory.

"The remains of the Emperor were conveyed to Europe in safety on board the *Belle Poule* frigate, and landed, with appropriate honors, at Havre de Grace. From thence they were removed to Paris, with a view to their being interred, with the other illustrious warriors of France, in the Church of the Invalides. The reinterment, which awakened the deepest interest in France and over Europe, took place on the sixth of December, 1849.

"The day was fine, though piercingly cold; but such was the interest excited, that six hundred thousand persons were assembled to witness the ceremony. The procession approached Paris by the road from Saint-Cloud, so often traversed by the Emperor in the days of his glory; it passed through the now finished and stupendous arch erected to the Grand Army at the barrier of Neuilly, and, slowly moving through the Elysian Fields, reached the Invalides by the bridge of La Concorde.

"Louis Philippe and all his court officiated at the august ceremony, which was performed with extraordinary pomp in the splendid church of the edifice; but nothing awakened such deep feeling as a band of the mutilated veterans of the Old Guard, who, with mournful visages, but yet a military air, attended the remains of their beloved chief to his last resting-place.

"An aged charger, once ridden by the Emperor on his fields of fame, survived to follow the colossal hearse to the grave. The place of interment was worthy of the hero who was now placed beneath its roof: it contained the remains of Turenne and Vauban, and the paladins of France; enchanting music thrilled every heart as the coffin was lowered into the tomb; the thunders of the artillery, so often vocal to his triumphs, now gave him the last honors of mortality; the genius of Marochetti was selected to erect a fitting monument to his memory; and the bones of Napoleon finally reposed on the banks of the Seine, amidst the 'people whom he had loved so well.'

"Yet will future ages perhaps regret the ocean-girt isle, the solitary stone, the willow-tree. Napoleon will live when Paris is in ruins; his deeds will survive the dome of the Invalides. No man can show the tomb of Alexander!"

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